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ABSTRACT
This thesis aims to present cautious evaluations of the viability of multilateral subregional
security frameworks in post-Cold War Central Europe. It uses the case of Polish official
and contending views of subregional security frameworks in Central Europe. The time
frame of the discussion extends from the collapse of the Warsaw Treaty Organization in
the spring of 1991 to the winter 1993/1994 North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Partnership for Peace initiative to study Central European approaches to this foreign and
security policy option. The central argument of this thesis is that subregional cooperation
in Central Europe is proving difficult because there are few realistic common goals and
no common historical base acceptable to all potential member countries.
The collapse of the Eastern bloc freed tensions and problems among the region's
countries, but also resulted in renaissance of old and development of new concepts of
subregional cooperation. However, this thesis argues that concepts of post-Cold War
subregional structures fail to provide clearly defined, pragmatic, and realistic sets of
short- and medium-term goals, which could bring these countries together, and if
accomplished, could consolidate this form of cooperation.
A distinction is made between new concepts of cooperation frameworks, aimed
at managing links with the West (Visegrad Group, Central European Initiative), and
concepts reflecting historical proposals, in general aimed at addressing the country's
relations with its Eastern neighbours (NATO-bis, Miedzymorze). It is argued that while
the former are backed by reform forces, the latter are advanced by relatively small
sections of the right, but occasionally also the left of the Polish political spectrum. These
proposals are of a popul istic character, appeal ing to the Polish sense of the country's
mission and role in East Central Europe, and based on historically controversial and
potentially destabilizing ideas. As the feeling of mission is interpreted by Poland's
neighbours as expression of imperialist tendencies, subregional cooperation has little in
terms of common historical experiences that create feelings of solidarity, institutional
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This is a study of security and subregional cooperation. Its focus is multilateral
subregional security cooperation in Central Europe after the collapse of the Eastern bloc
in 1989-1990. In particular, the work analyzes Polish views of such forms of cooperation.
The central argument of this thesis is that subregional cooperation in Central Europe is
proving difficult in the post-Cold War era because there are no uncontroversial common
historical experiences, and few well-defined and realistic common goals.
This thesis focuses on the case of one particular country in the Central European
regron because a discussion of security policies in the entire region runs the risk of
generalizing where few common features are to be found except for the common post-
Communist past of these countries and their post-Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO)
legacy.
Poland! has been selected for this study because it is both geopolitically
significant, and internationally active. Poland is the largest (312,690 square kilometres)
and the most populous (38.6 million inhabitants) of the former non-Soviet Warsaw Treaty
Organization (NSWTO) countries. It occupies a pivotal position on the great plain that
covers the northern part of continental Europe and that reaches from the Atlantic to the
Ural mountains. There are no natural boundaries for nation-states occupying the plain. ~
I Poland was officially known as the Polish People's Republic until 30 December 1989, and thereafter
as the Republic of Poland (RP).
2 Adrian Hyde-Price, 'East Central European Security After the Cold War', paper presented at the
Political Studies Association Conference, Lancaster, 15-17 April 1991, p. 4-5.
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Halford MacKinder described the plains on which Poland finds itself as an 'open
gateway', 1,000 miles wide." Through history, people and states have moved across this
plain in an eastward or westward direction. The Poles themselves developed in the
Middle Ages a Drang nach Osten which has been compared to the early eastward
expansion by the Germans. However, following the collapse of the powerful Polish state
in the 17th and 18th century, the Poles' geographical position exposed them to
expansionist shifts on the part of its powerful neighbours."
Located on the geostrategical East-West axis, and being geographically open to
access from both directions, Poland (and occasionally also its neighbours) has historically
performed the role of a buffer zone between Russia and Germany. Poland is thus part of
an area that has been considered a 'shatter belt', 'marchland' 5 , or 'crush zone' 6. A
Polish publicist used the term ventre mou - the soft underbelly of Europe? - to describe
the position of his country.
In the WTO, Poland was part of the geostrategically significant northern tier of
states" - the so-called Iron Triangle which included also the GDR and Czechoslovakia,
and which performed a dual role for the Soviet Union, 'offensively, as a springboard for
3 Early in the 20th century, MacKinder, a Scottish geographer, advanced geopolitical ideas which are
considered to be among the most eminent contributions to classical geopolitical theory. Halford J.
MacKinder, 'The Geographical Pivot of History', Geographical Journal 23 (1904); idem, Britain and
the British Seas. (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1969); idem, Democratic Ideals and Reality. (New York:
Norton, 1962); idem, 'The Round World and the Winning Peace', Foreign Affairs Vol 21, NO.4 (July
1943).
4 Frederick G. Heymann, Poland & Czechoslovakia. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1966), p. 22.
5 'Shatter belt' is defined by David Turnock as an area with conflicting state or great-power interests.
He also calls the region a 'marchland' between the gates leading to the Baltic and Black Seas, and between
the sea power of the West and the land power of the East. See David Turnock, Eastern Europe: An
Historical Geography 1815-1945. (London: Routledge, 1989), p. 1-13.
6 See James Fairgrieve, Geography and World Power. (London: University of London Press, 1915).
7 Tadeusz Lubienski, 'Pod drzwiami Europy' [At the foot of Europe's door], Rzeczpospolita (2-~
October 1993).
8 See Christoph Royen, 'The Northern Tier', in Richard D. Vine (ed.), Soviet-East European
Relations as a problem for the West. (London: Croom Helm, 1987), pp. 73-74; A. Ross Johnson, Rohal
W. Dean and Alexander Alexiev, East European Military Establishments: The Warsaw Pact Northern
Tier. (New York: Crane Russak, 1982), p. 17; Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, Christopher D. Jones and
Ivan Sylvain, Warsaw Pact: The Question of Cohesion. Phase II - Volume 2. Poland, German
Democratic Republic and Romania. (Ottawa: ORAE Extra-Mural Paper No. 33, November 1984). p. iii.
For recent statistical information, see Anthony Robinson and Christopher Bobinski. 'Cleared for Take off.
Financial Times Survey: Poland (18 March 1994).
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attack; and defensively, as a buffer zone.'." The Soviet policy after 1989 of non-
interference in the region ultimately meant that the Soviet Union was willing to give up
its offensive military position in the heart of Europe. However, even after the collapse
of the WTO, the Soviet Union, and later Russia, continued to perceive Central Europe
as a strategic buffer zone.
Poland is also active internationally. Its prominence on the international scene is
a reflection of its endeavours to overcome the condition which is described in Poland as
belonging to a 'grey' security zone. Some consider the country to inhabit a 'security
vacuum' following the collapse of the Eastern bloc.'? More recently, Poland was one
of the main proponents of the creation and institutionalization of multilateral cooperation
structures, and advocated the formulation of common Central European approaches to a
number of international issues. Simultaneously, Poland was careful to indicate that
existing subregional security cooperation frameworks must not develop into alliances or
replace the option of membership in Western security organizations.
For theoretical purposes, this thesis treats Poland as a small state. According to
Heinz Gartner, small states are states that can be described as militarily relatively
weak." Rothstein defines small powers as feeling 'threatened in some significant and
immediate sense, by the play of Great Power politics' .12 Trygve Mathisen actually
argues that countries such as Poland should be qualified as a ' lower class of middle
powers' 13. However, Poland is located in a cluster of small states, and has security
problems of the nature that are encountered by small states (such as inability to defend
its borders against most potential forms of aggression against it). Thus, Poland largely
9 Richard F. Starr, 'East-Central Europe and Soviet Foreign Policy', in Milorad M. Drachkovitch (ed.),
East Central Europe Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow. (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1982), p. 127.
10 While some observers dispute the existence of a 'security vacuum' in Central Europe, all agree that
Central Europeans themselves view their current de facto non-aligned/neutral status as potentially
dangerous. On the debate surrounding the term 'security vacuum', see Margarditsch Hatschikjan, "Foreign
Policy Reorientation in Eastern Central Europe', Aussenpolitik Vol. 45, No.1 (1994), p. 55. See also Pal
Dunay, 'Adversaries All Around? (Re)Nationalization of Security and Defence Policies in Central and
Eastern Europe', Clingendael Paper (January 1994), p. 37.
II Heinz Gar~r, 'Small States and Concepts of European Security', European Security Vol. 2. No.
2 (Summer 1993), p. 188.
12 Robert L. Rothstein. Alliances and Small Powers. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1968).
p.4.
13 Trygve Mathisen. The Functions of Small States. (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget. 1971). p. 20
conforms to the definition of a small state. 14
It needs to be said here that some political forces in Poland believe the country
to be a regional power with aspirations to a leading role among neighbouring countries.
but these claims are based on historical references rather than a clear analysis of its
capabilities and power. As this thesis suggests, these attitudes create uneasy feelings
among Poland's neighbours.
The period examined here begins with the collapse of the Warsaw Treaty
Organization in the spring of 1991 and concludes with the winter of 1993/1994, when
cooperation with Western security organizations gained a new dimension as a result of
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Partnership for Peace initiative. The two
events marked two turning points which had a significant impact on the course of Pol ish
foreign and defence policy. Information concerning events which have taken place II1
1990 or 1995 is included where necessary or otherwise relevant.
Since the events in Eastern and Central Europe have taken place at a dazzl ing
rate, this thesis does not aim to recount the myriad changes that this part of the world has
seen. Most of its metamorphoses lie well beyond the scope of this thesis. Instead, the
focus here is on the approaches Poland has been debating towards one particular aspect
of its foreign pol icy. Many sections of the thesis do not deal directly with subregional
cooperation, but rather with the political and historical context within which such forms
of cooperation must be placed.
The case of subregional multilateral security cooperation in Central Europe after
the end of the Cold War is better understood in the context of a careful case analysis of
the motivations and approaches of an individual state towards such structures, than
through general theories. The aim of the thesis is thus not to develop a comprehensive
theoretical framework for the understanding of security cooperation structures, but to
contribute cautious evaluations of the relevance of such forms of cooperation in the post-
Cold War era. However, for a discussion of the theoretical issues, see Chapter Two.
The central task of this thesis, then, is to explain why there is currently so little
subregional security cooperation in Central and East Central Europe. This study is
intended to make the following contributions:
1. Firstly, it documents and analyzes the Central European discussions of the security
14 See Michael I. tfa",dtf.\Weak States in the International System. (London: Frank Casso 1990). pp.
24 and 51.
13
advantages of subregional frameworks. This aspect is important both in its own right and
for the light it may shed on past and future subregional cooperation efforts in the Central
European region.
2. Secondly, this project contributes to a theoretical understanding of the purpose and
value of multilateral subregional security cooperation outside of frameworks that involve
the participation of great powers. The argument adds to our understanding of what can
and cannot be expected from subregional security arrangements in Central Europe.
It is necessary to define the central terms and concepts used in this thesis.
~
beginning with the very notion of security. Generally speaking, security can be defined
as the ability of states 'to maintain the independence of their life and their identity'. 15
In the post-Cold War era, however, there are two differing interpretations of this general
definition. The traditional, narrow definition of security, also described by some as
'mainstream', has as its core the analysis of military threat and the use and control of
military force as a tool of defence and diplomacy by state actors. This approach is usually
associated with the 'realist' tradition in international relations theory." In the 1970s and
1980s, the security studies community began to question the traditional notion of security.
New definitions of security take into consideration, in addition to military threats,
political, economic, social and environmental concerns, which are seen as affecting both
states and non-state actors." The new definition is thus both wider - by incorporating
non-state actors, and deeper - by embracing non-territorial considerations. Initially, this
debate about the definition of security took place almost exclusively among a largely
Western academic community. 18 With the end of the Cold War this debate has spread
further into the policy-making community on the one hand, and into Eastern and Central
Europe on the other.
Traditional definitions of security based on calculations of military strength
continue to be of significance for the region's policy-makers. In light of events such as
15 For a discussion of the notion of security see for example Barry Buzan et al, The European Security
Order Recast: Scenarios for the Post-Cold War Era. (London: Pinter, 1990), p. 3-10; K. J. Holsti,
International Politics: A Framework for Analysis (7th ed.). (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1995), pp.
84-87.
16 Andrew Butfoy, 'The Military Dimension of Common Security', The Strategic and Defense Studies
Working Paper 254 (July 1992), p. 2.
17 Buzan, European Security Order, p. 4.
18 See for example Bo Huldt, 'Conclusion', Adelphi Paper 285 (1993); Richard H. Ullman.
'Redefining Security', International Security Vol. 8, No. 1 (Summer 1983).
14
the wars in the former Yugoslavia, these concerns will not disappear from the Central
European security agenda in the near future." Many elements of the ways Poles have
traditionally defined security in the past persist and Pol ish decision-makers continue to
perceive dangers which in their opinion can only be alleviated by membership in military
organizations. A number of authors explain this anxiety at least partly by the fact that
national security policies reflect long-standing cultural factors." Indisputably. in the
Polish political-military culture, military power continues to be associated with the notion
of an independent Polish state and nationhood. 21 In addition, the country's security
policies are still characterized by the lasting effects of the militarization of security within
the Warsaw Treaty Organization (see Chapter Three).
Nevertheless, Poles perceive that the direct military threat has lessened in the
post-Cold War era. The 'comprehensive' definition of security is spreading in Poland."
In fact consideration of national security now encompass aspects of both the traditional
and the 'comprehensive' concepts of security. Consequently, the Polish government
associates two potential sources of security threats, or risks, with the end of the Cold
War - namely the 'extraneous' and the 'home-made'.
The widening and deepening of the definition of security, however, carries its own
problems. It has been noted that with the end of the Cold War security acquired an all-
embracing meaning for the former Communist countries." Consequently, as Nelson
indicates, although it faces few direct military dangers, Central Europe's post-Cold War
19 See Monika Wohlfeld, 'Implications for Relations between Western and Central Europe'. Chaillot
Papers (The Implications of the Yugoslav crisis for Western Europe's Foreign Relations) 17 (October
1994).
20 Alpo Rusi, After the Cold War: Europe's New Political Architecture. (New York: MacMillan.
1991), p. 113; Andrew Michta, East Central Europe After the Warsaw Pact: Security Dilemmas in the
1990s. (New York: Greenwood Press, 1992), p. 10; Hyde-Price, 'East Central European Security', p. 6.
21 See for example Hans-Georg Heinrich and Slawomir Wiatr, Political Culture in Vienna and
Warsaw. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990).
22 See Hieronim Kubiak, 'Poland: national security in a changing environment', in Regina Cowen Karp
(ed.), Central and Eastern Europe: The Challenge of Transition. (Oxford: Oxford University Press for
SIPRI, 1993), p. 70; Longin Pastusiak, 'Polska w bezpiecznej Europie' [Poland in a secure Europe].
Rzeczpospolita (8 October 1993); Joshua Spero, 'The Budapest-Prague-WarsawTriangle: Central European
Security After the Visegrad Summit', European Security Vol. I, No. I (Spring 1992).
23 Dunay, 'Adversaries All Around', p. 15.
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perception of insecurity has intensified and simultaneously widened." In fact, the
Security for Europe Project warns that the presence of both the ' mainstream' and the
,comprehensive' definitions of security in Central Europe causes problems for the pol icy-
making process, as they 'are based on different assumptions, lead in different directions.
and create different policy agendas'. 25
This thesis understands 'security cooperation' as multilateral attempts to work with
other states for the common end of achieving security. It focuses on cooperation at a
subregional level, that is, on links between small and mid-size states in the immediate
geographical proximity. The thesis does not consider cooperation taking place on a sub-
governmental level, such as the so called Euroregions, which include a number of border
areas. This form of cooperation contributes only indirectly to the sense of security of a
country. 26
The kind of security cooperation that is of interest to this work is that which
reflects common concerns and interests in the sphere of security. It is multilateral,
potentially but not necessarily institutionalized, and aimed at providing security benefits
or guarantees. It is not necessarily based on a binding alliance treaty. These forms of
cooperation could in fact be understood as alliances in the loose sense of this term.
There are many definitions of the term 'all iance' .27 All iances have been
conceived of as loose affiliations, connections, or cooperation frameworks, or as more
formal and institutionalized unions, coalitions, blocs, confederations or federations.
Stephen M. Walt defines alliance inclusively as 'a formal or informal relationship of
security cooperation between two or more sovereign states'. 28 Ken Booth, however,
states that there are two factors that characterize alliances: the formality of the
24 Daniel N. Nelson, 'Democracy, Markets and Security in Eastern Europe', Survival Vol. 35 No.2
(Summer 1993), p. 166.
25 Security for Europe Project: Final Report. Center for Foreign Policy Development. Brown
University (December 1993), pp. 36-37.
26 See Andrzej Kepinski, 'Piata kolumna czy fundament' [Fifth column or foundation), Rzeczpospolita
(14 December 1994).
27 For a discussion of the various meanings of the term 'alliance'. see for example Edwin H. Fedder,
'The Concept of Alliance', International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 12, No.1 (March 1968), pp. 68-70:
Michael Don Ward, 'Research Gaps in Alliance Dynamics', Monograph Series in World Affairs Vol.
19, Book 1 (1982), pp. 4-7.
28 Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), p. 1.
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relationship, and the military focus of the association. 29 Following Booth's more
discerning approach, this thesis defines an alliance as a collaboration among three or
more states, aimed at dealing with issues of national and international security. Thus the
term 'alliance' will be used to characterize only formal treaty-based arrangements such
as NATO.
The term 'Central Europe' (and to some degree also 'East Central Europe')
describes an area flanked by German and Russian territories, which lies between the
Baltic, the Adriatic, the Aegean and the Black Seas. Recently, the term has been applied
simply to Poland, Czech and Slovak republics and Hungary (today often referred to as
the Visegrad countries). This thesis follows the latter, more precise, definition of Central
Europe. It uses the notion of East Central Europe to describe these four Central European
countries (Poland, the Czech and Slovak republics, and Hungary) and their immediate
neighbours to the East - the newly independent former Soviet republics, in particular
Ukraine, Belorus, and Lithuania.
The concept of Central Europe has a brief but telling history. The Polish historian
Piotr Wandycz observes that the East-West dichotomy is a recent phenomenon, stemming
from the 19th-century Russian debate between Westernizers and Slavophiles." What
is understood to be Central Europe today was certainly mapped differently in the past.
As Tony Judt states, 'Western imagination mapped its cultures with Germany through the
first half of the century, and with the Soviet Union more recently. '31 After the Second
World War, the entire Soviet bloc has been defined as Eastern Europe by Western
analysts and policy-makers. It was not until the 1980s that the definition of non-Soviet
Warsaw Treaty Organization (NSWTO) countries as Eastern Europe has been questioned
in the West, despite the fact that there were many voices from the region proposing
alternative ways of naming it.32 The preferred term was Central Europe 'because the
29 Ken Booth, 'Alliances', in John Baylis et al (eds.), Contemporary Strategy I (2nd ed.). (New York:
Holmes and Meier, 1987), p. 258.
30 Piotr S. Wandycz, The Price of Freedom: A History of East Central Europe from the Middle
Ages to the Present. (London: Routledge, 1992).
31 Tony Judt, 'The Rediscovery of Central Europe', in Stephen R. Graubard (ed.), Eastern Europe
... Central Europe ... Europe. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), p. 23.
32 See Milan Kundera, 'The Tragedy of Central Europe', New York Review of Books (26 April 1984);
Jeno Szucs, 'Three Historical Regions of Europe', in John Keane (ed.), Civil Society and the State.
(London: Verso, 1988); Oscar Halecki, The Limits and Divisions of European History. (London: Sheed
and Ward, 1950); Bohdan Osadczuk, 'Miedzy Wschodem a Zachodem: Dwie cywilizacje i co dalej'
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"eastern" appellation involved a recognition of the region's forcible separation from
Europe. '33
Following the end of the Cold War, the West has 'rediscovered' the region as
separable from the former Soviet Union. The United States Department of State, for
example, announced that it will be using the term Central Europe rather than Eastern
Europe to describe the former NSWTO countries." The British Foreign and
Commonwealth Office adopted a similar terminology.
Central Europe today is not what Karl Deutsch or Barry Buzan define as a
regional security cornplex.i" Such a complex is comprised of states in which the
possibility of an outbreak of interstate violence has practically disappeared, and which
have interconnecting security perceptions and concerns. Even prior to 1989, Central
European national interests varied, although such differences were more or less kept in
check by membership in the bloc." Since the collapse of the WTO, the differences have
become more pronounced. While there are some similarities, for example their common
WTO and communist heritage (discussed further in Chapter Three), their approaches to
matters of defence and security vary considerably.
In fact, today, many Central European authors consider the notion of Central
Europe as apolitically, historically and culturally distinct unit a myth." They point out
the lack of willingness to pursue common objectives without competition. Others are
wary of attempts to name and classify regions, since this necessarily implies assessing
their 'proximity to Europe'. Some accept the definition but reject the pessimistic Milan
[Between East and West: Two civilizations and what now], Rzeczpospolita (8 December 1993). For a
discussion of the German concept of Mitteleuropa, see Timothy Garton Ash, 'Mitteleuropa?', in Graubard
(ed.), Eastern Europe ... Central Europe ... Europe; Charles Maier, 'Whose Mitteleuropa? Central
Europe Between Memory and Obsolescence', Contemporary Austrian Studies Vol. I (1993); Jacque Le
Rider, Mitteleuropa: auf den Spuren eines Begriffes. (Vienna: Deuticke, 1994).
33 Wandycz, Price of Freedom, p. 3.
34 Tadeusz Zachurski, 'Europa Srodkowa zamiast wschodniej: Slowa maja znaczenie ' [Central Europe
in place of Eastern: Words have significance], Rzeczpospolita (22 September 1994).
35 See Karl Deutsch et al, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area. (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1957); Buzan, European Security Order.
36 On this issue, see Peter Bender, East Europe in Search of Security. (London: Chatto and Windus.
1972).
37 See for example interview with Antoni Mestan, 'Czy istnieje Europa Srodkowa? Nasza bliskosc
skonczyla sie bezpowrotnie' [Does Central Europe exist? Our proximity has ended irrevocably I.
Rzeczpospolita (10-11 July 1993).
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Kundera-tradition of interpreting Central Europe as an innocent victim."
This thesis focuses on 'Polish views'. Polish views are taken to mean both official
policies and contending views which are discussed where relevant and necessary. This
thesis is therefore concerned with studying the patterns of motivations, goals, and
strategies which condition Polish attitudes towards, and ideas of, multilateral subregional
security cooperation in Central Europe after the end of the Cold War. 39 As Kal Holsti
reasons, 'attitudes can be conceived as general evaluative propositions about some
subject, fact or condition'. 40 They affect how policy makers respond to the realities of
the international environment. Attitudes reflect the values by which actions are judged,
and beliefs which include national 'myths' and ideologies.
2. Literature
Chapters Two and Three, and parts of this chapter function also as the literature
review of the thesis. At its most specific, the literature used in this study includes factual
accounts of the post-Cold War changes in foreign and security policies of Central Europe
in general and in Poland in particular. This body of literature is generally devoid of
theoretical content, but provides the necessary background information. A separate
chapter (Chapter Three) describes the historical and political background of the analyzed
case.
The research conducted for this thesis included a survey of literature on Central
European foreign policies after 1989, published in English and Polish. Some German-
language publications are also included. Only a limited number of relevant books and
monographs has been published to date on this particular topic. Official exposes,
speeches, and documents, news articles and occasional journal articles have been used
extensively. Western primary sources, mainly from NATO, the Western European Union
(WEU), and the Conference on Security and £ooperation in Europe (CSCE, renamed in
December 1994 as the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe, or OSCE),
38 Tadeusz Lubienski, 'Pod drzwiami Europy' [At the foot of Europe's door], Rzeczpospolita (2-3
October 1993). For an example of Kundera's writing, see Kundera, 'Tragedy of Central Europe'.
39 Stephen M. Walt suggests that 'when examining the historical record, we should focus not only
on what states did, but even more important, 011 what they preferred to do.' Stephen M. Walt, 'Alliance
Formation and the Balance of World Power', International Security Vol. 9, No.4 (Spring 1985), p.
55. See also Holsti, International Politics, p. 271.
40 Ibid., p. 272.
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as well as analyzes published in the aftermath of the collapse of the Eastern bloc have
been used. Regular updates on events in East and Central Europe such as the Foreign
Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) translations, Radio Free Europe, and BBC S\YB
(Survey of World Broadcasts) publications, have proven to be invaluable sources of
information.
Information and ideas have also been provided by interview partners from within
the Polish government, as well as other observers of the country's foreign and security
policies. Much of the information gathered in this way has not appeared so far in
secondary sources. The section on Polish attitudes towards various proposals for
subregional security cooperation in particular is to a large degree based on Polish
newspaper reports and on interviews, since little has been published on this topic to date
either in Poland or in the West. The thesis' footnotes do not reflect the number of
discussions and interviews conducted, as some have functioned mainly as guides to
available literature, and a way of corroborating facts.
Rzeczpospotita, a newspaper co-owned by the Pol ish government, was scanned
carefully for information about Polish attitudes towards various security issues. Polska
Zbrojna, the newspaper of the armed forces, and Gazeta Wyborcza, which emerged as
a voice of the opposition, were also of great use. Other newspapers contributed
occasional articles.
In addition, theoretical literature has been scrutinised for possible explanations of
Polish attitudes towards subregional security cooperation frameworks. The results are
summarized in the following chapter, which discusses potentially relevant realist
theoretical frameworks, such as literature on alliances and on geopolitics, as well as a
body of literature focusing on the role of political culture and historical images in the
formulation of foreign and security policies.
3. Outline of Study
The thesis is organized as and introduction and eight chapters of analysis followed
by a brief conclusion. After the methodological introduction, Chapter Two provides a
discussion of subregional multilateral security cooperation in theory. It describes a
number of factors which can be seen as either contributing to, or preventing the creation
of subregional security arrangements: the presence of an external purpose, such as
dealing with exogenous security risks, threats or constraints: the existence of an internally
generated predisposition, for example a sense of community based on COITIITIOn notions
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of security among a region's states; and the promise of economic or political benefits.
Chapter Three provides a discussion of the historical and political background of
the particular case. Firstly, it outlines the fortunes of the Polish state over time.
Secondly, it describes the common legacy of the communist bloc in Central Europe.
Chapter Four, entitled 'Prospects for Subregional Security Cooperation: Analysis
of Historical Images in Polish Political Culture' examines the images of history of Poles
as they have recast their willingness to follow certain foreign policy choices. As such,
the chapter has a particular focus - its purpose is not to present a full and balanced survey
of Polish affairs over the last millennium. Instead, this chapter first briefly assesses the
general significance of historical images as part of the political culture of a country.
Secondly, the chapter develops the notion of Polish patriotism, basing it on historically
predominant themes which, this author believes, have a direct or indirect impact on
Polish political culture today (nationalism, in particular as it affects relations with
Poland's neighbours; the significance of Christianity; and an identification with the
West).
The subsequent chapter deals with Polish perceptions of geopolitical realities in
the post-Cold War era. It focuses on Polish relations with the country's immediate
neighbours. It discusses positive developments as well as existing and potential problems
in Poland's relations with countries with which it shares borders. This discussion is not
intended to provide a chronological account of bilateral relations, but rather to assess
selected contemporary events as they relate to the topic of security cooperation. The
chapter is subdivided on a geographical basis, dealing with relations with the country's
Western, Eastern and Southern neighbours separately.
Chapter Six considers Polish perceptions of potential threats in the post-Cold War
era. Like other Central European governments, Poland associates sources of threats or
risks with the end of the Cold War - 'extraneous', and 'home-made'. Domestic security
challenges include economic, political and military reforms and their effects on society.
Extraneous security threats discussed in this chapter include tensions with other Central
European countries, the effects of the disintegration of the former Soviet Union. the
consequences and perceptions of German reunification, and the conflict in the former
Yugoslavia.
The seventh chapter analyzes the Polish governments' responses to perceived
security threats after the disintegration of the WTO. For the first time since the end of
the Second World War, Central European countries have had. hypothetically at least. a
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number of foreign policy options open to them. This chapter focuses on a number of
different policies the newly democratic Central European governments have advocated
in order to enhance their security. It discusses the Polish views of the options of
neutrality, collective security, NATO membership, and finally EC (later EU) and/or
WEU membership.
Chapter Eight focuses on the most important existing subregional cooperation
frameworks that involve Polish participation, the Visegrad Group and the Central
European Initiative. Neither of these two organizations has taken on a meaningful security
dimension, and their economic achievements so far can only be described as marginal.
This chapter first provides a brief description of the potential benefits for Central
European countries of taking part in such subregional frameworks. It then focuses on the
history of both organizations. In the following section, it discusses issues which hinder
the development of both the Visegrad Group and the CEI into viable subregional
cooperation structures. It concentrates on three kinds of constraints: limitations
originating within the region; restrictions stemming from the approaches of Western
organizations; and, finally, pressures generated by Eastern European countries that are
not members of the frameworks in question. Polish attitudes towards subregional
cooperation frameworks are discussed in the final section of this chapter.
The Ninth Chapter scrutinizes Polish attitudes towards a number of proposals for
subregional security cooperation structures put forward in the past few years by various
political forces. It details factors which have hindered the creation of proposed security
cooperation frameworks in Central Europe, and addresses prospects for initiatives of this
kind. This chapter centres around initiatives which, generally speaking, have never been
elaborated in any substantial detail and often have only been outlined in speeches or
newspaper interviews. It is for this reason that Chapter Nine is mainly based on
newspaper reports and interviews. This chapter provides a hitherto unique account and
analysis of the Central European debate surrounding concepts of subregional multilateral
security cooperation. Finally, a brief concluding chapter provides final thoughts on the
contribution made by this study.
4. Findings
All serious changes in the international system raise Issues concerrung the
positions of individual states in it. Confronted with the changes, Poland. Iike other
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Central European countries, was compelled to assess threats to its security; develop
relations with neighbouring countries; transform economically, politically and militarily:
and last but not least, develop foreign pol icy concepts and seek security guarantees.
Initially, it seemed that Poland had a number of foreign and security pol icy
options available. One of them was subregional cooperation. In fact, such frameworks
(Visegrad Group and the Central European Initiative) have been created in the post-Cold
war era, and Poland has been very supportive of such cooperation attempts. However,
security cooperation on subregional level in Central Europe turned out to be laborious
and intricate because there is little in terms of a common historical base acceptable to all
potential member countries.
True, some of Poland's political forces continue to discuss the creation of
subregional multilateral security cooperation based on concepts from the past, but the
memory of such events is not equally dear to all of the countries concerned. The shared
history in fact implied past subordination for some and glorious days of expansion,
domination or influence for others.
In Poland, subregional cooperation concepts often reveal aspects of Polish
admiration for the interwar period and for the Jagellonian period of the Polish-Lithuanian
empire (l4-17th century). They tend to reflect historically controversial ideas of a special
role for Poland in areas which today belong to the newly independent republics of the
former Soviet Union. These proposals must be understood as but one voice in the Polish
debate, which is still unresolved, about how to structure security relations with the
country's neighbours. Subregional concepts based on the historical idea of Central
European security community have never been implemented, but continue to have
supporters in the political spectrum of Poland and in some other East Central European
countries.
In short, all existing and proposed post-Cold War subregional structures lack
clearly defined, pragmatic and realistic sets of short-term and mid-term goals which, if
accomplished, could cement this form of cooperation. Moreover, existing cooperation
structures have exhausted their initial shared interests, which included the common task
of shaking off Soviet domination, and proving to the West that the region was indeed
capable of cooperation.
CHAPTER TWO
SUBREGIONAL MULTILATERAL SECURITY COOPERATION
IN THEORY
1. Introduction
There is no 'theory of subregional security cooperation'. Consequently, there have been
no rigorous theoretical attempts to analyze the prospects of Central European subregional
security cooperation in the post-Cold War era. Nonetheless, there are hypotheses in
international relations theory which provide insight into the broadly defined notions of
alignment or alliance formation. These hypotheses help to explain the theoretical
assumptions behind the claims, put forward by many observers, that subregional
cooperation would be advantageous to the Central European countries. 1
This chapter presents these hypotheses in a manner that seeks to enhance our
understanding of subregional security cooperation. It also provides an extensive review
of scholarly literature concerned with alliance formation.
As the introductory chapter specified, for reasons of precision, this thesis does not
I Joshua Spero in his work on the Visegrad Group argues that subregional security cooperation can
overcome historical animosities. Thus, optimistically, he concludes that regional cooperation will playa
fundamental role. Joshua Spero, 'Deja Vu All Over Again?: Poland's Attempt to Avoid Entrapment
Between Two Belligerents', European Security Vol. 1, No.4 (Winter 1992). Similarly, Janusz Prystrom
detects the presence of 'Central European regionalism' which he calls an entirely new and positive
phenomenon. Janusz Prystrom, 'The Military-Strategic Emancipation of Poland', PRIF Reports No. 25
(January 1992), p. 12. Andrew Michta, too, assumes that subregional security cooperation is a beneficial
trend. Andrew Michta, East Central Europe After the Warsaw Pact: Security Dilemmas in the 1990s.
(New York: Greenwood Press, 1992), p. 88. Other authors who have supported the creation of such
security frameworks include Zbigniew Brzezinski, Jeane Kirkpatrick and Jennone Walker. See Zbigniew
Brzezinski, 'Post-communist nationalism', Foreign Affairs, Vol. 68, No.5 (Winter 198911990); Jeanne
Kirkpatrick, 'Cautions for Clinton On Foreign Policy', International Herald Tribune (7-8 November
1992); Jennone Walker, 'European regional organizations and ethnic conflict', in Regina Cowen Karp (ed.),
Central and Eastern Europe: The Challenge of Transition. (Oxford: Oxford University Press for SIPRI.
1993).
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see multilateral subregional security cooperation as 'alliances', which are defined as
formal treaty-based arrangements. 2 However, theoretical approaches often follow a loose
definition of alliances. It is for this reason that this chapter discusses alliance literature
where it is relevant to the case. Of particular interest to this work are the questions why
and when multilateral security cooperation is pursued by a particular government, and
with what type of countries governments seek these kinds of arrangements.
This chapter's purpose is to shed light on the intellectual background for post-Cold
War subregional security cooperation, and to inform the structure and argument of the
thesis. At its most general, international relations theory suggests that the decision to
enter or form alliances reflects the presence of external considerations, and is based on
internal predispositions and the perception of domestic benefits. Following this theoretical
discussion, the thesis will analyze the influence of two conditions - external
considerations and internal constraints, and then will concentrate on actual foreign and
security policy choices pursued by Poland.
The structure of this chapter is sufficiently inclusive to capture most of the
theoretical hypotheses that have considered the utility of multilateral security cooperation.
The chapter is divided into three sections which represent three general ways of thinking
about alignment and multilateral security cooperation. The first section appraises
theoretical considerations of the distribution of power in the international system. It
includes hypotheses concerning balancing, bandwagoning, responses to external threats,
all iances as tools for management of member countries and as a means of overcoming
geopolitical constraints. The second section considers internal matters of ideology and
internal predisposition. It discusses ideological affinities among states, similar domestic
orders, cultural perceptions of a 'common fate', traditions of cooperation, and national
(ethnic) similarities. The third part focuses on internal politics, particularly the role of
alliances as providers of economic and political benefits. It discusses hypotheses which
see alignment as a function of domestic considerations including the requirements of
legitimacy, stability, and the provision of resources. Finally, the chapter assesses the
contribution of theoretical literature to our understanding of multilateral subregional
security cooperation.
The conclusion reached in this chapter is that is impossible to make a strong a
2 See for example Edwin H. Fedder, 'The Concept of Alliance', International Studies Quarterly, \'01
12, No.1 (March 1968), p. 69.
priori argument for or against the existence of such frameworks for cooperation. It is
therefore difficult or even impossible in theory to understand or to predict the will ingness
or unwillingness of states to form or to enter such cooperation frameworks.
2. Power considerations and external threats
This section considers countries' decisions to enter or form subregional security
cooperation frameworks as a response to external forces, such exogenous security threats
and geopolitical constraints. The dominant theoretical paradigm for considering this form
of security cooperation developed in the Cold War era and sees it in general as another
form of alliance behaviour.
Most versions of alliance theory follow the realist approach that explains
alignment as the result of an externally motivated purpose. It sees security threats or
constraints as direct causes of foreign and security policy behaviour. Indeed, Realists
assume, generally speaking, that states form and break alliances acting on perceptions of
national interests, and of the power of other states. There is a continual shifting of
alliances." Threats result from the structure of the competitive international system."
Geographical factors are part of 'the power equation'. Within this school of thought,
there are varying approaches to all iance behaviour.
Balancing
Alliances have long been associated by realist scholars with the balancing of
power. Balance of power can be defined as 'a combination of the powers of two or more
states to counter the perceived superiority of a third power'. 5 The most elegant
presentations of this theory are Hans Morgenthau's Politics Among Nations", and
Kenneth Waltz's Theory of International Politics'. For these authors alliances function
3 Alvin M. Saperstein, ,Alliance Building versus Independent Action' , Journal of Conflict Resolution
Vol. 36, No.3 (September 1992), p. 521.
4 O. R. Holsti, P. T. Hoffmann, and J. D. Sullivan, Unity and Disintegration in International
Alliances: Comparative Studies. (New York: Wiley, 1973).
5 See Saperstein, 'Alliance Building', p. 518.
6 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (4th ed.). (New York: Knopf, 1967).
7 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics. (Reading: Addison-Wesley. 1979).
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as an indispensable part of the balance of power In a system composed of multiple
states".
The applicability of this theory to the given case is limited. Heinz Gartner argues
that small states, attempting to develop a balance against strong powers, turn to another
strong state rather than to neighbouring small states." Thus, it has been suggested that
balance of power is 'a theory primarily about the behaviour of great powers', and does
not necessarily explain the behaviour of lesser states." In addition, it is not in the
interest of small states to pursue balance of power because, it has been argued. their
survival in such a system is intrinsically uncertain. 11 Rothstein concludes by saying that
'to describe the policy of a Small Power in terms of the balance of power is not very
illuminating. '12
Bandwagoning
Although the traditional alliance literature almost always falls within the scope of
balancing, other hypotheses appear as well. Schweller suggests that while theorists focus
on balancing, practitioners are more likely to think of bandwagoning as typical
behaviour." In this view, states, confronted with power imbalances, align with the
stronger and/or the threatening side.
To the detriment of realist theory, some of the most convincing support for the
concept of bandwagoning comes from authors who go beyond the systemic theoretical
framework and see bandwagoning not as a result of systemic power considerations, but
of domestic concerns. Steven David suggests that fragile Third World elites often
bandwagon in order to balance dangerous domestic threats." Deborah Larson suggests
8 Hans J. Morgenthau, 'Alliances in Theory and Practice', in Arnold Wolfers (ed.), Alliance Policy
in the Cold War. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1959), p. 175.
9 Heinz Gartner, 'Small States and Concepts of European Security', European Security Vol. 2, No.
2 (Summer 1993), p. 190.
IO Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), p. viii.
11 Robert L. Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1968),
p. 35.
12 Ibid., p. 36.
13 Randall L. Schweller, 'Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In',
International Security Vol. 19, No.1 (Summer 1994), p. 72.
14 Steven R. David, 'Explaining Third World Alignment', World Politics Vol. 43. No.2 (January
1991).
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that bandwagoning IS used by weak regimes to undermine domestic rivals, provide
economic benefits, and offer 'an aura of invincibility by association with the great
power's victories' .15 These motivational factors are discussed in section four of this
chapter.
Some authors argue that unlike balancing, bandwagoning does not require the
presence of an external threat. 16 If balancing intends to avoid losses, bandwagoning may
imply that there is an opportunistic chance and desire for gain. Schweller presents the
common-sense argument that 'states may bandwagon with the stronger side because they
believe it represents the "wave of the future'" 17, rather than because they see power
imbalances. Thus, bandwagoning, as well, may imply behaviour that cannot be accounted
for by the realist school of thought. The notion of alliances providing domestic gains is
analyzed in section four of this chapter.
In addition, it is doubtful that bandwagoning can work with a group of small states
In immediate geographical proximity. It appears that bandwagoning as a concept is
centred around the notion of a Great Power. Gartner suggests that small states tend to
ally with strong partners." Some authors go as far as to suggest that subregional
alliances can erode the support or responsibility that Great Powers feel for a region. 19
In short, small states are not likely to bandwagon with other small states.
Response to external threats
A number of authors suggest that alliances are formed to oppose an external
threat. 20 Stephen Walt in his seminal work on alliances explains alliance formation by
15 Deborah Welch Larson, 'Bandwagoning Images in American Foreign Policy: Myth or Reality', in
Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder (eds), Dominoes and Bandwagons: Strategic Beliefs and Great Power
Competition in the Eurasian Rimland. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 103.
16 Schweller, 'Bandwagoning for Profit', p. 74.
17 Ibid., p. 96.
18 Gartner, 'Small States', p. 190.
19 Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers, p. 175. See also Arnold Wolters. The Small Powers and
the Enforcement of Peace. (New Haven: Yale Institute for International Studies, 1943), p. 5.
20 See for example Paul Schroeder, 'Alliances, 1815-1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of
Management', in Klaus Knorr (ed.), Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems. (Kansas:
Lawrence, 1976).
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the notion of the 'balance of threat'. 21 This is a revised version of the balance-of-power
theory. Walt concludes that states typically balance and seldom bandwagon. However.
he does not believe that states align as a result of perceptions of systemic power
distribution. Rather, they do so due to imbalances of threats, which are based on
considerations of aggregate power, geographic distance, offensive capability, and the
perceived intentions of other states.
The balance of threat theory has been questioned by a number of scholars. One
of the most obvious and significant faults of this school of thought is that 'perceived
threats are very hard to either substantiate or to refute'. 22 Of course, the same applies
to the previous two approaches, balancing and bandwagoning, since they too are based
on states' perceptions which, by definition, cannot be disproved. Fedder and Robinson
believe that alliances formed in response to such inferred threats must by nature be very
fragile."
Additionally, most literature disregards the significant difference between military
alliances and political alliances. Rothstein suggests that a military alliance is based on
the perception of a threat which a state cannot respond to with only its own resources.
A political alliance is based on the perceptions of a situation on which an alliance can
capitalize." Thus, the absence of a threat may not mean that states are not entering or
forming security cooperation frameworks. In fact. some authors argue that small states
may choose to cooperate with a combination of lesser states for political reasons, if they
do not perceive a Great Power threat. 25
Finally, as a response to an external threat, subregional security cooperation
frameworks may be futile. Commentators usually see subregional security frameworks
as militarily ineffectual, if not hazardous. Alfred Cobban has noted that combinations
of weak states do not improve their individual standing." Annette Baker Fox concluded
21 Walt, The Origins of Alliances, p. 262.
22 Michael Don Ward, Research Gaps in Alliance Dynamics. (Denver: Graduate School of
International Studies, 1982), p. 15.
23 Edwin H. Fedder and James A. Robinson, Beyond Hegemony: The United States and the Future
of NATO. (Columbus: The Mershon Center for Education in National Security, 1967), p. 8.
24 Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers, p. 52.
25 Ibid., p. 61.
26 Alfred Cobban, National Self-Determination. (London: Oxford University Press, 1945), p. 178.
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that Small Power alliances failed 'for the sum of their power was weakness and the
combinations were too insubstantial '27. Some authors go as far as to say that they may
be militarily 'pernicious '28. Thus, these frameworks are not likely to be the response of
states faced with an external threat.
Tools of management over member countries
Alliances can also function as tools of management over member countries, or to
put this differently, tools for restraining rogue members. Paul Schroeder argues that
alliances are formed, among other reasons, 'to accommodate a threat through a "pact of
restraint'" and can 'provide the great powers with a "tool of management" over weaker
states?", Harvey Starr and Randolph M. Siverson assert that states join alliances in
order to control some of their allies." Significantly, unlike Schroeder, Rothstein
suggests that it is not only alliances that include the participation of a Great Power but
also subregional alliances, which can exercise this role. He states that 'they may very
well be extremely useful instruments if the goal involved maintaining the status quo and
controlling or removing local grievances without Great Power intervention. '31 Thus
subregional security cooperation, it has been suggested, can play the role of a regional
policeman." However, it has been suggested that this function of alliances tends to
become more important when alliances have existed for some time and when the
perception of an external threat is lessened." Thus, it is questionable whether
subregional frameworks are constructed as tools for management over member countries.
27 Annette Baker Fox, The Power of Small States. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1959),
p. 185.
28 Rothstein, Alliances and Small States, p. 170-171.
29 Schroeder, 'Alliances, 1815-1945'.
30 Harvey Starr and Randolph M. Siverson, 'Alliances and Geopolitics', Political Geography
Quarterly Vol. 9, No.3 (July 1990), p. 246.
31 Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers, p. 175.
32 Ibid., p. 174.
33 Robert E. Osgood, Alliances and American Foreign Policy. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press.
1968), p. 18.
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Means for overcoming geopolitical constraints
Little of the existing all iance literature expl icitly takes geopol itical theories Into
account, and little geopolitics literature explicitly deals with the phenomenon of alliances.
However, the environmental possibilists Starr and Siverson see alliances as an important
means of overcoming perceived geopolitical problems". 'Environmental possibilism'.
unlike realist theories, which are based on the assumption of environmental determinism.
hold that the environment offers a configuration of possibilities which allow policy-
makers to make certain policy choices. Thus, these authors see alliances as part of the
international system's structure of possibilities and constraints, and as the means by which
states deal with the geopolitical framework. These theorists assert that the environment
affects policy-makers only as it is perceived by them." Alliances are then used by the
decision-makers to adapt to the perceived geopolitical environment.
Possibilists acknowledge the importance of both the geographic setting and the
'human factor'. However, the result of their failure to address the exact relation between
the environment and the perceptions of environmental factors is that this approach is all-
inclusive and inexact.
More specifically, while small states in difficult geopolitical situations appear
likely to perceive alliances as ways of overcoming geopolitical constraints, they do not
seem likely to choose a subregional alliance to perform this role. A certain amount of
strength is necessary in order to accomplish this task, and it cannot be provided by
security links with other small states in immediate geographical proximity. It appears
more or less irrelevant then that these neighbouring states may be equally interested in
overcoming given geopolitical constraints. The only viable policy in such a situation
appears to be an alignment with Great Powers.
34 For the purpose of this thesis, it is sufficient to define geopolitics as the study of the geographical
setting in relation to power. However, the use of the term 'geopolitics' is heterogeneous and controversial
at best. Over time, the term has evolved to mean different aspects of the study of geography and politics.
The term'geopolitical' was first introduced by the Swedish political scientist Rudolf Kjellen in 1917. The
label was applied by him to the study of development and configuration of states. His usage of the term
reflected contemporary ideas of Social Darwinism and the communications revolution. However, this
original definition of geopolitics did not become popular. Oyvind Osterud, 'TIle Uses and Abuses of
Geopolitics, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 25, No.2 (1988), pp. 191-192; Peter J. Taylor. Political
Geography: World Economy, Nation-State and Locality (2nd ed). (New York: Longmann, 1989). p.
56; Geoffrey Parker, 'Continuity and change in Western geopolitical thought during the twentieth century'.
International Social Science Journal, Vol. XLIII, No. I (February 1991), p. 22; Dieter Weiser.
'''Geopolitics'' - Renaissance of a Controversial Concept', Aussenpolitik (Engl. edition) Vol. 45. No. .f
(1994), p. 403.
35 Starr and Siverson, 'Alliances and Geopolitics', pp. 233-234.
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3. Ideology and internal predisposition
Another body of Iiterature, focusing on issues of pol itical culture and historical
images, suggests that an important factor in the process of security cooperation is the
influence of an internally generated predisposition. A number of scholars have put
forward the idea that social, political, and cultural similarities among states pattern
similar foreign and security positions, including views on the issue of forming or entering
all iances. 36
Domestic predispositions reflect perceptions and therefore also political culture.
Issues of common history and a tradition of cooperation are therefore relevant. The
underlying assumption is that common history and a tradition of links facilitates
alignment.
Ideological affinities
A number of authors make a strong claim for the relevance of ideological factors
to policy choices. Herbert Dinerstein states that ideology became a principal determinant
in international relations after 1945. 37 This theoretical approach was shaped by the Cold
War situation. Today, the function of ideology is less clear, although one could surely
consider the Western free market/pluralist democracy as a successful ideology which
attracts countries to certain al ignment frameworks.
Other authors outright reject the claim that ideology informs foreign and security
policy choices. Fedder argues, however, that ideological considerations may be
pronounced as the main determinant of an alliance. Yet, 'ideology is at best inadequate
in explicating why or how an alliance comes into existence. '38 Ideology itself is not a
cause of alignment. It may consolidate existing alliances, but it does not bring them
about.
36 Ward, Research Gaps ... , p. 1; Bruce M. Russett, 'Components of an International Theory of
Alliance Formation', Journal of Conflict Resolution 12 (1968).
37 Herbert Dinerstein, 'The Transformation of Alliance Systems', The American Political Science
Review 59 (September 1965), p. 594.
38 Fedder, 'The Concept of Alliance', p. 86.
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Cultural perceptions of a 'common fate ': the sense of community
There is clearly a domestic dimension to the process of policy-making. In the case
of a country's attitudes towards security cooperation mechanisms an internally generated
predisposition, or a sense of community among states is important. Ward points out that
where alignment is concerned, cultural perceptions of a 'common fate' constitute one
motivational factor. 39 That sense is based purely on perceptions, and therefore on the
predominant political or strategic culture of the country.
The issue is a difficult one: Robert Jervis suggests that the process of perceiving
is complicated, since individual perceptual predispositions are based on experience. This
learning process implies that views of the future are based on past experiences, and are
therefore often flawed. This means, for example, that the neighbouring countries of a
frequently aggressive state learn to take equivocal indications as evidence of renewed
threat, although other explanations are possible. Thus, data are usually fit into a pre-
existing framework of beliefs. Learning from key events in international history shapes
the images that are used to interpret new information. This learning process, however,
is 'not entirely conscious"." Gaps exist between perceptions and reality. Thus, although
perceptions play an important role, it is not possible to specify how images actually relate
to the changing environment.
Perceptions of the international environment are also conditioned by the
predominant political culture of a country. The term 'political culture' was developed by
political scientists in the 1950s and 60S.41 Political culture has been defined in various
ways, but it implies subjective orientations, and perceptions of history and politics. It is
also seen as a product of the distinctive historical experiences of groups such as
nations."
Another relevant concept is that of 'strategic culture'. Yitzak Klein mentions in
passing that 'the formation of strategic culture has interesting sociological and historical
39 Ward, 'Research Gaps', p. 8.
40 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics. (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1976), pp. 146-147, 219.
41 Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba (eds), The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy
in Five Nations. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963); Lucian Pye and Sidney Verha reds),
Political Culture and Political Development. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965).
42 Archie Brown and Jack Gray (eds), Political Culture and Political Change in Communist States.
(London: MacMillan, 1977).
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aspects '43. It is these historical perceptions in the pol itical or strategic cui ture that appear
to offer one potentially viable framework for explaining policy-makers' attitudes towards
subregional security cooperation, that is, cooperation among what could be called
immediate neighbours, where multiple historical links among states exist. It appears.
however, contrary to popular assumption, that common history may alienate countries
rather than bring about close links. This is a relevant issue particularly in Central Europe.
Yet, most authors question the assumption that the cultural perception of a
common fate shapes security policies. Fedder writes that alliances are based 'only
incidentally (if at all)' on a sense of community among countries. 44 Others put forward
that once an alliance has been formed, it may be consolidated by a sense of community.
However, alliances are rarely formed due to such considerations, because 'when
community feeling is sufficiently strong, it commonly seeks other institutional forms of
expression. '45
Domestic and national (ethnic) similarities among states
Theory suggests that states with similar domestic characteristics and orders may
form alliances. This hypothesis was extremely controversial during the initial western
Cold-War debates concerning the values of containment. 46 Nevertheless. some authors
argue that alliances presuppose affinities."? Walt finds that there is a modest association
between domestic ideology and alignment. However, he discovers this to be the case in
relations between a Great Power and its small allies, rather than in a subregional security
framework." Again, domestic orders, like ideology, do not themselves bring about
alliances.
Liska also suggests that the decision to build alliances may express ethnic
·n Yitzak Klein, 'A Theory of Strategic Culture', Comparative Strategy Vol. 10, No. 1 (January-
March 1991), p. 4.
44 Fedder, 'The Concept of Alliance', p. 78.
45 George Liska, Nations in Alliance. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), p. 12.
46 Walt, The Origins of Alliances, p. 4.
47 Osgood, Alliances and American Foreign Policy, p. 20. See also Walt. The Origins of Alliances.
pp. 181-218.
48 Walt, The Origins of Alliances, p. 181.
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similarities": He says that 'there is least opportunism in such trans-national al ignments
when they involve ethnic groups. '50 This theme is rarely treated in theoretical writings
and case studies are sadly lacking. It appears relevant to cases of subregional security
frameworks among neighbouring states. Yet, theoretical Iiterature fails to specify what
kind of significance ethnic similarities play for countries in their decision to form or enter
alliances. It appears that ethnic similarities may be indirect causes of alignment or
security cooperation for states which pursue nationalist ideologies. It is questionable
whether this factor plays a role in any other circumstances.
4. Internal Politics: Economic or political benefits
Another interesting theoretical approach suggests that alliance behaviour is
informed and guided by the desire for economic or political benefits. Liska. who sees the
external need for security as determining alignment choices, includes the caveat that
'requirements of external security are often hypothetical: requirements of stability of the
country and of status for the regime seem to be immediate and manageable. '51 A recent
contribution by Randall L. Schwcller? suggests that the concept of a balance of interests
provides a tool for explaining alliance behaviour. He cautions that alliance choices are
not only a product of perceptions of danger but also of potential gains. Thus,
governments and leaders pursue alignment in order to improve the economic situation,
thereby strengthening their political standing. Another version of the same argument
submits that policy-makers pursue alliance choices to strengthen their domestic political
standing by achieving a success in international pol icy.
Starr and Siverson argue that governments may pursue certain alignment choices
for domestic reasons - to legitimize the regime or certain actions such as intervention. 53
Authors studying alliance choices of Third World countries emphasize the importance of
domestic factors, suggesting that illegitimate governments often see a Iink between their
49 Liska, Nations in Alliance, pp. 26-41, 61-63.
50 Ibid., p. 22.
51 Ibid., p. 39.
52 Schweller, 'Bandwagoning for Profit'.
53 Starr and Siverson, 'Alliances and Geopolitics', p. 246.
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survival and their foreign policy choices.54
Jack Levy and Michael Barnett stress the resource-providing role of alliances.
They see a link between domestic political economies and Third World alignments and
conclude that Third World leaders form or enter alliances to obtain economic and/or
military resources, and thus to improve their domestic positions. 55
Some authors argue that the provision of economic and military aid is not a
powerful cause of alignment.56 Others imply that alliances can be costly and burdensome
rather than economically advantageous. Many of them are characterized by ruthless
economic competition. Also, some, guided by the concept that alliances are only as
strong as their weakest member, point out that the economic collapse of any single
partner affects the whole alliance.57 In cases of small and economically weak countries,
their economies are not sufficiently specialized and large to provide the expected
economic advantages. 58 This approach is therefore problematic since there is little
political prestige or economic gain in pursuing alignment with small and poor countries.
Gartner, overlooking the existence of a number of small yet wealthy countries, argues
that 'small states need capital, technology, and general expertise. They are attracted by
economic and political strength. '59 Most authors agree that the resource providing
function can be fulfilled by strong states only.60 Thus, this function appears irrelevant
to subregional alliances among small Central European countries without sufficient
resources.
54 See for example Steven R. David, 'Explaining Third World Alignment', World Politics Vol. 43,
No. 2 (January 1991); Jack S. Levy and Michael M. Barnett, 'Domestic Sources of Alliances and
Alignments: The Case of Egypt, 1962-1973', International Organization Vol. 45, No.3 (Summer 1991).
55 Jack S. Levy and Michael M. Barnett, 'Alliance Formation, Domestic Political Economy and Third
World Security', The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations, Vol. 14, No.4 (December 1992),
p.35.
56 Walt, The Origins of Alliances, p. 4.
57 Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers, p. 175.
58 Trygve Mathisen, The Functions of Small States. (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget. 1971). p. 28.
59 Gartner, 'Small States', p. 190.
60 Liska, Nations in Alliance, p. 14.
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5. Assessment of foreign and security policy options
Theoretically, a small state can choose among several types of foreign and security
policy: it can remain neutral and/or non-aligned: it can rely on collective security
frameworks: it can integrate itself into an alliance with a great power: or. finally. it can
form a subregional system with other small states." This section reviews the theoretical
contributions discussed above, and applies them directly to these four foreign and security
policy choices.
Neutrality and non-alignment
Some authors suggest that non-alignment is a realistic policy for weak nations ."
Neutrality and non-alignment do have a number of political advantages. To be precise,
this policy option avoids many of the costs involved in aligning, such as restrictions in
sovereignty and flexibility, and adverse reactions on the part of outsider countries. This
argument, however, is informed by Cold War stability. Particularly following the collapse
of the Cold War order, alignment implies a number of potential advantages which
neutrality lacks. These include military benefits (deterring an enemy), a more effective
fighting force, the right to be consulted by other members on issues of relevance, and
possibly also a restraining effect on other members. 63
Being part of an alliance is a more viable option than de facto non-alignment or
neutrality, many authors suggest. Alvin M. Saperstein, for example, states that the
formation of an alliance prevents the occurrence of disturbances in the relationship among
the competing member states. Not constrained by alliance frameworks disturbances can
build up to 'strong chaos and presumably war. '64 Although it has been noted that
neutrality and non-alignment are appealing for small countries'". most authors agree that
to be able to pursue this type of foreign and security policy, 'the Small Power must be
61 See for example Geza Herczegh, 'The History of the International Relations of Small States:
Questions of Theory and Methodology', in Istvan Dobozi et al (eds), Small Countries and International
Adjustment: A Collection of Hungarian and Swiss Views. (Place of publication unknown: Institut
universitaire de hautes etudes intemationales. 1982), p. 24.
62 Dinerstein, 'The Transformation of Alliance Systems', p. 592.
63 Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers, pp. 48-50.
64 Saperstein, 'Alliance Building', p. 518.
65 Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers, p. 30.
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strategically irrelevant and politically non-provocative' .66 When they are exposed to
Great Power interests, however, neutrality or non-alignment is a dangerous secur itv
policy option."
Collective security
The basic principle of collective security is that an aggression against one state
will be considered an aggression against all states in the international system.
Theoretically, 'the international community would act as one to deter and, if necessary
to stamp out aggression. '68 Collective security is thus based on the notion of a system
designed to reform the international system and to replace alliances and balances of
power."?
Much has been written on the problems of this concept. 70 Suffice it to say here
that, for small states, one of the main faults of collective security and one of relevance
to small states is that it provides no guarantees against the Great Power guarantors."
Thus, collective security does not present a viable option for states such as Poland.
Alliances with great powers
Starr and Siverson argue that one of the determinants of alignment choices IS
proximity. They maintain, however, that states enter or form alliances because they seek
to augment their security. The states that have the greatest potential to offer security
benefits are the major powers", and they may not be in close proximity.
Mathisen goes even further and argues that for many small states the problem of
66 Ibid., p. 32.
67 Ibid., p. 34.
68 Ken Booth, 'Alliances', in John Baylis et al (eds.), Contemporary Strategy I. (New York: Holmes
and Meier, 1987), p. 302.
69 See Mark W. Zacher, International Conflicts and Collective Security, 1946-1977. (New York:
Praeger, 1979), p. 3. Over time, the notion of collective security has lost its clarity is came to he used to
describe military alliances. This thesis uses the term in its original meaning.
70 See for example Otto Pick and Julian Critchley, Collective Security. (London: MacMillan. 1974).
pp. 25-37.
7\ Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers, p. 42.
T2 Starr and Siverson, 'Alliances and Geopolitics', p. 244.
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defence can only be solved in cooperation with great powers." Thus. most authors
suggest that small states tend to join alliances with strong partners." Particularly where
the perceived security problems are caused by strong states, small states choose to align
with great powers, rather than small states in close proximity. The questions that arise
concern the costs of such an option, and the results of a situation in which great powers
are not available to form an alliance.
Subregional cooperation
Mathisen writes about the fourth foreign policy possibility, which he calls
'regionalism'. He assumes that small states should be interested in this form of
organization, and states that this has been the case in the past. He does not explain
whether he bases this statement on a historical review or on case studies. He admits that
subregional security organizations have not always fulfilled expectations placed on them.
particularly in matters of defence." Similarly, Rothstein points out that although in
theory subregional frameworks have been castigated, in reality they continue to be
pursued. He says that while this kind of alliance offers little in terms of military
advantages, it has some limited political relevance, particularly in relations with other
small states."
However, since small states aim to maximize their security benefits and pol itical
influence, their policy choices ought to involve entering or forming multilateral alliances
with the participation of Great Powers. Only if such an option is unavailable will they
choose a subregional all iance. 77
6. Conclusions
The review of theoretical approaches indicates that existing scholarship on the
underlying reasons for the creation of security cooperation frameworks is far from
satisfactory. The multiplicity of competing hypotheses concerning the util ity of forming
73 Mathisen, The Functions of Small States, p. 23.
74 Gartner, 'Small States', p. 190.
75 Mathisen, The Functions of Small States. p. 28.
76 Rothstein, Alliances and Small States, p. 170-172.
77 Ibid., p. 177.
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or entering alliances indicates that their universal applicability is questionable. There are
also problems specific to particular approaches. This section does not aim to review the
problems, but attempts to paint a broad picture of the relevance of theory to this study.
Of interest to this thesis is why certain alignment options are pursued by states.
Alliance literature offers a limited potential for providing clear answers to this question.
Walt, who analyzes a number of theories as they apply to alliance politics, concludes that
the main problem of existing alliance theories is that they have only a limited promise of
predicting when states may seek to build alliances with other states, but cannot foretell
who will ally with whom". Some scholars have thus suggested that the literature on
alliances is valuable only as a source of hypotheses. 79
One of the problems of alliance literature is the difficulty of defining the central
concept. As a result many authors fail to differentiate between alliances and alignment,
and further between wartime and peacetime alliances, offensive and defensive". bi- and
multilateral arrangements", and political and military alliances". That such distinctions
exist is suggested by authors like Michael Don Ward." Fedder cautions also that one
has to distinguish alliances from collective security arrangements. 84
A second problem is that most literature focuses on alliance behaviour that IS
centred around great power. Many of the systemic approaches overlook the
different requirements of weak and strong states. This distinction is a significant one,
given that all of the policy alternatives available to small states are imperfect. None of
78 Walt, Origins of Alliances, p. 9.
79 Ward, 'Research Gaps', p. 11; See Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers, p. 57.
80 'A defensive alliance presupposes only a common interest in opposing threats from specific states
or groups outside the alliance and does not necessarily or usually entail provisions for settling disputes
among its members. An offensive alliance aims at forcibly changing the international states quo, territorially
or otherwise, to increase the assets of its members. ' See Osgood, Alliances and American Foreign Policy,
p. 18. Liska cautions that offensive alliances are rare and uncommonly fragile. See Liska, Nations in
Alliance, p. 39.
81 Ward says that 'as yet, there is no work which seeks to untangle the differences between multilateral
and bilateral interaction patterns. One may not necessarily be a subset of the other.' See Ward. 'Research
Gaps', p. 60.
82 Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers, p. 52.
83 Ward, 'Research Gaps', p. 5.
l\-1 Fedder, 'The Concept of Alliance', p. 69.
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them assures complete security. 85 The pol icy of alliance, particularly on a subregional
level, is not without its problems, either. For most. if not all, small states. the various
foreign and security choices exist only in theory. In practice, in fact, there is often only
one viable policy. Occasionally, a weak state has no option whatsoever. The result is a
loss of independence and sovereignty for the country. 86 Most theoretical approaches see
states acting as 'free agents'. Alliance behaviour, however, is not only a function of
willingness but also of opportunity. This is particularly true for weak states. However,
the possibility that Great Powers and small states are different has been overlooked by
most traditional literature of international relations. 87
This difference is of great importance to this thesis since the focus here defies the
common emphasis on alliances centred around great powers. Thus, in place of the often
conducted analysis of Central European NATO policies, this work attempts to provide
a tool for explaining the Polish government's considerations of post-Cold War security
cooperation without the participation of any country that could be described as a global
or even a regional power. As such, theory appears to be of particularly Iimited utility.
A further problem which becomes particularly significant in the post-Cold era is
that realist theories provide frameworks that are informed by the traditional, narrow
definition of security. As the notion of security changes in Central Europe following the
collapse of the bipolar order, it is difficult to support the claim that this body of literature
provides a viable framework for the interpretation of contemporary subregional security
cooperation.
Most importantly, systemic analyzes tend to overlook important cultural, social
and economic factors in international relations. The difficulty is that, as Ward says, 'little
work has probed the black boxes of decision making within either states or alliances,
despite a wealth of historical scholarship. '88 Realist theories assume that states act in a
rational way. Realists consider foreign policies to be autonomous phenomena." To put
it in simple terms, realist theories concentrate almost exclusively on the level of systems,
85 Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers, p. 45.
86 Herczegh, 'History of the International Relations of Small States', p. 24.
87 Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers, p. 2.
88 Ward, 'Research Gaps in Alliance Dynamics', p. 26.
89 Robert L. Rothstein, 'On the Costs of Realism', Political Science Quarterly Vol. 87. NO.3
(September 1972), p. 360.
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and negate the importance of the unit level of analysis by assuming that it is constant.
They cannot take into account domestically-inspired foreign policy behaviour.
Yet, theories that concentrate on the unit level are beset by problems, as well.
Domestic predisposition or domestic interests can only occasionally and in specific cases
explain countries' alliance choices. Few alliances are formed in the interests of internal
considerations alone. Ideology and domestic similarities do not appear to be of great
relevance to the formation of subregional alliances in any case, since small countries
guided by domestic requirements are most likely to turn to powerful states as resource-
providers. There is little political and economic advantage in aligning with weak states.
The approaches presented in section two (Ideology and Internal Predisposition)
and three (Internal Politics: Economic or Political Benefits) do not explain alliance
behaviour in themselves, but may become important in conjunction with systemic
approaches. Robert Rothstein says that alliances are' involved in a confusing and complex
matrix of domestic and external policy'?", and arguably this is also true of other forms
of multilateral security cooperation. It becomes necessary to address both the presence
of external threats and the particularities of the Polish circumstances such as political
culture in this thesis.
The judgement reached in this chapter is that it is impossible to make a strong a
priori argument for or against the existence of such frameworks or to predict correctly
the policies likely to emerge in particular cases. Theory presents us with a confusing
array of motivations, interests and perceptions. It gives little in terms of a clear guiding
framework. It is therefore difficult or even impossible to understand or predict countries'
willingness or unwillingness to form or enter such cooperation frameworks. Nevertheless,
it is impossible to dismiss the potential contribution made by alliance literature entirely.
Alliance literature therefore informs the analysis in this thesis, although the particularities
of the Polish case cannot be adequately or exhaustively explained through it alone.
90 Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers, p. 57.
CHAPTER THREE
HISTORICAL SETTING: POLAND'S PAST
UNTIL THE COLLAPSE OF THE EASTERN BLOC
1. Introduction
This chapter presents the historical and political context in which Poland has
developed its views of subregional security cooperation. Such long-term factors must be
taken into account: 'the search for the "best" ally and the "best" kind of alliance can
hardly be carried on without examining the nature of the environment in which the choice
has to be made'. 1 This chapter forms the background for a discussion of Poland's
investments in certain historical images, its relations with neighbouring countries, threat
perceptions, and concepts of subregional cooperation presented in later chapters. The
observations here are confined to a discussion of aspects of the country's history and the
legacy of its membership in the Soviet-led alliance and trade pact. As such, the chapter
does not claim to present a full and balanced survey of Polish affairs over the last
millennium but rather some of the elements of Poland's past which appear relevant to this
study.
The first section of this chapter focuses on the rise and fall of the Pol ish state up
to the end of World War II. It discusses the so-called Jagellonian period, when Poland
was an empire, and the partitions which marked the end of the existence of a powerful
Polish state in the 18th century. The creation of the II Rzeczpospolita (Second Republic),
and the foreign policy of interwar Poland are then described. The subsequent section
examines the communist period and discusses borders and ethnicity in Poland after World
1 Robert L. Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers. (New York: Columbia University Press: 1968).
p.59.
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War II, as well as Poland's position in the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) and the
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA, or COMECON). Finally, the chapter
considers the 1989 revolution, and the perceptual, political and military implications of
the collapse of the Eastern military bloc."
In this chapter, Poland's past is discussed with particular attention to ethnic
relations, and links with neighbouring countries. The chapter aims to present the wealth
of literature available concerning both the history of Central Europe in general and
Poland in particular, as well as works that specifically consider Poland's recent
communist past. Although one cannot avoid drawing some obvious implications for
today's Polish foreign and security policies, this chapter does not attempt to do more than
to present a brief overview of historical memories which playa role in the country's
security policy-making. Conclusions from this chapter will be drawn in following relevant
sections of the thesis.
2. The rise and fall of the Polish state up to the end of World War II
The Jagellonian period and Polish partitions (l4th - 18th century)
Polish history of the pre-partition era is the story of a vast, multinational and at
times expansionist state pursuing an aggressive Drang nach Osten policy. 3 The Pol ish-
Lithuanian personal union consolidated Poland as a powerful European state in the 14th
century. The Commonwealth that was thus brought to existence gave Poland a leading
role in an empire that included areas now part of Lithuania, Ukraine and Belorus. It also
ensured it a powerful influence on the affairs of the entire region, particularly those of
Hungary, Bohemia, the Baltic and the Danubian countries. In the 15th and 16th centuries,
during the so-called Jagellonian period (named after the Lithuanian dynasty that ruled the
Commonwealth from 1386 to 1572), the Polish Commonwealth (Rzeczpospolitai
prospered, political liberty flourished, and the arts and literature developed." The
2 See Appendix A for a documentation of changes of Polish borders over time.
3 Tomasz Lubienski, 'Pod drzwiami Europy' [At Europe's door], Rzeczpospolita (2-3 October 1993).
4 Krystyna Olszer, 'Historical Background 1370-1795', in Krystyna Olszer (ed.), For Your Freedom
and Ours: Polish Progressive Spirit from the 14th Century to the Present (2nd ed.). (New York:
Frederick Unger Publishing, 1981), p. 13; Frances Millard, 'Nationalism in Poland', in Paul Latawski
(ed.), Contemporary Nationalism in East Central Europe. (Basingstoke: St. Martin's Press, 1995), p.
105.
commonwealth had a political rather than a national identity. 5 For Poles, the duration of
the Polish-Lithuanian empire remains the country's Golden Period", and this phase of
Polish greatness left behind for them a feeling of the country's mission in the region (see
Chapter Four).
Until the final collapse of the Pol ish state at the end of the 18th century, a
succession of foreign elected kings involved Poland in a series of wars which drained the
resources of the country. Domestically, the rul ing aristocracy (szlachta) was preoccupied
with various internal power struggles, preventing the development of a centralized state
that was capable of defending itself against pressures from the outside. The growing
weakness of the Polish state did not go unnoticed among its centralized and powerful
neighbours. Both Prussia and Russia took the opportunity to dominate Polish affairs.
Russian interference caused a series of uprisings which began in 1768. Four years later,
in 1772, Poland's powerful neighbours, Russia, Prussia and Austria partitioned the
country. Nevertheless, during this first partition, a part of Poland retained its
independence."
Challenged by political developments in the sovereign part of Poland, Russia and
Prussia declared war in 1792 and partitioned Poland once more, this time leaving only
a small, nominally independent section. An unsuccessful national uprising led by General
Kosciuszko followed in 1794. In the aftermath of the uprising, a third partition was
agreed by Russia, Prussia and Austria. This partition signalled the end of the once
powerful commonwealth and of Polish independence until the creation of a Polish state
in 1918. 8
After the third partition, Poles undertook numerous attempts to regain
independence, preferably within the borders of the old Commonwealth. Often, they
attempted to interest Western powers in supporting the recreation of a Polish state. High
hopes were placed in Napoleon. Yet, although Polish participation in the war effort was
5 See Janusz Tazbir, 'Ilu bylo Polakow w Polsce?' [How many Poles were there in Poland"], Polityka
(19 June 1993).
6 See Antoni Czubinski, 'Zwischen Deutschland und Ruhland: Geopolitik im polnischen Diskurs des
19. und 20. Jahrhunderts', Welttrends 4 (August 1994), p. 85.
70lszer, 'Historical Background 1370-1795', p. 13.
8 Ibid., p. 14; Wesley M. Shoemaker, Russia, Eurasian States, and Eastern Europe (23rd annual
edition). (Washington D.C.: Stryker-Post, 1992), p. 215.
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welcomed, Napoleon did little for Polish independence."
In 1815, the Congress of Vienna created the Polish Congress Kingdom. The
Kingdom's sovereignty was severely limited, as it could not take part in international
affairs. In effect, Poland became a state within the Russian Empire. An insurrection of
cadets and intelligentsia in 1830 actually succeeded in removing Russian troops from
Poland. However, the uprising had a bitter aftermath: the Czar declared war and Russian
troops occupied Poland. 10 Any signs of Polish autonomy were stamped out. In 1863 the
Czar subjected Poland's young men to compulsory military service in the Russian army.
Another insurrection followed, only to be defeated once more.
A long period of oppression and emigration followed the uprisings. 11 It must be
said, however, that by this time, the modern concept of nation had evolved to the point
that, although national consciousness had spread only among the gentry, there was no
threat of the disappearance of the Polish people as a nation. 12 The development of Polish
nationalism was accompanied by first debates of the concepts of federalism and pan-
Slavism. Federalist approaches aspired to consolidate the various ethnic groups of the old
Commonwealth and, for some, also other East Central European nations, within the
framework of a Polish state. They aimed, within the Polish context, at recreating a large
and strong independent state." Pan-Slavism was a movement which, as Hans Kohn
argues, 'proclaimed the affinity of various peoples, in spite of differences of political
citizenship and historical background, of civilization and religion, solely on the strength
of an affinity of language. '14 Unlike in Russia, where it originated, Pan-Slavism came,
generally speaking, to imply in Poland the cooperation of Slavic nations without the
9 Napoleon formed the Duchy of Warsaw in 1807 which was administered by Poles and had a Polish
army, and French legal institutions. After Napoleon's defeat, parts of the Duchy were returned to Prussia.
Ibid., p. 215.
10 Olszer, 'Historical Background 1795-1863', p. 57; Shoemaker, Russia, Eurasian States, and
Eastern Europe, p. 216.
11 Olszer, 'Historical Background 1795-1863', p. 58.
12 Frederick G. Heymann, Poland & Czechoslovakia. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall. 1966), p. 103.
13 See for example Karol Grunberg, Polskie koncepcje federalistyczne 1864-1918 [Polish federal
concepts 1864-1918]. (Warsaw: Ksiazka i Wiedza, 1971).
14 Hans Kahn, Pan-Slavism: Its History and Ideology (2nd ed). (New York: Vintage Books, 1960),
p. IX.
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participation of Russia, or even directed against Russia."
When in 1905 the First Russian Revolution was put down in the part of Poland
controlled by Russia, Polish independence forces, led by the military and political leader
Marshall Jozef Pilsudski, were forced underground. Pilsudski fled to Galicia. the section
of Poland occupied by Austria, and pursued the aim of creating a Pol ish army capable
of taking on the Russian military. 16
The creation of the II Rzeczpospolita (Second Republic)
The military collapse of Germany and Austria-Hungary in the First World War
opened up the possibility of Polish independence. In the German and Austrian occupied
areas of Poland, uprisings removed the rudiments of foreign control; in the Russian
section Pilsudski's army, which had been awaiting this moment, eliminated all elements
of Russian domination. The Second Polish Republic (II Rzeczpospolitai was created, but
its nature and extent remained unclear.'? The process of establishing Poland's borders
and institutions lasted another three years and involved local wars against Germany,
Czechoslovakia, Lithuania, the Western Ukraine, and Soviet Russia, instigated by Poland
in defiance of the Paris Peace Conference decisions.
In the aftermath of the Paris Peace Settlements of 1919-1920, three of Poland's
five neighbours at the time - Germany, Russia, and Lithuania - hoped for border
revisions." The Peace Settlements granted Poland access to the sea through a narrow
passageway, the Polish Corridor, which separated East Prussia from Germany proper.
The area around the Baltic city of Danzig/Gdansk was given the status of a Free City
with a League of Nations High Commissioner, a largely German self-government and
Polish control over foreign relations. Germany challenged this arrangement. Problems
also arose in Silesia, an area populated by a large number of Germans, which had been
awarded to Poland. The southern parts of East Prussia and Upper Silesia reverted to
Germany after plebiscites in 1920-21. However, Poland retained the very section of
15 Ibid., p. 29-30.
16 Antoni Czubinski, Dzieje najnowsze Polski do roku 1945 [Contemporary Polish History until 1q.+~ I.
(Poznan: Wielkopolska Agencja Wydawnicza, 1994), pp. 33-40.
17 Norman Davies, Heart of Europe: A Short History of Poland. (Oxford: Claredon Press. 1ClS'+ I,
p. lIS.
18 Heymann, Poland & Czechoslovakia, p. 148.
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Upper Silesia which contained the coal basin and most of the heavy industries.
In the south, the Polish state found itself in conflict with the Czechs over the city
of Cesin (Cieszyn in Polish, Teschen in German)." The city and surrounding area
which contained a Polish, Czech and German population and a wealth of natural
resources, was given to the Czechoslovak state. Polish troops were sent into the area in
1918; Czech troops regained Cesin in 1919. Eventually, the outcome of the Cesin contlict
was dictated in 1920 by the Entente powers. Poland acquired a large eastern part of the
duchy including the town of Cesin itself. Czechoslovakia gained the main part of the
Teschen coal basin. Some 80,000 Poles were now under Czechoslovak rule. A Polish
opposition, supported by Poland, was thus created and contributed further to damaging
relations between the two states. 20
In the aftermath of the Russo-Polish War (April - October 1920), the Peace of
Riga (March 1921) granted Poland a borderline far to the east of the Curzon Line, the
frontier based on ethnic considerations envisaged by the Paris Settlements. The Second
Republic was not given all the territories that the country's political leadership, looking
to the Polish-Lithuanian commonwealth as an inspiration, hoped to acquire. However,
once its borders had been established, the Polish state in the inter-war period was about
twice as large as originally foreseen by Western powers.
As a result of this 'enlargement', only approximately two-thirds of the population
of the Second Republic were Polish by language. The remaining third consisted mainly
of Ukrainians (15 per cent), Jews (9 per cent), Byelorussians (5 per cent), and Germans
(2 per cent). 21 A Lithuanian minority, although not particularly large, created a special
problem for Poland. Although the new Poland saw itself as the heir to the Polish-
Lithuanian Commonwealth", most of the Lithuanians in Poland did not share the fond
memories of times gone by, and felt closer to the newly created Lithuanian national state.
In 1920, Poles seized the ancient Lithuanian capital Vilnius (in German Vilna, in Pol ish
Wilno), which was populated by a mixture of Jews, Poles, and Lithuanians. Lithuania
19 Roger East, Revolutions in Eastern Europe. (London: Pinter, 1992), p. 109.
20 Heymann, Poland & Czechoslovakia, p. 132.
21 Davies, Heart of Europe, p. 120.
22 Jerzy Tomaszewski, 'Stereotyp mniejszosci narodowych w II Rzeczpospolitej' [Stereotype of national
minorities in II Commonwealth], in Janusz Tazbir (ed.), Mit), i Stereotypy w Dziejach Polski l\lyths and
Stereotypes in Polish History]. (Warsaw: Interpress, 1991), p. 263.
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responded by closing borders and breaking off political and economic relations.
In the new Polish state, the large Ukrainian minority was concentrated in Poland's
east and southeast. Despite the provisions of the Peace of Riga, the Ukrainian minority
was not granted the promised political influence nor cultural and economic self-
determination by the Polish state. The policy of polonization can be seen as one of the
factors leading to the formation of Ukrainian nationalist and autonomist movements in
Galicia. After 1930, these retorted to terrorism. This development in turn provoked
austere measures of suppression by the Polish government. 23
The 800,000 Germans in Poland did not reconcile themselves to the new borders,
particularly to the existence of the Polish Corridor. It played an important role in
relations between Poland and Germany in the years 1918-1939. Both countries attempted
to exploit the existence of this group: while Germany used Polish ill-treatment of the
minority to justify demands for revisions of the common border, the Polish government
accused the group of a lack of loyalty towards the Polish state, and criticized it for its
separatist tendencies and links with the German state. After 1933, particularly the young
generations of the German minority turned to nationalistic and anti-Polish propaganda. 24
The Polish government unilaterally repealed the minority treaty with Germany in 1937,
further aggravating the difficult situation."
The foreign policy of interwar Poland
Internationally, the new Poland was isolated. It was clear that the new Polish
state, which included areas claimed by Germans and Russians, would be faced with
territorial pressure from both sides as soon as its neighbours recovered economically and
politically. Pilsudski, the independent Poland's head of state, found himself faced with
the rise of Stalinist Russia in the East, and with Nazi Germany in the West. The foreign
policy concept he pursued when faced with these developments has been characterized
as 'the Doctrine of Two Enemies', or 'equal distance' concerning both East and West,
and federalist plans in Central Europe itself. The concept reflected Pilsudski's attitude to
23 Heymann, Poland & Czechoslovakia, p. 138.
24 Marian Dobrosielski, 'Mniejszosc niemiecka w Polsce' [German minority in Poland], in Mniejszosc
niemiecka w Polsce: Historia i terazniejszosc [German minority in Poland: History and the present].
(Warsaw: Elipsa, 1995), pp. 53-54.
25 Janusz Bugajski, Ethnic Politics in Eastern Europe. (Armonk: M. E. Sharp, 1994), p. 361.
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politics which was based on Romanticism combined with 'a hard-boiled pragmatic
approach' .26
According to this policy, Poland was to pursue relations with both neighbours, but
not to rely on friendship with either. Thus Pilsudski, trying to manoeuvre between the
two, signed a ten-year pact of non-aggression with the USSR on 25 January 1932 and
with Nazi Germany on 26 January 1934, and succeeded in alienating both the Germans
and the Russians alike. Poland also estranged Western public opinion by participating in
the division of Czechoslovakia with Germany in 1938. 27 After the German annexation
of parts of Czechoslovakia, Poland's government refused a Czechoslovak offer of
negotiations, and in September 1938 demanded a part of Czechoslovakia for Poland,
gaining an area with 80,000 Poles and more than 100,000 Czechs."
Squeezed between Germany and Russia, two countries which had territorial
disputes with Poland, the Polish government had little room to manoeuvre in its foreign
and security policy. Polish leadership aspired to a strong Poland, combined with
territorial guarantees by France and Britain, and some form of subregional federation or
alliance in Central and East Central Europe (also called the Miedzymorze region - the
region between the Black, Baltic and Aegean Seas), which would also create a north-
south axis in Europe". The latter task was a difficult one, since the countries in
question had few common interests. In addition, 'undertakings to act together. to consult
and to cooperate, were restricted in scope by the desire to avoid general obligations and
risks remote from home'. 30 Moreover, ethnic and historical grievances marked relations
among Central European states.
Nevertheless, Poles pursued the concept of a subregional security structure
throughout the interwar period, and during World War II as well. Following the end of
the war, when concepts of this kind could not be openly advocated in Poland, the Polish
26 Piotr Wandycz, Polish Diplomacy 1914-1945: Aims and Achievements. A Lecture. (London:
SSEES and DRBIS, 1988), p. 19.
27 Shoemaker, Russia, Eurasian States, and Eastern Europe, p. 216.
28 Heymann, Poland & Czechoslovakia, p. 153.
29 Wandycz, Polish Diplomacy, p. 18. See also Appendix B for a map of the Miedrvmorze area.
30 Davis, Heart of Europe. p. xii-xiii.
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government in exile in London continued to advance the idea."
The Pol ish pol itical spectrum was divided over the issue of subregional security
arrangements. The two political personalities who shaped the first phase of II
Rzeczpospolita's foreign pol icy during the struggle for borders (1919-1921) were Roman
Dmowski and Jozef Pilsudski. Dmowski (1864-1939) is often called the father of modern
Polish nationalism. Dmowski chaired the Polish National Committee in Paris which had
played a significant role in the creation of the Second Republic. Furthermore, he was the
inter-war period leader of the Polish National Democrats (Endecja). Marshall Pilsudski
(1867-1935), on the other hand, is described as the champion of modern Polish
independence. Of the two, Pilsudski is better known." He was the first head of state of
free Poland, and Poland's leading soldier. Later, Pilsudski became a highly respected
strongman of Polish politics."
Crucial to the political movements which formed around these two leaders was
the assumption that a small, weak and isolated Poland would not survive as a sovereign
state." In addition to such pragmatic power considerations, both camps believed that
Poland had a mission in East Central Europe. Pilsudski's 'federalist' concept or the so-
called Jagellonian tradition particularly reflected this consideration."
The group surrounding Pilsudski developed the idea of creating nation-states in
the East which would be linked with Poland by means of an alliance or a federal system.
This option is usually described as 'Pilsudskiite' and 'federalist', although it was
supported among other parts of the political spectrum and only at times insisted on
3\ See for example Marek K. Kaminski and Michal J. Zacharias, W Cieniu Zagrozenia: Polityka
zagraniczna RP 1918-1939 [In the shadow of threat: The foreign policy of the Polish Republic 1918-1939].
(Warsaw: Gryf, 1993). The government-in-exile approaches are discussed below.
32 See Henryk Samsonowicz, 'Mity w Swiadomosci Historycznej Polakow' [Myths in Poles' Historical
Consciousness], in Antonina Kloskowska (ed.), Oblicza Polskosci. (Warsaw: Uniwersytet Warszawski
Program Badan i Wspoltworzenia Filozofii Pokoju, 1990), p. 158.
33 For a discussion of domestic issues, see for example Piotr S. Wandycz, Cena Wolnosci [The Price
of Freedom]. (Krakow: ZNAK, 1995), pp. 306-313.
34 TadeuszKisielewski, Federacja Srodkowo-Europejska: Pertarktacje polsko-czechoslowackie 1939-
1943 [Central European Federation: Polish-Czechoslovak Negotiations 1939-19431. (Warsaw: Ludowa
Spoldzielnia Wydawnicza, 1991), p. 5.
35 Piotr S. Wandycz, 'Polish Foreign Policy: An Overview', in Timothy Wiles (ed.), Poland Between
The Wars 1918-1939. (Bloomington: Indiana University Polish Studies Center, 1989), p. 65; Czubinski.
'Zwischen Deutschland und Ruhland'. p. 99.
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federal structures." Its aim, at its most ambitious, was to reestablish a large federal
state under Polish leadership. This program was sharply opposed by Endecja (Dmowski's
National Democrats), which in keeping with their concept of nation-state did not believe
in the viability of a supra-national federation. Dmowski certainly planned to include in
a single state many if not all of the areas which Pilsudski hoped to link in a federal
union, but he was not prepared to grant national minorities in those areas any special
rights." Dmowski also opposed the idea of detaching Ukraine from Russia, and all other
actions which could exacerbate conflict with Russia, since he saw the Russians as future
allies of Poland.
Polish eastern policy in this period was largely shaped by Pilsudski. The idea of
a federated structure was supported by the foreign minister of the first government of the
Second Polish Republic, Leon Wasilewski, and later by the Prime Minister and Foreign
Minister Ignacy Paderewski." Piludskiites condemned the plans crafted by Dmowski
as nationalistic and imperialistic. Formally, Pilsudskiites claimed to stand for the
principle of national self-determination, but this masked the prevailing motive of
weakening and dismembering Russia. The federalist concept, historians argue, was used
to conceal this design."
Pilsudski was particularly interested in wrestling Lithuania, Belorus and Ukraine
36 See Janusz Stefanowicz, Rzeczypospolitej Pole Bezpieczenstwa [The Polish Republic's field of
security]. (Warsaw: Adam Marszalek, 1993), p. 23.
37 Michal Sliwa, Idee Polityczne w Polsce - Wiek XX [Political Ideas in Poland - 20th century].
(Krakow: Wydawnictwo Oddzialu Polskiej Akademii Nauk, 1994), p. 19; Michal Tymowski, Jan
Kieniewicz and Jerzy Holzer, Historia Polski [Polish history]. (Warsaw: Editions Spotkania, 1991), p. 279.
38 Ignacy Paderewski, a composer, pianist and politician, was member of Polish National Committee
(KPN), which had Roman Dmowski as president. See ibid., p. 270. In 1919, Paderewski became Prime
Minister. See Witold Sienkiewicz, Maly Slownik historii Polski [Small dictionary of Polish history].
(Warsaw: Wiedza Powszechna, 1991), p. 12l.
Masaryk and Paderewski, the Czechoslovak and Polish leaders, in the United States since 1915,
together with other representatives of the Central European region, created a Mid-European Democratic
Union in the U.S. in Sept. 1918. It had as its goal the demonstration of cooperation among the newly
sovereign countries. Paderewski, although a Dmowskiite, supported the concept of the creation of a bloc
of countries between the Baltic and the Adriatic and while in the U.S. advocated the creation of a multi-
ethnic United States of Poland. Accordingly, he was vehemently criticized by his Endecja colleagues.
particularly by Dmowski, but also occasionally by Pilsudski himself who did not see this idea as realistic.
See Marian Marek Drozdowski, Ignacy Jan Paderewski: zarys biografii politycznej (3rd ed.) [lgnacy
Jan Paderewski: outline of a political biography]. (Warsaw: Interpress, 1986). pp. 130-131; Czubinski,
Dzieje Najnowsze, p. 144; Piotr Wandycz, '0 probach integracji Europy Srodkowowschodniej: Dlugi
marsz' [About attempts to integrate East-Central Europe: Long march' I. Rzeczpospolita (6 November
1994); Wandycz, Polish diplomacy, p. 13.
39 Czubinski, Dzieje Najnowsze, pp. 170-171.
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from Russia. He wanted to link Poland and Lithuania in a structure similar to the old
Polish-Lithuanian empire."? His plans regarding the two other states were less clear. His
attempts to win Lithuania over to an all iance with Poland began in 1918, but had little
success. Lithuanians were afraid of Polish domination, and had a negative image of the
common history. Pilsudski then began short and fruitless discussions about establishing
a Belorussian state linked to Poland."
In the spring of 1920, perceiving weakness in Russia, Pilsudski sensed that it was
time to carry out plans for a Central European federation. The Ukrainian government.
headed by Semen Petlura, and almost entirely defeated by the Bolsheviks, was ready to
negotiate with Poland. On 21 April 1920, Pilsudski signed an agreement with the
Ukraine, and in keeping with it, a Polish offensive was mounted in the Ukraine four days
later. Polish forces reached Kiev in two weeks, but the Red Army began a
counteroffensive. In the beginning of July, Polish troops were forced to withdraw to the
so called Curzon line, which was designated by the coalition countries as a line separating
Polish territories from areas which were considered to be only under temporary Polish
administration. When a settlement was reached in March 1921, federal dreams were no
longer considered: Poland was weak, and neighbouring countries were not interested."
In fact, antagonisms between Poland and its neighbours became more pronounced. In
Poland, the Dmowski concept of incorporation of other ethnic areas became more popular
in Polish political circles.
Thus, during this phase of defining the country's borders, Polish politicians in
both camps demanded a return to borders in the East as they had been in 1772.
Simultaneously, they argued that the Western border should be drawn according to ethnic
criteria to include all ethnically Polish areas. These plans of course met with considerable
opposition from neighbouring countries. Eventually, the country's borders were defined
largely by force, and Poland faced accusations of neo-imperialist tendencies." The
federalists believed that because of common history, the peoples concerned would accept
Polish government as long as administrative autonomy was granted to them. This
40 Stanislaw Krukowski, 'Wielkie Ksiestwo Litewskie a obecna Republika Litwy ' [The Great Duchy
of Lithuania and the current Lithuanian Republic], Rzeczpospolita (30 July 1993).
41 Czubinski, Dzieje Najnowsze, p. 178.
42 Tymowski, Historia Polski, pp. 279-281.
43 Czubinski, Dzieje Najnowsze, p. 164.
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assumption, however, overlooked the significance and nature of modern national ism in
the region."
The second phase of debate concerning subregional cooperation took place during
the period of Polish parliamentary democracy (1921-1926), and was marked by attempts
to create subregional alliances. The country's eastern border, established in 1921,
corresponded neither to Pilsudski' s nor to Dmowski' s plans. A number of pol itical forces
continued to advocate a closer union of the countries in Central and East Central Europe
in a security framework. The Jagellonian federal idea, albeit in a new disguise, began to
be discussed again. Following the Rappallo agreements of 1922 between~viet Union
and Germany, Pilsudski inspired the so called 'prometeistic' programme, which aimed
to coordinate independence movements in various Soviet nations." This programme has
been championed by Polish federalists since mid-19th century. 46
During this period, as well, relations with Czechoslovakia were normalized, but
the two countries did not cooperate closely. While the United States did not support
concepts of regional cooperation and integration in Central Europe, the Soviet Union
actively protested against such plans, seeing them as 'reactionary', and as directed against
Moscow. Faced with vehement Soviet opposition to the plan, Czechoslovak President
Benes, who saw East-Central European integration as possible only with Soviet support,
decided not to pursue closer links with Poland."
The third phase of Polish interwar thinking about subregional security cooperation
was marked by Pilsudski's death in 1935 and the outbreak of World War II in 1939.
Colonel Jozef Beck (1894-1944) took over Polish foreign policy. Beck made efforts to
fortify Poland's position by arranging a 'region of security' with Warsaw as its centre,
which he called a 'third Europe'. His concept of a bloc of Central European countries left
out Czechoslovakia, which he considered doomed, and concentrated on Baltic, Balkan
44 Heymann, Poland & Czechoslovakia, p. 130.
45 Czubinski, Dzieje Najnowsze, p. 226.
46 See for example Grunberg, Polskie koncepcje, p. 47.
47 See Piotr Wandycz, '0 probach integracji Europy Srodkowowschodniej: Dlugi marsz' [About
attempts of integration of East-Central Europe: Long march], Rzeczpospolita (5-6 November 1994); Piotr
S. Wandycz, The Price of Freedom: A history of East Central Europe from the Middle Ages to the
present. (London: Routledge, 1992), p. 205.
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and Danubian countries." His plans were destined to fail because of the outbreak of II
World War.
The subregional concept continued to find supporters after the outbreak of the
war. The most prominent one was Wladyslaw Sikorski, a general and politician, and
from 1939, the Prime Minister of Poland's exile government. 49 Sikorski, unlike Beck,
aimed to create a bloc of countries reaching from the Baltic to the Black Sea and the
Aegean around Poland and Czechoslovakia tMiedzymorze region)." For this reason, he
attempted to maintain good relations with Benes, the President of Czechoslovakia. He
also intended to tighten links between the two countries, with the goal of a close alliance
and federation between the two countries. 51 The idea of a federation was supported by
almost all the exiled Polish political forces except for the communist groups, The
expansion of Polish culture and the development of Ukrainian, Belorussian and
Lithuanian cultures and identities were considered tools for curtailing Russian
influence." Sikorski saw himself as a self-appointed spokesman for small Central
European states. 53
The proposal, though seriously debated, withered due to a number of problems,
particularly Soviet rejection of the plan. 54 Today most authors argue that the concepts
advanced by Sikorski and other Polish leaders never had a reasonable chance of
realization, mainly because they were opposed by Soviet leaders, but also because
Poland's southern and eastern neighbours feared Polish influence. 55
48 Roman Debicki, Foreign Policy of Poland 1991-1939: From the Rebirth of the Polish Republic
to World War II. (London: Pall Mall Press, 1963), p, 105.
49 Sikorski was also known as one of the founders of Polish Armed forces in the West and in the Soviet
Union. See Sienkiewicz, Maly Slownik, p. 167.
50 Wandycz, Polish diplomacy, p. 37.
51 Czubinski, Dzieje Najnowsze, p. 508; Henryk Batowski, Polska dyplomacja na obczyznie 1939-
1941 [Polish diplomacy abroad 1939-1941]. (Krakow: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 1991), pp. 271-291.
52 Kisielewski, Federacja Srodkowo-Europejska, p. 231.
53 Wandycz, Polish Diplomacy, p. 39.
54 Ibid., p. 41.
55 Kisielewski, Federacja Srodkowo-Europejska, pp. 247-249.
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Poland in World War II
In 1939, when the Germans and the Russians invaded Poland, the country had
nothing but fragile French and British guarantees to rely upon. 56 In August 1939
Germany succeeded in reaching an agreement with the Soviet Union, named the Molotov-
Ribbentrop pact, after the ministers who signed it. It included secret protocols concerning
the partition of Central Europe". Hitler's Germany moved into Poland on 1 September
1939. The invasion was assisted by members of the German minority in Poland. While
not all members of the German ethnic group can be considered part of a 'fifth column',
many committed acts of sabotage and violence against Polish civilians and soldiers. For
this reason, after the war, the minority was considered as a threat to the state's
security. 58
Frederick G. Heymann speculates that even an exemplary treatment of the German
minority would not have altered its pro-German and anti-Polish behaviour. It must be
said, however, that the treatment of minorities in the Second Republic was by no means
praiseworthy. 59 The nationalism of ethnic minorities in Poland, particularly of the
Ukrainians, during the inter-war period and World War II has been described as 'a
philosophy of desperation, an ideology of self-defense' and thus a response to the
country's minorities policy which was based on the principles of polonization and grave
restrictions. 60
While the Polish Army fought the Germans, Soviet troops marched into Polish
territory on 17 September and stopped along the line agreed between the USSR and
Germany." Thus, the fourth partition of Poland was accomplished. Polish armed
resistance to the German armies came to an end just a few days after the invasion, in
56 Andrew Michta, East Central Europe After the Warsaw Pact: Security Dilemmas in the 1990s.
(New York: Greenwood Press, 1992), p. 24-26. Some authors reason that the inability to forge a regional
alliance was an indirect cause of the events in 1939. Most agree, however, that ultimately, the fact that the
German forces could bring Central Europe under their control so quickly was a result of the frailty of
Westen} security guarantees to the region.
57 East, Revolutions in Eastern Europe, p. 109.
58 Dobrosielski, 'Mniejszosc niemiecka ... ', pp. 55; Pawel Lisicki, 'Kontrowersyjny obraz przeszlosci '
[Controversial picture of the past], Rzeczpospolita (11-12 September 1993).
59 Heymann, Poland and Czechoslovakia, p. 138.
60 Stefan Kozak, 'Polsko-Ukrainskie Dylematy i Dialogi '. Polska w Europie Nr. 10 (January 1993),
p.54.
61 Shoemaker, Russia, Eurasian States, and Eastern Europe, p. 217.
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mid-September 1939, although the underground opposition to the occupation continued,
culminating in the tragic uprisings of the Warsaw Ghetto in April 1943, and of the city
of Warsaw in August-September 1944. 62
The Polish situation did not improve when Hitler launched an attack on Russia
in mid-1941. Although, with British intervention, relations between the USSR and Poland
had been officially restored, the Soviet Union began to express increasing displeasure
over the determination of the Polish government-in-exile to recreate its country according
to its prewar boundaries, and over subregional plans."
As Poland was conquered once more, the Polish government-in-exile in London
proceeded to organize a Polish army, navy, and air force in exile which fought alongside
the Western allies in the war. Consequently, other groups claiming leadership were
formed both within Poland and in the Soviet Union. These groups pursued the same goal
of the liberation of Poland, but their political views diverged on the issue of the territorial
and political future of the country. 64
During the war and its aftermath, the Polish government-in-exile in London
concentrated its activities on creating a Central European federation. In the process, the
leaders focused on previous proposals, particularly the concept of a Miedzymorze
federation. The creation was to include 16 countries between five seas (Albania, Belorus,
Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech lands, Estonia, Greece, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Romania,
Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine and Hungary). A legislative body, the Miedzymorze
Interparliamentary Union, was to be created. The government leaders also proposed the
formation of an exile parliament composed of representatives of the countries in question.
The idea reached back to the 'prometeistic' concept of weakening the Soviet Union. A
variation of the federation idea also had supporters among exile leaders in the United
States. 65
The London government-in-exile was eventually 'derecognized' by the victorious
62 Olszer, 'Historical Background 1939-1945', p. 258; Adam Krzeminski, 'Einst verlassen, bald
versohnt?', Die Zeit (22 July 1994).
63 Shoemaker, Russia, Eurasian States, and Eastern Europe, p. 217.
64 Olszer, 'Historical Background 1039-1945', p. 257.
65 Marian S. Wolanski, 'Europa Srodkowo-Wschodnia w koncepcjach osrodka prezydenckiego \\
Londynie w latach 1949-1953' [East Central Europe in concepts of the presidential centre in London in the
years 1949-1953], Politologia: Studia nad wspolezesna polska mysla poIityczna XIII (1994), pp. 51-67.
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powers seeking a compromise position with the USSR. 66 A government of 'national
unity', built around a Soviet-supported group of Polish Communists, the Polish
Committee of National Liberation (with the addition of a few non-communist leaders'? ,
who soon were forced to leave the country) was created.
The end of Second World War saw East Central Europe in the hands of the
USSR. In 1944, despite the existence of the Atlantic Charter, which promised Eastern
Europe self-government, Churchill and Stalin negotiated the establishment of spheres of
influence in the region. The Soviet Union established Communist rule and defined the
region as its sphere of influence, creating a buffer zone against the West in general and
particularly against Germany.
3. Communist period
Borders and ethnicity in Poland after World War II
The end of the war did not bring about the restoration of Poland's pre-War borders.
The Yalta Agreement of February 194568 fixed the Soviet-Pol ish border at the Curzon
line. This arrangement gave almost half of the country's prewar eastern territory to the
Soviet Union. At Potsdam, Poland's western frontier was moved westwards by 250
kilometres to the Oder-Neisse line."? The southern part of East Prussia became Polish
while the Soviet Union took the north around Konigsberg (Kaliningrad)."
The country's shift to the west meant that Poland henceforth felt vulnerable to
66 It nevertheless continued to exist until the first free elections in Poland following the collapse of the
Pax Sovietica.
67 Shoemaker, Russia, Eurasian States, and Eastern Europe, p. 217.
68 For details of the Yalta provisions, see Zygmunt C. Szkopiak (ed.), The Yalta Agreements:
Documents prior to, during and after the Crimea Conference 1945. (London: Polish Government in
Exile, 1986). For Polish perceptions of the Yalta agreements, see Jalta: Wczoraj i Dzis. Wybior
Publicystiki 1944-1985. (London: Polonia, 1985).
69 See: ' 1945 sierpien 2, Poczdam. - Umowa poczdamska podpisana przez szefow rzadow Stanow
Zjednoczonych, Wielkiej Britanii i ZSSR. (Fragmenty)' [2 August 1945, Potsdam. - Potsdam Treaty signed
by governmental heads of the United States, Great Britain, and the USSR. (Fragments)], in Hans-Adolf
Jacobsen and Mieczyslaw Tomala (eds), Warszawa - Bonn 1945 - 1991: Stosunki polsko-niernieckie.
Analiza i dokumenty. (Warsaw: Polski Instytut Spraw Miedzynarodowych, 1992), p. 39.
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German irridentism", and this vulnerability was translated into an intricate dependence
on Moscow. The Polish communist authorities presented the USSR as a guarantor of
Poland's western territories against West German claims." Thus, the communists
emphasized not only ideological bonds, but geopolitical needs. In this way, Moscow
guaranteed a lengthy term of Poland's reliance on the Soviet Union in the realm of
security."
Simultaneously, Poland was prevented from raising any claims to its former territories
in the East which now belonged to the Soviet Union, even though the shift of the Eastern
frontier to the West left sizable Polish minorities beyond the country's borders. 74
The killing of a large number of Poland's inhabitants during World War II and the
postwar territorial changes and population movements left Poland relatively uniform both
ethnically and religiously." Moreover, Poland's post-World War II policy towards
minorities was characterized by forced cultural and linguistic assimilation. In the east of
its territory, Poland conducted a protracted battle with Ukrainian partisans. Meanwhile,
the Polish army was executing a plan which aimed to destroy the culture and social and
religious structures of the Ukrainian minority. Some Polish analysts conclude that the
ultimate goal was the 'liquidation of the Ukrainian minority in Poland as a separate ethnic
71 Irridentism means territorial claims made by one state to lands of another. The claims are usually
based on historical or ethnic arguments, but often reflect pragmatic considerations of domestic political or
geopolitical nature. See James Mayall, Nationalism and international society. (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1990), pp. 57-61.
72 Adam Bromke, The Meaning and Uses of Polish History. (Boulder: East European Monographs,
1987), p. 97.
73 Teresa Los-Nowak, 'Transformacja formuly bezpieczenstwa zewnetrznego Polski po II wojnie
swiatowej' [Transformation of the formula of external Polish security after World War II], Politologia 13
(1994), p. 101.
74 For specific numbers of Polish minorities in the Soviet Union, see section on migration in Chapter
Six.
75 In 1773, at the First Partition, Polish Catholics formed some 50 per cent of the population of the
country. In 1921 they formed 66 per cent. By 1946, Catholics accounted for 96 per cent of the population.
See Davies, Heart of Europe, p. II.
Andre Liebich compiles a number of different estimates of the size of ethnic minority groups in Poland.
He numbers the minority populations in Poland as follows: Belorussians 200,000 to 400,000; Ukrainians
150,000 to 400,000; and Germans 4,000 to 2,000,000. See Andre Liebich, 'Minorities in Eastern Europe:
Obstacles to Reliable Count', RFE/RL Research Report Vol. I, No. 20 (15 May 1992), p. 38. In 1989-
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group"." The Ukrainian Insurrectionary Army was finally trapped in an offensive by
Soviet, Pol ish, and Czechoslovak forces and destroyed. 77
The German minority experienced mass expulsions and persecution. Some were
evacuated by Germany as the Soviet armies approached. Most of Poland's Germans were
forced to leave the country in the years 1945-50. A large number were expelled by
Poland under the Potsdam Agreement and according to the decision taken by Allied
Control Council for Germany on 20 November 1945. 78 Members of the German
minority who chose to stay in Poland were accused of complicity with Nazi crimes. Acts
of violence on the part of the Polish population followed, especially against Germans
expelled from Silesia." Expulsions of Germans from Poland were motivated by the
failure of the interwar system of protection for minorities as well as by the conduct of
the German minority during the war and German occupation of Poland. 80
After the World War II, the repressive ethnic policy pursued by the Polish
government had a regressive effect on the sense of Polish identity among national
minorities." In Upper Silesia, after the war, anyone wishing to remain in the region was
required to provide evidence of Polish background. The area was resettled by repatriates
from other parts of Poland. The danger of deportation resulted in mass declarations of
Polish loyalties and ethnic ties by members of the German minority. Yet, the policy of
enforcing Polishness resulted in the reinforcement of a sense of difference, or even
Germanness among the German population. The authorities proceeded to implement the
policy of assimilation and to eliminate any traces of Silesian autonomy, thus forcing
76 Maciej Kozlowski quoted in Kozak, 'Polsko-Ukrainskie Dylematy '. p. 53.
77 Davies, Heart of Europe, p. 80.
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waves of emigration to West Germany. 82
Poland in WTO and CMEA
The successful post-war creation of a Soviet sphere of influence In Eastern and
Central Europe served a number of different Soviet objectives. The Soviet Union had
economic ambitions in the region, such as reparations, and political and ideological
interests. However, according to Charles Gati, it is clear that 'geopolitical interests -
concerns about security - topped Stal in's list.' 83 Russ ia, the predecessor of the Soviet
Union, always felt vulnerable to mil itary pressure as a result of its relative lack of natural
defences. Historically, Russia had found itself attacked by Poles, Swedes, French and
Germans from the Western direction." The experience of aggression from the West
meant that the conquest of Eastern and Central Europe, which served as a gateway
between East and West had long been an aspiration of Russian rulers."
Strategically, Eastern and Central Europe performed two functions for the USSR
during the Cold War. The first function was a defensive one. The countries provided the
Soviet Union's armed forces with a space for deployment and manoeuvre west of the
Soviet border and a space for the location and training of ground and air forces.
Secondly, the buffer zone had the role of a potential spring-boards to the West. Soviet
troops were positioned on territories west of the Soviet borders, assuming an offensive
defence posture towards NATO countries." This double function persisted almost
unchanged throughout the post-World War II, pre-1989 period, despite changes in Soviet
emphasis on nuclear and conventional capabilities. 87
The sphere of influence was enforced by the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet-dominated
alliance, and the centralized economic organization, the Council for Mutual Economic
82 Kosiarski, 'The German Minority', p. 54.
83 Charles Gati, The Bloc that Failed: Soviet-East European Relations in Transition. (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1990), p. 23.
84 Malcolm Mackintosh, 'Military Considerations in Soviet-East European Relations', in Karen Dawisha
and Philip Hanson (eds.), Soviet-East European Dilemmas: Coercion, Competition and Consent.
(London: Heinemann for RIIA, 1981), p. 134.
85 Gati, The Bloc That Failed, p. 23.
86 Mackintosh, 'Military Considerations', p. 137.
g'7 On changes in emphasis on the geostrategic importance of Eastern and Central Europe for the Soviet
Union as result of military strategy development, see Edward N. Luttwak, 'Soviet Military Concerns and
Prospects in Eastern Europe', in Aurel Braun (ed.), The Soviet-East European Relationship in the
Gorbachev Era: The Prospects for Adaptation. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990).
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Assistance (CMEA, or Comecon). The CMEA was established in January 1949, as a
counterweight to the Marshall Plan aid for Western Europe, in which Poland was
prevented from participating. The CMEA's goals were to promote economic development
in the form of forced industrialization, and to serve as an instrument of Soviet control
over Eastern and Central Europe. Within the CMEA the Soviet Union focused primarily
on bilateral economic ties with its satellites. 88
The WTO officially came into being on 14 May 1955 as a response to the inclusion
of Germany into the Western military alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO).89 The establishment of the WTO was based on a treaty of friendship and
collaboration among eight governments (Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German
Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and the USSR).90 Albania ceased to
participate in 1961 and withdrew from the alliance in 1968. There were six WTO
member states after the unification of Germany in October 1990. On 31 March 1991 the
military organs and structures of the WTO were dismantled. 91
The WTO was not an alliance in the Western sense of the word, which implies
maintaining some form of sovereignty. 92 Although the alliance provided the Eastern and
Central European states with various military and economic advantages, it also enabled
the Soviet Union 'to determine both the political context of the domestic environment and
the limits of change' in member states." In other words, the WTO functioned as a
vehicle for Soviet intervention into the domestic affairs of Central and Eastern European
states. In situations of political crisis in Poland, the Soviet government demonstrated its
understanding of the function of the Pact by deploying its forces along the country's
borders. Strikes and demonstrations by workers, students and the intelligentsia broke out
in Poland in 1953, 1956, 1968, 1970, and 1976, often in response to similar events in
88 Renee de Nevers, 'The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe: The End of an Era', Adelphi Papers 249
(March 1990), p. 8.
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Pact: Soviet Security and Bloc Politics. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989).
91 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook 1991: World Armaments and
Disarmament. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. xxv.
92 Volgyes, Politics in Eastern Europe, p. 311.
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Hungary or Czechoslovakia. While WTO forces participated in 'fraternal interventions'.
crushing uprisings in these two Central European countries, Poland was spared."
Despite certain benefits stemming from membership in the all iance, being part of the
WTO was a liability because membership made it difficult, some would argue even close
to impossible, for Central and Eastern European countries to create independent foreign
and security policies based on national interests. A Soviet conducted social ization process
and coercive control mechanisms ensured the participation of Central European countries
in the WTO. Coercive factors were ways of putting pressure on non-Soviet Warsaw
Treaty Organization (NSWTO) countries to follow Soviet orders 'by limiting the
possibility of alternatives'. 95 These included the subordination of both security planning
and the military to the Communist Party; a dependence on Soviet weapons systems (with
the USSR controlling the rate of military modernization in NSWTO armies); Soviet
physical presence on or near the territory of these states, ready to contain any domestic
challenges to the political order; and the imposition until 1987 of a standard WTO
military doctrine upon member states, which shaped force structures in a direction
necessary to Moscow. 96 Socialization control mechanisms included the officer selection
process; ideological indoctrination, particularly aimed at eradicating nationalist sentiment;
military education concentrated in Moscow; and a system of rewards for the officer
corps. 97
Polish coalition doctrine centred around the task of rapid offensive operations on
NATO territory by Warsaw Pact forces. According to this doctrine, regular Polish
military forces were to fight on this 'external front'. Thus, the organisation, weaponry,
and training of the Polish armed forces were all focused on this task. In wartime, the
Polish armed forces were to be combined with Soviet forces, and subordinated to the
Soviet High Command. A 'Polish flavour' was added with the creation of a territorial
defence force. The coal ition doctrine was also based on the assumption that Poland, as
94 Marek Tarniewski, 'Poland's Struggle for Democracy Under Communist Rule', in Olszer (ed.), For
Your Freedom and Ours, p. 311.
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a small state, could not provide for its own defence from NATO. 91'
Soviet policy towards Central Europe was purely exploitative during the immediate
postwar (Stalinist) years. Many authors note however that the WTO came to look more
like a traditional alliance in later years." During the Stalinist period, the USSR decreed
organizational changes in the Polish army, training patters, doctrines, tactics and
uniforms. It placed Soviet officers and advisors. In 1965, a 'renationalization' took place,
and a formal status-of-force agreement was signed between Poland and the USSR. 1°O
Following this change, Polish nationalism was used consciously by the Polish communist
regime to 'sell' the armed forces to the population. 101 Despite the use of the army for
the regime's needs, the military commanded the respect of the Polish population. 102
Because in the Polish political-military culture military power continued to be associated
with the notion of an independent state and Polish nationhood, there was 'an astonishing
amount of support of the army. '103
Particularly during the Stalinist period, the WTO and CMEA emphasised bilateral
relations over multilateral cooperation. The non-Soviet member states were barred from
developing meaningful ties with one other. As Karen Dawisha argues, Stalin's 'divide and
rule' policies destroyed hope of cooperation among the non-Soviet bloc states. 104
In the summer of 1980, a new wave of strikes caused by price increases spread
throughout Poland. The principal victory of the movement was the government's
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concession to allow the creation of independent trade unions, which adopted the name
'Solidarity'. But towards the end of the same year, the threat of armed Soviet intervention
appeared in official propaganda and on 13 December 1981, General Jaruzelski, the
Chairman of the Council of Ministers, declared martial law and ordered the arrest of
activists and dissidents. lOS The decision to introduce martial law and the regime's
references to imminent Soviet intervention in 1981 are to this day subject of a
controversy in Poland. As in 19-56 or 1968, the Soviet leadership was planning and
preparing for the possibility of an intervention in Poland, but their preference was to find
a domestic solution'?", possibly in the expectation that the Pol ish army and population
would have joined forces to resist a Warsaw Pact military intervention.
From 1985, the Soviet Communist Party's newGeneral Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev
moved to establish better relations with the West. The offensive military doctrine was
amended to emphasize defence and sufficiency. This change had ramification for the role
of Central Europe as Soviet war operations zone107 , and was followed by a redefinition
of the role of Eastern Europe in the protection of Soviet territory.
4. Collapse of Communist structures
The 1989 revolution
In 1989, the annus mirabilis, Mikhail Gorbachev moved to apply his domestic
reform policies to the allied states in Eastern and Central Europe, giving them a certain
degree of freedom in both their domestic affairs and their foreign policies.'?" The
'Brezhnev doctrine' which reserved for the Soviet Union the right to intervene in the
105 Shoemaker, Russia, Eurasian States, and Eastern Europe, p. 223.
106 Frances Millard, The Anatomy of the New Poland: Pre-Communist Politics in its First Phase.
(Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1994), pp. 17-18.
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machinery. In addition, autonomous actions by elites and masses in the East-Central European countries
themselves were factors completely beyond USSR control.' See: Charles Jokay, 'Hungarian-Soviet relations
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policies of any Bloc state if the Soviet Communist party elite perceived that 'the interests
of socialism' were endangered was replaced in 1989 by a policy of non-interference.
which some observers called 'the Gorbachev doctrine."?". The Soviet Union's decision-
makers seemed to believe that a sphere of influence could in this way be preserved. 110
In response to this new Soviet policy, however, communist regimes in Eastern and
Central Europe came tumbling down, giving way to multiparty structures. III In Poland,
Solidarity trade unions were legalized again in January 1989. Roundtable talks between
the government and the trade union opened in February. The first truly free elections
were held in October 1991.
The process of unravelling the Cold War order continued. The Berlin Wall collapsed
in November 1989 and was followed by the celebration of German unification on 3
October 1990. On 1 April 1991, the WTO military structures were officially disbanded.
The pact's political structures were abolished on 1 July 1991. 112 CMEA was laid to rest
on 28 June 1991. Following the progressive disintegration of the Soviet Union after the
failure of the August 1991 coup, the USSR collapsed by the end of 1991, and was
replaced by 15 successor states. The inherently unstable Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS) was created in December 1991, and brought together eleven of the fifteen
former republics in a federal structure. Finally, the Czechoslovak state dissolved in what
was called 'the velvet divorce' on 1 January 1993. The metamorphosis of the
109 Richard F. Staar, 'East-Central Europe: The End of the Beginning', in Richard F. Staar (ed.), East-
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international structure left Poland in a 'grey' security zone, but gave it the opportunity
to participate in the process of defining a new position for Poland in the international
system. In framing the country's new foreign policy directions, Polish elites often drew
on Poland's historical experiences.
Most discussions of Polish post-Cold War defence policy are part of a larger debate
about whether security is divisible or indivisible. 113 Accounts of that debate concentrate
on Central Europe's links with existing European security organizations!".
Nevertheless, since the 1989 revolutions in Central Europe, numerous attempts to
institutionalize the existing subregional cooperation frameworks, and proposals to create
new ones in the former NSWTO region have been made both by analysts and policy-
makers attempting to deal with Central European security problems. Little attention has
been paid to these proposals in the West. Nevertheless, the debate surrounding security
and defence orientations in Central Europe is far from finished. Thus, Central European
concepts of subregional multilateral security cooperation deserve a closer look.
Implications of the collapse of the Eastern bloc
The collapse of the Eastern bloc left in its wake a region in transition. Chapter Six
(Threat Perceptions) discusses specific endeavours undertaken by the democratically
elected Polish governments to overcome the legacy of the country's membership in the
WTO. This section gives a general overview of the effects of membership in the Eastern
alliance. Thus it briefly discusses the context in which Poles began to reform and adapt
their security policies and defence structures, and to develop a foreign and security policy
identity.
During the existence of the WTO, armed forces in Central Europe functioned as
instruments of the communist regimes. They were more or less directly subject to Soviet
113 Bonnie Young, 'The Reform of Poland: Military Change Within the National Agenda', in Jeffrey
Simon (ed.), European Security Policy After the Revolutions of 1989. (Washington D.C.: The National
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1993); Andrzej Podraza, 'The Western European Union and Central Europe: A New Relationship', RIIA
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control and influence. 'Within this context, the East European armed forces can be
viewed as archaic vestiges of the ancient regime - political institutions long subject to
direct Soviet/Party controls, presumably thoroughly communized', says Gitz115 . In
Poland, however, the situation may not have been as critical as it was in other states,
since the Polish armed forces were not entirely discredited during the communist period,
and a modicum of national control was maintained. Nevertheless, the armed forces were
to a large degree communized and one of the primary tasks involved depoliticizing them.
The armed forces were required to develop new loyalties, and new ways of thinking. 116
The Polish armed forces were not democratically accountable. The collapse of the
Warsaw Pact left Central European countries with militaries which had almost complete -
and secretive - control over military issues. The military lacked civilian control. Without
a body of civilian expertise, the Central European countries were forced to reform
defence ministries, create parliamentary commissions, decide upon budgets, and begin
a public debate on issues of defence and defence spending.
Central European countries were left with Pact doctrines which did not correspond
to the demands of the new environment. The process of elaborating new doctrines was
bound to be difficult, as it could not be seen as a review, but rather as a completely new
procedure. The tasks were formidable: Poland was left with a large, conscript-based
military force with an offensive posture. Indeed, forces were concentrated almost
exclusively in the western sections of the territories. In addition, the collapse of Warsaw
Pact integrated structures meant for example that former member countries experienced
problems finding spare parts for their equipment. More significantly, some elements of
the defence frameworks, such as air defence, became practically non-functional as the
various national components left the integrated structures.
A second issue was that during the existence of the Eastern bloc, national differences
among its members were kept in check. Thus, non-Soviet member countries were not
able to express their national interests adequately, which by necessity differed not only
from Soviet interests, but also from the interests of other Central European states. The
process of defining and expressing national interests and national differences was bound
to be difficult, and had the potential to create tensions in the Central European region.
The regional fluidity which followed the collapse of the WTO was seen as threatening
115 Gitz, Armed Forces and Political Power, p. 3.
116 Ibid., p. 3.
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by Polish leaders. An additional difficulty was that debates about security needs were by
necessity tied to issues of national identity. 117
Nevertheless, many authors point to the fact that Central European countries were
bound together by their common experience. Regina Cowen Karp writes that' Central
and East European states share a historical experience of communist rule and its
authoritarian political and economic structures. '118 Yet, it occasionally appears that
Western observers put more emphasis on these commonalities than Central Europeans
themselves.
A Polish commentator observed recently that since 1989, for the first time since the
creation of a Polish state a millennium ago, Poland finds itself not facing any enemies
along its borders. 119 Today the country's interests may not necessarily coincide with
those of its neighbours, but these differences do not constitute a direct threat to Polish
sovereignty."? Under these conditions, Central European countries make decisions
about their foreign and defence policies. Whether or not they opt for cooperation with
countries in their immediate geographic proximity is one of the issues which will have
an impact on their security in the future. 121
There have also been domestic changes which changed the qual ity of relations with
neighbouring countries. One of the most significant changes was the change in Polish
policy towards national minorities. It was not until 1989/1990 that minority questions
began to be discussed again in the Polish parliament. A new parliamentary commission
and a special commission in the Ministry of Culture and Arts were created. New
legislation pertaining to minority rights, education and representation was created. The
regulation of relations with countries such as Belorus, Ukraine, Lithuania, Germany and
Israel strengthened the position of minority groups further. Moreover, Polish hopes
of joining Western organizations improved the minorities' situation further, since they
117 Regina Cowen Karp, 'The challenge to transition', in Regina Cowen Karp (ed.), Central and
Eastern Europe: The Challenge of Transition. (Oxford: Oxford University Press for SIPRI, 1993), p.
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forced the country's government to adhere to European standards on the issue of
protection of minorities.
However, the Polish minority policy is frustrated by financial constraints. There are
also problems for example regarding decisions which force members of minorities to use
in official matters Polish versions of their names. A further important matter is the
difficulties regarding representation of minorities on the national level. The Polish
election law, which Iimits participation of small splinter parties, effectively restricts
participation of minority parties, particularly if the groups are small or geographically
diluted. Most importantly, however, little has been done to prepare the Polish society to
accept the changes in the social and political standing of minorities. As a report presented
to the Polish parliament indicates, the historical ballast continues to affect relations
between the Polish population and the national minorities.!" This ballast continues to
affect Poland's relations with its neighbours.
5. Summary and Conclusion
This discussion of Polish history points to a number of phenomena potentially relevant
to contemporary Polish views of subregional cooperation. First, the period of Polish
greatness reaches back to the late middle ages. This Golden Period saw Poland as an
expansionist and multinational state controlling territories now to the East of its borders.
Second, following the collapse of the Polish empire, the country faced a number of acute
challenges to its independence, which threatened its very survival as a state. Poland's
proximity to Germany and to Russia, the two largest and historically most aggressive
neighbours, has thus been a continuous source of dangers. Historically, as the influence
of either Germany or Russia has increased, that of the other has declined; cooperation
between the two big powers has historically been lethal to the smaller states trapped
between them, as the four partitions of Poland attest. Various geopolitical pictures of
Eastern and Central Europe have thus seen Poland as instrumental to the interests of
another power. Third, with its smaller neighbours, Poland was involved in ethno-national
rivalries that prevented them from cooperating. Small state cooperation in this situation
has been both rare and ineffective. The common membership in the WTO has further
122 See Slawomir Lodzinski, 'Struktura narodowosciowa Polski i polityka wobec mniejszosci w latach
1989-1992' [Poland's national structure and minority policies in 1989-1992), BSE Raport 22 (July 1992);
Slawomir Lodzinski, 'AktYWllOSC spoleczno-polityczna i dzialalnosc kulturalno-oswiatowa mniejszosci
narodowych w Polsce w okresie 1989-1992' [Social. political and cultural-educational activities of national
minorities in Poland in 1989-1992], BSE Raport 29 (November 1992).
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contributed to separating Central European countries from each other.
Fourth, the recreation of a large and strong Polish state continued to be the aim of
most sections of the Polish political spectrum throughout the era of partitions and in the
interwar period. The borders of the post-World War II Polish state did not satisfy Polish
irridentist hopes. Moreover, the country's territorial shift to the West exposed the country
to the danger of German irridentism. Poland, now part of the Eastern bloc, pald,_' with
its sovereignty in foreign and security policy for protection of its Western border.
Finally, following the collapse of the Eastern bloc, Poland found itself incapable of
assuring its own defence, and was faced with a number of difficult and lengthy processes
such as the restructuring of command structures and defence posture. Simultaneously, all
of Central Europe was subjected to the processes of transition which were not always
peaceful. It is in this context that Poland, for the first time since 1945, needed to make
sovereign foreign policy choices. One of the foreign policy options available to Poland
was subregional security cooperation.
However, Poland was disliked by its small neighbours because of the imperial ist
aspects of Poland's historical images, and was suspicious of its big neighbours since it
has learnt to distrust great power guarantees. Historically, Polish concepts of subregional
cooperation reflected claims to regional dominance and were hardly attractive to Poland's
neighbours, small or large, yet after the Cold War and the failures associated with other
policy options, they appear attractive precedents for some modern Polish politicians to
draw on.
CHAPTER FOUR
HISTORICAL IMAGES IN POLISH POLITICAL CULTURE
1. Introduction
This chapter examines contemporary Polish BUder der Vergangenheit - images of
the country's history. The chapter first briefly defines the relevant concepts. It then
assesses the general significance of historical images as a part of the political culture of
a country, and relates these images to the concept of nationalism. It interprets historical
images as aspects of political debates and thus as components of political cultures, and
also explores the theoretical relationship between historical awareness and nationalism.
There is not space to highlight differing aspects of political cultures and nationalisms, but
for the sake of the argument generalization is chosen over detailed description.
The second section is devoted to a discussion of the origins of Poland's historical
images. It examines the sources of Poland's images of its history, looking at various
periods of Polish history and discussing elements of contemporary Polish political culture
which these images have helped to shape. Arguably, because of a keen historical
consciousness in Poland, the study of durable components of political culture becomes
particularly important in this case. This section argues that the origins of Polish historical
images are not only to be found in recent history but are of long standing. The late
middle ages, and the era of partitions and Romanticism provide the most significant
ingredients informing modern Polish political culture and Polish nationalism, and are the
source of the most influential historical images. Later periods largely contributed to the
reinforcement of existing historical images. Despite the changes in political culture which
are taking place in the post-communist period, historical images continue to play an
important role in Polish political life.
In the third section, the chapter focuses on the notion of nationalism, since the
72
crucial images informing Polish political culture are necessarily intertwined with notions
of national struggle. Since Poland's historical images have been used as 'protective
shields' against external pressures on the state and the nation, this section analyzes how
Polish nationalist forces have used history in the service of the national survival. It
focuses on external and internal aspects of Polish nationalism. In conclusion, the chapter
assesses the problems and benefits of Poland's reliance on historical images in the current
political debate surrounding issues of foreign and security policy.
2. Historical Images, Political Culture, and Nationalism: A Brief Theoretical
Discussion
Historical images are prevalent ideas about a common past, and factors integrating
a community. They usually have the conscious or unconscious mission of achieving or
resisting assimilation. 1 Historical images have thus been used in the process of nation-
building." Consequently, historical images are collective rather than individual memories
of the past. Which historical phenomena are remembered and in what way depends to a
large extent on the realities of the present, and on the perspective from which they are
viewed.
Accordingly, historical images must be interpreted as important aspects of the
political debate taking place in a given society. They address issues that are relevant to
the 'here and now', rather than the 'somewhere and sometime.'." As such, historical
images are closely related to the concept of perceptions, as this is understood by political
scientists. The assumption from which this study proceeds is that the environment affects
policy-makers only as it is perceived by them and that perceptions are in turn affected by
historical images.
The idea that images of history can be components of political cultures and can
shape political attitudes and behaviours is hardly new. Many authors have in the past
concluded that evaluations of historical experiences can affect political cultures, that is,
I Andrzej Szpocinski, Przemiany Obrazu Przeszlosci Polski [Changes in the Image of Polish Past].
(Warsaw: Instytut Socjologii Uniwersytet Warszawski, 1989), p. 4; Anna Kloskowska, 'Kultury Narodowe
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Functions], and Henryk Samsonowicz, 'Mity w Swiadomosci Historycznej Polakow' [Myths in Poles'
Historical Consciousness], in Anna Kloskowska (ed.), Oblicza Polskosci. (Warsaw: Uniwersytet
Warszawski Program Badan i Wspoltworzenia Filozofii Pokoju, 1990), p. 26.
2 Peter Alter, Nationalismus. (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1985), p. 68.
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the totality of all opinions, values and attitudes which are predominant in a society and
which playa role in the process of public decision-making." Political culture provides
guiding principles for the processing of information and decision-making. The concept
is a difficult one, since political cultures change over time and there is no single political
culture at anyone time in any single country. Nevertheless, generalizing somewhat, it
is possible to say that political cultures have semi-permanent and generally prevalent
elements.
Historical Images may not be an exclusive motivating factor in the process of
decision-making, but they have the potential to overshadow pragmatic considerations.
Thus, it is possible to say that Central Europe's security concerns are Iinked not only to
social, economic, and political developments, but also to more permanent components of
political culture, particularly to historical images held by each society. 5
While durable components of political culture and historical images in particular
have had a significant impact on political scenes in most if not all European countries,
most authors argue that a focus on such elements becomes especially important in the
case of Central and Eastern Europe in general and of Poland in particular. Karen
Dawisha argues that the region is characterized by a 'keen historical consciousness' in
the population as a whole as well as among political leaders." Adam Bromke, speaking
of Poland, calls this phenomenon 'strong historicism'. 7
This historical consciousness is closely related to the notion of Polish nationalism.
Nationalism has meant various things to different people at different times. The classical
approach to nationalism sees it as a state of mind involving individual loyalty to the
nation-state. Woodrow J. Kuhns describes it as 'a psychological phenomenon'
4 The development of nationalism in the 19th and 20th centuries was accompanied by the development
of national historiographies which sought to establish the legitimacy of nation-states by searching for their
roots in Medieval and occasionally even earlier history. History began to be used as a framework of
reference for national policies in European cultures. For descriptions of this phenomenon in Poland, see
Rudolf Jaworski and Nora Koestler, 'Der historische Imperativ in der politischen Kultur Polens', in Gerd
Meyer and Franciszek Ryszka (eds), Die Politische Kultur Polens. (Tuebingen: Francke, 1989), p. 56:
Hans-Georg Heinrich and Slawomir Wiatr, Political Culture in Vienna and Warsaw. (Boulder: Westview
Press, 1990), p. 10; Kloskowska, 'Kultury Narodowe'.
5 Rett R. Ludwikowski, Continuity and Change in Poland: Conservatism in Polish Political
Thought. (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1991), p. xii.
6 Karen Dawisha, Eastern Europe. Gorbachev and Reform: The Great Challenge. (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press. 1988), p. 37.
7 Adam Bromke, Poland's Politics: Idealism vs. Realism. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
1967), p. 253. See also Jaworski and Koestler, 'Der historische Iruperativ', p. 56.
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characterized by both rational and emotional concerns. Rational considerations include
for him 'objective indicators of nationality' - linguistic, cultural, and historical ties.
However, these components are frequently supplanted by 'mythology and mysticism'. 8
Other authors suggest that there is a link between nationalism and a group's interpretation
of its history. Anthony D. Smith in his work on The Ethnic Origins of Nations proposes
that ethnie are communities founded upon shared memories." It follows that although
nationalism does not 'write its history as it pleases', it 'prunes' history for its own
purposes", thus creating historical images.
In the Polish language, 'nationalism' is understood as one of the main political
ideologies, one that gives priority to the interests of the nation over all other
considerations, sees international relations as a struggle for survival, and often has racist
undertones. In languages such as French and English 'nationalism' has a wider meaning
and includes what Poles understand as 'patriotism"." Unlike nationalism, which is
motivated by a devotion to the interests of a national community, patriotism means
devotion to the interests of a particular state, understood as a pol itical community.
While Poles make a distinction between patriotic and nationalist movements, In
the English language the difference is not immediately clear. It is, however, possible to
think of the difference as reflecting what Western scholars see as two different kinds of
nationalism. Western literature suggests that, in principle, there are two types of
nationalism - civic and ethnic", shaped respectively by the Roman/French tradition and
8 Woodrow J. Kuhns, 'Political Nationalism in Contemporary Eastern Europe', in Jeffrey Simon and
Trond Gilberg (eds), Security Implications of Nationalism in Eastern Europe. (Boulder: Westview Press,
1986), p. 82.
9 Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), p. 25.
10 Ibid., p. 176.
II Peter Wandycz, Cena Wolnosci [Price of Freedom]. (Krakow: Znak, 1995), p. 208.
12 See for example Elie Kedourie, Nationalism. (London: Hutchinson University Library, 1961);
Anthony D. Smith, National Identity. (London: Penguin, 1991); Benedict Anderson, Imagined
Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism. (London: Verso, 1983); Hugh
Seton-Watson, Nations and States: An Enquiry into the Origins of Nations and the Politics of
Nationalism. (London: Methuen, 1977). Other scholars have occasionally described civic nationalism as
open or liberal, and ethnic nationalism as closed, nativism, romantic nationalism, and aggressive or integral
nationalism. Charles Gati, 'After Communism, What?' The Political Agenda in Central and Eastern Europe
in the 1990s', in Armand Clesse and Lothar Riihl (eds), Beyond East-West Confrontation: Searching for
a New Security Structure in Europe. (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1990), p. 26; Wojciech Roszkowski,
'Nationalism in East Central Europe: Old Wine in New Bottles'?', in Paul Latawski (ed.). Contemporary
Nationalism in East Central Europe. (Basingstoke: St. Martin's Press, 1995), p. 13; Alter,
Nationalismus; Wandycz, Cena Wolnosci.
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the German ethnic counter-tradition of the 19th century. 13 Civic nationalism is based on
the idea that a nation is not a function of race or ethnicity but of the existence of a
political community. Thus, the presence of a state structure and a system of law is
regarded as vital to the definition of the nation. Cultural and historical considerations are
usually secondary. Ethnic nationalism underscores the nation's shared racial and/or
historical roots as determinants of the national character, although it must be
acknowledged that the use of history for Identitatsbildung - the construction of identity -
is common to both civic and ethnic kinds of nationalism. By contrast, ethnic nationalism
is based on the concept of the subordination of the individual to the interests of the ethnic
group. For this reason, it often expresses itself in restrictions of the rights of minorities.
Ethnic nationalism is also occasionally linked to notions of Realpolitik and narrowly
defined national interest. 14
Many authors make a distinction between Western and Eastern nationalism,
arguing that while in the West the state created the nation, in the East the nation
struggled to create the state. 15 While there is some truth to these arguments, they should
not be accepted uncritically. 16 While the process of spreading national consciousness was
quite clearly different in East and West, in reality, modern nationalism in most countries,
including those of East Central Europe, is an elusive blend of both ethnic and civic types.
The concepts of historical images, political culture and nationalism are necessarily
interlinked: the images informing Polish political culture are intertwined with notions of
national struggle. For this reason, this chapter studies the Polish context by considering
all of these concurrently.
3. Origins of Polish Historical Images
Many Polish sociologists, historians, and political scientists refer back to the
Jagiellonian period of Poland's greatness, and the 19th-century struggle for an
13 See E. J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 20-22.
14 Jan Zielonka, Political Ideas in Contemporary Poland. (Aldershot: Avehury, 1989), p. 53.
15 See for example Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983), p. 99.
16 Wandycz, Cena Wolnosci, p. 211; Peter Sugar, 'External and Domestic Roots of Eastern European
Nationalism', in Peter F. Sugar and Ivo J. Lederer (eds), Nationalism in Eastern Europe. (Seattle:
University of Washington Press, 1969).
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independent state to explain contemporary phenomena." This far-reaching historical
awareness is in itself not a new occurrence in Poland or in other countries. 18 In Poland,
however, this attitude must be viewed in combination with the notion of the Primat der
Aussenpolitik,
The beginnings of this focus on foreign and security policies can be traced to the
17th century, to the Poland of the Jagiellonians, and even earlier, to medieval times. Yet,
it may have been the 19th century, and particularly the Romantic period, which provided
'the largest single ingredient of modern Pol ish culture' 19. Most European countries
experienced Romanticism. However, the influence of the period in Poland was greater
than anywhere else because it coincided with the struggle to regain national independence
and with a series of heroic yet tragic Polish uprisings. The historical experiences of
partitions and foreign rule made Polish traditions and history into a legitimizing device
for the often externally questioned existence of the Polish state." Romanticism shaped
programmes for Polish independence, directed mainly against Russian domination, and
centred on the notion of subregional security cooperation (see Chapter Three).
Significantly, the birth of Polish nationalism took place at the time of the
country's demise and during the cultural period of Romanticism. Similar to other states
during this period before the partitions, the Polish nation was identical with its elite - the
szlachta. The spread of national awareness to other sections of the population then
coincided with the disappearance of the Polish state from maps." During the partitions
of Poland, the occupying powers banned all displays of Polish patriotism and nationalism,
forcing them underground, and defining these as an expression of opposition. As a
consequence, Polish patriotism became enveloped in mysticism and an irrational sense
17 See for example essays in Janusz Tazbir (ed.), Mity i Stereotypy w Dziejach Polski [Myths and
stereotypes in Polish History]. (Warsaw: Interpress, 1991); Michal Tymowski, Historia Polski [Polish
history]. (Paris: Editions Spotkania, 1986).
18 See for example works of Jacques Le Goff and Emmanuel La Roi Ladurie in France, and Doris
Mary and Frank Merry Stenton in Britain.
19 Norman Davies, Heart of Europe: a short history of Poland. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984),
p. 169. See Janusz Tazbir, 'Stereotypow Zywot Twardy: Przedmowa' [TIle hard life of stereotypes:
Preface], and Maria Janon, 'Polski Korowod' [Polish pageant], in Tazbir (ed.), Mity i Sterotypy w
Dziejach Polski; Kazimierz Woycicki, 'Niemcy - Moe Sprawcza Oczekiwan?' [Germans - the fulfilling
force of expectations], Polska w Europie Nr. 10 (January 1993), p. 37; Frederick G. Heymann, Poland
& Czechoslovakia. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1966), p. 112.
20 Jaworski and Koestler, 'Der historische Imperariv'. p. 60.
21 Tymowski, Historia Polski, p. 9.
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of destiny. This 'Romantic patriotic religion' evolved out of the country's Catholicism.
Scholars describe Pol ish nationalism of this period as taking on the character of .a
coherent sect'. 22 This mystic, romantic nationalism was championed by 19th-century
writers, among others Adam Mickiewicz, Juliusz Slowacki and August Cieszkowski.
Romantic nationalism is the basis of the philosophy of messianism which will be
described further below. The destiny of Poland was believed to be unique in the pattern
of the world's history. This spiritual concept of the Polish nation was based on the
conviction that struggle and suffering would bring universal deliverance." Many nations
believed themselves to be 'the chosen people', but Polish nationalism was unique in its
messianic vision.
Historical images which are relevant to Poland's modern pol itical culture and date
back to the 19th century or earlier include the idea of Poland as a 'Bulwark of
Christianity' which is understood to be identical with the European civilization, as well
as what Polish authors call the 'myth of the West' , both of which will be discussed in this
chapter. There is in fact a link between these two images: the concept of Poland as the
vanguard of Christianity and therefore also of Western civilization in the East became a
factor that was pointed out to the West, which was then expected to support the Polish
drive for independence. 24
A school of political thought that developed slightly later than Romanticism was
Positivism. It also constitutes an ingredient of Poland's modern political culture, though
less influential than Romanticism. Positivism's primary inspiration was a disenchantment
with the Romantic notion of 'insurrectionary politics'. Rejecting the unrealistic and often
catastrophic Romantic approaches, it called for a pragmatic and constructive approach to
the country's problems", and for accommodation with larger neighbours. Positivism or
Realism is the inspiration behind political programmes aimed at seeking Russian
support. 26
22 Davies, Heart of Europe, pp. 269-270.
23 Frances Millard, 'Nationalism in Poland', in Paul Latawski (ed.), Contemporary Nationalism in
East Central Europe. (Basingstoke: St. Martin's Press, 1995), p. 109; Andrzej Walicki, The Three
Traditions in Polish Patriotism. Some Peculiarities and Vicissitudes of the Polish National
Consciousness, Past and Present. (Indiana: Indiana University, 1988), p. 31.
24 Tazbir, 'Stereotypow', p. 24.
25 Davies, Heart of Europe, p. 205.
26 Bromke, Poland's Politics, p. 3.
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In the inter-war period, the political culture of the country crystallized further
under the influence of two political personalities. The ideas championed by the architects
of modern Polish nationhood, Jozef Pilsudski, an independence politician and patriot in
the Polish sense of the term, and Roman Dmowski, a nationalist and positivist, are worth
discussing within the context of this question, because they highlight the debate
surrounding the orientation of Polish foreign policy. Jerzy Giedroyc, the prominent editor
of Kultura, probably the most significant emigre publication, , laments that even today
the Polish state is ruled from the tombs of these two men". The II Rzeczpospolita
continues to be greatly admired in contemporary Poland." In fact, Pilsudski and
Dmowski had a lasting effect on Polish political culture. To this day, the two continue
to provoke controversy as well as veneration. They clearly influenced the attitudes of the
communist elites, opposition movements and Polish society at large."
While serving common goals, Dmowski and Pilsudski represented the
contradictory elements of Polish political culture as it was shaped by the period of
partitions. Although arguably on opposite sides of the political spectrum, Dmowski and
Pilsudski did have characteristics in common. In short, both had Iittle respect for
democratic procedures, and transcended party politics." Both also aimed to make
Poland a strong and territorially large state.
Over a period of some forty years these two contemporaries and rivals carried out
passionate debates on all aspects of domestic and international politics. Pilsudski
maintained that the nation was created by a common history rather than by a shared
ethnicity. Thus, if different ethnic groups chose to be loyal to a multinational society,
Pilsudski would accept them as part of the Polish nation. This model of a nation came
close to the civic paradigm of nationhood and citizenship, but reflected more closely
27 Jerzy Giedroyc quoted in Stefan Kozak, 'Polsko-Ukrainskie Dylematy i Dialogi' , Polska w Europie
Nr. 10 (January 1993), p. 49. See also 'Problem panstwa z nieprawego loza. Rozmowa z prof. Jerzym
Holzerem' [Problem of the illegitimate state. Conversation with prof. Jerzy Holzer], 'Bal w historycznych
kostiumach. Rozmowa z prof. Karolem Modzelewskim' [Ball in historical costumes. Conversation with
prof. Karol Modzelewski], and 'Zakurzony szyld. Rozmowa z prof. Piotrem Wandyczem' [Dusty sign.
Conversation with prof. Piotr Wandycz], in Mariusz Urbanek (ed.), Pilsudski his. (Warsaw: MOST,
1995).
28 Davies, Heart of Europe, p. 151.
29 See for example Michal Sliwa, Idee Polityczne w Polsce - Wiek XX [Political Ideas in Poland - 20th
century]. (Krakow: Wydawnictwo Oddzialu Polskiej Akademii Nauk, 1994), p. 36.
30 Davies, Heart of Europe, p. 133.
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Pilsudski's admiration of the multinational and powerful Pol ish-Lithuanian
commonwealth. Dmowski, on the other hand, subscribed to the ethnic nationalist view
that a nation was a distinct entity with a separate language, territory, and history. He
believed in the 'once and forever' nation. This implied that a nation would exist
irrespective of political circumstances, and had the corporate right to control its own land
and people." Dmowski was not prepared to allow minority groups to participate in the
decision-making process in the large, unitary Polish state he envisaged, unless they
became assimilated."
The two diverged also on the issue of religion. Dmowski saw Roman Catholicism
as a factor that defined Pol ish identity. For Pilsudski, who followed the secular notion
of a civic nation, religion was not of such great importance and Polish nationhood was
not for him based on religious affiliations."
Another issue which divided Pilsudski and Dmowski was the feasibility of Polish
national independence. For Pilsudski, independence was apriority. Dmowski thought
of Poland's independence as a goal, but not as a way of reforming Polish society. He did
not see independence in itself as providing for a nation's success." Consequently, their
preferred political methods diverged." Pilsudski believed in the use of violence and
military force. Dmowski saw risings as problematic because they diverted attention and
energy from what he considered effective approaches to the country's problems."
In the ideas of both of these men, history and historical symbols played a
dominant role. Dmowski based his ideas of Poland on the Piast period of the early
Middle Ages. Pilsudski looked back to the Republic of Poland-Lithuania, and Poland's
Jagellonian period. According to Polish historical images, the Piast perspective is linked
31 Ibid., p. 138. See also Tadeusz Lepkowski, 'Historyczne Kryteria Polskosci' [Historical Criteria of
Polishness], in Kloskowska (ed.), Oblicza Polskosci, pp. 93-94; Millard, 'Nationalism in Poland', p. 111:
Stanislaw Gomulka and Antony Polonsky, 'Introduction', in Stanislaw Gomulka and Antony Polonsky (ed.),
Polish Paradoxes. (London: Routledge, 1990), p. 9.
32 Jerzy Tomaszewski, 'The National Question in Poland in the Twentieth Century', in Mikulas Teich
and Roy Porter (eds), The National Question in Europe in Historical Context. (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1993), p. 307.
33 Davies, Heart of Europe, p. 143.
34 Ibid., p. 139.
35 Sliwa, 'Idee Polityczne', pp. 27-37. 13-26; Davies, Heart of Europe. p. 140: Wandycz, Cena
Wolnosci, p. 328.
36 Davies, Heart of Europe, p. 140.
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with a preoccupation with the country's western borders, whereas the Jagellonian
perspective implies interest in eastern expansion."
The main difference between Dmowski and Pilsudski consequently lay in the
orientation they believed best for Polish foreign policy. Dmowski saw Germany as the
main threat to Poland; Pilsudski perceived Russia as most dangerous. The latter's goal
was the creation of an anti-Russian federation of independent states between the Black
and the Baltic Seas (see Chapter Three and Nine). Variations of their views of Poland's
position and role in Central and East Central Europe are still voiced by Polish political
forces.
The Poles' experiences in the Second World War reinforced many of the historical
images formed earlier. The ordeal bolstered their fears of Germany. Even prior to 1939,
Germans were seen as 'century-old enemies of Slavs'. 38 However, the losses Poland
endured under German (and Soviet) occupation were unlike anything the country had
undergone even in the most tragic periods of its history. The Soviet attack on Poland,
Soviet behaviour during the Warsaw uprising", and finally, the imposition of a
communist regime strengthened Polish Russophobia. In addition, the 1939 Molotov-
Ribbentrop Pact became for the Poles a symbol of the ill-wishing intentions of their
western and eastern neighbours alike. Poles felt abandoned by their Western allies in both
1939 and after the war, when Western powers conceded a compromise with the Soviet
Union concerning Poland. 40 Finally, the war confirmed the romantic notion of a Polish
nation with a tradition of resistance.
Post-war Polish political culture was shaped by communism as well as in
opposition to it." The political programme of the official Polish communist regime
borrowed heavily from the tradition of Dmowski's National Democrats. It linked their
37 See Jerzy Topolski, 'Narod, spoleczenstwo i panstwo jako czynniki tworcze w dziejach Polski'
[Nation, society and state as creative factors in Polish history], in Kloskowska (ed.), Oblicza Polskosci,
p.43.
38 Tazbir, 'Stereotypow', p. 20.
39 Poles interpret the events surrounding the Warsaw uprising as proof of Soviet treachery. The Red
Army stopped its advance and calmly watched the atrocities committed by Germans against the Poles
participating in the rebellion. Heinrich and Wiatr, Political Culture in Vienna and Warsaw, p. 124.
40 Andrew Michta, East Central Europe After the Warsaw Pact: Security Dilemmas in the 1990s.
(New York: Greenwood Press, 1992), p. 27-28. See Chapter Three for further information on the Pact.
41 George Kolankiewicz, 'Poland', in Stephen Whitefield (ed.), The New Institutional Architecture
of Eastern Europe. (Basingstoke: St. Martin's, 1993), p. 102.
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concepts of real istic patriotism to the ideology of social ism, by arguing that the country's
position in the Eastern bloc allowed it to accomplish the necessary social reforms. It
emphasized that the Polish-Soviet alliance created conditions for the continued existence
of the Pol ish state. Wladyslaw Gomulka, the First Secretary of the Communist Party for
a brief period after the Second World War and again from 1956 to 1970, summed up the
arguments as follows:
The enemies of the People's Poland would like to push our country into an abyss
of chaos and anarchy ... They are well aware that only socialist Poland can
remain on the map of Europe as an independent and sovereign state. They are
well aware that the Polish United Workers' Party is the guarantor of her
independence ... the guarantor of fraternal neighbourly Polish-Soviet relations,
which are in line with the most vital interest of the Polish nation. To [turn against]
the candidates of the Polish Workers' Party is tantamount to destroying socialism
in Poland ... destroying the independence of our country, erasing Poland from the
map of Europe. 42
The opposition groups that evolved in Poland before 1989 embraced political
doctrines based on the teachings of the Catholic Church, and 'sanitized' versions of
Dmowski's ideas. In the early 1980s, the Solidarity movement officially recognized
Christian ethics as part of its programme. Indeed, 'Christ's suffering on the cross became
a symbol of workers' strikes and national manifestations'. 43
The absence of political forces expressing neo-Pilsudskiite ideas in the pre-1989
period can be at least partly attributed to the fact that under the circumstances nationalist
ideas could not be pursued openly. 44 In the 1980s, a number of political groupings
emerged that did adhere to the nationalist, Pilsudski-inspired ideas (such as the concept
of Miedzymor:e, a Central European community of states). The main one was the
patriotic-fundamentalist Confederation for Independent Poland, an opposition party which
subsequently held 49 seats in the Parliament under Prime Minister Hanna Suchocka (see
Chapter Nine).
Today, both the post-endeks, named after Dmowski's National Democrats
(Endecja) , and the 'neo-Pilsudskiites' take part in the country's political debates. The
Endecja-inspired part of the political spectrum currently encompasses some twenty
42 Wladyslaw Gomulka quoted in Davies, Heart of Europe, p. 120.
43 Zielonka, Political Ideas, p. 35.
44 Sliwa, 'Idee Polityczne', p. 36.
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organizations. None of them have succeeded in creating a solid political structure. The
most influential of them is the Christian-National Union (ZchN), lead by Wieslaw
Chrzanowski."
In general, the fall of communism has resulted in the revival of suppressed
national identities and nationalism in Central and East Central Europe. While sections of
the Polish population have rejected the notion of ethnic nationalism, there are nonetheless
political forces relying on aggressive nationalist political platforms."
Poland's modern political culture, like that of every other European country, IS
based on an elusive mix of two diametrically opposed schools of thought, Romanticism
and Positivism, or more generally, political idealism and political realism. Yet unlike
other cultures, Poland's political culture is dominated by Romantic concepts.
It is beyond dispute that Polish historical awareness manifests itself In a
Geschichtskanon. In the past, the historical images on which this canon relies were an
ideal source of strength for the Polish nation, a mode of cultural and political survival.
Jaworski and Koestler describe it as a Schild kollektiver Selbstbehauptung - a shield of
collective self-assertion." Arguably, historical images continue to playa valuable role
in three respects. Marcin Krol suggests that they are indispensable elements of the
political discourse in contemporary Poland. The 'language of ideology' has never played
a great role in Polish politics, even under communist rule. Significantly, too, after the
demise of the Eastern bloc, the 'legal-constitutional language' of Western European
politics has not become the language of Polish politics. In this situation only the use of
the historical discourse allows, according to a number of Polish observers, an
involvement by citizens in the political Iife of the country. 48 No other language of
politics would allow the population to participate in the political process. Secondly, for
the heavily fragmented political spectrum, the historical narrative provides a minimum
of the necessary unifying force. Thirdly, for Polish society, the shared image of Polish
history furnishes a source of motivation and identification in a difficult period of
45 Ibid., p. 24.
46 Roszkowski, ,Nationalism in East Central Europe', p. 21.
47 Jaworski and Koestler, 'Der historische Imperativ', p. 67.
48 Marcin Krol, 'Przedmowa' [Preface], in Adolf Bochenski. Historia i Polityka: Wybor
publicystyki. (Warsaw: Panstwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, 1989), p. 5; Anna Uhlig. W Kregu Symboli




However, a number of scholars suggest that in addition to these constructive
aspects, there are dangers inherent in the reliance on historical images in political
discourse. Marcin Krol speaks in this context of the Poles' 'fatal propensity' to treat their
history as collective inheritance." Jaworski and Koestler point out that history is a
component of Polish political culture which no political or societal force believes it can
do without, or rather, which no politically aware Pole can safely step back from. 50 Poles
do not easily tolerate deviation from accepted images. Individuals who choose to point
out the less glorious aspects of Polish history and issues of historical interpretation in too
explicit a way, are faced with a widespread lack of acceptance or interest in their
work." Bromke claims that many Polish historians are reluctant to challenge the
traditionalist notion of the country's history because of its political function. 52 If
deviation from an accepted way of thinking and a canonical version of historical events
is sanctioned, the political discourse cannot be either innovative or constructive. Indeed,
Jaworski and Koestler suggest that this aspect of Polish historical awareness could hinder
national development. 53
The escape into history also results in the danger that the people and the elites
may not distinguish between the present and the past, thus creating an illusory world in
which contemporary political discourse takes place." References to the country's history
can be conceived of as ways to avoid confronting today's difficult problems."
Moreover, although the use of historical images can open up the political discourse to a
wider public, it can also prevent the creation of a necessary legal-constitutional
framework. Finally, the use of historical images in political discourse may affect relations
with neighbouring countries which experienced what Poles call the Golden Age as a
49 Jaworski and Koestler, 'Der historische Imperativ', p. 60.
50 Ibid., p. 67.
51 Marcin Krol, 'Przedmowa', p. 5; idem, 'Patriotyczna mysl i patriotyczny stereotyp' [Patriotic
thought and patriotic stereotype], in Tazbir (ed.), Mity i Stereotypy w Dziejach Polski.
52 Adam Bromke, The Meaning and Uses of Polish History. (Boulder: East European Monographs.
1987), p. 105.
53 Jaworski and Koestler, 'Der historische Imperativ', p. 67.
54 Krol, 'Przedmowa', p. 5.
55 Jaworski and Koestler, 'Der historische Imperativ', p. 67.
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period of oppression and Polish imperialism.
4. Historical Images and Nationalism in Poland
External aspects of Polish nationalism
Polish nationalism is 'popularly defined as being intrinsically Western in
orientation'. 56 Although geographically Poland finds itself between the East and the
West as these are usually defined, the Western connection has always been of paramount
importance to the cultural self-definition of the Polish nation. 57
Arguably, Poland's westward gaze is a function of its Catholicism. During the
Jagellonian period, Poland claimed to constitute the Antemurale Christianitatis, or in
other words, the 'Bulwark of Christendom'. Poland's elected kings came from the West,
rather than the East, because they were required to be Catholic. For the same reason,
most of the country's cultural, economic and political links connected Poland to the
Western world. Thus Poles' sympathies lay with the peoples of the West rather than with
the country's eastern neighbours. Indeed, Poland's geographical isolation from the West,
and the failures of the West to come to Poland's assistance have not discouraged the
Polish enthusiasm for Western ties. Simultaneously, Poland's geographical proximity to
the East has only increased its hostility, particularly towards Russia.
The deep-seated Russophobia in Poland stems from a number of historical
differences and conflicts between the two countries, both religious and territorial in
nature. It is worth recalling that Russians (or Soviets) marched into Poland in 1632,
1655,1706,1710,1768-72,1791-2,1794,1813,1831, 1863, 1919-20, 1939-41, and
1944-5. 58 Accordingly, anti-Russian emotions date back to the Jagellonian period of
Pol ish history, but were reinforced throughout following centuries. As mentioned above,
the Second World War and its aftermath further intensified the historically motivated
Polish fears of both Germans and Russians". Heinrich and Wiatr, in their empirical
study of Polish political culture in the 1980s, detected continued 'fierce anti-Sovietism
56 Dawisha, Eastern Europe, p. 73.
57 Davies, Heart of Europe, p. 342.
58 Ibid., p. 376.
59 Dawisha, Eastern Europe, p. 58.
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and anti-Communism'. 60 Suspicion and mistrust towards the USSR existed even among
the communist leadership." Nevertheless, in the post-communist era, Polish sociologists
discovered a change in attitudes towards Russians. While the expectation was that Polish
Russophobia would continue or even intensify with the end of the Cold War. the Polish
population appears suspicious of the Russian state, but not of the Russian people."
The myth of the West as it has been held by Polish elites since the 16th century
sees Poland as part of Western Europe, culturally related to countries such as Italy.
France and later also the Netherlands and England, but not Germany (see Chapter Five).
The traditional fear of Germany among Poles originated from the German Drang nach
Osten accompanied by religious and territorial disputes and clashes with Poland. Feelings
caused by German participation in the partitions of Poland, accompanied by ruthless
policies of Germanization were further enforced by the atrocities committed against Poles
during the World Wars. The tense relations between the two countries following 1945
were marked by Polish fears of German revisionism.
Current attitudes of Poles toward Germans and Germany are divided. Woycicki
suggests that there is a mixture of great and historically rooted fears, combined with
hopes for a more positive future." On the one hand, scholars agree that anti-German
sentiments remain an important factor in Polish public opinion." The possibility that
Germany might attempt to exploit the fact that there is a German minority in Poland in
60 Heinrich and Wiatr, Political Culture in Vienna and Warsaw, p. 82.
61 It is reported that a section of the Polish Foreign . ministry was responsible in the 1970s for
relatively clear and unbiased assessments of Soviet purposes and aims in its relations with Poland, and the
threat stemming from Soviet links with East Germany. There are also reports of conversation that took
place between Wladyslaw Gomulka, the First Secretary of the Polish Communist Party, and Leonid
Brezhnev, the First Secretary of the Soviet Union's Communist Party, in 1969, during which Gomulka
accused the Soviet Union of negotiating a treaty with the Federal Republic of Germany 'behind Poland's
back'. Andrzej Wilk, 'Podejrzany sojusznik' [Suspicious ally], Rzeczpospolita (15-15 January 1994).
62 'Miedzy Polakami. Rozmowa z Dr. Hab. Ireneuszem Krzeminskim. Pracownikiem Naukowyrn
Instytutu Socjologii Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego' [Among Poles. Conversation with Dr. Ireneusz
Krzeminski, researcher at the Institute of Sociology of the Warsaw University], Rzeczpospolita (16 March
1995).
63 Woycicki, 'Niemcy - Moe Sprawcza Oczekiwan?', p. 37.
64 Ronald D. Asmus and Thomas S. Skyway, Polish National Security Thinking in a Changing
Europe: A Conference Report. (Santa Monica: RAND, 1991), p. 17; Krzeminski. 'Miedzy Polakami'.
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order to change present borders is often mentioned as potentially destabilizing for
Poland." German economic initiatives are viewed with suspicion. On the other hand,
Poles favour Poland's return to Europe accomplished with German political and economic
help.
Poland traditionally saw its actual neighbours as less civilized than Western
European states. Furthermore, Poland was constantly involved in armed conflict with one
or several of the surrounding states. Thus, help was always sought somewhere else: in
Paris, Rome or London." Belief in the West's forthcoming help, together with the
conviction that it had the duty to assist Poland, became a persistent theme in Polish
politics. This myth of the West expressed itself, for example, in a recurring trust in
French and/or English military commitment to Poland." Since this trust has been
disappointed so often, Poles' attitudes to the West are now divided. On the one hand,
there is a perception of a perpetual link, on the other, the opinion that the West has not
lived up to its responsibilities.
The underground opposition of the pre-1989 era and most Polish political forces
today refuse to accept the current division of Eastern and Western Europe. This attitude
is linked to the Western orientation of Polish nationalism. 'Poland belongs to Europe' and
'Europe must include all nations that cultivate the European historical heritage' - are the
repeated cries. Demands for Poland (and other Central European states) to 'return to
Europe' can be found in any official speech. For example, Poland's Prime Minister
Hanna Suchocka stated recently that 'the family of democratic Western European
countries, ... , is what we aim at. Not because we need some umbrella, but because we
all share the same values and objectives. '68 President Lech Walesa said that ' in the
divided Europe we have always been standing on the side of the same values .... The
sovereign 3rd Republic being created today resumes its place in Europe for the sake of
these values. '69 But the sentiment is best expressed by Andrzej Olechowski, an adviser
65 Boleslaw Balcerowicz, Brigade General, Polish Armed Forces, interview by author, 19 November
1991, Warsaw; Polish Foreign policy in the Program of the Polish Christian Democratic Forum.
(Warsaw: Christian Democratic Forum, 1991).
66 Tazbir, 'Stereotypow', p. 25.
67 Ibid., p. 21.
68 From'Address of her Excellency the Prime Minister of the Republic of Poland, Hanna Suchocka,
at Chatham House on March 3, 1993'. London (March 1993).
69 'President Lech Walesa Visits NATO Headquarters 3 July 1991', NATO Review Vol. 39, No.4
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to the Polish President, who in 1992 said that 'like a majority of Poles, I identify with
the West and always disliked to be qualified as an Eastern European. '10
Nevertheless, despite the fact that most Western observers conclude that In
Poland, 'the dominant Westernizers have hardly any native opponents with whom to
contend'71, there are admittedly weaker political forces advocating Slavophile or even
pan-Slavist approaches inspired by a mixture of aggressive ethnic nationalism and some
elements of the Positivist tradition. Pan-Slavism as a term is usually used loosely to
describe a number of expressions of affinity, sometimes mutually hostile, among some
or all Slavic peoples. As Michael Boro Petrovich argues, 'by Pan-Slavism is meant the
historic tendency of the Slavic people to manifest in some tangible way, whether cultural
or political, the consciousness of ethnic kinship'. 72
Pan-Slavism, which first developed in mid-19th century, during the Romantic
period, is based on corporate principles, glorifying the nation rather than the
individual. 73 At its extreme it advocates territorial and cultural expansion at the expense
of other peoples." This statement may appear contradictory: after all, pan-Slavism
pleads for the supra-national unity of the Slav peoples as opposed to national preferences.
However, this supra-national cause did not preclude pan-Slavists from believing in
national egoism - the sacra egoism.
The aspirations and hopes of the various Slavic people were often at odds, and
thus it is not surprising that Polish pan-Slavism evolved to mean something quite different
than Russian or Soviet pan-Slavism. Following the collapse of the Polish-Lithuanian
empire, Polish nationalists continued to see their nation as having a civilizing mission in
the East. As Kohn says, 'romantic nationalism based on the veneration of the past without
foundation in the present, and the consciousness of grave threats by power pressure from
without and centrifugal pressures from within, prepared the soil for the Polish messianic
70 Andrzej Olechowski, 'Polacy i Niemcy w procesie integracji europejskiej' [Poles and Germans in
the process of European integration], Studia i Materialy 54 (February 1993), p. 25.
71 Davies, Heart of Europe, pp. 342-345.
72 Michael Boro Petrovich, The Emergence of Russian Panslavism 1856-1870. (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1956), p. ix.
73 Kuhns, 'Political Nationalism', p. 82.
74 Hans Kohn, Pan-Slavism: Its History and Ideology (2nd ed). (New York: Vintage Books, 1960),
p. IX.
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Slavism." Although some Polish pan-Slavists were prepared to seek Russian help,
others pursued closer links among the West Slavs - the nations of what is today defined
as Central Europe - directed against Russian imperialism.
Polish pan-Slavism has waxed and waned like all nationalist concepts. Today, it
IS supported by a small number of relatively insignificant political groupings.
Nevertheless, it continues to playa role in Polish political culture and Polish nationalism.
Significantly, Polish federalist concepts have never been linked with pan-Slavist
ideas. The geographical field of interest of both pan-Slavists and federalists did to a great
extent coincide. But Polish federalist forces, such as Pilsudskiites and neo-Pilsudskiites,
advocated, unlike the pan-Slavists, the notion of civic nationalism, or in the Polish usage,
patriotism. The Polish endecja with its programme based on ethnic nationalist concepts
was closer to pan-Slavism."
Polish nationalism and Domestic Policy
Nationalism affected not only external orientations, but also domestic policies.
Aspects of such internal developments have for example affected the treatment of national
minorities within the country, and thus also relations with neighbouring countries. It is
therefore necessary to discuss Polish nationalism and domestic policy.
Polish history included periods of tolerance, for example during the Jagellonian
period, when Poland may have been the most open-minded state in Europe. The Polish-
Lithuanian federation (14-17th century) was multi-religious and multi-lingual. These times
of tolerance figure prominently in Polish historical awareness as the country's Golden
Period. However, although during this period Polish national consciousness emphasized
the diverse cultural background of the country, it was frequently characterized by a
narrow ethnocentricity. From its beginnings Poland's history was marked by territorial
pressures from both east and west and by efforts to establish or maintain an independent
national state despite an unfavourable geopolitical location." It is not surprising that
already in the 18th century, Poles 'had a reputation for exaggerated pride in their
75 Ibid., p. 30.
76 See Antoni Giza, Neoslawizrn i Polacy: 1906-1910 [Neo-Slavism and Poles: 1906-19101. (Szczecin:
Wyzsza Szkola Pedagogiczna, 1984).
77 Wesley M. Shoemaker, Russia, Eurasian States, and Eastern Europe (23rd ed.). (Washington
D.C.: Stryker-Post, 1992), p. 214.
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country'78. During this period, Polish nobility, the szlachta, adhered to so-called
'Sarrnatism '. the conviction that Polish traditions were superior to those of their
neighbours."
With the development of nationalist ideas during the period of Romanticism.
which coincided with the collapse of the Polish state, the various national communities
began to drift apart, considering themselves parts of separate and distinctive nations. 80
In the Poland of the partition era, it was not only the extreme right that believed that the
country should be reconstructed in its old territorial grandeur. The national aspirations
of Lithuanians, Ukrainians and Belorussians caused bitterness among Poles." and the
desires of these minorities were seen as fuelled by foreign interests. This viewpoint was
revived during the interwar period.
Significantly, Heinrich and Wiatr suggest that the concept of tolerance has
survived in one particular political context - that of the creation of a Central European
federation." This statement indicates that proposals for subregional cooperation formed
after the interwar idea of a Central European federation, discussed in Chapter Nine, are
founded upon the notion of tolerance towards other ethnic groups. That such a view is
a simplification and to some degree a distortion of the notion is suggested in Chapter
Three and Chapter Nine. The findings of these two chapters indicate that many of the
Polish subregional concepts actually reflect elements of ethnic nationalism. They
occasionally reflect references to the past of the Polish state as an empire, and implicitly
or explicitly advocate the policy of cultural expansionism.
Polish nationalism has been shaped by both the Positivist tradition of
accommodation and the Romantic notion of contestation. These confl icting attitudes
continue to be evident. The Church in the Solidarity era cultivated a romantic tradition
of nationalism." Cardinal Wyszynski propagated the 'cult of national suffering and
patriotic heroism'. As in many other political cultures, the test of patriotism was the
78 Davies, Heart of Europe, p. 269.
79 Lepkowski, 'Historyczne Kryteria', p. 91.
80 Davies, Heart of Europe, p. 152.
81 Tazbir, 'Stereotypow', p. 18.
82 Heinrich and Wiatr, Political Culture in Vienna and Warsaw, p. 84.
83 Wieslaw Peczak, 'Bez Symboli ' [Without Symbols]. Polityka (19 June 1993).
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willingness to give one's life for the country." However, for the Church, romantic
veneration of 'Polish historical destiny and of national spirit of Polish souls' went hand
in hand with compromises with the communist government. 85 Surprisingly, the Polish
Church also significantly contributed to a relative normalization of Polish-German
relations by conducting a dialogue with its German counterpart. 86
The Solidarity movement, which had its beginnings in 1980, while deeply
patriotic, also pursued positivist reform rather than revolution. Although not actively
following a philosophy of non-violence, it distanced itself from acts of violence and, like
the Church, pursued a strategy of dialogue and compromise with communist
authorities. 87
Yet, in a discussion of the historical idea of a revolutionary Polish nation with a
tradition of risings and resistance, Heinrich and Wiatr point out that the influence of the
past on the minds of the younger generation continues to be immense. The authors detect
'unspecified readiness to fight for Poland's freedom, to sacrifice oneself for the
nation. '88 In the 1980s, Poland's youth, particularly the more highly educated sections.
were prepared to fight, which often reflected 'unfounded romanticism' or an escape from
realities.89
84 Zielonka, Political Ideas, p. 57.
85 Ibid., p. 59. See also Norbert Zmijewski, 'Between Cooperation and Opposition - the Church in
Poland since 1945', in R.F. Miller and T. H. Rigby (eds), Religion and Politics in Communist States.
(Canberra: The Australian National University, 1986).
86 As early as 1965, Polish bishops addressed an open letter to German bishops, advocating a
normalization of relations. Other contacts between the German and the Polish Churches followed. See:
'1965 listopad 18, Rzym. - Oredzie biskupow polskich do ich niemieckich braci w Chrystusie ' [18
November 1956, Rome. - Proclamation of Polish bishops to their German brothers in Christ]: '1965
grudzien 5, Bonn. - Odpowiedz biskupow niemieckich do biskupow polskich' [5 December 1965, BorID. -
Response of German bishops to Polish bishops]; '1970 listopad 5, Rzym. - List kardynala Wyszynskiego
do kardynala Doepfnera' [5 November 1970, Rome. - Letter of Cardinal Wyszynski to Cardinal Dopfner];
'1970 grudzien 14, Monachium. - Odpowiedz kardynala Doepfnera do kardynala Wyszynskiego [14
December 1970, Munich. - Response of Cardinal Dopfner to cardinal Wyszynski], , 1989 sierpien,
Warszawa-Bonn. - Oswiadczenie katolikow polskich i niemieckich w piecdziesiata rocznice wybuchu II
wojny swiatowej' [August 1989, Warsaw-Bonn. - Declaration of Polish and German Catholics on the
fiftieth anniversary of the outbreak of World War II], and other documents, all in Hans-Adolf Jacobsen and
Mieczyslaw Tomala (eds.), Warszawa - Bonn: Stosunki polsko-niemieckie. Analiza i dokumenty.
(Warsaw: PISM, 1992). See also Jozef Pospiech, 'Niemcy i Polacy po otwarciu granicy [Germans and
Poles after Opening of the Border], Studia i Materialy 71 (December 1993).
87 Zielonka, Political Ideas, p. 78.
88 Heinrich and Wiatr, Political Culture in Vienna and Warsaw. p. 82.
89 Ibid., p. 173.
91
An important aspect of Polish nationalism has been its close link to religion.
Polish culture defined itself through Roman Catholicism, belonging to the Latin West,
and at a distance from Byzantium and the orthodox East. 90 Significantly, the Latin
alphabet of the Roman Cathol ic Church had the effect of contrasting Poland with other
eastern or southern Slav nations, which used Cyrill ic. The Poles cultivated the notion that
they were a frontier of Catholicism and thus of Western culture, a belief that somewhat
clashed with reality (after all, some of the countries west of Poland's borders were
Protestant). The combination of conflicting political claims and spiritual values caused
hostility and friction between Poles and Russians."
In the era of the partitions, Catholic religion became interwoven with
nationalism." From religious mysticism emerged Polish messianism, a belief in a supra-
national mission of the Polish nation. Thus Poland was seen as a 'Christ of nations', a
collective Messiah, whose crucifixion would save the world.'? Messianic romantic
national ism had a powerful impact on Pol ish pol itical culture until 1918 and later. 94
After the Second World War the position of the Church in Poland grew stronger
than ever. 95 The distress and misery of the war years prompted people to turn to
religion for solace. The new communist authorities' attempts to weaken the influence of
the Church only seemed to increase people's allegiance to the Church;" Most
importantly, with the ethnic changes in Polish society caused by the killings and
90 Gerd Meyer, 'Einleitung: Die Politische Kultur Polens in den 80er Jahren - ein Ueberblick', in Gerd
Meyer and Frauciszek Ryszka (eds), Die Politische Kultur Polens. (Tuebingen: Francke, 1989), p. 3;
Henryk Skomlinowski, 'Uniwersalne wartosci etosu polskiego' [Universal values of Polish ethos], in
Antonina Kloskowska (ed.), Oblicza Polskosci. (Warsaw: Uniwersytet Warszawski Program Badan i
Wspoltworzenia Filozofii Pokoju, 1990), pp. 147-150; Lepkowski, 'Historyczne kryteria', pp. 97-98;
Samsonowicz, 'Mity w Swiadomosci', p. 155.
91 Shoemaker, Russia, Eurasian States, and Eastern Europe, p. 213.
92 Davies, Heart of Europe, p. 203.
93 For a discussion of Polish Messianism, see: Wojciech Dzieduszycki, Messyanizm Polski a Prawda
Dziejow [The Polish Messianism and the Truth of History]. (Krakow: Czas, 1901); See also Meyer,
,Einleitung: Die Politische Kultur'. Messianism is a conservative concept which reaches back to the times
of struggle for Polish nationhood. It was further developed at the turn of the century, when Poland was not
on the map of Europe. See Sliwa, Idee Polityczne, pp. 6-13; Andrew Targowski, Chwilowy Koniec
Historii [Momentary end of history]. (Krakow: Nowe Wydawnictwo Polskie, 1991), p. 8.
94 Gomulka and Polonsky, 'Introduction', p. 5.
95 Davies, Heart of Europe, p. 11.
96 See Bohdan Cywinski, 'Koniec Wieku nad Wisla' [The end of the century on the Visrula],
Rzeczpospolita (19 December 1994).
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repatriations during and after World War II, Poland was for the first time in its history
almost homogeneously ethnically Polish and Catholic.
During the communist era, the Cathol ic Church played an important role in
fostering Polish culture and historical heritage." Various personal and institutional links
existed between the Church and the opposition, particularly with Solidarity. Writing
before the systemic changes of 1989, Heinrich and Wiatr assert that the identification of
the Church with national struggle was so strong that Poles who could not be described
as religious attended religious services to parade their patriotism."
After 1980, but especially after 1989, religion and the Church began to be less
important. In 1980, 53 per cent of respondents supported the idea of increasing the
Catholic church's role in public life. In 1984, only 21 per cent greeted this idea."
According to a poll published in May 1992, the confidence rating of the Polish Catholic
Church showed a significant drop (from 81 % in 1990 to 55 % in 1992).100 Nevertheless,
one cannot overlook the continued importance of the Church in Polish political culture.
5. Assessment and Conclusion
This chapter proceeds from the assumption that images of history are elements of
the political debate, generally inspired by nationalism, of which there are two kinds: civic
and ethnic (or in the Polish usage patriotism and nationalism). The civic tradition is based
on the idea of nation as a function of the existence of a political community, state
structure, and system of law. The ethnic concept emphasises shared racial and/or
historical roots, subordinates the interests of the individual to the interests of the nation,
and restricts the rights of minorities. The discussion concluded that Polish nationalism is
a blend of both theoretical types.
Contemporary Polish political debate refers back to the Golden Period of Poland
as a powerful and expansionist state, and 'Bulwark of Christianity' in the East. But the
debate also alludes to periods of national struggle and severe external threats to the
existence of the state. Poles thus see Poland both as a country with a great-power
97 Zielonka, Political Ideas, p. 3.
98 Heinrich and Wiatr, Political Culture in Vienna and Warsaw, p. 82.
99 Ibid., p. 90.
100 Michael Deis and Jill Chin, 'Roundup: Life in Poland', RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. l , No.
21 (22 May 1992), p. 63.
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heritage, and a weak victim. As Poland had to cope with severe external pressures from
the 17th century on, the Primat der Aussenpolitik resulted in the creation of a 'protective
shield' of historical images, ensuring the cultural and physical survival of the Polish
nation. Grunberg says that Poles envisage two Polands: one strong, large and aristocratic:
the other one weak, uneducated and victimized for centuries. 101
Polish historical images reflect predominantly romantic, but also posmvist
elements, as well as pro-Western but also pan-Slavist ingredients. Romanticism provides
the single most significant component in modern Polish political culture. The strong link
between nationalism and the Church in the Polish case further reinforced its Romantic
character. The powerful influence of religion meant that Poles identified themselves as
Western Europeans. However, it also signified strong historicism and a belief in common
historical roots as basis for the nation. Moreover, religion can be held responsible for
many irrational beliefs and historical myths in the country's political culture.
In Poland, historical images provide a Geschichtskanon which limits a critical
evaluation of the country's past. As a result, nationalist and expansionist programmes
(today mostly limited to the notion of a cultural mission in the East), although not
represented by strong political organizations, continue to attract followers. Such
programmes reflect a belief that Poland is a regional power, and are expressed in a lack
of tolerance towards national minorities in the country. They rely heavily on images of
history as a legitimizing factor.
Nationalist programmes of this kind create antagonisms with neighbouring
countries, particularly in the East. This danger is recognized by some parts of the Polish
political spectrum.'?' It is thus pointed out that in today's changed environment, a
101 Karol Grunberg, Polskie koncepcje federalistyczne 1864-1918 [Polish federal concepts 1864-1918].
(Warsaw: Ksiazka i Wiedza, 1971), p. 62.
102 Maciej Rosa1ik argues that the 'polonocentric' myth of Poland as a bulwark of the Western
civilization played its role in times of foreign rule as it allowed Poland to maintain a national identity and
some form of dignity. Today, it is only a myth, which obscures the reality. Maciej Rosalik, 'Wiatr z
Zachodu' [Wind from the West], Rzeczpospolita (18-19 February 1995). The publicists Stefan Bratkowski
and Stefan Kozak argue that a focus on past Polish-Ukrainian relations does not lead anywhere. They sum
up their argument by saying that 'during the past few centuries we have been pushing eastward, not they
westward', Stefan Bratkowski, 'Z czym na Zachod' [With what to the West], Gazeta Wyborcza (13-14
January 1990); Kozak, 'Polsko-Ukrainskie Dylematy', p. 49.
Mieczyslaw Tomala pleads for turning away from images of Germans as Poland's blood enemy.
The belief in old, mostly negative images makes Poles appear 'old fashioned' in todays Europe, which
rises above old prejudices. With these sentiments, it is difficult to form relations based on good
neighbourliness. Mieczyslaw Tomala, Zjednoczenie Niemiec: Aspekty Miedzynarodowe i Polskie
[Unification of Germany. International and Polish Aspects]. (Warsaw: Polski Instytut Spraw
Miedzynarodowych, 1991), p. 110.
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continued reliance on historical images can be interpreted as an escape into history: these
images become a substitute for dealing with modern challenges. While nationalism is
useful as a means for mobilizing the population, there is a shortage of other values and
impulses which could move Poles to accept the political and economic system in a
difficult period of transition. At the same time, Polish nationalism is dangerous to the
country's efforts to achieve a new position in the region and in the international system.
The reliance on history as a source of political wisdom testifies to a limitation in
Polish political thought. The future of Poland's relations with its neighbours will depend
on whether this whole region will be able to overcome the historical sources of
resentment without entirely forgetting their past. The prospects for subregional
cooperation will hinge on this outcome.
According to Poland's Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski, nationalism is dangerous to Polish
efforts to achieve a new position in the international system. ' "Kres Europy" to tylko literacka przenosnia:
Dodawanie Ulamkow' [' End of Europe' as a literary metaphor: adding up fractions], Polityka (17 October
1992). Charles Gati warns that nationalism could damage the prospects for regional cooperation in Central
Europe. Gati, 'After Communism, What?', p. 26.
CHAPTER FIVE
POLAND'S RELATIONS WITH ITS NEIGHBOURS
IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA
1. Introduction
This chapter focuses on contemporary relations between Poland and its immediate
neighbours. It discusses current conditions which have the potential either hinder or to
favour the development of close subregional ties, such as those required for states to
establish subregional security cooperation frameworks. Moreover, it charts positive
developments as well as existing and potential problems in Poland's relations with
adjacent countries. This aspect of the study is crucial background information for the
following chapters. It is not intended to provide a historical chronology of developments
in the region. Rather, selected contemporary events are discussed as they relate to
Poland's relations with its neighbours. Thus the argument presented here does not seek
to provide general information e.g. about German unification or the disintegration of the
Soviet Union, but aims to describe how these events have affected bilateral relations with
Poland.
The first section of the chapter considers Poland's place in the post-Cold War
international environment. The following section focuses on Polish perceptions of changes
to the West of its borders. This section deals with German unification and considers how
this development was received in Poland. The third section discusses Polish reactions to
the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the country's relations with the post-Soviet
republics Ukraine, Belorus, and Lithuania, as well as with Russia. Finally. the fourth
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section analyzes Polish relations with its neighbours to the South. At its focus is the
Czechoslovak 'velvet divorce' and Poland's relations with the successor countries.
Poland's relations with the Soviet successor states, particularly with countries
which at various times in the country's history have been part of the Polish state (called
by the Poles kresy - Eastern borderlands), are proving to be complicated and somewhat
unpredictable. This section aims to present the factors that are at the heart of this
instability. This is not to say that Poland's relations with its Western and Southern
neighbours are of a less complex nature, but simply that Poland's Ostpolitik is proving
to be the most difficult task for the Polish policy-makers.
This chapter thus deals primarily with the geopolitical perceptions that Poles hold
of their region. These perceptions are important for two reasons: firstly, because Poles
pay a great deal of attention to geopolitics; and secondly, because many of their
geopolitical perceptions are connected to the historical images they share. The formation
of new states as neighbours makes the search for a post-communist identity difficult and
often results in problematic decisions because the search is guided by historical aversions
and biases. 1
For Polish policy-makers, the quality of bilateral relations with neighbouring
countries is an indication of the viability of potential subregional security cooperation
frameworks. Thus they must answer questions ranging from whether neighbouring
countries are sources of threats or security problems (discussed in depth in Chapter Six)
to whether a subregional arrangement would function as an instrument for managing
member countries, that is, a question of the influence the government could exercise on
its partners in such structures. In addition, bilateral relations show whether or not there
are commonalities among the countries in question, and whether economic benefits can
be derived from cooperating with the countries in question. Many of the considerations
are related to historical images, since these function as ways of evaluating current and
future experiences. Many Polish attitudes towards neighbouring countries arise from
objective motives, but others must be understood as potentially subjective interpretations,
based, for example on images of the past rather than on dispassionate assessments of the
present situation.
I Werner Adam, 'Lauter neue Nachbarn', Frankfurter Allgemeine (30 June 1993).
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2. Poland's post-Cold War International Environment
In the communist era, official relations between peoples and states in Central
Europe were rooted in the'centrally decreed principle of "fraternal friendship'''. In fact.
their interaction remained heavily influenced by a long history of resentments and
conflicting ambitions.? The Central European revolutions of 1989 marked the first stage
in the disintegration of the entire European post-World War II order. Elements of fragile
Cold War stability collapsed at a breath-taking place, particularly the partition of Europe
into East and West, and the balance of the two competing blocs. Geopolitical settlements
established in Yalta and Potsdam, but also by treaties concluded in the aftermath of
World War I, became meaningless, as multinational creations such as the Soviet Union,
Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia, when freed from external pressures, disintegrated. The
division of Germany was erased, and the German Democratic Republic (GDR)
disappeared from the international scene, having been integrated into West German
federal structures. Whereas some of the processes were peaceful (German unification, and
the Czechoslovak 'velvet divorce'), others brought with them conflicts and violence (as
in the former Soviet Union, or Yugoslavia). These changes have wrecked the structures
that characterized the European security order for most of this century. 3
For Poland, itself ethnically fairly homogeneous, and thus relatively stable, the
fall of the Pax Sovietica did not entail any risk of ethnic disintegration. But it did create
the need to adjust its domestic policies, and an urgent need to devise foreign and security
policies able to address the creation of new states all around its borders. Poland, which
before 1989 bordered on the German Democratic Republic in the West, Czechoslovakia
in the South, and the Soviet Union in the East, now shares borders with seven states: the
united Federal Republic of Germany, the Czech and the Slovak Republics, Ukraine.
Belorus, Lithuania, and finally Russia through the enclave of Kaliningrad.
In this situation, the Central European states' decision to dismember the Warsaw
Treaty Organization provided them with the freedom to pursue independent foreign and
defence policies, but robbed them of security guarantees provided by defence pacts.
Moreover, years of economic mismanagement and central mil itary planning left these
countries struggling to carry out a reform of their militaries. Not surprisingly. after a
2 Jan B. de Weydenthal, 'Cross-border Diplomacy in East Central Europe', RFE/RL Research Report
Vol. 1, No. 42 (23 October 1992), p. 19.
3 J.F. Brown, 'Crisis and Conflict in Eastern Europe', RFE/RL Research Report Vol. 1, No. 22 (29
May 1992), p. 1.
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short period of euphoria over gained independence, and despite the pressing need to
undertake difficult domestic political and economic reforms, geopolitical issues quickly
became paramount. 4
3. Poland's Relations with its Western Neighbour: Germany
For centuries, Poles perceived Germany as the greatest threat to their state- and
nationhood. Not surprisingly, the process of German unification has intensified these
feelings in Poland, which was awarded some of the German territories in the aftermath
of World War II. The traditional fear of German expansionism has been fuelled by the
speed of the unification of Germany and its initial refusal to guarantee the German
adherence to existing borders with Poland and Czechoslovakia. In response to these
events, Polish leaders argued that continued ambiguities concerning the Western border
made the presence of Soviet troops on Polish soil necessary until a treaty could be
signed." A Polish parliamentary leader and Solidarity strategist, Bronislaw Geremek,
even argued that any attempt to alter the border would precipitate war. 6
On 28 November 1989, Federal Republic's Chancellor Helmut Kohl introduced
the first official vision of German unification." Yet, the 10-Point Plan which he presented
to the Bundestag did not address Polish concerns." On the one hand, such reassurances
were, legally speaking, unnecessary. After all, the Polish-German border was the subject
of binding bilateral treaties." Furthermore, in the same month, Chancellor Kohl had
4 Jan Zielonka, Political Ideas in Contemporary Poland. (Aldershot: Avesbury, 1989), p. 160.
5 Blaine Harden, 'Pole Says Soviet Army Should Stay', Washington Post (22 February 1990).
6 Daniel N. Nelson, 'Security in Europe's Eastern Half, in R.F. Staar (ed.), East-Central Europe and
the USSR. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), p. 67.
7 Catherine McArdle Kelleher, 'The New Germany: An Overview', in Paul B. Stares (ed.) The New
Germany and the New Europe. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1992), p. 16.
8 Karl Kaiser, Deutschlands Vereinigung: die Internationalen Aspekte. (Bergisch Gladbach: Gustav
Luebbe, 1991), p. 158.
9 The Zgorzelec Agreement with the German Democratic Republic of July 1950, and the Warsaw
Treaty of December 1970 with the Federal Republic of Germany explicitly recognized the Oder-Neisse line
as the border between Poland and (East) Germany. 'Uklad Miedzy Rzeczapospolita Polska a Niemiecka
Republika Demokratyczna 0 Wytyczeniu Ustalonej i Istniejacej Polsko-Niemieckiej Granicy Panstwowej'
[Treaty between the Polish Republic and the German Democratic Republic on marking the decided-upon
and existing Polish-German state border], in Hans-Adolf Jacobsen and Mieczyslaw Tomala (eds),
Warszawa-Bonn 1945-1991: Stosunki polsko-niemieckie. Analiza i dokumenty. (Warsaw: PISM, 1992),
pp. 47-48. 'Uklad Miedzy Polska Rzeczpospolita Ludowa a Republika Federalna Niemiec 0 Podstawach
Normalizacji ich Wzajemnych Stosunkow' [Treaty between Polish People's Republic and the Federal
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signed a declaration proclaiming West German acceptance of the post-1945 Polish
frontiers. On the other hand, as Polish voices argued, the Kohl declaration was not
legally binding, and the previous treaties had never been accepted by significant sectors
of the German pol itical spectrum and were considered provisional agreements in view of
possible future unification of Germany. 10
Polish decision-makers had attempted to deal with the situation by calling upon
the two German countries to sign a bilateral treaty with Poland re-affirming the
inviolability of borders even before unification had taken place. The Bonn government
claimed, however, that a territorial settlement could only be approved by an all-German
government." Under pressure from the Polish government, in March and April 1990
the West German and East German parliaments passed declarations pledging to respect
the Oder-Neisse border. Yet, these declarations did not entirely satisfy Polish
requirements because they did not have the legal force of an internationally binding
treaty.
In February 1990, Poland made two demands: it asked to be included in the 'Two-
plus-Four' conference, where issues related to Polish security, and particularly the
problem of its borders, were to be discussed; and, secondly, it again proposed to codify
the existing border in a bilateral treaty with Germany. 12 In May, Poland was assured
that it would be invited to participate in the round of talks dealing with border and
security issues. Subsequently, the 'Two-plus-Four' meeting in Paris on 17 July confirmed
. -
the existing border and stipulated that a Polish-German border treaty be initialled before
unification and ratified as soon as possible thereafter. During the final 12 September
session of the 'Two-plus-Four' conference the two German governments agreed to delete
Article 23 of the Federal Republic's constitution, which kept open the possibility of new
Republic of Germany on the base of normalization of their mutual relations], in Jacobsen and Tomala,
Warszawa-Bonn 1945-1991, pp. 158-159.
10 Jan Barcz and Mieczyslaw Tomala, Polska Niemcy: dobre sasiadzstwo i przyjazna wspolpraca
[Poland Germany: good neighbourliness and friendly cooperation]. (Warsaw: PISM, 1992), p. 7; Jan Barcz,
Udzial Polski w konferencji "2+4": Aspekty prawne i proceduralne [Polish participation in the "2 +4"
conference: Legal and procedural aspects]. (Warsaw: Polski Instytut Spraw Miedzynarodowych, 1994), pp.
20-21, 24-26.
II Anna Sabbat-Swidlicka, 'The Signing of the Polish German Border Treaty', Report on Eastern
Europe Vol. 1, No. 49 (7 December 1990), p. 17.
12 In the framework of the 'Two-plus-Four' conference, the two German states and the four allied
powers were to decide upon 'external aspects' of German unification. See Barcz and Tomala, Polska
Niemcy, p. 6.
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Lands (federal units) acceding to the German Federation. 13
Nonetheless, the German government appeared disincl ined to proceed with the
border treaty both before and immediately after the unification on 3 October. Chancellor
Kohl, speaking in Paris in mid-October, proposed that there should be only one general
friendship and cooperation treaty with Poland which would also include stipulations
concerning addressing the border issue. This proposal was considered unacceptable by
the Poles and the German government was ultimately forced to give in to the Polish
demand for separate treaties. The first round of formal negotiations concerning both
treaties was held in Warsaw on 30 and 31 October. 14 The border treaty was finally
signed on 14 November 1990"5 It differed legally from both the 1970 Polish-German
treaty and the 1990 declaration by specifying that the united Germany does not have any
territorial claims and will not bring such forward in the future. 16
A Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation followed on 17 June 1991. 17 Provisions
in the Treaty include the delicate issue of the protection of minorities, and stipulate that
Germany will support Poland's efforts to enter the EC. Furthermore, it commits Germany
to aid Polish economic development. 18 In fact, Germany has indeed proven to be the
most eloquent supporter of Polish membership in Western organizations and
institutions'", and has also become Poland's most important economic partner."
13 For texts of relevant documents and evaluation of the process, see Barcz, Udzial Polski w
konferencji "2+ 4".
14 Sabbat-Swidlicka, 'Signing', p. 18.
15 The treaty was signed in Warsaw, 14 November 1990. See 'Traktat Miedzy Rzeczpostpolita Polska
a Republika Federalna Niemiec 0 Potwierdzeniu Istniejacej Miedzy Nimi Granicy' [Treaty between the
Polish Republic and Federal Republic of Germany on Verification of the border existing between them],
in Barcz and Tomala, Polska Niemcy, pp. 19-20.
16 Barcz, Udzial Polski w konferencji "2+4", p. 87.
17 'Traktat Miedzy Rzeczapospolita Polska a Republika Federalna Niemiec 0 Dobrym Sasiedztwie i
Przyjaznej Wspolpracy' [Treaty between the Polish Republic and Federal Republic of Germany on Good-
neighbourliness and Friendly Cooperation], in Jacobsen and Tomala, Warszawa-Bonn 1945-1991, pp. 399-
409.
18 Jan B. de Weydenthal, 'The Polish-German Reconciliation', RFE Report on Eastern Europe Vol.
2, No. 27 (5 July 1991), pp. 19-20.
19 Anna Wolff-Poweska, 'Polacy i Niemcy po otwarciu granicy' [Poles and Germans after opening of
the border], Studia i Materialy 71 (December 1993), p. 22; 'Konferencja Olechowskiego: Polowicznie
spelniony postulat' [Olechowski's conference: partially fulfilled demandI, Rzeczpospolita (4 January 1994).
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On the one hand, then, unification created the appropriate climate for resolving
a number of issues important to Poles. It gave the Warsaw government the chance to
settle finally the question of Germany's borders; and it established the opportunity for
Poland to come closer to Western Europe by moving closer to its German neighbour. On
the other hand, Polish policy-makers still seemed to be preoccupied with perceived
potential security threats resulting from German unification. Even the bilateral treaty
officially recognizing the border could not entirely lay to rest Polish fear of German
revanchism. The resurgence of historical animosities was therefore caused by a number
of unresolved issues, including differences over the ownership of property in Poland that
was once held by German citizens," conflicting claims about rights in the Baltic, and
disputes regarding the future status of German minorities".
The possibility that Germany will attempt to exploit the presence of the German
minority in Poland in order to change present borders is often mentioned as potentially
destabilizing." The links between the revisionist West German Expellee Union and the
German minority in Poland are considered potentially dangerous." In this context,
Germany's rapid recognition of Slovenia's and Croatia's independence was interpreted
by some Poles as a prelude to German demands for self-determination by the former
German territories which are today part of Poland."
Ethnic Germans in Poland have much to gain by demanding revisions. Many insist
on a special status for Silesia (for example EU supervision) and for Silesians (for example
dual citizenship, which is not permitted by German law). In Zielonka's words, 'this
subsequently makes many Poles very nervous, if not obsessive, in their dealings with the
20 On this issue, see Ewa Sadowska-Cieslak, 'Zagraniczne inwestycje bezposrednie w Polsce' [Foreign
direct investments in Poland], Studia i Materialy 71 (December 1993). Germans have formed four times
as many joint ventures in Poland and invested nearly three times as much in it as investors from any other
country. Jeffrey Simpson, 'Knocking on the West's door', Globe and Mail (5 March 1992).
21 For a discussion of the property situation before 1989, see Wladyslaw Czaplinski, 'Property
Questions in Relations Between Poland and the Federal Republic of Germany', Polish Western Affairs
Vol. 24, No. 1 (1988).
22 See'Article Reviews Status of German Minority', FBIS-EEU-90-127 (2 July 1990).
23 Boleslaw Balcerowicz, Brigade General, Academy for National Defense, interview by author, 19
November 1991, Warsaw.
24 'Hupka za "polubowna" zmiana granicy z Polska' [Hupka for an 'amiable' change of border with
Poland], Rzeczpospolita (12 July 1993).
25 See for example Polish Foreign Policy in the Program of the Polish Christian Democratic Forum.
(Warsaw: Polish Christian Democratic Forum, 1991), p. 6.
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German minority there. '26 In reality, the ethnic conflict in Upper Silesia is not an acute
one. Nevertheless, the situation in Silesia continues to be potentially destabilizing.
Perhaps the best indication of latent Polish fears of Germany have been references
to the possibility of a second Rapallo or a second Yalta - a rapprochement between the
USSR and Germany at the expense of Poland." Kazimierz Woycicki, for example,
argued that just the mere existence of a centre of power in Moscow and the preservation
of the Russian empire, no matter how meagre it might be, constitutes a temptation for
Germans to develop ,special relations' with it" - over the heads of Poles and at their
expense. The achievement of German unification was characterized by close consultations
between German and Soviet leaders. As a result, there were fears about a new German-
Soviet deal on Eastern and Central Europe."
A further problem was German economic penetration into the region. Central
Europe saw in Germany an economic giant" interested in exploiting its superior
economic position over the states of Central Europe. Polish officials feared that the
country's economy would be moulded to fit the needs of German industry, and that its
political and cultural identity would be compromised. German economic initiatives were
thus received coolly. 31
Even after the conclusions of a border treaty, anti-German sentiments and fears
of Germany remain an important factor in Polish public opinion and are rooted in Polish
26 Jan Zielonka, 'Security in Central Europe', Adelphi Paper 272 (Autumn 1992), p. 25.
27 Ronald D. Asmus and Thomas S. Skyway, Polish National Security Thinking in a Changing
Europe: A Conference Report. (Santa Monica: RAND, 1991), p. 17; Piotr Niemczyk, 'Podzial wplywow
jeszcze nie nastapil' [Division of influence has not taken place yet], Rzeczpospolita (12 October 1994);
'Czy grozi nam nowa Jalta?' [Are we threatened by a new Yalta?], Polska Zbrojna (3 October 1994).
28 Kazimierz Woycicki, 'Niemcy - Moe Sprawcza Oczekiwania?' [Germans - fulfilling force of
expectations?], Polska w Europie, No. 10 (January 1993), pp. 40-41.
29 Robert G. Livingstone, 'New Germany: Not Just a Bigger Federal Republic', International Herald
Tribune (16 July 1990).
30 'Skubiszewski Addresses Sejm on Security Issues', FBIS-EEU-91-032 (15 February 1991).
31 In July 1991 Manfred Stolpe, Minister-President of Germany's Land of Brandenburg, presented
Polish Prime Minister Bielecki with a proposal to create a Polish-German economic border region. As a
response to the plan, several Polish newspapers suggested that this border region could be seen as a German
attempt to revise the Polish-German border agreement. For Polish reactions see for example: Piotr
Cegielski, 'Zamieszanie wokol Odry' [Confusion surrounding Oder]. Gazeta Wyborcza (14 November
1991). See also Jan B. de Weydenthal, 'German Plan for Border Region Stirs Interest in Poland', RFEIRL
Research Report, Vol. 1, No.7 (14 February 1992), p. 39; Wolff-Poweska, 'Polacy i Niemcy ... '. p. 24;
Mieczyslaw Tornala, Polacy - Niemcy: Wzajemne postrzeganie [Poles - Germans: Mutual perceptionsI.
(Warsaw: Polski Instytut Spraw Miedzynarodowych, 1994), p. 37-38.
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nationalism." Nevertheless, the inclusion of Poland in the talks regarding the process
of German unification, the signing of the border treaty, and the German commitment to
limit the size of the federal armed forces lessened these fears and normalized conditions
between Central European and German policy-makers. Further reassurances were
provided by the membership of the united Germany in European security organizations.
The unification of Germany has brought Poland closer to Western Europe and its
economic and political organizations." And finally, Germany speaks in favour of
subregional cooperation in Central Europe, particularly in the Visegrad Group".
4. Poland's Relations with its Eastern Neighbours
Before the Collapse of the Soviet Union
The collapse of the WTO left the Soviet Union without allies, forward deployment
possibilities, or a strategic buffer in Central Europe. The 'loss' of Central and Eastern
Europe was felt in Moscow and contributed to a polarization of the leadership into
reformers and conservative hard-liners. Moscow's belated grief over the lost Pax
Sovietica caused Central European, and particularly Polish fears of a restoration of a
hard-line regime in the Soviet Union.
These fears culminated in the autumn and winter of 1990-1991. The turn towards
conservatism in the Soviet Union was best illustrated in early 1991 by the violent crack-
down in the Baltics. The most pessimistic scenario was presented by President Lech
Walesa of Poland, who considered it possible that the Soviet intervention in the Baltics
was only the first step in the USSR's attempt to reclaim Eastern and Central Europe."
The hard-liners' coup of August 1991 in the USSR seemed to justify Polish fears.
However, the coup collapsed and subsequently there was a subsequent leadership change.
Confronted with the imminent collapse of the Soviet empire, Poland had mixed feelings.
32 Katarzyna Kolodziejczyk, 'Jak budowac wspolnote interesow' [How to build a community of
interests], Rzeczpospolita (10 February 1994).
33 Krystyna Grzybowska, 'Bilans slow i bilans czynow' [Balance of words and balance of deeds].
Rzeczpospolita( 20 December 1994); Marek Jedrys, '''Teutoni tez sie zmieniaja" , ['Teutons change too'],
Rzeczpospolita (17 June 1994); 'Czego obawiaja sie Polacy' [What are Poles afraid of], Rzeczpospolita
(13 September 1994).
34 Jaroslaw Drozd, 'Republika Federalna Niemiec' [Federal Republic of Germany], in Stanislaw
Parzymies (ed.), Europa Srodkowa i Wschodnia w Polityce Zachodu [Central and Eastern Europe ill
Western policy]. (Warsaw: Polski Instytut Spraw Miedzynarodowych, 1994), pp. 49-50.
35 'Walesa, OKP Voice Concern Over Soviet Union', FBIS-EEU-91-016 (24 January 1991).
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On the one hand, following the change, however, Poland felt that the chances of
resolving a number of outstanding issues between Poland and the Soviet Union, such as
the signing of bilateral treaties and military agreements, and the settlement of claims
relating to troop withdrawal, had improved." Furthermore, the emergence of a number
of new states as Poland's neighbours to the East would create a new cordon sanitaire,
separating Russia from Eastern and Central Europe. Many saw the disintegration of the
Soviet Union as a means of weakening the Russian heartland and a chance for a more
balanced and reliable relationship between Eastern and Central Europe and the newly
independent republics. There was an expectation that the relations of all Central European
countries with the post-Soviet republics would be better than they had been with the
Soviet Union, because such relations would be based on realistic discussions of their
needs and expectations, rather than founded, as in the past, on ideological factors and the
unilateral imposition of policies by Moscow.
Yet, there were also worries about the effects of the disintegration of the Soviet
Union. More cautious Poles feared a migration of people who were either displaced under
Stalin or might feel attracted by the comparatively higher living standards in Central
Europe. The threat of mass migration has not in fact materialized so far. (For an in-depth
discussion of the phenomenon of migration as a security threat, see Chapter Six.)
The second question which frustrated efforts to establish good bilateral relations
was the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Central Europe. After a series of difficult
negotiations, Soviet soldiers left Hungary and Czechoslovakia in the summer of 1991. As
a consequence of concerns about the Western border, the Polish government officially
asked the Soviet Union to begin negotiations on the withdrawal of troops only in
September 1990. The complicated and repeatedly delayed talks ended in May 199237 ,
when Russia and Poland signed a final agreement and a financial protocol attached to a
treaty on friendship and cooperation. Since in the meantime the Soviet Union had ceased
36 See for example Alfred A. Reisch, 'Hungary: New Prospects for Hungarian-Soviet Relations', RFE
Report on Eastern Europe Vol. 2, No. 39 (27 September 1991); Adrian G. V. Hyde-Price, 'After the
Pact: East European Security in the 1990s', Arms Control, Vol. 12, No.2 (September 1991), p. 281:
'UdSSR und Polen einig tiber Zeitplan fur Armee-Abzug', Siiddeutsche Zeitung, (28 October 1991).
37 See 'Uklad miedzy Rzeczapospolita Polska a Federacja Rosyjska w sprawie wycofania wojsk
Federacji Rosyjskiej z terytorium Polski - Moskwa, 22 maja 1992 r. ' [Contract between the Polish Republic
and Russian Federation on the issue of withdrawal of Russian Federation armed forces from Polish territory
_ Moscow, 22 May 1992], Zbior Dokurnentow/Recueil de Documents 3 (1992). For a discussion of the
agreement, see Wojciech Zajaczkowski, 'Stosunki polsko-rosyjskie' [Polish-Russian relations), in Rocznik
Polskiej Polityki Zagranicznej 1992. (Warsaw: PISM, 1994), p. 189-190.
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to exist, the Russian government accepted and took over Soviet obligations with regard
to the presence of Soviet forces in Poland in lanuary 1992. 38 On 28 October 1992 the
withdrawal of the last former Soviet combat troops from Poland was completed. Support
troops were withdrawn in the autumn of 1993. 39
A third source of tension was the completion of new bilateral treaties of friendship
and cooperation between the Central European countries and the Soviet Union. The
Soviet proposal for the text of these treaties submitted to its former allies included a
clause which stipulated that the Central European states could not take part 'in any
military alliance which could be directed against the USSR and that they would consult
with the Soviet Union if a situation arose whereby the security of either side was
affected. '40 The clause was finally withdrawn, but only in the aftermath of the failure
of the August coup.
Furthermore, disagreements pertaining to economic issues threatened new bilateral
relations. When in lanuary 1991 trade between the Soviet Union and Central European
countries was changed to hard currency accounting, the quantity of goods exchanged
decreased sharply. Although diplomatic efforts were undertaken on both sides to improve
the situation, trade volume did not rise. Efforts to deal with the situation failed, partly
because there was no effective central authority in the Soviet Union, and partly because
both sides now chose to look for trade partners in the West."
Other issues of concern to Central Europeans included finding a reliable custodian
for the Soviet nuclear arsenal and resolving issues relating to arms control treaties. Post-
Soviet republics' challenges to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the Strategic
Arms Reduction Treaties (START) agreements", and most recently, to the Conventional
38 Jan B. de Weydenthal, 'Poland Free of Russian Combat Troops'. RFE/RL Research Report Vol.
1, No. 45 (13 November 1992), p. 33.
39 Roman Przeciszewski, 'Koniec wycofania' [End of withdrawal], Polska Zbrojna (17-19 September
1993).
40 Zielonka, 'Security in Central Europe', p. 38.
41 Ibid., pp. 38-40.
42 Suzanne Crow, 'START II: Prospects for Implementation', RFE/RL Research Report Vol. 2. No.
3 (15 January 1993), p. 14.
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Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) agreement" caused apprehension in Poland.
On the whole, Poland welcomed the disintegration of the Pax Sovietica and the
Soviet Union, but it also was aware that the collapse of the imperium would present the
country with serious problems. Unlike the old Soviet Union, which represented the threat
of military strength, the post-Soviet republics constitute the security threat of structural
weaknesses.
Poland began to develop relations with individual Soviet republics as early as the
winter of 1990. According to Roucek, Poland was among the first countries 'to foresee
the "republicanization" of the USSR'44. Polish post-communist foreign policy towards
the Soviet Union was based on a 'dual track' approach. Thus Poland pursued both
friendly relations with the authorities in Moscow and its first cultural and economic
contacts with the individual republics." The dual track strategy was aimed at permitting
Poland to support national self-determination movements to the East of its borders. It had
the effect of creating the foundations for future cooperation with independent republics.
Some observers argue that this Polish strategy laid the groundwork for cooperation with
the Soviet republics without substantially damaging Poland's political and economic links
with the central organs of the Soviet Union. 46 However, it seems that the dual-track
policy was not fully appreciated in the new republics or in Moscow. Polish political
forces continue to be divided on this issue."?
After the Collapse of the Soviet Union
While the dual track strategy has been still relatively successful, the collapse of
the Soviet Union exposed Polish Eastern policy to a tough test. Poland's reaction to this
43 'Rosja domaga sie rewizji ukladu 0 redukcji zbrojen konwencjonalnych' [Russia demands a revision
of the treaty on reduction of conventional armaments], Polska Zbrojna (7 October 1993). See also Chapter
Six.
44 Libor Roucek, 'After the Block: The New International Relations in Eastern Europe', RIIA
Discussion Paper 40 (1992), p. 10.
45 Jerzy Marek Nowakowski, 'Polska polityka wschodnia w 1991 roku' [Polish eastern policy in 19911,
in Rocznik polskiej polityki zagranicznej 1991. (PISM: Warsaw, 1993), p.72.
46 Roucek, 'After the Block', p. 10.
47 Jerzy Marek Jezioranski, 'W poszukiwaniu nowej koncepcji [Searching for a new concepti.
Rzeczpospolita (14 January 1994).
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development was somewhat incoherent." Polish political activities in the Miedzvmorze
area, including the signing of bilateral economic and military treaties with non-Russian
former Soviet republics, have been criticised by Russian leadership. 49 Faced with
Russian disapproval and integratory tendencies within the framework of the CIS, Poland's
diplomacy slowed down its efforts to establish close links with neighbouring republics.
Belorus: Belorus declared its sovereignty within the USSR on 27 July 1990. The
chance of bilateral relations between Belorus and Poland before this step was practically
non-existent, but following the Belorussian declaration of sovereignty, the Polish
government attempted to establish closer relations with the republic. 50
In October 1990, Poland's Foreign Minister met with representatives of the Soviet
government, and of Russia, Ukraine, and Belorus. Yet although declarations of friendship
and cooperation renouncing territorial claims and declaring mutual willingness to
cooperate on minority issues" were signed with Russia and Ukraine, none could initially
be concluded with Belorus.
The reasons for the initial Belorussian refusal are not clear. The Polish side
insisted that legal and procedural obstacles were at the heart of the problem.
Nevertheless, as Zielonka reports, Poles added that Belorus made 'unspecified' territorial
claims to the Polish district of Bialystok and complained about the treatment of the
Belorussian minority there. 52 During initial negotiations, Belorus' government refused
to endorse a clause declaring the frontier between the two countries inviolable, arguing
that the border had been originally established by an agreement with the Soviet Union
rather than with Belorus. Minsk also expressed reservations regarding the treatment of
the Belorussian minority in Poland. Observers suggest, however, that one of the reasons
Belorus' policy-makers resisted signing the declaration was the unclear relation of Belorus
48 See discussion of this aspect by Jan B. de Weydenthal, 'Poland's eastern policy', RFE/RL Research
Report Vol. 3, No.7 (February 1994); Jerzy Marek Nowakowski, 'w poszukiwaniu nowej koncepcji'
[Searching for a new concept], Rzeczpospolita (14 January 1994).
49 Andrzej Romanowski, 'Czy przespalismy "smute"?' [Have we slept through 'smuta'"]. Tygodnik
Powszechny (3 October 1993).
50 Zielonka, 'Security in Central Europe', p. 24.
51 The Belorussian minority in Poland is 15,000-300,0())strong. Estimates of the number of Poles in
Belorus vary as well, and are estimated at between 417,000 and 600,000. See Jan Zaprudnik, Belarus: At
a Crossroads in History. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), p. 215.
52 Zielonka, 'Security in Central Europe', p. 24.
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with the Soviet, later the Russian, government. There were also communist party officials
in the Belorussian government who resented the internal changes in Poland. 53
Relations improved after the Belorussian proclamation of independence on 25
August 1991, when Belorus turned its attention toward the West and became aware of
the potential benefits of links with Poland. 54 On 27 December 1991, a few days after
it was announced that the Soviet Union would cease to exist as of 1 January 1992, Poland
recognized the independence of a number of former Soviet republics, including
Belorus.f Soon after, on 23 June 1992, the presidents of the two countries signed a
Treaty of Good-Neighbourly Relations and Friendly Cooperation. 56 Issues relating to
minorities and borders were agreed upon. In July, Belorus opened its first embassy
abroad in Warsaw. 57 A series of economic and political agreements has since been
concluded by the two countries. At this point, the previously non-existent economic
cooperation began to develop positively. In 1991, Poland became one of Belorus' most
significant trade partners. Indeed, despite the general slump in Polish-Soviet commerce,
trade with Belorus in that year underwent a 20% increase. After Russia, Poland was the
most important destination for Belorussian exports and, after Japan, also the most
53 Nowakowski, 'Polska polityka ... ', pp. 77-78, Stephen R. Burant, 'Problematyka wschodnia:
Studium porownywawcze stosunkow Polski z Litwa, Bialorusia i Ukraina' [Eastern issues: comparative
study of Polish relations with Lithuania, Belorus and Ukraine 1, Studia i Materialy 58 (February 1993),
p. 16.
54 Ibid., p. 18.
55 See 'Uchwala Rady Ministrow RP ill 170/91 (w sprawie uznania przez Rzeczpospolita Polska
Republiki Annenii, Republiki Azerbejzanu, Republiki Bialorusi, Federacji Rosyjskiej, Republiki
Kazachstanu, Republiki Kyrgyzstanu, Republiki Moldawii, Republiki Tadzykistanu, Turkmenistanu i
Republiki Uzbekistanu) - Warszawa, 27 grudnia 1991 r.' [Resolution of the Council of Minister of the
Polish Republic No. 170/91 (concerning the recognition by the Polish Republic of the Republic of Armenia,
the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Republic of Belorus, the Russian Federation, the Republic of Kazachstan,
the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, the Republic of Moldova, the Republic of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and
Republic of Uzbekistan], Zbior Dokumentow/Recueil de Documents 2 (1992) .
•
56 See 'Deklaracja 0 dobrym sasiedztwie, wzajemnym zrozumieniu i wspolpracy miedzy Rzeczapospolita
Polska i Republika Bialorus - Warszawa, 10 pazdiernika 1991 r' [Declaration on good neighbourly
relations, mutual understanding and cooperation between the Republic of Poland and Republic of Belorus -
Warsaw, 10 October 1991], Zbior Dokumentow/Recueil de Documents 2 (1992); 'Traktat miedzy
Rzeczapospolita Polska a Republika Bialorus 0 dobrym sasiedztwie i przyjaznej wspolpracy - Warszawa.
23 czerwca 1992 r.' [Treaty between the Republic of Poland and the Republic of Belorus on Good-
Neighbourly Relations and Friendly Cooperation - Warsaw, 23 June 1992], Zbior Dokumentow/Recueil
de Documents 1 (1993).
57 Christoph Royen, 'Central Eastern Europe and the Western CIS: Potential Conflict Constellations'.
paper prepared for the International Conference on Redefining Regional Security and the New Foreign
Policies in Eastern Europe, Potsdam (23-26 June 1992), p. 7.
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important source of imports. 58 However, trade patterns changed the following year, with
Germany becoming Belorus's most important foreign economic partner. 59 Trade with
Poland increased again in 1994, but the policy-makers of both countries recognize that
economic cooperation could be substantially improved. 60
Poland and the independent Belorus also pursued a dialogue aimed at dealing with
their security concerns. However, although Poland considered Belorus' statehood as
significant for Polish security, it did not seek closer security relations. Despite the
assurances of Polish policy-makers that Poland was interested In strengthening
Belorussian independence and sovereignty", Polish governments did not take up
Belorussian proposals for the creation of a subregional security framework or suggestions
of Visegrad expansion." Belorus, thus deprived of external support, concluded a
number of bilateral agreements with Russia. These agreements were so extensive that
Russia's Prime Minister, Egor Gaidar, interpreted them as tantamount to the creation of
a 'Belarussian-Russian confederation within the CIS framework. '63 In particular, Poles
considered the Belorussian 1994 decision to join the CIS' security organization potentially
dangerous.?' Supporters of this pact in Belorus have also been insinuating that Poland
is a security threat to Belorus." Burant suggests that Belorussian fears are a result of
Soviet 'divide and rule' policy, which 'encouraged Belorussians to believe that, given an
58 Burant, 'Problematyka wschodnia', pp. 19 and 43; Ryszard Malik and Piotr Koscinski, 'Dobrzy
sasiedzi' [Good neighbours], Rzeczpospolita (12 November 1992).
59 Alexander Lukashuk, 'Belarus: A Year on a Treadmill', RFE/RL Research Report Vol. 2, NO.1
(1 January 1993), p. 67.
60 'Polsko-bialoruska wspolpraca: Gospodarczy impuls' [Polish-Belorussian cooperation: Economic
impulse], Polska Zbrojna (23 January 1995).
61 'Polityka Zagraniczna Polski w 1993 roku - Expose Sejrnowe Ministra Spraw Zagranicznych RP
Krzysztofa Skubiszewskiego. Warszawa, 29 kwietnia 1993 r.' [Poland's Foreign Policy in 1993 - Sejm
Expose by the Polish Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski], Zbior Dokumentow/Recueil de
Documents 2 (1993), p. 27. See also Piotr Koscinski, 'Polsce zalezy na suwerennosci Bialorusi' [Poland
is interested in Belorus' sovereignty], Rzeczpospolita (23 January 1995).
62 On proposals of subregional cooperation frameworks, see Chapter Nine.
63 Lukashuk, 'Belarus: A Year on a Treadmill', p. 68; Olga Alexandrova, 'Geostrategic Reconstructing
in the Former USSR', Aussenpolitik (Engl. edition), Vol. 43, No 4 (1992), p. 326.
64 Antoni Z. Kaminski, 'Dlaczego Polska me rna polityki wschodniej' [Why Poland has no Eastern
policy], Rzeczpospolita (8 March 1995).
65 Jacek Sobczak, 'Stosunki Polski z Bialorusia' [Polish relations with Belorus], in Polska i jej nowi
sasiedzi [Poland and its new neighbours]. (Poznan: Adam Marszalek, 1994), p. 39.
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opportunity, Poland would seize Belorussian lands annexed by the Soviet Union during
World War 11'.66
In January 1994, Belorus chose Miechyslav Grib, a former Communist as
president. His position on the direction of the country's foreign policy differs
substantially from that of the previous president, Stanislav Shushkievich. Grib announced
early on that, unlike Shushkievich, who had supported concepts of collective European
security and neutrality for his country, he believed that Belorus' best option was to
participate in the security arrangements of the CIS. 67 The change also indicated an end
to Belorussian good-will concerning Polish foreign policy aspirations. Indeed, Belorus
now opposes Polish membership in NATO, and in March 1995 linked the issue of
prospective NATO extension indirectly to its decision to halt implementation of the CFE
treaty. This decision was evaluated by Poles as an indication of Belorus' dependence on
Russia's strategic interests. 68
In addition to their differences on security issues, Poland and Belorus could not
solve all territorial and minority problems using diplomatic procedures. One unresolved
territorial issue was that of the Lithuanian districts of Vilnius and Salciniankai. These
districts are largely inhabited by Poles, but Belorus on occasion made territorial claims
to them."? The border issue was finally settled by Lithuania and Belorus in January
1995. 70
Furthermore, there are ongoing conflicts between religious communities in each
country's areas inhabited by national minorities. Polish Catholic priests in Belorus work
on behalf of Polish nationalist ideas and see themselves as defenders of the Polish
minority in Belorus. Incidents in which the Polish flag was flown from Catholic churches
66 Burant, 'Problematyka wschodnia', p. 42.
67 Malgorzata Leczycka, 'Bialorusini postawili na komunistow' [Belorussians placed on communistsJ,
Polska Zbrojna (31 January 1994).
68 'Bialorus przeciwko rozszerzeniu NATO' [Belorus against widening of NATO], Rzeczpospolita (10
March 1995); 'Bialoruski premier 0 Polsce i NATO' [Belorussian Prime Minister about Poland and
NATO], Rzeczpospolita (14 January 1994); 'Bialorus wstrzymala realizacje ukladu CFE' [Belorus halted
the implementation of the CFE treaty], Rzeczpospolita (24 February 1995).
69 Zielonka, 'Security in Central Europe', p. 24.
70 Maja Narbutt, 'Mniej wojsk, wiecej integracji' [Less military, more integration], Rzeczpospolita (7
February 1995).
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further aggravated local ethnic conflicts", since these were interpreted as expressions
of Polish imperialism.
Burant argues that because both the Polish minority in Belorus and the Belorussian
minority in Poland are small, they do not pose a threat to the integrity of these
countries." Nevertheless, the Bialystok district inhabited by Belorussians is one of the
poorest and least developed parts of Poland, and thus it is not surprising that as minorities
in Poland are becoming more assertive, the Belorussian minority is beginning to voice
concerns and grievances." There are marginal groups advocating the inclusion of all
territories inhabited by Belorussians into Belorus, which would encompass areas now part
of Poland." Similarly, there is a Polish minority in Belorus, which could bring forward
autonomist demands, if the already difficult economic situation were to deteriorate
further .75
While Belorussian elites seem to be fascinated by Poland, they are also highly
fearful of Polish domination. Such feelings are caused by images of the past as well as
by current tensions, created for example by the presence and behaviour of Polish Catholic
priests in Belorus. On the other hand, Poles know little of Belorus, and tend to view the
smaller republic in a patronizing way. Observers indicate that Polish governments have
done too little to strengthen the country's relations with Belorus."
Ukraine: For Poland, Ukraine is, after Russia, the most important partner among
former Soviet republics.As in the case of Belorus, Ukraine's declaration of sovereignty
on 16 July 1990 marked the beginning of closer relations between the two countries. In
fact, the size and potential significance of Ukraine meant that Poland was prepared to risk
jeopardizing somewhat its relations with Moscow for the possibility of cooperation with
Kiev. A series of treaties on economic, political and military cooperation were concluded.
71 Adam, 'Lauter neue Nachbarn'.
72 Burant, 'Problematyka wschodnia', p. 45.
73 See Andrzej Kaczynski, ' ... ale z dusza, bracia, sprawa ciezka' [... but with the soul, brothers, the
situation is difficult], Rzeczpospolita (25-26 February 1995).
74 Sobczak, 'Stosunki Polski z Bialorusia', p. 39.
75 Janusz Bugajski, Nations in Turmoil: Conflict and Cooperation in Eastern Europe. (Boulder:
Westview Press, 1993), p. 42; Helena Fiedorcowa, 'Polacy poza granicami kraju' [Poles beyond the
country's borders], Polska Zbrojna (23 June 1994).
76 See Wojciech Gorecki, 'Wiedza ze znaczka pocztowego' [Knowledge from a stamp I, Rzeczpospolita
(23 March 1995).
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On 13 December 1990, the two countries signed a declaration of directions for the
development of Polish-Ukrainian relations. This document contained a clause regulating
border issues." It also functioned as the basis for an economic cooperation agreement
in January 1991 and for the establishment of a Joint Commission on Polish and Ukrainian
Minorities in March 1991.78
After Ukraine's secession from the former Soviet Union in December 1991,
official Pol ish- Ukrainian contacts improved even further. Poland was the first country
which recognized Ukraine's statehood", a fact remembered by Ukrainians;" At
trilateral political consultations held in Warsaw on 14 February 1992, representatives
from the foreign ministries of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary stated that a stable,
prosperous Ukraine was in the interest of Central Europe. They also decided to
strengthen and deepen cooperation with their new eastern neighbour. At the same time,
however, they rejected Ukraine's requests to either create a new subregional security
framework or to be admitted to an existing subregional structure. 81
In May 1992 Poland and Ukraine signed a treaty on Good-neighbourly Relations,
Friendship and Cooperation." The treaty was ratified in January 1993. 83 The text of
the treaty guarantees the inviolability of shared borders, and envisages cooperation
regarding approaches to European organizations and security issues. In May 1993, during
a Polish-Ukrainian summit, agreements promoting cooperation in matters of immigration,
trade, law enforcement and nuclear reactor safety were also signed. Furthermore, a
bilateral Presidents' Consultative Committee on Polish-Ukrainian Relations was
77 Burant, 'Problematyka wschodnia', p. 21.
78 Ian J. Brzezinski, 'Polish-Ukrainian Relations: Europe's Neglected Strategic Axis', Survival Vol.
35, No.3 (Autumn 1993), p. 29-29.
79 See 'Oswiadczenie Rady Ministrow RP dotyczace uznania przez Polske niepodleglej Ukrainy -
Warszawa, 2 grudnia 1991 r.' [Statement of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Poland concerning
recognition by Poland of independent Ukraine - Warsaw, 2 December 1991], Zbior Dokumentow/Recueil
de Documents 2 (1992).
80 Brzezinski, 'Polish-Ukrainian', p. 29-29.
81 For a discussion of both options see Chapters Eight and Nine.
82 See 'Traktat rniedzy Rzeczapospolita Polska a Ukraina 0 dobrym sasiedztwie, przyjaznych stosunkach
i wspolpracy - Warszawa, 18 maja 1992 r.' [Treaty between the Republic of Poland and Ukraine on good
neighbourliness, friendly relations and cooperation - Warsaw, 18 May 1992], Zbior Dokumentow/Recueil
de Documents 4 (1992).
83 Brzezinski, 'Polish-Ukrainian'. p. 29.
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established", but has subsequently failed to Iive up to the expectations placed on it. 85
A sovereign Ukraine is said by Polish analysts to be a precondition of Polish
independence." In addition to security benefits stemming from its existence for Poland,
Ukraine is a nation rich in resources and thus a possibly promising economic partner.
This is still only a possibility, however, since Poland's trade with Ukraine in 1992
amounted to only $ 350 million." Nevertheless, Ukraine has the potential to act as a
political and economic bridge between Russia and Poland.
For Poland, the most important issue at stake is Ukraine's internal stability.
Indeed, Poland could become a destination or a transitional stop on the way to the West
for a wave of Ukrainian refugees, if the Ukrainian experiment were to fail. Particularly
worrying is any internal conflict scenario involving the Ukrainian armed forces. The
Polish Vice-Minister for Defence, Przemyslaw Grudzinski, stated in an interview that
despite Ukraine's adherence to the CFE treaty, the size of the Ukrainian armed forces
did not correspond to the country's relatively limited defence needs", and dwarfed
Polish capabilities.
Yet the worst case scenario for Poland involves political and economic failure in
Ukraine, leading to its reintegration into Russia. Observers argue that such a development
would probably involve some form of regional conflict. And in this instance, Poland
would also suddenly be bordered by a powerful imperial Russian state. 89
84 'Protokol 0 utworzeniu Komitetu Konsultacyjnego prezydentow Ukrainy i Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej -
Kijow, 12 stycznia 1993 r.' [Protocol on the Establishment of a Consultative Committee of the Presidents
of Ukraine and the Republic of Poland - Kiev, 12 January 1993], Zbior Dokumentow/Recueil de
Documents 1 (1993).
85 See Wladyslaw Gill, 'Stosunki Polski z Ukraina' [Poland's relations with Ukraine], Polska i jej nowi
sasiedzi. (Poznan: Adam Marszalek, 1994), p. Ill. For further information on the Committee, see Chapter
Nine.
86 Ryszard Malik, 'Slowianska jednosc' [Slavic unity], Rzeczpospolita (9-1 July 1994); Malgorzata
Leczycka, 'Polska polityka wschodnia: Bezpiecznie i po partnersku' [Polish eastern policy: Safe and
partner-like], Polska Zbrojna( 22 February 1994); Jaroslaw Bratkiewicz, 'Stosunki z Rosja, Ukraina i
Bialorusia' [Relations with Russia, Ukraine and Belorus], in Rocznik Polskiej Polityki Zagranicznej
1993/1994. (Warsaw: PISM, 1994), p. 132.
87 'Problems of Trade with Ukraine Viewed', FBIS-EEU-93-044 (9 March 1993).
88 'Nasi sasiedzi i nasze bezpieczenstwo: Obecna sytuacja bardziej nam sprzyja. Rozmowa z
wicemiuistrem obrony narodowej Przemyslawem Grudzinskim' [Our neighbours and our security: The
current situation favours us. Conversation with deputy defense minister Przemyslaw Grudzinski I,
Rzeczpospolita (16-17 January 1993), p. 8.
89 Brzezinski, 'Polish-Ukrainian', p. 27.
114
A first indication of potential problems to come between the two countries
surrounds the issue of Polish membership in NATO. Prior to April 1994 elections in the
Ukraine, Ukrainian politicians were supportive of Poland's desire for admission to
NAT090 , but the NATO issue became a bone of contention following the election, when
Ukraine elected a deeply fragmented parliament which created a post-communist
government. 91 Ukraine's politicians fear that if Poland's joined NATO, their own
country would find itself in a buffer zone between East and West, and are concerned
about Russia's reaction to NATO expansion."
There are also disagreements between Poland and Ukraine on minority issues."
Nevertheless, most observers agree that these ethnic conflicts are not likely to lead to
conflicts between the two states in the foreseeable future." Yet, mutual fears are fuelled
by the existence of groups with revisionist programmes on both sides of the Polish-
Ukrainian border. Polish observers criticize that the Polish society views Poland's
relations with Ukraine from the perspective of Lwow (German Lemberg, Ukrainian Lviv,
a formerly Pol ish city)?', not from the perspective of Kiev, its current capitol. 96 To put
it in different words, Poles continue to see Ukraine as a former part of Poland rather than
as an independent country. However, voices in Poland that want to open the issue of the
eastern borders represent, for the time being, only a small fraction of the political
90 'Wspolnie 0 bezpieczenstwie' [Together about security], Rzeczpospolita (29 October 1993).
91 Piotr Koscinski, 'Komunisci beda tworzyc najwieksza frakcje w nowej Radzie Nawyzszej Ukrainy:
Kto jest kim w nowym parliamencie' [Communists will create the largest fraction in the new Supreme
Committee of the Ukraine: Who is who in the new parliament], Rzeczpospolita (19 April 1994).
92 'Rozumiemy Polske, niech Polska zrozumie nas. Rozmowa z ministrem spraw zagranicznych Ukrainy
Gennadijem Udowenka' [We understand Poland, Poland should understand us. Conversation with Ukraine's
foreign minister Gennady Udovenko], Rzeczpospolita (13 March 1995); 'Ostrozniej do NATO' [More
carefully into NATO], Rzeczpospolita (1 December 1994); 'Ukraina przeciwna naszemu czlonkowstwu
w sojuszu' [Ukraine opposed to our membership in alliance], Rzeczpospolita (15 February 1995).
93 For a discussion of the situation of the Polish minority in Ukraine and the Ukrainian minority in
Poland, see Gill, 'Stosunki Polski z Ukraina', pp. 116-120.
94 Piotr Koscinski, 'Bez klotni narodow' [Without national arguments], Rzeczpospolita (6 December
1994); Anna Wielopolska, 'Mniejszosc ukrainska w Polsce: Listy bez odpowiedzi' [Ukrainian minority in
Poland: Letters without a response], Rzeczpospolita (16 December 1993).
95 This city belonged to Poland from 1340 to 1772. to Austria until 1918, and finally went to the Soviet
Union in 1945. See Jan Krauze, 'Poland's new eastern policy takes place', Guardian Weekly (15 March
1992).
96 'Nie wyprowadzam sie z Polski: Z Jerzym Giedroyciem rozmawia Andrzej Garlicki' [1 am not
moving away from Poland: Andrzej Garlicki speaks with Jerzy Giedroyc], Polityka (26 October 1994).
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spectrum. The political mainstream In Poland is fully aware of the disastrous
consequences any such move would entail for Poland's western territories, just recently
finally confirmed in the treaty with united Germany. 97 Yet, Kozak argues that Poles do
not always understand that members of the Ukrainian minority in Poland are not
foreigners, that they have lived in their areas for centuries and that most are loyal Polish
citizens. Simultaneously, Poles of Ukrainian descent think of themselves as disadvantaged
in the Polish political system, SInce it puts small political groupings such as parties
representing ethnic minorities at a disadvantage in an attempt to avoid political
splintering. Furthermore, they feel that their cultural, religious, and social needs are not
fulfilled. 98
Conflicts between local Roman Catholic and Greek-rite (uniate) Catholic Churches
on both sides of the border have contributed further to the deterioration of relations on
the local level, on occasion sharpening Polish-Ukrainian tensions." Relations between
the two religious communities have always been difficult. But serious tensions evolved
following the Ukrainian independence when Roman Catholic Poles in Ukraine and in
Poland began to reclaim property which the Orthodox Church had claimed for itself.
There were cases of violent clashes between members of both congregations on both sides
of the border. 100
The Polish-Ukrainian partnership represents a new facet, then, in 'a relationship
that has historically been characterized by acrimony, confrontation and conflict.' 101
Despite some progress in Polish-Ukrainian relations, one cannot take friendly contacts
for granted. The problem is that of the many agreements between the two countries'
governments, few are more than mere statements of intent. Many factors are at the root
of this phenomenon. Poland tries to avoid provoking Russia and has doubts about
Ukraine's future as a state. Roucek adds that 'long historical memories, fuelled by the
revival of nationalism and transborder ethnic interests, might be strong enough to cause
97 Zielonka, 'Security in Central Europe', p. 23.
98 Stefan Kozak, 'Polsko-Ukrainskie Dylematy i Dialogi' [Polish-Ukrainian Dilemmas and Dialogues I.
Polska w Europie No. 10 (January 1993), p. 46.
99 Zielonka, 'Security in Central Europe', p. 22; Brzezinski, 'Polish-Ukrainian', p. 32.
100 Royen, 'Central Eastern Europe and the Western CIS', pp.5-6.
101 Brzezinski, 'Polish-Ukrainian', p. 28.
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at least some irritations and frictions. '102 Kozak argues that the future of Polish-
Ukrainian relations will depend to a large degree on whether the two nations will be able
to free themselves of the weight of the past.'?' However, as in the case of Belorus, in
the long run, Ukraine's relations with Russia will be the main determining factor in the
future of Polish-Ukrainian relations.
Lithuania: The independence of Lithuania was proclaimed on 11 March 1990. It
was well received in Poland104 , and the Polish government was among the first to
recognize its independence. Significantly, as Roucek observes, 'in contrast to the
Ukrainian question, where the Central European reaction was motivated primarily by
national interests and geopolitical considerations, their support for Baltic independence
was more a matter of principle. '105
Developments since 1990 suggest, however, that Polish-Lithuanian relations are
complicated by historical factors.'?" Attempts to normalize relations between the two
countries have been stifled by the attitudes of nationalistic forces on both sides, who
invoke the historical domination of Lithuania by Poland during the existence of the I
Rzeczpospolita. Poles speak of Polish achievements and their civilizational mission in the
East; Lithuanians see in Poland a powerful and patronizing country. 107
Lithuania was the last neighbouring country with which Poland signed a treaty of
good-neighbourliness (after five rounds of difficult negotiations). 108 The arduous process
102 Roucek, 'After the Block', p. 15.
103 Kozak, 'Polsko-Ukrainskie', p. 58.
104 Maria Schoppa, 'Der Wandel in Europa und die Sicherheit Polens', Hamburger Beitraege zur
Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik 61 (January 1992), p. 22.
105 Roucek, 'After the Block', p. 12.
106 Piotr Lossowski, 'Bezzasadnosc oskarzen i pretensji' [Groundless accusations and resentments],
Polska Zbrojna (22-24 October 1993).
107 Marceli Kosman, 'Polska - Litwa' [Poland - Lithuania], in Polska i jej nowi sasiedzi [Poland and
its new neighbours]. (Poznan: Adam Marszalek), 1994, pp. 43 and 46-51.
108 The treaty was initialled by the Foreign Ministers of the two countries in Warsaw on 28 March
1994, and signed in Vilnius 26 April by the respective presidents. The treaty contains a compromise
statement on the condemnation of the use of force which had occurred in past relations between the two
countries. Initially, the Lithuanian government demanded the inclusion of a clause castigating Polish
interwar policy towards the Lithuania, particularly the occupation of Vilnius (Wilno), but they eventually
agreed to omit specific historical references. The parliaments of the two countries ratified the treaty in the
autumn of 1994. See Rzeczpospolita Magazyn Wydarzenia 1994 (January 1995), p. 17; 'Droga do
ratyfikacji traktatu polsko-litweskiego' [Way to ratification of the Polish-Lithuanian treaty], Rzeczpospolita
(13 October 1994); and text of the 'Traktat miedzy Rzeczapospolita Polska a Republika Litewska 0
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of finding a formula acceptable to both Poland and Lithuania points to the unresolved
problems and differences between the two governments, particularly regarding
interpretations of their common history. 109 Significantly, according to public opinion
polls, Poles have felt increasingly less sympathetic toward Lithuanians since 1991. 110
Poland does not feel that Lithuania poses a military threat. The latter has armed
forces of some 16,000, including 5,000 border guards and another 5,000 rapid reaction
forces. III There are no disagreements on the principles of economic cooperation,
although trade levels are still low. Problems still exist, however, on the issue of national
minorities. There are estimated to be over 300,000 Poles in Lithuania. 112 The Polish
ethnic minority makes up 7 % of the Lithuanian population. In the districts of Vilnius and
Salciniankai some 80% of the population calls itself Polish. 113 Moreover, ethnic
conflicts centring around the Polish minority in Lithuania intensified after the collapse of
the Pax Sovietica. A large section of Poles in Lithuania, afraid of what they called 'anti-
Polish' propaganda on the part of the independence movement Sajudis, opposed the Baltic
republic's pursuit of independence. A 1988-89 Lithuanian language law that gave no
official standing to the Polish language in the districts of Vilnius and Salciniankai
confirmed their fears. Yet, the Polish government did not come to the support of the
Polish minority's concerns until September 1991, when the Lithuanian parliament
dissolved the local councils in these two Polish-dominated districts, apparently as a
punishment for supporting the August coup attempt in Moscow. On 4 October 1991,
however, a joint statement of intent recognized the rights of ethnic minorities to public
participation and to education in their native language, and soon after Poland and
Lithuania signed an agreement establishing consular relations. Nevertheless, the situation
przyjaznych stosunkach i dobrosasiedzkiej wspolpracy' [Treaty between the Polish Republic and the
Lithuanian Republic on friendly relations and good-neighbourly cooperation]. (Warsaw: Polish Foreign
Ministry, 1994).
109 See for example Maja Narbutt, 'Burza wokol "Ostrej Bramy" , [Storm surrounding "Ostra Brama"],
Rzeczpospolita (4 July 1994); Maja Narbutt, 'Litwa-Polska: Spor 0 historie' [Lithuania-Poland: Argument
about history], Rzeczpospolita (15-16 October 1994).
110 'Litwa: dyskusje wokol ratyfikacji traktatu z Polska' [Lithuania: discussions about ratification of the
treaty with Poland], Rzeczpospolita (8-9 October 1994).
III Maja Narbutt, 'Litwa: Najsilnijsza w Nadbaltyce' [Lithuania: Strongest in the BalticI.
Rzeczpospolita (16-17 January 1993), p. 8.
112 Brown, 'Crisis and Conflict', p. 7.
113 Zielonka, 'Security in Central Europe', pp. 20-22.
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of the Polish minority in Lithuania is not thought to have improved significantly. 114
An attempt to deal with the issue of minorities was made in the Declaration on
Friendly Relations and Good-Neighbourly Cooperation between Poland and Lithuania.
signed on 13 January 1992. This document contains a statement of will ingness to pursue
minority rights on the basis of CSCE principles. Yet, the accord caused considerable
tension. Polish right wing forces, as well as the Polish minority in Lithuania argued that
by signing the Declaration, Poland relinquished its political leverage in Vilnius, thus
deserting the Polish minority. Lithuanian nationalists, particularly the Vilnija movement
and parts of the Sajudis group, criticized the Declaration as an instrument of Polish
revisionism. 115
Another source of potential tensions IS the question of Kaliningrad Oblast, a
Russian enclave bordering on both Poland and Lithuania. Roucek states that although
Poles deny aspirations of gaining influence over this area, Lithuania has on occasion
openly expressed its interest in the Oblast. 116 For the time being, the issue of
Kaliningrad is a hypothetical one, yet it could become a bone of contention in the event
of further disintegration in the Russian Federation.
Russia: Poland borders on Russia only through the small enclave of Kaliningrad
Oblast (KO). 117 Yet, the Russian military presence in this area is one of Poland's major
security concerns. 1I 8 Of KO's population of 900,000 people, two thirds consists of
military personnel, their families, and civilian employees of the armed forces.'!" Poland
sees the large contingent of Russian combat troops in the Kaliningrad region as a critical
problem in its relations with Russia. Poles calculate that Russia's troops in Kaliningrad
114 Helena Fiedorcowa, 'Bolesnych spraw mniejszosci polskiej nie ubywa' [Painful issues of the Polish
minority do not diminish], Polska Zbrojna (25 April 1994).
lIS Roucek, 'After the Block', p. 16.
116 Ibid., p. 16.
117 The Kaliningrad Oblast is a smaller part of the pre-1918 East Prussia. The remaining part of East
Prussia now belongs to Poland and Lithuania. See Vladimir Kusin, 'Notes on Kaliningrad '. Notes from
Special Adviser for Central and Eastern European Affairs, NATO HQ (9 November 1992), p. 1.
118 Zajaczkowski, 'Stosunki polsko-rosyjskie', pp. 190-191.
119 Not counted in this calculation are military troops stationed there temporarily after withdrawals from
former Warsaw Treaty Organization countries. See Grzegorz Lys, 'Czolgi za sciana' [Tanks behind the
wall], Zycie Warszawy (11 February 1993).
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alone equal half of the entire Polish armed forces.!" The disintegration of the Soviet
Union makes the area difficult for Russian access!", and thus KG is of little value as
a forward deployment base. However, Russia does not have a place for the men and
hardware now stationed in Kaliningrad.!" Thus, Poles fear that Kaliningrad will
become a greater problem in future, since the economic situation in deteriorating Russia
could result in discontent among the forces.':" Polish military observers speak of the
'powder keg' Kaliningrad.!"
Another concern is German economic interest in the KG, and Russian-German
cooperation in this area.!" This kind of cooperation, Poles fear, may be to the
detriment of Polish needs and interests.':" For this reason, Warsaw has put forward a
number of proposals and initiatives aimed at strengthening Polish economic presence in
the Oblast,'?'
Thus, Poland's security concerns associated with Kaliningrad are either fears of
a powerful Russia, or fears of a weak and disintegrated Russia. Such worries are
certainly fuelled by anti-Russian sentiment, which is still strong among segments of
120 G.K. Wisniewski, 'Krolowiec and Polish Security', Notes from Special Adviser for Central and
Eastern European Affairs, NATO HQ (18 February 1992), p. 2.
121 Kusin, 'Notes on Kaliningrad', p. 3.
122 Ibid., p. 4. Russia proposed in 1994 to create a 'special defense zone' in the Kaliningrad Oblast,
aimed at defense of air space and the Russian border with Poland and Lithuania. Poles interpreted the
announcement as a move away from the policy of normalization in this highly militarized area. They saw
it as an attempt to assert Russia's role in the Baltic 'near abroad'. The plan violates the CFE agreement
which allows fro 36,000 troops in Kaliningrad. See Maria Wagrowska, 'Nowy problem: Kaliningrad' [New
problem: Kaliningrad], Rzeczpospolita (21 March 1994). In September 1994, Russian Defense Minister,
Pavel Grachev announced that Russia was prepared to move some of the troops based in Kaliningrad. but
that would require amending the CFE treaty. See 'Mniej wojsk w Kaliningradzie' [Less armed forces in
Kaliningrad], Rzeczpospolita (12 September 1994). For Poland the prospect of solving the Kaliningrad
issue, is enticing, but it fears reopening up the CFE debate.
123 Ireneusz Michalkow, 'Kaliningrad: Grozba destabilizacji czy szansa rozwoju' [Kaliningrad: threat
of destabilization or chance for development], Polska Zbrojna Magazyn Tygodniowy (22-24 July 1994).
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June 1995).
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public opinion.
Poland's relations with Russia proper, which emerged as the Soviet Union's legal
successor after the collapse of the USSR on 21 December 1991, affect its relations with
all of the other countries in the region. Although the quality of relations between Poland
and Russia has changed since the collapse of the Soviet Union, because of the size of
Russia (70 times that of Poland), its population, economic weight, and military strength,
as well as historical images associated with it by Poles, Russia is the most important of
all the former Soviet republics for Poland and other Central European countries. Adding
to the uncertainty, Russia's final political and territorial form have not yet been defined,
and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), linking Russia with most post-Soviet
republics in the realm of politics, economics and security is likewise still in the process
of definition and creation.
Initially, Poland's relations with post-Soviet Russia were relatively limited, and
occasionally rather COOP28. One of the sources of tensions in Polish-Russian relations
was found in the economic sphere, as trade practically collapsed following the dissolution
of CMEA, and the issue of mutual debt was not resolved until January 1995. 129
Political factors also played a role in creating problems. By keeping relations with Russia
at a low profile, Poles hoped to deter any conceivable return to imperialistic behaviour
on the part of Russia. 130 This early and difficult phase of Polish-Russian relations could
be described as the'de-Sovietization' of links. One of the main issues at stake in relations
between the two countries during this phase was the clarification of historical issues. 131
A treaty signed by Presidents Walesa and Yeltsin on 22 May 1992132 , and a
military agreement from July 1993, are considered to have created a new framework for
128 Andrzej W. Pawluczuk, 'Daleko i blisko Rosji' [Close and far from Russia], Rzeczpospolita (10-11
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132 See 'Traktat miedzy Rzeczapospolita Polska a Federacja Rosyjska a przyjaznej i dobrosasiedzkiej
wspolpracy - Moskwa, 22 maja 1992 r.' [Treaty between the Polish Republic and Russian Federation on
friendly and good-neighbourly cooperation - Moscow, 22 May 1992]. Zbior Dokumentow/Recueil de
Documents 2 (1993).
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relations. According to some Polish observers, old prejudices are slowly being replaced
by cooperation and coexistence.':" Yet, it is the beginning of a difficult process. A
Polish Foreign Ministry official said that due to the delicate nature of Polish-Russian
relations, their links will develop along a 'wavy' and not a straight line.!" This
phenomenon can be explained by the fact that Russia does not have a clear Central
European policy':", and Poland, faced with multifaceted changes to the East of its
borders, has had some difficulty in creating a coherent Eastern policy. 136
Russian politics continues to be marked by struggles between reform forces and
conservative elements. Russia' foreign policy remains vague, and characterized as much
by imperialist overtones as by democratic concepts. There has been a resurgence of
Russian interest in Central Europe since mid-1993, reflecting a more assertive Russian
foreign policy, and an increasingly serious debate about the expansion of NATO. One of
the most significant examples between the difficulties in relations of the two countries is
the so-called Yeltsin declaration which the Russian President presented while visiting
Warsaw in August 1993. 137 In it, Yeltsin expressed understanding for the Pol ish desire
to join NATO, and stated that Poland's aspirations did not damage the interests of
Russia. 138
Under pressure from Russia's conservative elements, Yeltsin retracted his words,
and accepted a doctrine in which Russia declared itself prepared to intervene where its
133 Teresa Los-Nowak, 'Transformacja formuly bezpieczenstwa zewnetrznego Polski po II wojnie
swiatowej' [Transformation of Polish external security formula after World War II], Politologia 13 (1994),
p. 112.
134 'Falowanie z Rosja' [To wave with Russia], Gazeta Wyborcza (15 March 1995); Janina Jarocka,
'Dobre podstawy budowy zaufania' [Good foundations for creating trust], Polska Zbrojna (9-11 July
1993). For a chronology of Polish-Russian links, see 'Polsko-rosyjskie kalendarium' [Polish-Russian
calendarium], Rzeczpospolita (17 February 1995).
135 Kazimierz Dziewanowski, 'Bez koncepcji' [Without a concept], Rzeczpospolita (8 December 19940.
136 Antoni Z. Kaminski, 'Dlaczego Polska nie rna polityki wschodniej' [Why Poland does not have an
Eastern policy], Rzeczpospolita (8 March 1995); Slawomir Popowski, 'Dwa panstwa, dwie koncepcje
[Two states, two concepts], Rzeczpospolita (17 February 1995); Kazimierz Dziewanowski. 'Bez koncepcji'
[Without a concept], Rzeczpospolita (8 December 1994).
137 See Ryszard Malik, 'Czas rozpoczac odliczanie na nowo' [Time to begin calculations again],
Rzeczpospolita (26 August 1993); Anna Wielopolska, 'Politycy stawiaja znaki zapytania' [Politicians pla~e
question marks], Rzeczpospolita (30 August 1993); Jan Nowak-Jezioranski, "Traktat i umowy me
wystarczaja'[Treaty and agreements are not sufficient], Rzeczpospolita (28-29 August 1993).




ill-defined national interests were threatened.!" Finally, President Yeltsin's stated in
a letter to four NATO countries' leaders that Russia had reservations about Central
European membership in NATO I40 • Thus, visions of European security in Poland and
Russia differ significantly. 141
Poles do not necessarily see Russia as a potential aggressor - although they take
seriously the possibility of a return of authoritarian rule and neo-imperialism in Russia _
but rather as a country seeking to reduce Central Europe to a cordon sanitaire by
thwarting its desire for integration into Western organizations and institutions. 142
Russia's claims to a 'sphere of influence', 'special interests' or 'role' in neighbouring
countries and its ideas concerning Russian or Western-Russian patronage in Central
Europe and a 'conditional' membership in NATO (marked by the non-stationing of
foreign forces and nuclear weapons on Polish territory) are seen by Poland as potentially
threatening to its sovereignty!". In this context the close political and military links
between Russia and Belorus are considered potentially dangerous to Polish security. The
withdrawal of Russian troops from Belorus has been halted, and Belorus has decided not
to continue to implement the CFE agreement. Thus there is a realistic prospect that
139 Los-Nowak, 'Transfonnacja fonnuly', p. 112; Jerzy Nowakowski, 'Rosja uzbraja ... doktryne'
[Russia arms ... the doctrine], Polska Zbrojna (28 October 1993); Andrzej Karkoszka, 'Interesy - tak,
strefy wplywow - nie', Polska Zbrojna (12-14 November 1993).
140 Andrzej Wilk, 'Cien Frankensteina' [Shadow of Frankenstein], Rzeczpospolita (30 October - 1
November 1993); Anna Wielopolska and Zbigniew Lentowicz, 'Muzyka Przeszlosci' [Music of the past],
Rzeczpospolita (2-3 October 1993).
141 Ryszard Malik, 'Historia zaprzepuszczonych szans' [History of wrecked chances], Rzeczpospolita
(24 August 1994); Popowski, 'Dwa panstwa, dwie koncepcje'.
142 Stanislaw Parzymies, 'The European Union and Central Europe: Prospects of Security Cooperation',
Polish Quarterly of International Affairs, Vol. 2, No.3 (Summer 1993), p. 109; Tadeusz Chabiera,
'Warunki Rosji' [Russia' s conditions], Rzeczpospolita (21 March 1995).
143 See 'Statement by Mr. Andrzej Olechowski at the Ost-West Wirtschaftsakademie, Berlin, 9th May,
1994', Materials and Documents 3-4 (1994), p. 406. At the CSCE summit in Budapest Moscow restated
its interest in 'crossing', that is joint, Russian-Western security guarantees for Central Europe. See Jan
Skorzynski, 'Bezpieczenstwo, ale jakie?' (Security, but what kind?), Rzeczpospolita (6 December 1994);
the statement of the deputy Foreign Minister, Andrzej Towpik to the Foreign Affairs Commission of the
Polish Parliament, in BiuIetyn Nr. 1238/11 kad. Komisja Spraw Zagranicznych nr. 35 (31 January 1995),
p. 8. See also Bohdan Osadczuk, 'Rosyjska ruletka w nowej Jakie', Rzeczpospolita (7 September 1993);
Maria Wagrowska, 'Zimny pokoj' [Cold Peace], Rzeczpospolita (14 December 1994); 'Jerzy Milewski
w Brukseli: Do NATO hezwarunkowo [Jerzy Milewski in Brussels: Unconditionally into NATOI.
Rzeczpospolita (9 March 1995); 'Bez broni nuklearnej i obcych wojsk w Europie Srodkowej' [Without
nuclear weapons and foreign armies in Central Europe], Rzeczpospolita (7 March 1995).
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Poland will be faced with the Russian army again along its borders. 144 Recent Ukrainian
opposition to Polish NATO membership is also viewed by the Poles in the context of
Russian attempts to create zones of influence. Polish observers argue that this attitude
reflects the Ukrainian leadership's awareness that once Central European countries join
NATO, former non-Soviet republics will find themselves behind a new Iron Curtain. 145
Moreover, the Western focus on Russia's 'needs' is considered detrimental to Polish
security.':" German links with Russia are particularly feared. 147
The war Russia has been conducting in Chechnya, although considered an internal
matter by the Polish government, is subject to a vigorous political debate among both
policy-makers and the public. The use of force is condemned and judged a vindication
of Polish fears about both Russian imperialism and the disintegration of the multi-national
country. Simultaneously, the scope of Western reactions to Chechnya is compared to the
West's weak response to the wars in the former Yugoslavia. Poles fear that the conflict
in Chechnya is undermining any remaining Western consensus concerning ways to
structure Western relations with Eastern and Central Europe. Indeed, the Polish
discussion of the Chechnya crisis is often accompanied by speculations about whether the
crisis will have an impact on the speed of Poland's integration into NATO. 148
Occasionally, Poles seem to believe that the more threatening the situation to the East of
the country's borders, the better the prospects for the country's membership in
144 Chabiera, 'Warunki Rosji'.
145 Ibid.
146 Los-Nowak, "Transformacja formuly', p. 113; Maciej Wierzynski, ,Kochany Jelcyn' [Dear Yeltsin],
Rzeczpospolita (16-17 October 1993); 'NATO-Europa Srodkowa: Z Rosja w tie' [NATO-Central Europe:
With Russia in the background], Rzeczpospolita (7 January 1994).
147 Czeslaw Mojsiewicz, 'Stosunki Polski z Federacja Rosyjska' [Poland's relations with the Russian
Federation], in Polska i jej nowi sasiedzi. (Poznan: Adam Marszalek, 1994), p. 86.
148 For the specifics of the Polish discussion of the Chechnya crisis, see' Foreign Ministry: Chechnya
is Russia's internal affair', BBC SWB EE 2178 (14 December 1994); 'Foreign Minister Olechowski critical
of Russian operations in Chechnya' BBC SWB EE 2188 (29 December 1994); Marian Moraczewski.
'Czeczenski (?) Znak Zapytania' [Chechen (?) question mark], Polska Zbrojna (14 December 1994);
Slawomir Popowski, 'Pokojowy plan kapitulacji' [Peaceful plan of capitulation], Rzeczpospolita (28
December 1994); Maria Wagrowska, 'Pozegnanie ze zludzeniami ' [Farewell to illusions]. Rzeczpospolita




Recent developments In relations between the two countries have been mixed.
Polish initiatives have not found a positive response in Moscow, and the signing of
several agreements has been postponed. 150 Difficult issues include Russian police
aggression against Pol ish Catholics in Moscow, and the Russian decision to celebrate 17
November as an anniversary of the liberation of Moscow from Polish invaders in the year
1612. However, the decision on the construction of a cemetery for the murdered Polish
officers in Katyn, and the decision about a framework for consultations between the
respective Foreign Ministries bring some hope for the two countries' relations. 151 Trade
relations after the collapse of CMEA remain weak, and Polish initiatives aimed at
improving the trade balance between the two countries have not garnered support 10
MosCOW. 152 Polish analysts indicate that economic cooperation with Russia is often
contingent on Moscow's political aspirations.':"
5. Poland's Relations with its Southern Neighbours: Czechoslovakia/ Czech Republic,
Slovak Republic
Compared to the apparent importance of Poland's relations with its eastern and
western neighbours, Poland's southern neighbours, particularly Slovakia, are only of
peripheral concern to Warsaw. 154 The relations between Poland and Czechoslovakia
were 'frozen' prior to the 'velvet revolution', since the Czechoslovak leadership refused
to accept political changes taking place in Warsaw. Following the 'velvet revolution',
149 For a discussion of this phenomenon, see Marek Siwiec, 'Czas pragmatyzmu' [Time of pragmatism],
Rzeczpospolita (23-24 July 1994). It was revealed that in 1992, the then Defense Minister Jan Parys
commissioned a study on cooperation with NATO in case of armed conflict with the country's eastern
neighbour. 'Zarzuty Parysa: Kto zagraza bezpieczenstwu Polski' [Parys' accusations: Who threatens Polish
security], Rzeczpospolita (27 June 1994). Significantly, sections of the political spectrum believe that
Poland was closest to membership during the unsuccessful coup in Moscow in 199\
150 'Sposob ua sasiada' [Method for the neighbour], Rzeczpospolita (4 January 1995).
151 'Falowanie z Rosja' [To wave with Russia], Gazeta Wyborcza (15 March 1995).
152 Slawomir Popowski, "T'artnersrwo dla rozwoju" z Rosja' ['Partnership for development' with
Russia], Rzeczpospolita (15 March 1994); idem, 'Dwa panstwa, dwie koncepcje '; Bratkiewicz. 'Stosunki
z Rosja', p. 131.
153 Piotr Niemczyk. 'Ostroznie z Rosja' [Carefully with Russia], Rzeczpospolita (31 October-I
November 1994).
154 Jan Obrman, 'Uncertain Prospects for Independent Slovakia'. RFE/RL Research Report Vol. L
No. 49 (11 December 1992), p. 46.
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however, former dissidents who seized power in both countries soon found a common
language.
Polish relations with Czechoslovakia developed positively, both in the realm of
bilateral relations, and in consultations about potential directions for foreign pol icy. 155
The Czech and Slovak republics, created after the 'velvet divorce' of Czechoslovakia on
1 January 1993,156 do not constitute a security threat to Poland in any way. Their
military and economic potential is comparatively small. Not surprisingly then, Poland
recognized the new republics immediately.'? Furthermore, Poland and the two post-
Czechoslovak republics are members of frameworks which promote limited cooperation.
Indeed, cooperation with Central European neighbours is an important aspect of
Warsaw's foreign policy. 158
Nevertheless, debates about the future of the region showed vital initial differences
between the political attitudes of the two countries. The former US National Security
Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski put forward a proposal for a Polish-Czech confederation in
his article on 'Post-communist nationalism' in the winter 1989/1990. In it he argued that
closer relations between Poland and Czechoslovakia, eventually leading to a
confederation, would have stabilizing effects, both economically and politically. In his
words, 'institutionalized Polish-Czechoslovak cooperation would create a stronger unit
in the vulnerable area between Germany and Russia, and thus contribute to greater central
European stability. '159 In Brzezinski's opinion, such arrangements would fill 'the
security vacuum' in the region and should be supported by the West. The idea of setting
up a Czechoslovak-Polish confederation was not new and had been discussed both after
155 See Marian Szczepaniak, 'Stosunki Polski z Poludniowymi Sasiadami' [Poland's relations with
southern neighbours], in Polska i jej nowi sasiedzi [Poland and its new neighbours]. (Poznan: Adam
Marszalek, 1994), p. 13.
156 Jiri Pehe, 'Czechoslovak Parliament Votes to Dissolve Federation', RFE/RL Research Report Vol.
1, No. 48 (4 December 1992), p. 1.
157 'Oswiadczenie Ministerstwa Spraw Zagranicznych Reczypospolitej Polskiej w Zwiazku z Powstaniem
Republiki Czeskiej i Republiki Slowackiej jako niepodleglych panstw' [Statement by the Polish Ministry
of Foreign Affairs in Connection with the Establishment of the Czech Republic and Slovak Republic as
Independent States. Warsaw 31 December 1992], Zbior Dokumentow/Recueil de Documents 4 (1992);
'Otwarcia granic jeszcze nie bedzie' [There will be no opening of borders yet], Rzeczpospolita (21
December 1992).
158 Jan B. de Weydenthal, 'Poland Supports the Triangle as Means to Reach Other Goals', RFE/RL
Research Report Vol. 1, No. 23 (5 June 1992).
159 Zbigniew Brzezinski, 'Post-communist nationalism', Foreign Affairs, Vol. 68, NO.5 (Winter
198911990), p. 18.
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World War I and during World War II, by the Polish and Czechoslovak governments-in-
exile."?
As a response to Brzezinski's plan, there were unofficial discussions between
Poland and Czechoslovakia in 1990. According to a Polish observer, these discussions
lasted no longer than two or three months."! Although there was more support for this
idea among Polish representatives, it was by no means a popular concept. It was openly
rejected by Czechoslovak officials. The Czechoslovak side avoided any indications that
it was discussing a potentially anti-German framework. Czechoslovakia also distanced
itself from any plans which could be interpreted as watering down its policy aimed at
integration in European organizations and institutions.l'" Instead, Czechoslovak leaders
proposed a loose trilateral cooperation framework involving the participation of Hungary,
whose Prime Minister Jozsef Antall had, before the formal dissolution of the WTO,
proposed the creation of a Central/East European Union once his and other countries had
left the Eastern alliance.l'" This proposal led to the creation of currently the most
significant subregional framework for cooperation between Poland and its southern
neighbours - the Visegrad Quadrangle, or Group (formerly Triangle). Yet, the member
countries, particularly the Czech Republic, made the conscious decision to refrain from
dealing with security problems within this framework. 164
Poland and the Czech and Slovak republics also cooperate within the framework
160 Jan Obrman, 'Czechoslovakia Overcomes Its Initial Reluctance', RFE/RL Research Report Vol.
1, No. 23 (5 June 1992), p. 20. See also Chapter Three.
161 Krzysztof Gorski, Senior expert, National Security Office at the President's Chancellory, Polish
Republic, interview by author, 6 February 1995, London.
162 Obrman, 'Czechoslovakia Overcomes', p. 20.
163 Antall first mentioned the plan at the European Democratic Union conference in Helsinki in
September 1990. When asked to elaborate on the concept he stated that it was not a political union or an
economic union. He stressed that the goal was not to create an alternative to existing Euro-Atlantic
organizations. His proposal was centred on creating a organization to include Poland, Hungary and
Czechoslovakia, of a military security nature, like the Western European Union, which could function as
an example. He believed that later on other smaller member states of the Warsaw Pact could join the
structure. 'Speaks on the Future of Union', FBIS-WEU-90-173 (6 September 1990), p. 3.
In an interview, Antall added that effects of membership in WTO imply that Central European
armies 'gain time in the transitional period - for example, for the maintenance of the military technology,
spare parts supply, and replacements - because our interests would not be served either if, from one day
to the next, our Army would suddenly find itself in possession of a scrap yard, completely ohsolete
weaponry and equipment.' 'Comments on Pact, NATO Issues', FBIS-WEU-90-173 (6 September 1990),
p.3.
164 Barbara Sierszula, 'Polska-Czechy: Boom dyplomatyczny [Poland-Czechia: diplomatic boom].
Rzeczpospolita (13 August 1994).
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of the Central European Initiative (CEI), a loose regional cooperation group emphasizing
economic cooperation, described in Chapter Eight. The structure is theoretically capable
of dealing with security issues, yet so far the member countries have refrained from
putting them on the agenda. 165
There is, however, a lack of political coordination between Poland and its
Visegrad partners, the Czech and Slovak Republics and Hungary. This is in part because
historical preconceptions and distrust were not swept away with the collapse of
cornmunism.!" Zielonka states that 'Poland ... used to view itself as a regional power
in security terms, and was reluctant to work together in this field with two small players
such as Hungary and Czechoslovakia.' 167
Moreover, after the end of the Cold War, relations among the Visegrad countries
were damageel by a number of disputes of an economic, ethnic and environmental nature,
such as quarrels concerning the ethnic Poles in the Czech section of the Cesin region. In
January 1992, when Poland and Czechoslovakia were to sign a Friendship and
Cooperation Treaty, the Confederation for Independent Poland (KPN), one of the major
right wing Polish parties, spoke against such a step in the Sejm because, it argued, a
Polish renunciation of rights to the Cesin region would be problematic in view of the fact
that a Polish minority lives in the area.!" As a result, the presence of the Polish
minority in the Czech republic continues to be an important issue in relations between the
two countries.l'" There are also minor unresolved border issues between Poland and
both Slovakia and Czech Republic'?" but they have not been raised by any major
political forces in either state.
The race to join Western European institutions has been another source of discord
among the countries in question. Furthermore, despite the creation of the Central
165 For a discussion of the Visegrad Group and the CEI, see Chapter Eight.
166 de Weydenthal, 'Poland Supports the Triangle'.
167 Zielonka, 'Security in Central Europe', p. 41.
168 Ibid., pp. 12-13.
169 Barbara Sierszula, 'Obietnice dla polskiej mniejszosci w Czechach' [Promises for the Polish minority
in Czechia], Rzeczpospolita (27 April 1994); Anna Paciorek, 'Polskie wyspy na Zaolziu' [Polish islands
behind the Olza] , Rzeczpospolita (26 April 1994).
170 Barbara Sierszula, 'Czesko-polskie granice: Korekta czy odszkodowania' [Czech-Polish borders:
Correction or compensation], Rzeczpospolita (22 April 1994); 'Tarry beda podzielone ' [Tatra will be
divided], Rzeczpospolita (8 June 1994).
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European Free Trade Area (CEFTA; for a more detailed discussion, see Chapter Eight),
economic links between Poland and the Czech and Slovak republics are weak. 171
The new Slovak government formed after the September-October 1994 elections
has not followed a clear foreign policy, despite announcements that it aspires to EU and
NATO membership. The coalition government also includes extremist parties: the Slovak
National Party and Workers' Union. The leader of the National Party, Jan Slota, is a pan-
Slavist and a friend of the Russian nationalist Zhirinovsky, and not convinced about the
wisdom of the government's Western direction of foreign policy. The government
actually announced that Slovakia must turn to the East should it not be accepted into
Western organizations. Some Slovak politicians continue to speak of a neutral
Slovakia.!" Thus, while the Czechs are turning Westward, away from Central
European partners, Slovaks could potentially do the opposite. Neither prospect is
considered advantageous by Polish policy-makers.
6. Summary and Conclusion
Poland regards its relations with Germany and Russia as crucial. In the past, these
two countries have often challenged the country's sovereignty. Polish policy-makers
consider the task of assuring the country's security as unthinkable without a lasting
settlement with Germany and Russia.!" The first priority for Polish policy-makers after
the end of the Cold War was to settle the Polish-German border issue. However, even
Polish participation in the 'Two-plus-Four' negotiations and the conclusion of a border
treaty has not fully alleviated Polish fears of Germany.
Poland has also attempted to develop constructive responses to the disintegration
of its eastern neighbour, the Soviet Union. Even before the final collapse of this multi-
state creation, Poland began to pursue a dual track policy, focusing on contacts with both
Moscow and the republics. The collapse of the Soviet Union was both anticipated and
welcomed, despite the many security problems it necessarily created for Poland. In fact,
171 See for example 'Uniknelismy napiec spolecznych i strajkow. Z prezydentem Republiki Siowacji
Michalem Kovaczem rozmawia Jan Forowicz' [We avoided social tensions and strikes. With the President
of the Slovak Republic Michal Kovach speaks Jan Forowicz], Polska Zbrojna (3 March 1994); Andrzej
Niewiadomski, 'Premier Siowacji 0 wspolpracy z Polska: Wyjsc poza deklaracje ' [Slovakia's Prime
Minister about cooperation with Poland: To go beyond declarations], Rzeczpospolita (31 March 1994).
172 Berthold Kohler, 'Flotte Spruche tiber ED and Nato', Frankfurter Allgemeine (18 January 1995).
173 See Jan B. de Weydenthal, 'Poland on Its Own: The Conduct of Foreign Policy'. RFE/RL
Research Report Vol. 2, No.2 (8 January 1993), p. 2.
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Poland evaluated the disintegration as an opportunity to develop relations with its eastern
neighbours based on partnership. In many aspects of Poland's relations with the post-
Soviet states, this has indeed been the case. Nevertheless, there are clear tensions with
most of these newly independent states, both on the governmental and local community
level, particularly regarding minority issues. Poland continues to fear the strength of its
neighbours, but is now also concerned about potential problems created by their
weakness.
In terms of security, Poland's relations with its southern neighbours are not of the
same importance to the country's policy-makers as are relations with the West and the
East. Poland cooperates with the Czech and Slovak republics within regional cooperation
frameworks. Their relations can be described as good, although tensions and
disagreements exist concerning the purposes and intensity of cooperation.
Both historical relations and geopolitical considerations about the sheer political
and economic weight of Germany and Russia make it seem that multilateral subregional
links with either Germany or Russia would hardly be in the Polish interest (although
some far left and far right political forces in Poland do occasionally advocate coming
closer to Russia as a solution to Poland's problems, and relatively close cooperation with
Germany is pursued within the framework of European integration by mainstream
forces).
Relations with Poland's southern neighbours have developed relatively well, and
existing troublesome issues are not acute. But the discussion of Poland's relations with
neighbouring countries undertaken in this chapter has shown that countries to the south
are relatively insignificant for Polish foreign policy compared to the links with the large
and historically difficult neighbours to the East and West.
The non-Russian former Soviet republics to the East of Poland's borders (Ukraine,
Belorus, Lithuania) constitute, together with Russia, one of the most difficult aspects of
Polish foreign policy. In its relations with these countries Poland intends to support
democratic transformation, the creation of free market economies, the construction of
economic links based on partnership, non-governmental links, and the protection of Polish
minorities;'?" The difficulty in its relations with these republics is that on the one hand
Poland's security requires that these countries be independent and sovereign. On the other
174 See Krzysztof Skubiszewski, 'Pozycja Polski w Europie: dzis i jutro' [Position of Poland in Europe:
today and tomorrow], Gazeta Wyborcza (8-9 January 1994); Skubiszewski, 'Polityka Zagraniczna Polski
w 1993 roku'.
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hand, Poland cannot do much to influence the quality and quantity of their relations with
Russia. An assertive policy on the part of Poland would alienate Russia. At the same
time, difficult historical heritages make sound bilateral links with these countries difficult.
Thus, Polish policy's biggest dilemma in the Polish debate over subregional cooperation
in East and Central Europe is the country's Ostpolitik.
CHAPTER SIX
POLISH PERCEPTIONS OF SECURITY THREATS
IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA
1. Introduction
This chapter discusses contemporary Pol ish notions of threats to national security.
States' foreign policy choices clearly reflect their perceptions of the threats to their
security.' Thus, questions about the need for subregional security cooperation between
Poland and its neighbours cannot be discussed outside of the context of Polish perceptions
of threats to security in the post-Cold War era.
As Chapter Two suggests, one of the factors which determine whether or not
countries choose to align with other countries is the perception of an external or an
internal threat. Chapter Five, which discusses Poland's relations with its immediate
neighbours after the end of the Cold War, presents many of the external geopol itical
security problems with which face Polish leaders. Polish perceptions of security issues
arising from its being sandwiched between Germany and the former Soviet Union will
not be granted much attention in this chapter, since they have been exhaustively
considered in Chapter Five.
The first section of the chapter argues that in the post-Cold War era the notion of
security threats in Poland is based on both traditional and so-called 'comprehens ive
definitions of security. The second part considers Polish policy-makers' perceptions of
I See also Curt Gasteyger, 'The remaking of Eastern Europe's security'. Survival Vol. 33. NO.2
(March/April 1991), p. 117.
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external geopolitical security threats and concentrates on considerations of military
potential and the role of arms control agreements. External threats of a non-geopolitical
nature are the subject of the third section. This discussion concentrates on threats
emanating from wars in the former Yugoslavia, local conflicts, and potential mass
migration. In addition, the chapter addresses 'home-made' threats and military and non-
military risks (economic, and ecological! environmental). Military risks are seen as
reflecting the challenges of the reform of the defence system (financial constraints, the
renationalization of defence, civilian control of the military, doctrinal matters, and the
reform of the armed forces). In conclusion, the chapter attempts to assess the intensity
of Polish perceptions of threats and risks to the country's security, and discusses them
as an important but not an exclusive explanation of foreign, security and defence policy
choices.
2. Notions of security threats
As Chapter One indicates, many if not most Central Europeans, considered the
region as having entered a 'grey zone of security' or a 'security vacuum' after the
collapse of the WT02 , marked mainly by an absence of security guarantees. Yet Central
Europeans' present perceptions of security threats are occasionally difficult to describe
as they tend to be steeped in ambiguity', as they tend to be divided between two
conflicting claims. Following the collapse of the Eastern bloc, all of the former NSWTOs
stated that they did not expect military aggression from any direction." Simultaneously,
they emphasized that their countries required firm security guarantees. Thus, they
refrained from presenting specific threat scenarios, and yet continued to emphasize the
importance of NATO and its vital role in Eastern and Central Europe.
Poles, and Central Europeans more generally, fail to provide clear definitions of
the potential threats to their security for three reasons. First, the process of defining
potential security threats in a fluid environment is a complicated one. After all, most of
2 See Magarditsch Hatschikjan, 'Foreign Policy Reorientations in Eastern Central Europe',
Aussenpolitik (English edition) Vol. 45, No.1 (1994), p. 55; Beata Peksa-Krawiec, Kai Hirschman, and
Krzysztof Rak, 'Wspolnie w europejskich strukturach bezpieczenstwa' [Together in European security
structures], Polska Zbrojna (17 January 1995).
3 See for example Jan Zielonka, 'Security in Central Europe', Adelphi Paper 272 (Autumn 1992), p.
49.
4 See for example Eliza Olczyk and Jerzy Pilczynski, 'Rzad uie widzi zagrozen dla Polski' [The
government does not see threats to Poland], Rzeczpospolita (22-23 January 1994).
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the former NSWTO countries have a number of new states as their neighbours, and all
new states in the case of Poland. Second, naming threats is seen as a potential obstacle
to Central Europeans' attempts - which have not always been successful - to create
friendly bilateral relations within Central Europe. Indeed, they try to avoid possible self-
fulfilling prophecies, that is naming security threats that then create tensions, and thus
security threats. The final point is that the region's policy-makers are aware that in all
likelihood no immediate aggression will take place, but that one should not infer too
much from the present situation, since not all the post-Cold War changes are necessarily
irreversible. In addition, as Chapter One argues, security has been interpreted in more
general terms since the end of the Cold War, making Poles feel insecure.' Increasingly,
Polish security fears are shifting away from traditional, external geopolitical worries. The
Polish debate of security matters is 'plugged in' to the Western debate, and of course also
the Russian debate. Polish scholarship contains references to Western and Russian events,
speeches, and literature. It is thus not surprising that the Polish debate is shaped by many
of the trends visible among the international security community abroad.
3. External threats
External geopolitical threats
Germany is no longer seen as a potential aggressor, particularly as a result of its
membership in European and Euro-Atlantic structures. Polish officials admit that a
reconstruction of the German military potential is possible, but not probable. Still, a
disintegration of NATO and/or the EU would place Poland in a dangerous position
between 'two giants'. Yet, for the time being, Polish policy-makers see this scenario as
a highly hypothetical one."
The threats emerging from the former Soviet Union are the most senous
traditional security problem Polish policy-makers find themselves confronting. But even
5 Pal Dunay, 'Adversaries All Around? (Re) Nationalization of Security and Defence Policies in Central
and Eastern Europe', Clingedael Paper (January 1994), p. 15; Jan Forowicz. 'Bezpieczenstwo Polski to
sprawa calego narodu ponad wszelkimi podzialami' [Polish security is a matter for the entire nation above
all divisions], Polska Zbrojna (20-22 January 1995).
6 See the statement of the deputy Foreign Minister, Andrzej Towpik to the Foreign Affairs Commission
of the Polish Parliament, in Biuletyn Nr. 1238/II kad. Komisja Spraw Zagranicznych ill. 35 (31 January
1995), p. 7.
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here, there is little fear of a direct attack.' Polish policy-makers, generally speaking, do
not believe that Poland is threatened by armed conflict, but rather see the possibility of
regional or local conflicts like the one taking place in the former Yugoslavia." However,
the military capabilities and potentials of neighbouring countries are considered a source
of insecurity. Polish policy-makers and military planners are concerned about the
possibilities of 'blackmail' and of conflicts involving armed forces that could spill over
into Poland."
Polish policy-makers and military planners are particularly concerned about the
military potential to the East. While the Tashkent agreement of CIS countries, which
decided the division of CFE treaty-limited equipment, complied with 'aggregate
equipment ceilings on the Soviet Union and the Eastern group of states, but also with the
regional sub-ceilings'!", it also, according to Poles, gave disproportionately high limits
to the republics along its Eastern borders (although the three Russia, Ukraine and Belorus
also had the largest reduction liabilities, which means the largest amount of equipment
to be stored or destroyed, in the former Soviet Union). II The non-Russian republics
bordering on Poland (including Kaliningrad) have close to 1 million armed forces, a
quarter of whom are based along Pol ish borders because of the heritage of the WTO and
provisions of the CFE Treaty. The Polish armed forces are dwarfed by this military
presence.
Poland is also faced with Russia's estimated 1.7 million strong armed forces
(expected to be reduced to 1.5 million in the future)" and Ukraine's more than half a
million" (to be reduced under the CFE agreement to some 400,000). Belorussian armed
7 'Boimy sie bardziej Rosji niz Niemiec' [We are more afraid of Russian than Germany],
Rzeczpospolita (2 December 1993); 'Rosja i Niemcy - sasiad nie sojusznik' [Russia and Germany -
neighbour, not ally], Rzeczpospolita (l August 1994).
8 Tenets of the Polish Security Policy and Security Policy and Defense Strategy of the Republic
of Poland. (Warsaw: Polish National Security Office, November 1992); Ernest Skalski, 'Bac sie czy nie
bac' [To be or not to be afraid], Gazeta Wyborcza (9 November 1994).
9 See for example Tenets of the Polish Security Policy, p. 6.
10 Richard A. Falkenrath, Shaping Europe's Military Order: The Origins and Consequences of the
CFE Treaty. (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1995), p. 211.
11 See ibid., p. 286.
12 See The Military Balance 1994-1995. (London: Brasseys for the lISS. 1994), p. II.
13 Ibid., p. 104.
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forces, although smaller (currently some 92,500 strong), have not only a larger amount
of equipment than the Polish army but also arms that are more advanced. 14
Confronted with such military potential, Poland could be expected to have
benefited greatly from arms control measures. Indeed, Poland does carry out all arms
control obligations, and sees the process of arms control as a pillar of security and
stability in Europe." According to the Polish defence doctrine, Poland 'favours strict
adherence to the principle of nuclear arms non-proliferation and the reduction of nuclear
arsenals' .16 Poland endorsed the denuclearization of Ukraine and Belorus. Poles
welcomed the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from the two countries to Russia
in 1992 and the declarations on the future of the Ukraine as a neutral and non-nuclear
state." Polish politicians were also involved in attempts to convince Ukrainian policy-
makers that relinquishing nuclear status was 'the best passport into Europe'. 18
Poland supports the process of nuclear disarmament to the East. Here it is,
however, worth mentioning that the 1995 Russian debate on 'conditional' membership
of Central European countries in NATO, which would among others be characterized by
NATO's commitment not to deploy its nuclear weapons in this region, has not been
welcomed or accepted by the Polish policy-makers. They argue that although this is a
highly hypothetical scenario, Poland, as a sovereign country should be permitted
sovereign decision-making in its foreign and security policy. 19
For Poland, the most important arms control agreement regulates the conventional
14 Zygmunt Czarnota, 'Armia z poteznym arsenaleru' [Army with huge arsenal], Polska Zbrojna (23
March 1995).
15 Tenets of the Polish Security Policy, p. 10.
16 Ibid., p. 12.
17 Wladyslaw Gill, 'Stosunki Polski z Ukraina' [Poland's relations with Ukraine], Polska i jej nowi
sasiedzi. (Poznan: Adam Marszalek, 1994), p. 110; Janusz Prystrom, 'Polityka bezpieczenstwa
zewnetrznego Polski w 1992 r.' [External security policy of Poland in 1992], in Rocznik Polskiej Polityki
Zagranicznej 1992. (Warsaw: PISM, 1994), pp. 46-47.
18 'Nasi sasiedzi i nasze bezpieczenstwo. Rozmowa z wiceministrem obrony narodowej Przemyslawem
Grudzinskim' [Our neighbours and our security. Conversation with deputy defense minister Przemyslaw
Grudzinski], Rzeczpospolita (16-17 January 1993).
19 'Jerzy Milewski w Brukseli: Do NATO bezwarunkowo' [Jerzy Milewski in Brussels: Unconditionally
into NATO], Rzeczpospolita (9 March 1995); 'Bez broni nuklearnej i obcych wojsk w Europie Srodkowej'
[Without nuclear weapons and foreign armies in Central Europe], Rzeczpospolita (7 March 1995).
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military balance with respect to land forces in Europe." The CFE-1 (Conventional
Armed Forces in Europe) and CFE-1 A establish ceilings on certain categories of
equipment and ground and air force personnel. 21 The 1991 CFE agreement was aimed
at ending the conventional disparity between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. It was based
on establishing fixed ceilings for the various Warsaw Pact countries, rather than on
constructing an adequate security concept in the individual countries of the collapsing
military bloc. The geopolitical changes in Europe, however, have brought with them new
imbalances of power. 22 Addressing this problem, the Polish Deputy Defence Minister
Przemyslaw Grudzinski stated in 1991 that 'talks on disarmament must ... continue and
thought should be given to a new mandate to them, their former mandate being based on
the division of Europe and the existence of blocs. More countries should be brought into
the talks. '23
While the limits on conventional forces are applauded, Polish policy-makers and
analysts often point out that the treaty allows its eastern neighbours disproportionately
high limits." The CFE suffers from a number of other problems, which Poland
considers significant. Some countries (post-Yugoslav republics, Baltic republics) are left
out of the agreement altogether, which is potentially threatening to the sensitive
balance." Furthermore, the treaty does not limit ballistic missiles, and none of the
Central European countries are capableel defending themselves against these missiles."
While the Polish government is officially committed to the implementation of the
20 See Tenets of the Polish Security Policy, p. 11.
21 See for example Jane M.O. Sharp, 'Conventional arms control in Europe', in SIPRI Yearbook 1991,
World Armaments and Disarmament. (Oxford: Oxford University Press for SIPRI, 1991); Pal Dunay,
'The CFE Treaty: History, Achievements and Shortcomings', PRIF Report 24 (October 1991); Ivo H.
Daalder, The CFE Treaty - An Overview and an Assessment. (Washington D.C.: The Johns Hopkins
Foreign Policy Institute, 1991).
22 Theo van den Doel, Central Europe: The New Allies? The Road from Visegrad to Brussels.
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), P 43.
23 Janusz Onyszkiewicz, 'The security of Eastern and Central Europe in the shorter and long-term' , in
The Prague Conference on the Future of European Security. (Brussels: The NATO Office of
Information and Press, 1991), p. 130.
24 Jerzy M. Nowak, 'CFE Treaty in the Post-Yalta System', The Polish Quarterly of International
Affairs Vol. 3, No.2 (Spring 1994), pp. 95-96.
25 Ibid., pp. 93-94.
26 van den Doel, Central Europe: The New Allies?, p. 51.
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CFE Treaty, some Western observers have pointed out that the process is not without its
problems. Van den Doel reports that the unclear security/political future makes some
Polish officials feel that the country should construct a credible defence organization, if
not in terms of quality then at least in quantity." President Walesa expressed this
sentiment when he said: 'we need military organization today as we need air'. 28 Many
Central European officials see the CFE treaty as a memento of the Cold War's bloc-based
approach to arms control. For some, the specifics of the CFE treaty mean the continued
subjugation of Central Europe to Moscow. 29 For example, Poles rejected the intra-bloc
verification procedures, which would have forced Poland to cooperate with Russia."
Yet, Russian and Ukrainian demands for a revision of certain articles of the
Treaty are not welcomed in Poland. Jerzy Nowak, the chief Polish negotiator of the
Treaty claimed that the proposed changes 'do not directly concern Poland although it
would be advantageous if Russian and Ukrainian equipment could be moved away from
the Polish border. Nevertheless, it is also in Poland's interest to defend the integrity of
the Treaty and block the attempts to tamper with it. '31
The CFE treaty, then, offers a minimum of strategic predictability. 32 However,
Poles today are more concerned about the possibility of local conflicts spilling over the
country's borders than about the prospect of full military aggression. In this respect, too,
the CFE does not provide much reassurance. Thus, the suggestion that existing arms
control agreements in themselves have little impact on the militaries or the security of
most former non-Soviet WTO states" appears largely correct in the case of Poland.
27 Ibid .. p. 69.
28 'President stresses importance of army at time of "great danger"', BBC SWB EE (25 November
1992).
29 Jenonne Walker, Security and Arms Control in Post-Confrontational Europe. (Oxford: Oxford
University Press for SIPRI, 1994), p. 83.
30 Ibid., p. 84.
31 Nowak, 'CFE Treaty', p. 100.
32 Ibid., p. 105.
33 Daniel N. Nelson, 'Creating Security in the Balkans'. in Regina Cowen Karp (ed.) Central and
Eastern Europe: The Challenge of Transition. (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1993), p. 161.
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External non-geopolitical threats
The former Yugoslavia: The Yugoslav crisis is for Poland a test case of Western
resolve and ability to deal with actual or potential problems in Central Europe.
Consequently, the Yugoslav crisis must have implications for Polish perceptions of
national security. It has been suggested that the experience of Western involvement in the
Balkans has taught Central Europeans that 'there is no NATO, no Europe, and no
reliance on American help. '34 And indeed, it is undeniable that the Balkan crisis has
been a sobering experience for Poles.
Due to the nature of the confl ict and the physical distance between the former
Yugoslavia and Poland, no direct threats to the country's security emerge from the
Balkans. Polish feelings of insecurity created by the events in former Yugoslavia are
indirect: dismay about the West's lack of unity on basic principles and its failure to give
firm backing to agreed courses of action. Poland cannot feel secure in the aftermath of
Sarajevo, one Polish commentator argues, because it will be hard to convince the West
that the Visegrad countries are not comparable to the Balkans;" Hence, for Polish
policy-makers, the situation in Yugoslavia demonstrates the West's confusion about its
interests in Eastern and Central Europe.
Polish leaders have assessed the Western European involvement in the former
Yugoslavia so far as both delayed and largely inadequate." They attribute this to the
inability of Western organizations to cope with the crisis, stemming from disagreements
among Western powers, a lack of proven mechanisms of coordination between European
and Euro-Atlantic structures, as well as the West's lack of commitment to the region. The
governments of Hungary and Slovakia for example began, in response, to emphasize
domestic interests and even to strengthen their own defences." Such developments have
the potential to endanger the stability of the region because countries faced with
increasingly armed and uncooperative neighbours are likely to respond in kind. Local
34 'Gorazdes Fall bedrueckt aIle postkommunistischen Staaten', Die Welt (19 April 1994).
35 Dawid Warszawski, 'Zmeczenie i lek' [Fatigue and fear], Gazeta Wyborcza (24-26 December
1994).
36 See for example'Address by Hanna Suchocka to the Council of Europe, 13 May 1993', (1993).
37 As a result of perceived threats to its security stemming from the Yugoslav conflict combined with
a lack of Western security guarantees, Hungary recently sought to modernize its air force and air defense
systems. In 1993, Hungary accepted 28 MiG fighters from Russia in partial repayment of trade debts.
Shortly after, Slovakia accepted a similar settlement. 'Eastern Europe caught up in new arms race'.
Financial Times (12 January 1994).
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arms races in south-eastern Europe thus appear possible. The continuing lack of arms
control measures in the Balkans may in the future make this problem a significant one.
Such a development could actually threaten Poland's security directly.
Potential local conflicts: The reappearance of historical disputes and tensions
among Central European countries constitutes another source of threats to Polish
security." Poland sees itself as an island of stability in the region. It has formally
regulated its relations with all neighbouring countries by the means of bilateral treaties.
And although negotiations for the good-neighbourliness treaty with Lithuania were
difficult, (see Chapter Five), neither this situation nor any lesser problems with other
neighbouring countries are considered acute.
However, there are concerns about the potential spill-over effects of ethnic,
territorial, religious, and nationalistic tensions among other countries of the region."
Examples of such tensions range from the dangerous strain between Ukraine and Russia
over eastern Ukraine and Crimea, to disputes between Slovakia and Hungary regarding
the construction of a joint project on the river Danube (the Gabcikovo-Nagyrnaros
barrage), and unresolved minority matters between Romania and Hungary." There is
a sense, for example, that social and environmental problems could spark nationalist
responses which would further exacerbate existing ethnic confl icts.
The inadequate Western attempts to stop the killing in the former Yugoslavia has
implications for the ways that Poles view the sources of tension in the region. The public
in Central European countries is aware that 'if the West and the world cannot stop this
war, perhaps they could not stop other wars that may break out in the Balkans or in east
central Europe generally':". Polish leaders reason that the best assurance would come
with membership in Western organizations which could contribute substantially to
improving cooperation and calming tensions in the region. Polish policy-makers believe
that 'controlling mechanisms' to resolve existing conflicts and prevent emerging conflicts
38 Zdzislaw Stelmaszuk, 'Poland', Military Technology (6 June 1992);Tadeusz Mitek, 'Nowe myslenie
o obronnosci panstwa' [New thinking about national defense], Polska Zbrojna (23 May 1994).
39 Skalski, 'Bac sie czy nie bac?'.
40 For a discussion of national minorities in Eastern and Central Europe see: Stephan M. Horak (ed.),
Eastern European National Minorities 1919-1980: A Handbook. (Littleton: Libraries Unlimited, 1985);
John Jaworsky, The Strategic Significance of the Nationalities Issue in Eastern Europe. (Ottawa:
ORAE, November 1990).
41 Security for Europe Project: Final Report. Center for Foreign Policy Development, Brown
University (December 1993), p. 26.
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in the region are necessary. 42 Such mechanisms, they postulate, could only be provided
by existing Western European organizations. The only alternative would be the unchecked
build-up of military capabilities.
Migration: Polish government officials have often argued that another external
non-military risk is potential mass migration, particularly from the former Soviet Union
and later from post-Soviet republics, but also from South Eastern Europe (Balkans), and
to some degree the Third World." Polish authorities cite two reasons for treating
migration as a source of security problems. First, officials argue that mass migration
would result in the economic destabilization of the country. Second, they link the threat
of mass migration to a potential rise in organized crime. Although only approximately
1 percent of criminal acts in Poland are committed by foreigners, Pol ish officials point
out that these also tend to involve mores serious crimes such as robbery, murder and
blackmail, committed by organized groups."
An exodus from the former Soviet Union is considered the most realistic mass
migration scenario. While Poland in the past protected its Western border, the Eastern
border was hardly manned. Accordingly, Poland is only now constructing adequate
border protection, capable of dealing with the rapidly increasing numbers of legal and
illegal border crossings."
So far, the expected tidal wave of migration has not materialized, despite the fact
that Russia has opened its Western borders. A Polish analyst, following Russian sources,
argued in 1993 that about 10 million former Soviet citizens could migrate to Central
Europe within the span of 10 years." The number of border crossings from the former
42 Polish Institute of Foreign Affairs, 'Towards a New Security Structure in Europe', Peace and the
Science, No.3 (December 1990), p. 8.
43 'Problems of Security in Central Europe: Lecture delivered by Professor Krzysztof Skubiszewski,
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, and the
Israel Council of Foreign Relations, Jerusalem, 9th November 1992', p. 3; Longin Pastusiak, 'Threats to
security in Central and Eastern Europe', North Atlantic Assembly Political Committee PC/ES 5 (1994),
p.4.
44 'Nie otworzylem puszki Pandory. Rozmowa z Jerzym Zimowskim, wiceministrem spraw
wewnetrznych, negocjatorem porozumienia azylowego' [I did not open Pandora's box. Conversation with
Jerzy Zimowski, deputy minister of home affairs, negotiator of the asylum agreement], Rzeczpospolita (l
July 1993).
45 Robert Kowal, 'Granica (nie)bezpieczenstwa' [Border of (iujsecurity '. Polska Zbrojna (7 June
1994).
46 Aleksander Korybut-Woroniecki, 'Migracyjne Problemy' [Migratory Problems], Polska w Europie
No. 10 (January 1993), p. 86.
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Soviet Union has in fact increased dramatically, yet most of the individuals actually leave
the country again. Generally speaking, the black market work, trade and tourism have
been the most important motivations for visits from the East. 47 As a result, the number
of refugees from this direction are so far manageable, but officials warn that arrivals
from the former Soviet Union are on a slow but steady increase."
In addition, some Poles expect that Western European, particularly German,
restrictions on migration will further exacerbate the Polish immigration problem."
Consequently, in this context, the EU's efforts to tighten controls along its borders, and
to send refugees back to countries (such as Poland) from which they have attempted to
enter the EU heighten the feel ing of exposure to waves of migration. In May 1993,
Poland concluded an agreement with Germany which obliged Poland to take back
expelled asylum-seekers who had arrived in Germany from Poland. In return Germany
agreed to support Poland financially in its efforts to enforce stricter border controls. 50
Yet in May of the same year at a meeting of the Council of Europe Hanna Suchocka,
Polish Prime Minister, stated:
As far as migration problems are concerned, we are explicitly against attempts
made by individual states to pass the responsibility for creating conditions of their
own security onto other countries. The only possible result of such an approach
is an export to weaker countries of one's own social and political tensions which
partially derive from illegal immigration; the weaker countries are thus being
transformed into some kind of refugee camps. In order to avoid this situation,
bilateral agreements must be concluded between the countriesinvolved and, first
47 Ibid., p. 88.
48 'Czy wiosna ruszy Wschod' [Will the East move by spring], Rzeczpospolita (4 January 1994).
49 Adam Bernatowicz, 'Biuro Pelnomocnika Ministra Spraw Wewnetrznych ds. Uchodzcow' [The Home
Affairs Minister's Office of the Plenipotentiary for Refugees], Rocznik Polskiej Polityki Zagranicznej
1992. (Warsaw: PISM, 1994), p. 324. Even the Polish Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski stated in
April 1993 that 'in view of the new German policy towards asylum seekers and migration, we find it
necessary to protect our interests by means of new agreements'. See 'Polityka Zagraniczna Polski w 1993
roku - Expose Sejmowe Ministra Spraw Zagranicznych RP Krzysztofa Skubiszewskiego. Warszawa, 29
kwietnia 1993 r.' [Poland's Foreign Policy in 1993 - Sejm Expose by the Polish Foreign Minister Krzysztof
Skubiszewski], Zbior Dokumentow/Recueil de Documents 2 (1993), p. 19.
50 See 'Porozumienie miedzy Rzadem Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej a Rzadem Republiki Federalnej Niemiec
o wspolpracy w zakresie skutkow wynikajacych z ruchow migracyjnych - Bonn, 7 maja 1993 r.'
[Agreement between the government of the Polish Republic and the government of the Federal Republic
of Germany on cooperation in the realm of effects caused by migratory movements - Bonn, 7 May 1993],
Zbior Dokumentow/Recueil de Documents 2 (1993). About 100,000 of the 500,000 refugees who have
not received asylum in Germany have arrived in this country from Poland. Zimowski, 'Nie otworzylem
puszki Pandory'.
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of all, a purposeful action should be taken on a European scale. 51
In fact, the agreement has not so far resulted in a wave of deportations, but it
continues to be subject to criticism by parts of the Polish political spectrum that see it as
a 'Pandora's box'. According to Polish officials, only about 70 percent of non-Polish
deportees from the EU to Poland leave Poland as obliged. Of the remaining, few stay
in Poland and some attempt to cross the Western border again. 52
In addition, Polish policy-makers fear that Polish minorities in the former Soviet
Union, driven by economic problems and rising tensions, will want to return to their
country of origin. It is not clear how many Polish nationals actually live on the territory
of the former Soviet Republic. A Western expert calculates that there are approximately
a million. According to him, the most sizable group lives in Belorus (600,000). There
are also Poles in Lithuania (250,000), Ukraine (300,000) and Russia (95,000).53 Polish
sources, following information from the Polish Main Statistical Office, speak of some 2.5
million, with the largest concentration in Ukraine, Lithuania, Belorus and Kazakhstan. 54
But according to local members of the Polish minority in Kazachstan, some 65,000 in this
community are interested in emigrating to Poland. 55
The repatriation of Polish minorities (cross-border Poles) from countries to the
East is increasingly a focus of Polish political debate. 56 The numbers of returning ethnic
Poles are still low but 'the higher the degree of nationalist tendencies and religious
fundamentalism in the former Soviet republics, the greater the number of Poles eager to
51 'Address by Hanna Suchocka, Prime Minister of the Republic of Poland on the occasion of the 44th
Session of the Parliamentary Assembly (5th part) of the Council of Europe. Strasbourg, 13 May 1993.',
Council of Europe Press Release DI4(93) (13 May 1993).
52 Korybut-Woroniecki, 'Migracyjne Problemy', p. 86; Zimowski, 'Nie otworzylem puszki Pandory':
Zbigniew Lentowicz, 'Najczesciej deportuja naszych' [Most often they deport our own people],
Rzeczpospolita (8 July 1993).
53 van den Doel, Central Europe: The New Allies?, p. 43.
54 'Repatriation of Poles in Former USSR Considered', FBIS-EEU-93-037 (26 February 1993), p. 17;
Tadeusz Stpiczynski, Polacy w swiecie [Poles in the world]. (Warsaw: GUS, 1992).
55 'Czy nasi powroca z Kazachstanu' [Will our people return from Kazachstan], Rzeczpospolita (20
April 1994).
56 See analysis published by the Polish parliament: Ewa Toczek, 'Warunki ewentualnej repatriacji
Polakow z bylych republik radzieckich' [Conditions of repatriation of Poles from former Soviet republics J,
BSE Informacja 120 (March 1993). See also Piotr Koscinski, 'Masowa emigracja czy "Kartka Polaka'"
[Mass emigration or the 'Polish card'], Rzeczpospolita (20 August 1994); Helena Fiedorcowa. 'Polacy za
granicami kraju' [Poles beyond the country's borders], Polska Zbrojna (22 June 1994); 'Czy nasi
powroca'.
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return to Poland', one Polish commentator warns. 57 Polish government officials have
declared that the country does not have the resources to accommodate even a limited
wave of repatriates. 58 Nevertheless, the general attitude is that members of Polish
minorities in the East, some of whom have found themselves 'in exile' as a result of
border changes and some as a result of Stalin's policies, should be permitted to move to
Poland. 59
Unlike other Western or Central European countries, Poland has not experienced
a massive surge of refugees from the Balkans." In 1992 it was reported that Poland
accommodated about 1200 refugees from the former Yugoslavia and was prepared to take
in a larger number, if necessary. 61 It is significant however, that these additional
refugees were not supported by the state, and that they had to depend on Polish families
to provide accommodation.
Poland has not yet consolidated its immigration laws'" and the country is
increasingly seen not only as a transitory state but also as a final destination for citizens
from impoverished countries in the region (Romania for example), and the Third World.
So far, the situation has been manageable, with only 2-3 percent of the 'migratory mass'
that moves through the country asking for asylum in Poland. Mass migration remains a
hypothetical scenario. The reasons for this phenomenon are numerous. First, the Polish
government is adopting practical measures aimed at countering this threat. 63 Second,
most areas of the former Soviet Union have no tradition of migration, and the Balkans
are distant enough that only a small percentage of Balkan refugees actually make their
57 'Repatriation of Poles', p. 18. See also Piotr Koscinski, ,Masowa emigracja czy It Kartka Polaka'"
[Mass emigration or the 'Polish card'), Rzeczpospolita (20 August 1994).
58 See 'Czy nasi powroca'.
59 See ibid.; Ewa K. Czaczkowska, 'Osadnicy z Kazachstanu' [Settlers from Kazachstan],
Rzeczpospolita (3 June 1994); Jerzy Bukowski, 'Przyjmijmy Polakow ze Wschodu' [Let us accept Poles
from the East), Polska Zbrojna (29 June 1994).
60 In 1992, Hungary had 50,000 refugees from the former Yugoslavia. See Nico Colchester, 'Survey
of the European Community (8): United in Rivalry - One of history's flabbier alliances is on the drawing
board', Economist (11 July 1992). Refugees from former Yugoslavia accounted in 1993 for 20 percent of
those applying for asylum in Western Europe. 'Circling the wagons. Immigration controls in Europe',
Economist (5 June 1993).
61 'Government Willing to Aid Balkan Refugees', FBIS-EEU-92-231 (l December 1992).
62 Bematowicz, 'Biuro Pelnomocnika', pp. 324-325.
63 Zielonka, 'Security in Central Europe', p. 30.
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way to Poland. There are also other, more theoretical, explanations, including the small
current differentials in purchasing power between Poles and their eastern neighbours, and
the fact that where basic human rights are generally observed, people tend not to move
on a massive scale. Conversely, the latter two factors also explain why the current lack
of mass population movements should not be taken for granted. Poles have begun to see
Poland as a 'frontier' state or 'vestibule' on the migration front. The country failed to
achieve cooperation or coordination of efforts with other states in similar position (such
as Austria and the Czech Republic), and efforts to discuss issues of migration within
existing subregional frameworks, although useful as fora for the exchange of information
and experience, have not resulted in concrete agreements. 64
4. 'Home-made' threats
Despite the seriousness of external problems, Central European policy-makers now
find that some of the most significant security threats have emerged from internal
developments. The transition to democracy and market economies creates a number of
'home-made' problems. It is understood that social strain can give rise to anxiety,
disappointment, and ultimately to general instability. 65 In addition, there are 'home-
made' risks of military nature, related to the process of military restructuring.
Domestic non-military risks
Economic: Internal instabilities, created by the transition to the market economy
are seen as the greatest domestic source of insecurity by many Eastern and Central
European politicians, but also by the publics." In January 1990, the Polish government
imposed economic 'shock therapy', unmatched so far by any other former communist
countries. The Balcerowicz plan (named after the Deputy Prime Minister and Finance
Minister Leszek Balcerowicz, who crafted it) freed prices, set out to sell state-owned
64 Bernatowicz, 'Biuro Pelnomocnika', p. 324.
65 liri Dienstbier, 'Central Europe's Security', Foreign Policy 83 (Summer 1991), p. 126.
66 Pastusiak, 'Threats to security', p. 5~ Skubiszewski, 'Problems of Security in Central Europe'. p.
2~ 'Raport 0 stanie panstwa' [Report on the condition of the state], Rzeczpospolita (19 October 1993);
'Obronnosc we wspolnocie i wspolodpowiedzialnosci. Wystapiene premiera Waldemara Pawl aka w Sejmie
19 stycznia 1995 r.' [Defense in communality and mutual responsibility. Pronouncement by Prime Minister
Waldemar Pawlak in the parliament 19 January 1995], Rzeczpospolita (20 January 1995).
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property and made the Polish currency convertible." This programme saved the country
from hyperinflation and resulted in agreements reducing Poland's foreign debt".
Simultaneously, however, the resulting phenomena of recession, a slump of production
by close to 50 percent, unemployment of nearly 16 percent, and social disorder" are
seen by Polish policy-makers as a cause of a temporary rise in internal security threats
of a political and socio-economic nature. Such threats weaken the state structure and
make it more susceptible to external pressures, as the Polish post-Cold War defence
doctrine argues."
This thesis does not aim to describe or explain the economic processes of
transition. Suffice it to say that Poland's economy has been showing the first signs of
recovery." There are however no quick fixes and the situation is difficult due to foreign
debt, problems with the process of privatization, threats of inflation, the collapse of
CMEA markets, and the failure to find alternative markets.
The rapid dismantling of the CMEA in mid-1991 and the Soviet-initiated
'dollarization' of trade among its former members beginning in January 1991 were
factors which bore a significant responsibility for the extent of the subsequent recession
in Central Europe. The Soviet Union embodied for Central Europe what has been
described as 'a large captive market for poorly made but expensive manufactured goods'
manufactured by NSWTO countries. In addition, the Soviet Union once supplied the
region with cheap energy. The loss of the Soviet market has had a tremendous impact on
67 On the Balcerowicz plan, see for example Tadeusz Kowalik, 'The Costs of "Shock Therapy"',
Dissent (Autumn 1991); Marek Dabrowski, 'The Polish Stabilisation Programme: Accomplishments and
Prospects', Communist Economies and Economic Transformation 1 (1991); Ben Slay, 'The Polish
Economy: Between Recession and Recovery', RFE/RL Research Report Vol. 1, No. 36 (11 September
1992); 'Poll Indicates Rise of Dissatisfaction', FBIS-EEU-91-053 (19 March 1991).
68 On Poland's debt deals see for example 'Eastern Europe comes in from the cold: Poland's debt deal
will spur an investment boom in Eastern Europe that is already in the making', Economist (19 March
1994).
69 Anthony Robinson and Christopher Bobinski, 'Poland poised to be a post-communist success story',
Financial Times (24 February 1992). For information on size of budget deficit and unemployment, see the
government-published Strategy for Poland (A Synthesis). (Warsaw: Government of the Republic of
Poland, June 1994); 'Sytuacja spoleczno-gospodarcza w kraju w 1993 r.' [Social and economic situation
in the country in 1993], Rzeczpospolita Statystyka Polski (7 February 1994).
70 Tenets of the Polish Security Policy, p. 7.
71 The Polish economy grew by a strong 4 percent in 1993. See 'Eastern Europe comes in from the
Cold: Poland's debt deal will spur an investment boom in Eastern Europe that is already in the making',
Economist (19 March 1994). The Polish government has recently presented a draft economic strategy. in
which it forecasts an economic growth rate of 5 percent per annum. See Strategy for Poland.
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the economies of Central European countries." In 1991. the Polish Finance Minister at
the time, Leszek Balcerowicz, blamed two thirds of the drop in Polish production on the
breakdown of the country's trade with the Soviet Union. 73
In addition, intra-regional trade too collapsed dramatically with the dissolution of
the CMEA. 74 Simultaneously, despite the conclusion of Europe Agreements with what
was then the EC, economic links with the West were still insubstantial and poorly
established. Even now, the European Union continues to deny access to its markets to
Central Europe's most competitive products. Central European steel, textiles and farm
produce are subject to EU quotas and tariffs." Central European officials fear that
economic distress caused by these factors could easily lead to disappointment and long
periods of destabilization.
A special place in any consideration of Polish perceptions of economic security
risks must be reserved for German investment and economic initiatives in Poland. While
the majority of policy-makers maintain that Poland benefits immensely from close
economic ties with Germany", sections of the Polish public and some politicians seem
to disagree with this judgement. 77 Many Poles suspect that Germany is mainly interested
in exploiting its position of economic superiority over the states of Central Europe.
Occasionally, even Polish officials seem to fear that their country's economy could be
moulded to fit the needs of German industry, and that their country's pol itical and
72 Stanislaw Gomulka, 'Economic and Political Constraints During Transition', Europe-Asia Studies
Vol. 46, No.1 (1994), pp. 94, 97.
73 Patrice Dabrowski, 'East European Trade (Part I): The Loss of the Soviet Market', RFE/RL Report
00 Eastern Europe Vol. 2, No. 40 (4 October 1991), p. 34. On developments in Poland's trade with the
former Soviet Union, see for example 'Wymiana handlowa Polski z krajami b. ZSSR' [Poland's trade
exchange with the former Soviet Union], Rynki Zagraniczne Nr. 35 (23 March 1993); Malgorzata
Pokojska, 'Na Wschod!' [To the East!], Gazeta Bankowa Nr. 26 (25 June 1993); 'Szanse i zasadzki
rynkow wschodnich' [Chances and traps of eastern markets], Zycie Gospodarcze Nr. 42 (17 October
1993).
74 Andrzej Rudka and Kalman Mizsei, 'The Fall of Trade in East-Central Europe. Is CEFTA the Right
Solution?', Russian and East European Finance and Trade Vol. 30, No.1 (January-February 1994), p.
7.
75 See Dominick Salvatore, 'Privatization, Economic Restructuring, and Foreign Trade in Eastern
Europe', Russian and Eastern European Finance and Trade Vol. 28, No.1 (Spring 1992); 'Survey of
Eastern Europe (6): 2001 is too late - Why the EC should accept Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic
Economist (13 March 1993); 'Looking up: East European economies', Economist (12 December 1992).
76 See for example Zdzislaw Lasota, 'Podgladanie giganta' [Peeping at a giant], Polska Zbrojoa (4
January 1995).
77 'Skubiszewski Addresses Sejm on Security Issues', FBIS-EEU-91-032 (15 February 1991).
147
cultural identity would be then compromised.
While there has been grave economic deterioration in Poland, no mass social strife
has so far broken out. Although this is an encouraging sign, Polish policy-makers warn
that time is working against them, and continuously request Western assistance and, most
importantly, access to Western markets. There is, therefore, the potential for a
radicalization of Polish domestic politics, as elsewhere in East Central Europe, if the
ideology of free market and Western-style democracy is not seen to bring hoped for
advantages.
Ecological/Environmental: Poles today also perceive ecological risks, particularly,
but not exclusively, related to possible nuclear contamination by Central and Eastern
European nuclear reactors which are in a state of disrepair. 78 Moreover, some of these
reactors are placed in potential or actual conflict zones, making them vulnerable to
terrorist action, and to problems with supplies and energy sources. As both Western and
Central European specialists and observers suggest, technical and financial support to end
this problem can only come from the West. 79
Other environmental problems (domestic and global) which are seen as potential
security threats are contamination by heavy metals, acid rain, and limited water reserves,
among others." It should be mentioned here, too, that Poland is coping with substantial
environmental problems, which are a result of 45 years of industrialization without
appropriate environmental protection. 81 In the opinion of the Polish policy-makers, the
scale of problems is of such magnitude that massive Western involvement would be
necessary to tackle them. Environmental degradation and its effects on human health are
considered to be a significant security issue."
78 See for example Skubiszewski, 'Problems of Security in Central Europe', p. 2; Pastusiak, 'Threats
to security', p. 4.
79 Krystyna Forowicz, 'Rodos - zdazyc przed katastrofa' [Rodos - to make it before a catastrophe],
Rzeczpospolita (16 January 1995); van den Doel, Central Europe: The New Allies?, p. 42.
80 Andrzej Madejski, 'Assessments & Prognosis of Threats to the Polish Republic to 2010-2015',
Papers of the Foreign Military Studies Office and Soviet Studies Centre G27 (March 1992).
81 See for example Krystyna Forowicz, 'Homo jeszcze sapie' [Homo still breathing), Rzeczpospolita
Magazyn 2/29 (February 1995); Andrzej Kepinski, 'Piata kolumna czy fundament' [Fifth column or
foundation], Rzeczpospolita (14 December 1994); 'Chance fur einheitliche Entwicklung', Das Parlament
10 (5 March 1993).
82 Skubiszewski, 'Problems of Security in Central Europe', p. 2; Jozef Wiejacz, 'Zagraniczna polityka
ekologiczna Polski' [Polish foreign ecological policy], Rocznik Polskiej Polityki Zagranicznej 1992.
(Warsaw: PISM, 1994).
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Military risks of domestic kind
Poland is also coping with domestic military security challenges which centre on
the reform of the armed forces. In Central Europe (unlike the former Soviet Union)
military transition cannot be seen as a direct threat to the existence of the democratic
order. Rather, the region's armed forces, undergoing difficult restructuring processes
under tight fiscal requirements, are often perceived as not being capable of dealing
adequately with the various potential threats to the countries' security. 83
Financial Constraints: Both in relative and in absolute terms Poland's defence
budgets are among the lowest in Europe." To give one example, Poland's military
budget for 1992 was just $1700 million, which is approximately 3 % of the military
budget of the United Kingdom." Only 4 % of Polish defence spending in the same year
was allocated for the purchase of arms and equipment. 86 By 1992 the Defence
Ministry's budget was 56% lower than the 1988 figure.
In 1994, when only 2.4 percent of the Polish GNP was earmarked for defence
spending, high-ranking military officials warned that if spending was not increased to 3
percent, the Polish armed forces would have to be cut by about a third." The budget
for 1995 was not higher." In 1995, Polish Prime Minister Pawlak and President Walesa
spoke of the process of a 'technical degradation of the armed forces' caused by budgetary
83 See for example 'Impact of Defense Funding Level Reviewed', FBIS-EEU-92-193 (5 October 1992),
p. 13-15; Tim Ripley, 'The Polish Armed Forces in the 1990s', Defense Analysis Vol. 8 NO.1 (1992);
Peter Podbielski, 'Whence Security? Polish Defense and Security After the Warsaw Pact', The Journal
of Soviet Military Studies Vol. 5, No.1 (March 1992).
84 See The Military Balance 1993-1994. (London: Brassey's for IISS, 1993), pp. 244-245; Andrzej
Korbonski, 'The Polish Military at a Time of Change' , RFE/RL Research Report Vol. 3, No. 30 (29 July
1994), p. 21; 'Niekorzystna struktura wydatkow. Rozmowa z plk. Marcinem Krzywoszynskim, zastepca
dyrektora Departamentu Finansow MaN' [Disadvantageous spending structure. Conversation with colonel
Marcin Krzywoszynski, deputy director of the Finance Department, Ministry of National Defense], Polska
Zbrojna (5 December 1994); Tadeusz Mirek, 'Trwaja spory, czas ucieka' [Quarrels continue, time is
running out], Polska Zbrojna (15 March 1995).
85 'New Commanders for Polish Army', RFE/RL Research Report Vol. 1, No. 37 (18 September
1992), p. 67.
86 As has been noted, this would pay for six military aircraft or half a warship. 'Budget Cuts Hit
Military', RFE/RL Research Report Vol. 1, No.4 (24 January 1992), p. 64.
87 'New defence head says Poland has no strategic reserves for war', BBC SWB EE 2003 (21 May
1994), p. A9. See also Ryszard Choroszy, 'Czas priorytetow i splaty dlugow' [Time of priorities and
paying of debts], Polska Zbrojna (5 January 1994); Pawel Nowak, 'Przyszlosc sil zbrojnych' [The future
of armed forces], Polska Zbrojna (18 January 1995).
88 See Ryszard Choroszy, 'Budzet MaN na 1995 r.: Sztuka latania dziur' [Budget of the Ministry of
National Defense in 1995: The art of patching up holes], Polska Zbrojna (18-20 November 1994).
149
constraints. 89
Like the military itself, the national defence industry suffers as a result of
constraints imposed on defence spending. The Polish arms industry is experiencing a
crisis because of cancellations of orders both from abroad and from domestic sources as,
well as related problems, such as unpaid debts from the former Soviet Union and the
effects of embargoes which closed such traditional export destinations as for example Iraq
to Polish exports." While most of the defence industry remains in public hands. it is
still expected to conform to market principles." This expectation is somewhat at odds
with the government's impulse to maintain levels of employment. Thus, the country's
vocal industrial lobbies and trade unions accuse the Polish government of destroying the
Polish arms industry because they are not resisting pressures from foreign capitols."
Backers of a strong domestic arms industry, who usually support their statements by
drawing historical parallels, as, for example, the situation of Poland in 1939, argue that
domestic production could satisfy 60 percent of domestic needs."
Expansion of foreign arms sales has also been examined as a partial solution to
the problems facing the defence industries in Poland." Yet, after the collapse of the
Eastern bloc, the West was interested in curtailing arms production and trade in the
former members countries. In response, Poland signed a number of agreements limiting
both the kinds of arms it can sell and the destinations of its arms trade." This situation
89 Pawlak, 'Obronnosc we wspolnocie'; 'w interesie Polski jest, aby sily zbrojne byly odizolowane od
partyjnych rozgrywek. Przemowienie prezydenta RP Lecha Walesy' [It is in the interest of Poland, that its
armed forces be isolated from parties' contests. Address by President of the Polish Republic Lech Walesa],
Polska Zbrojna (22-22 January 1995).
90 In 1994, domestic orders amounted to a quarter of orders from 1990. See Jan Forowicz, 'Rezolucja
w sprawie ograniczen w eksporcie broni: lnicjatywa nieco spozniona' [Resolution on the issue of restrictions
in arms exports: A somewhat belated initiative], Polska Zbrojna (30 May 1994); Mika, 'Los
zbrojeniowki' .
9\ Wieslaw Mazur, 'Zbrojeniowka zawiesza akcje protestancyjne' [The arms industry suspends protests
actions], Rzeczpospolita (27 July 1993).
92 Romuald Szeremetiew, 'W boj bez broni?' [Into combat without weapons"], Polska Zbrojna (14
September 1994). See also Mazur, 'Zbrojeniowka zawiesza akcje'.
93 Szeremetiew, 'W boj bez broni?'.
94 Ian Anthony, 'Conclusion', in Ian Anthony (ed.), The Future of the Defense Industries in Central
and Eastern Europe. (Oxford: Oxford University Press for SIPRI, 1994), p. 131.
95 'COCOM na emeryturze: Zniesienie instytucji i zakazow' [COCOM retires: Cancellation of
institution and bans], Polska Zbrojna (29 March 1994).
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is occasionally interpreted by Polish observers as a successful Western attempt to wrestle
arms markets from former enemies." In 1994, the Polish parliament discussed the
possibility of limiting arms trade restrictions to UN lists, and thereby widening the range
of countries to which Polish companies could export armaments. Such a shift would
imply dropping self-imposed restrictions which are part of list compiled in 1990. Polish
analysts describe this list, which has not been made public, as 'the longest in the
world' .97 No decision on this issue has yet been made."
Western experts argue that a strategy of maintaining the arms industry based on
foreign sales is not likely to be successful. Ian Anthony states that foreign markets
likewise have been transformed by political and economic barriers to sales. Additionally,
there has been a change in the rationale for arms sales, which have made its appeal to
Central Europeans less political and more commercial. In this context, many of the
former recipients of arms are not capable of paying for their orders."
Another way to support domestic arms industries which the Polish government
considered was to expand the share of domestic arms consumption.'?' In 1992, the
Polish defence ministry decided against ordering large amounts of Western-made
equipment in spite of their policy of reaching technological compatibility with Western
armies. 101 In 1994, 90 percent of the budgetary expenditure earmarked for funding new
military equipment and repairs was spent within the country. 102 However, this meant
that the domestic arms industry's capability was exploited to only 15 percent. 103
Enterprises with strategic significance (which number about 30) will continue to be
96 Ryszard Rogon, 'Rosjanie tez dali sie nabrac' [Russians have been had too], Polska Zbrojna (22-24
July 1994).
97 Forowicz, 'Rezolucja w sprawie ograniczen'.
98 Mika, 'Los zbrojeniowki'.
99 Anthony, 'Conclusion', p. 131.
100 Tenets of the Polish Security Policy, p. 15.
101 'Dlaczego stawiamy na polska zbrojeniowke. Rozmowa z plk. mgr. inz. Tadeuszem Je?ynasty,
zastepca dyrektora Departmentu Uzbrojenia i Sprzetu Wojskowego MON' [Why we bet ~n Polish arms
industry. Conversation with colonel magister engineer Tadeusz Jedynasty, deputy director of the
Department of Armaments and Army Equipment of the Ministry of National Defense] Polska Zbrojna (22
August 1994).
102 Ibid.
103 Forowicz, ,Rezolucja w sprawie ograniczeu' .
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supported by the state and undergo debt rescheduling.'?' Poland has also become
interested in licensing agreements, which would allow foreign technology to be brought
into the country, and would permit the export of parts of production.'?' Poland is
prepared to purchase foreign weapon systems, but in return for the chance to pay with
licensed equipment produced in Poland.
The country is thus currently experiencing a growing gap between the scale of
perceived security threats and the means available to counter such threats. This is not
only a result of the changing international environment, but also of the condition of the
Polish military which reflects the more general problems of the society, economy and
political system.'?" Polish leaders acknowledge that in terms of defence, the country
'cannot go it alone', as in fact very few powers are capable of doing so. It is for this
reason that the Polish post-Cold War defence doctrine specifies that Poland will attempt
to deal with local and regional problems on its own, but that when faced with other
threats, it will require Western assistance. 107
Renationalization of defence: Two of the processes that uniformly characterize the
post-1989 Central European political landscape are the de-Sovietization and
renationalization of the armed forces.'?' The means of lustration has been employed in
a number of Central European countries in order to depoliticize the armed forces, which
under the WTO functioned as tools of the communist regimes. Some countries, Iike
Czechoslovakia, for example, have adopted a severe approach by screening all
104 Apolinary Wojtys, 'Nadzieje zbrojeniowki' [Hopes of the arms industry], Polska Zbrojna (21
March 1995). The Polish defense doctrine announces that 'the functioning of selected defense industry
enterprises will be protected by states guarantees'. Tenets of the Polish Security Policy, p. 15.
105 Pawel Nowak, 'Pieniadze dla wojska' [Money for the army], Rzeczpospolita (22 March 1995);
Pawel Wieczorek, 'Czy bedziemy kooperowac z krajami NATO w przemysle obronnym?' [Will we
cooperate with NATO countries in defense industry?], Polska Zbrojna (3 March 1994).
106 In a recent poll, for example, 64 percent of Polish respondents felt that the country's army could
not assure the country's security because of financial constraints. Reported by Tadeusz Mitek, 'Szacunek
bez zludzen' [Appraisal without delusions], Polska Zbrojna (8 December 1994). See also Ryszard
Choroszy, 'Siodmy chudy rok' [Seventh thin year], Polska Zbrojna (17 August 1994).
107 Tenets of the Polish Security Policy, p. 7.
108 See for example Gasteyger, 'Remaking of Eastern Europe's security': Kjell Engelbrekt, 'Reforms




professional soldiers."?" Countries which pursued a more gradual political transition.
and in which the 'post-communist' forces did not discredit themselves entirely, such as
Hungary and Poland, have so far avoided purges and conducted a de-Sovietization of the
officer corps within the framework of reforming the defence sector. 110 The priority of
Polish policy-makers in the complicated international environment was to ensure that
military preparedness was not affected by purges of former communist activists. III
Nevertheless, as Zielonka reports, in Poland about 75 % of high-ranking posts have
undergone personnel changes.!" In many cases, ordinary retirements take care of this
problem. In addition, in Poland, professional soldiers are now required to remain
apolitical. 113
In Poland, the debate surrounding the issue of lustration has calmed down but is
far from over.'!" However, it appears, not only among high-ranking military officials,
that the prevailing opinion is that dogmatic attempts at lustration could destabilize the
Polish armed forces. Indicative of the general mood is the statement of a Polish military
official, who, from the perspective of the country's security, defined lustration as 'a
tragedy for the entire country'. 115
Civilian control of the military: A vital process in Central Europe has involved
educating civilian experts and establishing civilian control of the military. The collapse
109 In Czechoslovakia about 5,000 high ranking officers, including all generals, deputy ministers of
defense, heads of military colleges, district commanders and political officers have been released in the
process. Zielonka, 'Security in Central Europe', p. 47.
110 See Tadeusz Mitek, 'Restrukturyzacja oznacza masowa redukcje' [Restructurization means mass
reduction], Polska Zbrojna (22 March 1995).
111 Bronislaw Komorowski (Deputy Defense Minister), 'Ostoja demokratycznego panstwa i suwerennego
narodu moze bye tylko demokratyczna annia' [Mainstay of a democratic state and sovereign nation can only
be a democratic army], Polska Zbrojna (27 October 1993).
112 Zielonka, 'Security in Central Europe', p. 47.
113 Komorowski, 'Ostoja demokratycznego panstwa'. See also Dale R. Herspring, 'TIle Case of the
Military', in John R. Lampe and Darnel N. Nelson, East European Security Reconsidered. (Washington
D.C.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), p. 63.
114 Eliza Olczak and Jerzy Pilczynski, 'Osiem recept na lustracje' [Eight recipes for lustration].
Rzeczpospolita (8 July 1994); Tadeusz Mitek, 'To bylby demontaz armii' [That would be deconstructing
the army], Polska Zbrojna (14 February 1994).
115 'Rece mamy czyste: rozmowa z gen. dyw. Tadeuszem Wileckim, Szefem Sztabu Generalnego \VP'
[We have clean hands: discussion with Division General Tadeusz Wilecki, Chief of General Staff of the
Polish Armed Forces], Rzeczpospolita (9 November 1992); 'Polish Defense Ministry opposes lustration.
RFE/RL Research Report Vol. I, No. 38 (25 September 1992), p. 59.
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of the Warsaw Pact left Central European countries with militaries which had complete -
and secretive - control over military issues. Without a body of civilian expertise, Central
European countries were forced to reform defence ministries, create parliamentary
commissions, decide budgets, and begin a public debate on issues of defence and defence
spending. Furthermore, under the NATO Partnership for Peace programme, Poland is
obliged to implement effective civilian control of the military.
Today, civilians in the Polish defence ministry and in parliament have officially
assumed control over the military. However, some observers warn that 'few of them have
developed any expertise in security matters or have any sympathy for the extensive needs
of the defence sector. '116 The area of security and defence policy-making has been a
battlefield for many competing interests and political forces (though the different voices
have remained within the democratic framework). Often, these power struggles, called
in Poland 'battles on top', have been translated into political paralysis.
Poland has succeeded in appointing civilian defence ministers (against the grain
of the national tradition, as some would say), transforming the Ministry of Defence
(MoD) into a political and administrative body for the direction of the defence
establishment, and the General Staff (GS) into a central command for the armed forces.
In addition, a civilian section of the MoD has been created, and the GS has been made
subordinate to the Minister of Defence. Problems have occurred however in defining the
scope of parliamentary control over the military."?
The civilians appointed to the post of ministers of defence and also to other high-
ranking posts in the MoD are often actually non-active military personnel. 118 Many
positions supposed to be in civilian hands are thus held by individuals who have retired,
or have been released from military duty while holding the civilian appointment. In
practice, even the civilian section of the MoD is dominated by military personnel.
Similarly, it has proved difficult to clarify the position of the General Staff.
President Walesa and many generals question the arrangement according to which the
116 Zielonka, 'Security in Central Europe', p. 46.
117 This has been the case mainly because until very recently there was an almost complete lack of
interest on the part of the parliament and its national security commission in military and se~~rity matters.
But there has also been no interest in having the parliament involved on the part of the military leaders.
For example, the parliamentary committee was not consulted on doctrinal matters when a new doctrine was
developed in 1992.
118 For example, Piotr Kolodziejczyk was defense minister while on active duty as a Vice Admiral in
1991, and took the post up again when retired, under Pawlak.
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General Staff is subordinate to the Minister of Defence. There is a clear tendency to
transfer power from the MoD to the GS. This process is openly supported by Walesa,
but ignored by parliament and the Defence Minister .'!"
In Poland, the principle itself of civil control over the military is not contested.
It is, however, not yet clear who precisely should exercise this control. The problem
hinges on the country's failure to provide a constitutional framework for the command
and control of the armed forces, and thus to establish intelligible rules for the
disassociation of the armed forces from political power. 120 Difficulties also stem from
the apparent inability to reassure the military that its concerns are heard by civilians.
Civilian-military tensions are exacerbated by the conflict between post-communist forces
and the post-Solidarity president, upcoming presidential elections, and delays in
constitutional discussion.
Doctrinal matters: The conception and execution of a cohesive defence policy can
be considered one of the main prerequisites for the stability of a state. In this process
military doctrine plays an important function since its role is to guide the formulation of
security and defence policies. In Central Europe, the post-WTO security and defence
policies have been adapted, often on an ad hoc basis, to reflect the new European
realities, but their directions have for a long time remained uncodified in post-Cold War
defence doctrines. In addition, the new doctrines fail to specify potential conflict
scenarios and thus, as Zielonka argues, cannot suggest directions concerning ways to
cope with security problems.':"
Poland has had a post-Cold War defence doctrine only since November 1992. The
doctrine was presented in the form of two documents prepared by the Presidential
National Defence Committee - Tenets of the Polish Security Policy and Security Policy
and Defence Strategy of the Republic of Poland. The form which these documents have
taken and the fact that they were not presented to the Parliament indicated that due to a
constitutional debate, which raised issues of responsibility for security and defence issues,
a more formal document could not be agreed upon. The documents' orientation was
119 Walesa, 'W interesie Polski'; Jan Nowak-Jezioranski, 'Niewczesne rozgrywki' [Untimely contests],
Gazeta Wyborcza (7 November 1994); Zbigniew Lentowicz, 'Batalie i potyczki' [Battles and skirmishes],
Rzeczpospolita (24 December 1994).
120 See 'Wojsko w oczach parlamentarzystow - stanowiska klubow poselskich' [Army in the eyes of
parliamentarians - positions of deputies' clubs], Polska Zbrojna (23 January 1995).










clearly defensive and pro-Western, with a strong emphasis on future membership in
Western organizations and institutions. They considered isolationism to be unacceptable.
The doctrine did not foresee a direct military aggression from any direction, but
discussed a number of security risk of both external and internal nature. 122
The doctrine has been controversial, mainly because it did not foresee the creation
of feasible and viable national defence structures but emphasized the need to rely on
external help in case of aggression against its territory, and is expected to be reviewed
in 1995. The Polish defence doctrine professes to adhere to the principles of international
law, and to concepts of both limited defence, and circular defence. As such, the new
doctrine constitutes a symbolical break with the WTO doctrine. In addition to the
declared adherence to rules and laws of the United Nations (UN), the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), as well as bilateral and multilateral
agreements, the Polish defence doctrine professes to adhere to the principle of the
inviolability of borders.
Two of the most important principles presented by the new doctrine are the move
away from an offensive posture, and the creation of principles for territorial defence!".
The main goals are to decrease the size of the armed forces while increasing mobil ity,
and to acquire defensive weapons, such as those required for air defence.!" The
practical implications of this change are further discussed in the following section which
cons iders reform of the armed forces.
Thirdly, in the new defence doctrine, Poles decided to pursue defence based on
a tout azimuts (all around) principle as a logical consequence of their concept of not
facing any specific enemies. Thus, the idea of ensuring the defence of all borders was put
forward as a guiding principle for the military restructuring process. The redistribution
of forces would allow the military to deal with potential threats from the East without
declaring the Soviet Union or the post-Soviet republics to be a specific source of security
122 For a discussion of the doctrine see Monika Wohlfeld, 'Poland's defence doctrine', Notes from the
Special Adviser for Central and Eastern European Affairs (21 December 1992).
123 Territorial defence has been defined as conventional defence (with a negligible offensive potential)
of the territory of a state. It relies on a strong defence capability rather than on the threat of retaliation. See
Colin Mclnnes, 'Glossary of Strategic Terms', in John Baylis et al (eds), Contemporary Strategy II (2nd
ed.). (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1987), p. 201.
124 'Bye daleko od polityki. Rozmowa z Piotrem Kolodziejczykiem, ministrem obrony narodowej' [To
be far from politics. Conversation with Piotr Kolodziejczyk, minister of national defense], Rzeczpospolita
(26 January 1994).
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problems. During the existence of the WTO Polish forces were concentrated almost
exclusively in the western sections of the territories, and thus a redistribution to the East
has been initiated, but has proved difficult. 125 Poland can claim only partial success In
the relocation of the armed forces across its territories. 126
Considering the tremendous expense connected with setting up new infrastructures
Poland can be expected to tacitly move away from the tout azimuts concept, or at least
to suspend or postpone its implementation. Poland has instead made the improvement of
the technical state of its armed forces a priority. Accordingly, the transfer of troops has
not received the necessary funds. In addition, Kolodziejczyk, the defence minister at the
time, indicated that such transfers would cause frictions with Poland's eastern neighbours
Belorus and Ukraine. 127
Generally speaking, the practical implications of the principles put forward in the
new Central European doctrines are still unclear. It is possible to say that not all of the
new ideas presented by the post-WTO defence doctrines in Central Europe actually guide
the making of current security and defence policies. While Poland can be expected to
continue to adhere to principles which do not require substantial financial commitments,
without external financial support they may slow down or stop altogether the
implementation of costly redeployments.
Reform of the armed forces: The Polish armed forces are currently undergoing
various processes of reform. Some of the changes, particularly cuts in the size of the
forces, date back to the late 1980s, but most have been initiated since the dissolution of
the WTO. 128 Both voluntary and enforced reductions of the size of the armed forces and
armaments constitute an important trend. While the impact of the 1990 Armed Forces in
125 For a description of the process in Poland, see for example Heiko Flottau, 'Poland's Angriffsarmee
muss umsatteln' [Poland's offensive army must resaddle], Siiddeutsche Zeitung (22-23 January 1994);
Kolodziejczyk, 'Bye daleko od polityki'.
126 Andrzej Karkoszka, 'Defensive Security Concepts and Policies: Transition to Defense-Oriented
Configurations', Disarmament Vol. 15, No.4 (1992), p. 108.
127 Kolodziejczyk, 'Bye daleko od polityki'.
128 During the existence of the WTO, Poland's troops strength was 410,000. In 1992, it reached some
240,000. Polish policy-makers announced that the size would eventually drop to approximately 180,000.
Jerzy Milewski, 'Jaka armia, takie bezpieczenstwo' [What sort of army, such security], Gazeta Wyborcza
(17 February 1992).
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Europe (CFE) treatyl29 and the new emphasis on defensive rather than offensive
capabilities playa role, one of the motivations for the reform process is in fact financial
constraints. The difficult economic situation of the officer corps has actually resulted in
an exodus of career and noncommissioned officers. The Polish army, which by the end
of 1992 had armed forces of 225,000 (313,000 personnel) in a country of approximately
38.5 million':", is expected to stabilize at about 180,000. 131
Another important principle guiding military reform IS interoperabil ity and
compatibility with western standards. This principle was initially intended to guide the
modernization of equipment and arms acquisition, as well as the training of forces, but
efforts have been hampered by a number of factors, including the small numbers of
English-speakers in the Polish military, a lack of funds to purchase Western equipment
and technology!", and the social costs created by the elimination of jobs in the defence
industries. Generally speaking, the Polish armed forces are opening themselves to the
West, but they remain equipped with Soviet-style arms. 133
In addition to financial problems, the aim to reduce dependence on Soviet
equipment in favour of Western arms has been limited in the past by Western export
restrictions, imposed both by the now defunct Coordinating Committee for Multilateral
Export Controls (COCOM), and by national control systems in individual countries,
particularly the United States.!" COCOM coordinated the West's policy of export
controls concerning Eastern and Central Europe. In 1990/91 the COCOM embargo was
129 The CFE treaty limits the Polish armed forces to a size of 234,000. See 'Nasza armia silna.
Rozmowa z generalem broni Tadeuszem Wileckim, szefem Sztabu Generalnego' [Our strong army.
Conversation with general Tadeusz Wilecki, chief of the General Staff], Rzeczpospolita (10 March 1994).
130 Andrzej Medykowski, 'Wojsko i obronnosc w statystyce' [Army and defense in statistics], Polska
Zbrojna (22 November 1993). See also Polish Army: Facts and Figures (in the transition period).
(Warsaw: Ministry of National Defense 1991); Rocznik Statystyczny 1993 [Statistical yearbook 1993].
(Warsaw: Glowny Zarzad Statystyczny, 1993).
131 Mitek, 'Trwaja spory'.
132 In 1993, Hungary accepted 28 MiG fighters from Russia in partial repayment of trade debts. Shortly
after Slovakia accepted a similar settlement. Bulgaria appears to be considering the acquisition of MiGs as
well. See Yves-Michel Riols, 'Hongrie: la recherche de l'autonomie militaire', Le Monde (31 January
1994); Anthony Robinson, 'Eastern Europe caught in a new arms race', Financial Times (12 January
1994); Martin Plichta, 'Slovaquie: balbutiements', Le Monde (31 January 1994).
133 Zielonka, 'Security in Central Europe', p. 46.
134 For a discussion of these limitations and their impact, see Katarzyna Zukrowska, 'COCOM a Polska'
[COCOM and Poland], Studia i Materialy 44 (December 1992).
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modified. It ended 'in its present form' in March 1994 after 47 years of existence.
leaving in place individual national restrictions on trade with Central Europe. 135
In 1994, the U.S. Congress, reflecting the emphasis on military cooperation
encouraged by the NATO Partnership for Peace initiative, gave permission to the four
Visegrad countries to purchase American weapons. While this decision will not incite a
stampede to purchase American technology because the Central European countries
currently lack the necessary funds, it does address some of their concerns regarding
restrictions of arms procurement. On the other hand, however, Western observers warn
that efforts to acquire Western equipment are being made without due consideration for
their potential to spur regional arms races. 136
Polish defence planners stress mobility over heavy equipment. They are trying to
create lightly armoured, mobile forces and rapid reaction forces, and are preparing quick
mobilization procedures. However, the costs of such restructuring are prohibitive. While
some mobile units have been created, they can be expected to remain an exception for
the immediate and mid-term future. In addition, the creation of rapid reaction units
carries the danger of creating tensions with neighbouring countries, which could be the
potential objects of force.
A further goal for reform is the profess ional ization of the armed forces. In
Poland, the number of conscripts is around 160,000, which is more than 50 % of the
total number of troops.':" Compulsory military service has already been cut from two
years to eighteen months!", and may be cut further to one year in the future in
connection with plans for professionalizing the Polish armed forces. 139 The chief of the
Polish General Staff stated that by the end of 1995, he expected to be able to man all
135 On the history of COCOM see Andrzej Rudka, 'Western Export Controls: An East European View',
in David M. Kemme (ed.), Technology Markets and Export Controls in the 1990s. (New York: New
York University Press, 1991), pp. 17-19. On the modification of the COCOM regime see Kjell Engelbrekt,
'Bulgaria and the Arms Trade', RFE/RL Research Report Vol. 2, No.7 (12 February 1993), p. 45. On
the dissolution of COCOM see David Buchan, 'World Trade Confusion in shadowy Paris HQ', Financial
Times (31 March 1994). On Polish views of the dissolution of COCOM, see 'COCOM na emeryturze:
Zniesienie instytucji i zakazow' [COCOM retires: doing away with institution and bans], Polska Zbrojna
(29 March 1994).
136 Susannah L. Dyer, 'Arming Nato's Partners', Basic Papers (December 1994), p. 1.
137 The Military Balance 1994-1995, p. 96.
138 Herspring, 'Case of the Military', p. 64.
139 Wilecki, 'Nasza annia silna'.
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modern equipment with professional soldiers. 140 Yet, despite announcements of
expected changes to the ratio of conscripts to professional soldiers, Polish policy-makers
recognize now that such reforms are too costly. Furthermore, they realize that it will be
difficult to fill professional positions, since young people are deterred by low wages of
military jobs, and thus prefer to enter the private sector.
The effort to professionalize the armed forces is also intended to foster peace-
keeping capabilities. Few Central European policy-makers believe in the possibility of
effective regional peace-keeping and peace-enforcement missions in the immediate
future. 141 Nevertheless, Poland and other Central European countries are prepared to
participate in international peace-keeping activities and to cooperate with other countries
in the training of peace-keepers. They view peace-keeping operations as a route to further
integration with NATO forces. Poland currently participates in a number of UN peace-
keeping operations.!" In addition, the country has built up an extensive network of
exchange and peace-keeping training programmes with the participation of a number of
Western European and North American countries.
Although the process of restructuring the armed forces has been progressing, then,
it is severely affected by budgetary shrinkage."? It is evident that democratic countries
facing critical domestic problems and the impact of economic transition cannot give
priority to the modernization and reform of their militaries, and thus it is currently
impossible to assess prospects for the implementation of the principles discussed above.
In the meantime, the armed forces of the former NSWTO countries cannot provide the
capabilities considered necessary to cope with perceived threats. Structural changes are
140 Ibid.
141 Security for Europe Project, p. 41.
142 Poland is involved in operations in Cambodia, Croatia, Iraq/Kuwait, Korea, Lebanon, Syria,
Western Sahara, and most recently also in Haiti. See Military Balance 1993-1994, p. 85/86; 'Misje
pokojowe - od zadan logistycznych do operacyjnych. Rozmowa z plk. Andrzejem Bolewskim,
wicedyrektorem Departmentu Wojskowych Spraw Zagranicznych' [Peace missions - from logistical to
operational tasks. Conversation with colonel Andrzej Bolewski, deputy director of the Department for
Military Foreign Affairs], Polska Zbrojna (23 March 1994). With 1,949 active peacekeepers, Poland was
among the group of countries most involved in UN operations in mid-1994. See 'United Nations
Peacekeeping: Trotting to the rescue', Economist (25 June 1994).
143 On Poland, Grzegorz Lys, 'Cost of Joining NATO', Polish News Bulletin (27 January 1994),
'Podchorazy znow nie zdazy'[Officer cadet not on time again], Rzeczpospolita (15 November 1992); on
Hungary, 'Budget Allocations for national defense "utterly insufficient", says minister', BBe SWB EE
1817 (12 October 1993). See also Jeffrey Simon, 'Central European Security, 1994: Partnership for Peace
(PfP)', Strategic Forum 1 (1994), p. 4.
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limited by fiscal constraints, but their direction IS clear: an emphasis on
professionalization, civil control of the military, and compatibil ity is aimed at gaining
NATO membership. As Simon reports, Central European governments view 'their
military restructuring as an instrument for achieving the goal of Western integration
rather than as one of meeting immediate defence needs and requirements. '144
5. Summary and Conclusions
Increasingly, Polish security fears are shifting from worries about traditional,
external geopolitical threats. Only the threats emanating from the former Soviet Union
pose a truly significant traditional security problem. The post-Cold War 'comprehensive'
security risks that Polish leaders consider relevant are both external and 'home-made' in
nature. They are less 'intensive' than Cold War security threats, but more difficult to
predict, avert and eliminate. In Poland, a feeling of insecurity is generated by the West's
inadequate response to the Yugoslav crisis. This is a reflection of the concern that the
West is confused about its interests in Eastern and Central Europe. Local conflicts in the
region and the possibility of mass migration are two other concerns which top the list of
Polish perceptions of external security threats.
Domestic threats are increasingly seen by Polish policy-makers as a significant
source of insecurity. Risks of non-military kind, such as economic difficulties created by
the process of economic reform, and environmental and ecological problems, are seen
to contribute to the rise of security threats. In addition, domestic military reforms are
thought to affect Polish defence capabilities and therefore to contribute to the country's
inability to assure viable defence structures. Security is gained by preserving a dynamic
balance between threats and capacities.r" In the Polish case, such a balance has not
been struck.
While many Western observers imply that the former NSWTO countries do not
require Western security guarantees, in the opinion of Central European governments the
current situation of de facto neutrality/non-alignment is a dangerous one. Central
Europeans do not extrapolate their security threat perceptions from today's relatively
peaceful situation, but foresee the possibility of a deterioration in their security
144 Ibid., p. 2.
143 Daniel N. Nelson, 'Democracy, Markets and Security in Eastern Europe', Survival Vol. 3), No.
2 (Summer 1993), p. 156.
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environment. The discussion of Polish perceptions of risks to Poland's security indicates
that since 1989 threats have widened and intensified, even though Polish policy-makers
see few direct external military dangers.
The new security and defence policies pursued by Poland attempt to cope with the
fact that no country in Central Europe can guarantee its security entirely independently,
even if it undertakes all-out militarization, and that no firm security guarantees will be
forthcoming in the foreseeable future. Nelson is not alone in his assessment that
'Europe's eastern half will not obtain security through national armed forces .... Even
for a state with notable resources - Poland, for example - maintaining a credible
conventional defense is doubtful, given the current budgetary constraints'. 144
Polish efforts have not been directed towards coping with threats directly (by
means of nationalizing defence), but rather towards creating the appropriate conditions
for entrance into Western organizations and institutions, which could provide security
guarantees. In addition to Western-oriented foreign and security policies, reforms of the
armed forces have likewise been undertaken in light of membership in Western
institutions. Thus, Poland has increasingly tied its fate to expected NATO and EU/WEU
membership.
144 Ibid., p. 167. Of course, one could also argue that in a nuclear world, conventional defence cannot
be credible by definition. It is, however, not the purpose of this thesis discuss and resolve this complicated
debate.
CHAPTER SEVEN
POLISH FOREIGN POLICY OPTIONS AFTER
THE DISINTEGRATION OF THE EASTERN BLOC
1. Introduction
When the military functions of the Warsaw Treaty Organization came to an end,
Poland was left without any formal allies, in a strategic limbo characterized by the
progressive disintegration of the Soviet Union, the unification of Germany, and domestic
instability. For the first time since the end of the Second World War, Poland had, at least
hypothetically, various foreign policy options open to it. Since that time, the Polish
government has discussed and advocated a number of different approaches in order to
enhance the country's security. This chapter presents the various options, and describes
the debates surrounding each one. It is not intended to provide a detailed account of the
history of Polish relations with all of the organizations, institutions, and frameworks
which were at times considered relevant to Polish security, but presents such information
only where the quality of relations has actually affected Polish debates about foreign
policy options.
The first section of this chapter discusses the rather unpopular option of
Soviet/Russian security guarantees for Poland. The section that follows focuses on
another possible foreign policy - neutrality/non-alignment - which Poland considered only
briefly. In the third section, the chapter considers the option of membership in a pan-
European collective security framework, mainly advanced by Czechoslovakia, but also
discussed for a short period in Poland. Finally, the last sections address the possibil ity
of security guarantees from various existing Western security organizations.
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The chapter discusses the options Polish policy-makers have considered viable and
why they have favoured them, the ones they have rejected, and those not open to Central
European countries. Thus, it focuses on two basic factors: willingness and opportunity.
This approach highlights the expectations of Polish leaders as well as the realities of the
international system. The Central European subregional cooperation security option must
be understood as only one of the many foreign and security policy possibilities which
Central European leaders have debated following the collapse of the Eastern bloc. With
this chapter as background, then, subregional arrangements are the specific subject of
separate chapters (Eight and Nine).
2. Russian option
A Polish commentator stated recently that 'the Russian orientation is richly
represented in the Polish political scene.". However, he included in his account all anti-
Western groupings, opposing Polish membership in NATO. The 'Russian option' or
'Russian orientation' is in fact probably the least popular of all the possible foreign and
security policy possibilities theoretically available to Poland in the post-Cold War era.
Indeed, according to opinion polls, Germany is seen as a better alliance partner than
Russia among the younger generation in Poland, while the older generation opts for
neither." With the exception of the Confederation for Independent Poland (KPN), whose
foreign policy platform of subregional cooperation frameworks is presented in Chapter
Nine, all serious political forces currently represented in the Polish parliament favour
integration with the West. 3
While any form of Russian or Russian-Western security guarantees is immediately
and disdainfully dismissed by most political forces as threatening to the country's newly
won sovereignty, there are marginal parties with little popular support which
clandestinely, rather than openly, advocate close links with Russia. As Kazimierz
Dziewanowski, the former Polish Ambassador to the US, says, in the current climate few
I Jacek Kwiecinski, 'Promoskiewski oboz w Polsce' [Pro-Moscow camp in Poland], Gazeta Polska
(January 1993).
2 'Rosja i Niemcy - sasiad nie sojusznik' [Russia and Germany - neighbour, not ally], Rzeczpospolita
(1 August 1994).
3 Krzysztof Gorski, senior expert, National Security Office at the President's Chancellory, Polish
Republic, interview by author, 6 February 1995, London.
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dare to speak of Russian orientation openly. 4 Significantly, pro-Russian groupings exist
both on the left and right of the political spectrum, and have populist leanings. These
'positivist', neo-Dmowskiite, or pan-Slavist groupings' include for example the right-
wing nationalist, pan-slavist (and pro-Russian) Polish National Front - Self-defence
(Polski Front Narodowy - Samoobrona). The leader of this small grouping invited
Vladimir Zhirinovsky, a Russian nationalist who foresees the possibility of Germany and
Russia dividing Poland again, to visit Poland in 1994. The invitation caused a political
storm in Warsaw."
Polish observers occasionally suspect pro-Russian tendencies among sections of
the postcommunist parties." There is no doubt that there are social and financial links
between former Russian and Polish communist forces." Dziewanowski calls this 'the
nostalgic option', characterized by a longing for the Eastern bloc past.
Today, the Russian orientation in Poland is mainly based on an econormc
argument that a vast eastern market exists. Currently, Poland's exchange with Russia
accounts for only 8 percent of the country's trade. Most Polish observers dismiss the
claim that the way to economic recovery for Poland is through Russian markets because
of the chaotic state of the Russian economy. Occasionally other reasons are presented,
ranging from assertions that Russia does not seem to be interested in opening its markets
to Poland, to the warning that Russia might use economic Iinks as an instrument of
political pressure."
4 See statement by Kazimierz Dziewanowski to the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Polish
parliament, in Biuletyn Nr. 1238/II kad. Komisja Spraw Zagranicznych nr. 35 (31 January 1995), p. II .
.5 Kwiecinski, 'Promoskiewski oboz'.
6 Gorski, interview by author, 1995.
7 See for example the statement by Andrzej Ananicz from the Presidential Chancellory to the Foreign
Relations Committee of the Polish parliament, in Biuletyn Nr. 1238, p. 24.
8 Gorski, interview by author, 1995.
9 Kaziemierz Dziewanowski, 'Aby Wrzesien nie mogl sie powtorzyc' [So that September cannot repeat
itself], Rzeczpospolita (6 February 1995).
165
3. Neutrality
In 1989, the option of neutral ity had supporters among Hungarian and
Czechoslovak el ites. The Hungarian discussion concerning future foreign pol icy directions
focused on the so-called 'Finnish' model of neutrality, characterized by close political and
economic ties to Western Europe and good relations with the Soviet Union as an
alternative to WTO membership. Gorbachev' s visit to Finland in October 1989, during
which he recognized Finnish neutral ity'" , seemed to strengthen the Hungarian belief that
neutral ity was a viable pol icy alternative.
The debate was fuelled by a number of unofficial statements by Soviet analysts
and academics, which indicated that the Soviet policy of non-interference in Central and
East European affairs could be interpreted as a way of permitting Hungary as a former
Soviet satellite to become neutral without hurting Soviet interests in the Central European
region. 11 Indeed, some even argue that after the collapse of the WTO, the Kremlin
pursued a conscious policy of 'Finlandization' in the region".
Furthermore, some Western observers" suggested in 1990 and 1991 that a
neutral or non-aligned status for the countries of the Central European region would
permit them to free themselves gradually from Soviet domination. Others argued that
although no Central European country wished to be part of a 'buffer zone', they played
that role anyhow 'by virtue of geography'. Barry Buzan, Henry Kissinger, and Steven
van Evera, as well as Paul K. Davis and Robert D. Howe from the RAND Institute, have
advocated the 'neutralization' of Eastern and Central Europe as a long-term solution to
10 Francois Nieto, 'Neutral Territory', Manchester Guardian Weekly (5 November 1989).
II See Alfred Reisch, 'Hungarian Neutrality: Hopes and Realities', Report on Eastern Europe Vol.
1, No. 13 (30 March 1990); 'Hungary Free to Leave the Pact, Soviet Official Says', Globe and Mail (30
October 1989).
12 Libor Roucek, 'After the Bloc: The New International Relations in Eastern Europe', RIIA
Discussion Paper 40 (1992), p. 6. The Soviet Union put forward a set of new bilateral treaties with Central
European countries. The Soviet proposal included a clause which stipulated that they could not take part
'in any military alliance which could be directed against the USSR'. The clause was withdrawn after the
August 1991 coup. See Jan Zielonka, 'Security in Central Europe', Adelphi Paper 272 (Autumn 1992),
p. 38; Jane M. O. Sharp, 'Security Options for Central Europe in the 1990s', in Beverly Crawford (ed.),
The Future of European Security. (Berkeley: University of California, 1992), p. 63.
13 See for example Richard A. Bitzinger, 'Neutrality for Eastern Europe: Problems and Prospects',
Bulletin of Peace Proposals Vol. 22, No.3 (September 1991).
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the region's security problems." However, for most Polish policy-makers. these
unofficial suggestions were an 'illustration of Western indifference towards the security
of the states of East-Central Europe.' 15
Neutrality, then, was initially seen by Hungarians as an alternative to WTO
membership and as a guarantee of independence and sovereignty as well as a means of
securing access to markets in both East and West. The Czechoslovak approach to
neutrality, however, was less optimistic than the Hungarian." The Central European
country least interested in this policy option was Poland. Initially, Polish policy-makers
believed on the one hand that the country required the WTO both as a security guarantee
and as a bargaining chip in its negotiations with Germany, and on the other hand that the
Soviet Union continued to see Poland (more than other Central European countries) as
part of its sphere of influence. Thus, while Hungary debated neutral ity, Poland continued
to preserve its position within the WTO, albeit at the same time pushing for its
restructuring. 17
Polish elites began to consider options other than membership in the WTO in late
1990 and early 1991, by which time the discussion of neutrality had almost come to an
end in other Central European countries." As the Report on the State of National
Security says, Poland had 'a brief flirtation with the idea of "armed neutrality" or the
formula of "equal distance" vis-a.-vis our Western and Eastern neighbours, which
appeared in the official pronouncements of government ministers at the turn of 1991. '19
Indeed, these November 1991 statements on the new direction of the Polish security and
defence policy presented at the Second Conference on Security and Cooperation in
14 Barry Buzan et al, The European Security Order Recast: Scenarios for the Post-Cold War Era.
(London: Pinter, 1990); Henry Kissinger, 'A Plan for Europe', Newsweek (18 June 1990); Stephen Van
Evera, 'Primed for Peace: Europe After the Cold War', International Security, Vol. 15, NO.3 (Winter
1990/91); Paul K. Davis and Robert D. Howe, Planning for Long-Term Security in Central Europe:
Implications of the New Strategic Environment. (Santa Monica: RAND, August 1990).
15 Report on the State of National Security - External Aspects. (Warsaw: PISMo 1993). p. 60.
16 'The Security Policy of the Czech Republic: Research Project', IIR Study Papers 3 (1994). p. 18.
17 Sharp, 'Security options', p. 66.
18 Ibid., p. 56.
19 Report on the State of National Security, p. 60.
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Europe (CSCE) Seminar on Military Doctrine" indicate that Poland favoured the
concept of 'equal proximity' - preserving the balance in relations between Poland's two
largest neighbours at the time, Germany and the Soviet Union.
Neutrality may have been an option as long as it presented a relatively harmless
alternative to membership in the Warsaw Pact. But for Poland, with its many security
concerns, neutrality was hardly appealing. According to Gasteyger, one concern was that
neutrality meant a total absence of security guarantees. 21 Furthermore, Polish leaders
believed that the USSR would consider a neutral belt to its west as an attempt to isolate
the region from Europe. In addition, in the post-Cold War era, neutral status could not
provide solutions to security problems of a social and economic nature. Some observers
suggest in addition that neutrality lacked appeal for historical reasons - since Poland has
no tradition of neutrality. 22
The 1992 doctrine" lacked any reference to the concept of 'equal proximity'.
The move away from this concept was triggered by the changes to the East of Poland's
borders, particularly the instability after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the
consequent creation of the shaky Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).
Recently, there have been reports of a resurgence of the idea of neutrality among
Slovakia's opposition parties. Neutral status for Slovakia would certainly mean stronger
ties with Russia." Such a possibility would not be considered advantageous by Polish
policy-makers, who, as a result, are likely to work towards including Slovakia in the
Visegrad framework, and to develop joint approaches towards membership in Western
organizations and institutions.
20 'Statement by Dr. Janusz Onyszkiewicz, Deputy Minister for Defense of the Republic of Poland,
Vienna, 8 October 1991', in Second Seminar on Military Doctrine, Statements on Agenda Items 1,2.
(Vienna: Landesverteidigungsakademie, November 1991)~ 'Presentation by the Chief of General Staff of
the Polish Armed Forces, Maj. -Gen. Dr. Zdzislaw Stelmaszuk, 11 October 1991 " in Second Seminar on
Military Doctrine; 'Presentation by the Deputy Chief of General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces, Brig.
Gen. Marian Robelek, 16 October 1991', in Second Seminar on Military Doctrine: Polish Army: Facts
and Figures (in the transition period). (Warsaw: Ministry of Defense, 1991).
21 Curt Gasteyger, 'The remaking of Eastern Europe's Security', Survival. Vol. 33, No. '1
(March/April 1991), p. 123.
22 Ibid., p. 123.
23 Tenets of the Polish Security Policy and Security Policy and Defense Strategy of the Republic
of Poland. (Warsaw: National Defense Committee, November 1992).
24 Peter Robejsek, 'Driften Visegrad-Staaten zu Russland ab? Osrmitteleuropas Annaherung an westliche
Strukturen wird sich verlangsamen', Die Welt (8 July 1994).
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The irony of the situation is that while Poland turned away from the concept of
neutrality as early as in 1991, today Poland continues to find itself in a defacto situation
of neutral ityInon-al ignment, Most political forces are dissatisfied with this status because
it is expensive, and, as it is argued, must entail militarization." Nevertheless, as the
Polish deputy Foreign Minister Andrzej Towpik stated to the Sejm Committee, there is
no dearth of people who support the concept of armed neutrality. 26 This foreign and
security policy option is a natural extension of the 'neither' orientation, that is, the neo-
Pilsudskiite desire to create distance between Poland and both Germany and Russia.
There are supporters of this option both among left- and right-wing forces of the Polish
political spectrum", but it seems to be advocated mainly in military circles." In
November 1993, for example, a high ranking military official said that following the end
of what he called 'NATO-mania', Poland must develop realistic approaches to its security
based on the recognition that Poland is effectively alone. While Poland should continue
to emphasize that it is interested in and available for coalitions, alliances, and collective
security frameworks, its military must develop based on the principle of self-
sufficiency. 29
4. Collective Pan-European Security
The notion of pan-European collective security dates back to the interwar League
of Nations. According to Ken Booth, 'the basic principle of collective security is that an
attack upon one state will be regarded as an attack upon all states. In theory, the
international community would act as one to deter and, if necessary to stamp out
aggression."
25 Andrzej Wilk, 'Podejrzany sojusznik' [Suspicious ally], Rzeczpospolita (15-16 January 1994).
26 Statement by Andrzej Towpik to the Foreign Relations Commission of the Polish parliament, in
Biuletyn Nr. 1238, p. 12.
27 Aleksander Smolar, 'Polityka zagraniczna i jej przeciwnicy' [Foreign policy and its opponents I.
Rzeczpospolita (26-27 November 1994).
28 Krystian Piatkowski, senior expert, National Security Office at the President's Chancellory. Polish
Republic, interview by author, 15 March 1995, Warsaw.
29 'Polska mysl wojskowa: Dobrze, ze skonczyla sie "NATO mania'" [Polish military thought: Good.
that 'NATO-mania' ended], Rzeczpospolita (26 November 1993).
30 Ken Booth, 'Alliances', in John Baylis et al (eds.), Contemporary Strategy I. (New York: Holmes
and Meier, 1987). p. 302.
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Encouraged by the rapid collapse of the Cold War framework, Central European
countries, and especially Czechoslovakia, pinned their hopes on the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, since its 1994 Budapest conference renamed
the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe, or OSCE) and its future
transformation into a pan-European collective security framework. Czechoslovakia
considered the CSCE a structure that could give the Central European states some form
of security vis-a-vis both the Soviet Union and Germany, and would keep the United
States in Europe." Beginning in early 1990, Czechoslovakia, both on its own and jointly
with other states, advocated a number of ambitious schemes for a new pan-European
collective security framework based on the CSCE process."
While Czechoslovakia, and to some degree, Hungary" saw the Helsinki process
as an imminent security guarantee for the Central European states, Poland stressed that,
although the idea of a collective security system was an interesting one, the creation of
such an order would require time and hard work, and in any case, it was not clear
whether or not the creation would be successful or effective." Jane Sharp argues that
beginning in early 1991, after the collapse of the WTO, 'few Poles were reassured by
the CSCE. The government in Warsaw continued to search for ways to strengthen the
CSCE but also sought closer ties with NATO and WEU, as well as bilateral agreements
, 35
Polish diplomacy was nevertheless relatively active In the CSCE process, due
31 Due to its membership and mandate, the CSCE seemed well suited to deal with the post-Cold War
security challenges. It includes virtually all European states, the United States and Canada as members. Its
mandate covers issues of security, human rights and economic development. Most importantly, unlike any
other European organizations, it was not built around one of the two Cold War security blocs. Indeed,
many saw the CSCE, through its support for human rights in Eastern and Central Europe, as a contributing
factor in the collapse of the bi-polar structure in Europe. James Steinberg, 'The Role of European
Institutions in Security After the Cold War: Some Lessons from Yugoslavia', RAND Note (1992), p. 3.
32 In March 1990, Czechoslovakia first presented the idea of an European security commission within
the CSCE framework to the Warsaw Treaty members. In April, a memorandum outlining the proposal was
presented to the CSCE. See: 'Dienstbier proposes European Security Commission', FBIS-EEU-90-067 (9
April 1990).
33 'Defense Official on Security, Warsaw Pact', FBIS-EEU-90-158 (15 August 1990).
34 'Skubiszewski on European Security', FBIS-EEU-90-099, 22 May 1990; 'Expose premiera RP
Tadeusza Mazowieckiego w Zgromadzeniu Parlamentarnym Rady Europy - Strasburg, 30 stycznia 1990
r.' [Address by Prime Minister of the Republic of Poland Tadeusz Mazowiecki in the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe - Strasbourg, 30 January 1990], Zbior Dokumentow/Recueil de
Documents 1 (1991), p. 13.
35 Sharp, 'Security options', p. 66.
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probably to a mixture of factors, including the desire to remain a visible and
'uncomfortable' country, as well as a combination of euphoria, inexperience and personal
ambition within the Polish diplomatic staff itself. In June 1990, a joint proposal on the
institutionalization of the Helsinki process was presented by Czechoslovakia, East
Germany and Poland." In September 1990, a Pol ish-Austrian initiative to institutionalize
the CSCE process proposed that representatives of CSCE member states should meet
twice a year. 37 In October 1991 Poland submitted a proposal suggesting the creation of
a CSCE monitoring and peace-keeping force."
Central European attitudes towards security began to change substantially
beginning in late 1990, as a response to a number of perceived and real new security
risks, dangers and threats, and to changing perceptions of CSCE's capabilities. The fall
and winter of 1990-1991 were characterized by several important developments - the
unification of Germany, the Gulf War, and especially the turn towards conservatism in
the Soviet Union which culminated in early 1991 with the violent crackdown in the
Baltics. The most pessimistic scenario was presented by President Lech Walesa of
Poland, who saw the possibility that the Soviet crackdown in the Baltics was only the first
step in the USSR's attempt to reclaim Eastern and Central Europe."
Also during this period, a shift in Central European perceptions of institutional
opportunities and limitations became apparent. Beginning with the Paris Summit of 19-21
November 1990, the CSCE developed both institutions and mechanisms intended to give
operational capability to what could be described as a debating forum", but its
contribution to European security has continued to be marginal.
36 'Initiative to Institutionalize CSCE Process', FBIS-EEU-90-109 (6 June 1990).
37 'Joint Initiative With Austria on CSCE Process', FBIS-EEU-90-180 (17 September 1990).
38 See: 'Monitoring and Peace-Keeping Forces under the Auspices of the CSCE', proposal submitted
to the CSCE Committee of Senior Officials by Poland on 22 October 1991. The proposal was radical for
its time, and although since implemented, was originally turned down in 1991. Piotr Switalski, 'The role
of the CSCE in Conflict Settlement', The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs Vol. 2, No.4
(Autumn 1993), p. 29.
39 'Walesa, OKP Voice Concern Over Soviet Union', FBIS-EEU-91-016 (24 January 1991).
40 For a description of the development, see Czeslaw Marcinkowski. 'KBWE wobec konfliktow
europejskich' [CSCE faced with European conflicts], Rzeczpospolita (7 December 1994); Michael Bryans
(ed), 'The CSCE and Future Security in Europe', ClIPS Working Paper 40 (March 1992); 'Beyond
Process: The CSCE's Institutional Development, 1990-1992'. paper prepared by the staff of the
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Washington D.C. (December 1992); 'Deciding the
CSCE's Future: Prospects for the 1994 Budapest Summit'. British American Security Information
Council Report 94.3 (1994).
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The fact that the CSCE has not assumed a more important role in the post-Cold
War era can be ascribed to a combination of factors. Probably the most important
of these is the CSCE's lack of capabilities when it comes to handling changes in the
character of security threats. The CSCE's new tools are under-utilized"; because they
are not appropriate to conflicts where questions of territory or identity are involved,
where there is no effective state control, and where violence is used."
Secondly, states anxious about the possibility that the CSCE might grow at the
expense of other organizations have blocked attempts to institutionalize it.43 The US
leadership was concerned about the potential effects of the CSCE on NATO. Others
opposed the new development as distracting attention and resources from the CSCE's
traditional human rights focus."
A third problem has been the CSCE's continual lack of financial resources. This
has meant that its institutions have continued to under-perform, failing to make
themselves more appealing to member states." The funding for the CSCE has always
been minimal, and it is clear that 'states proved more reluctant to fund the [CSCEj
institutions than they had been to create them. '46
Fourthly, the CSCE has suffered from problems relating to its decision-making
mechanisms.f The principle of unanimity gave countries a veto right and thus the
chance to block any initiative. The stalemate resulting from the Soviet refusal to discuss
the crackdown in the Baltic republics demonstrated that the CSCE could not deal with
matters of security effectively because of its decision-making mechanism. The problems
41 Procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes and peacekeeping have never been employed. Other
mechanisms (such as the Berlin Emergency Mechanism, or the Vienna Mechanism on unusual military
activities) have only been used sporadically. 'Deciding the CSCE's Future', p. 8.
42 , Report Of the CSCE Meeting of Experts on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes', Valetta (1991), p. 3;
Kal J. Holsti. 'Conflict Prevention and Resolution in the New Europe: Making the CSCE Relevant' , ClIPS
Working Paper 40 (1992), p. 78; Marcinkowski, 'KBWE wobec konfliktow': Maria Wagrowska, 'Spor
o bezpieczenstwo Europy' [Argument on Europe's security], Rzeczpospolita (11 October 1994); Switalski,
'The role of the CSCE', p. 29.
43 Gasteyger, 'Remaking of Eastern Europe's security', p. 123.
44 Beyond Process: The CSCE's Institutional Development, 1990-1992. (Washington D.C.:
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1992), p. 5.
45 'Deciding the CSCE's Future', p. 8.
46 Beyond Process, p. 8.
47 Maria Wagrowska, 'Koniec KBWE' [The end of CSCEj, Rzeczpospolita (7 December 1994).
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of seeking CSCE-wide consensus had also been visible during the August 1991 coup
attempt in Moscow. As a result the 'consensus minus one' and 'minus two' rule was
developed in 1992. 48 Decision-making processes were made difficult by the growing
membership of the organization. Expansion began in June 1991. From 34 before the Paris
Summit, the CSCE grew to 52 members in 1992. There are 53 member states today.
Fifthly, the CSCE's role was curtailed by other organizations, which took over
its tasks in a struggle to redefine their functions in the post-Cold War era. The CSCE
suffered a blow with NATO's creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council
(NACC) and later PfP (Partnership for Peace), when the North Atlantic Alliance
incorporated many of the functions which had been traditionally provided by the CSCE.
These included arms control and confidence and security-building measures (CSBMs).49
Similarly, NATO's peacekeeping role took over the CSCE's mandate. In addition to
NATO's initiatives, the EU's European Stability Pact, which tackled matters previously
discussed under the CSCE's auspices, also shows the minor position Western
governments assign to the CSCE. 50 Thus, NATO and PfP took over the tasks of the
CSCE's first 'basket' (security); the EU secured the second 'basket' (economy); and the
third 'basket' (human rights) was seized by the Council of Europe.
Sixthly, and finally, the CSCE does not possess viable enforcement capabilities. 51
At the Helsinki Review Conference of 1992, CSCE Heads of Government and State
decided to consider the organization a regional arrangement under the auspices of the
UN. In theory, this allows the CSCE to carry out enforcement actions and peace-keeping
operations by permission of the UN Security Council. In practice, until late 1994 the
CSCE has not been involved in any peacekeeping, and is unlikely to take a peace-making
or peace-enforcing role. 52
The idealistic dissident visions of the CSCE security guarantees have in effect
48 Wagrowska, 'Spor 0 bezpieczensrwo ': Switalski, 'The role of the CSCE', p. 30.
49 'NATO, Peacekeeping, and the United Nations', British American Security Information Council.
Berlin Center for Transatlantic Security Report 94. 1 (1994), p. 10.
50 'Deciding the CSCE's Future', p. 5.
51 Marcinkowski, 'KBWE wobec konfliktow': Switalski, 'The role of the CSeE', p. 31.
52 'Deciding the CSCE's Future', p. 7.
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been abandoned by Polish decision-makers. 53 The concept of a pan-European security
framework based on an institutionalized CSCE has not been discarded entirely, but the
realization of such a system is not envisaged for the near future. 54 Poles expect the
CSCE to playa role in the former Soviet Union, where it should undertake tasks such
as preventative diplomacy, observer missions, peace-keeping, and human rights
monitoring. In addition, Polish policy-makers want it to continue to playa role in arms
control. 55
The former NSWTO countries have not entirely abandoned the concept of
collective pan-European security, but they no longer see it as a potential source of
security guarantees. Yet pan-European security is in fact Russia's preferred choice."
Recently, Russia's Defence Minister Pavel Grachev presented a plan at the January 1994
Brussels conference of NATO defence ministers according to which NATO would be
subordinate to the CSCE. 57 This Russian proposal was reiterated in preparation for the
October 1994 Budapest Summit of the CSCE. According to this version of European
security architecture, the CSCE would play a predominant role, while NATO would
become practically its subordinate. The CSCE would be equipped with a decision-making
body similar to the UN Security Council. NACC, separated from NATO and attached to
the CSCE, would be responsible for matters such as peace enforcement, military
activities, and conversion of arms industries. PfP would fall under NACC's
responsibility . NATO, WEU, and the CIS would be subordinate but equal to one another
bodies with their own peace-keeping forces. Central Europe, in this proposal, would be
given guarantees by both Russia and NATO. 58
Russian officials have subsequently denied that they want to subordinate NATO
53 Maria Wagrowska, 'Czy KBWE sie przezyla' [Did CSCE outlive itself"], Rzeczpospolita (23-24
June 1993).
54 'Problems of Security in Central Europe', lecture delivered by Krzysztof Skubiszewski, Minister of
Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, at the Instituto de Cuestiones Internacionales Y Politica Exterior,
Madrid (26 October 1992), p. 2.
55 Jacek Czaputowicz, 'Szczegolny moment' [Particular moment], Rzeczpospolita (5 July 1994); Maria
Wagrowska, 'Minister Olechowski wierzy w KBWE: Nowy program kontroli zbrojen' [Minister
Olechowski believes in CSCE: New programme of arms control], Rzeczpospolita (8 September 1994).
56 Wagrowska, 'Czy KBWE sie przezyla'.
57 Friedbert Pflueger, 'Take PfP one step further', Wall Street Journal (Europe) (6 July 1994).
58 Czaputowicz. 'Szczegolny moment' .
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to CSCE, and their proposal to subordinate NACC to the same organization was rejected
by Western governments even before the January 1994 NACC meeting. Nevertheless, the
Russian plan worries Central Europeans, particularly Poles. A strengthened CSCE would
increase Russia's leverage in the direction of European security. 59 Indeed, even in the
West, observers suggest that Russia wants to use the CSCE to gain influence over
NATO. 60
In this context, it is worth noting the Polish reception of the initiative launched
by the German and Dutch Foreign Ministers Klaus Kinkel and Peter Kooijemans on 17
May 1994. An advisor to the Polish Foreign Minister interpreted the attempt to
strengthen the CSCE by linking it to NATO as a way of giving Russia a participatory
role in shaping the European security framework - a goal which does not please Poles."
In the Polish view, the proposal could well result in an unacceptable Western - Russian
condominium in Central Europe.
5. Membership in alliances
According to Booth, 'if states have not been able to secure their interests by
going it alone, then searching for allies has been their normal course. Other alternatives,
collective security and neutralism have not been seen to be satisfactory options ... '62
The foreign policy choice which all former NSWTO countries eventually favoured was
membership in Western organizations and institutions. NATO, the WEU, and
occasionally also the post-Maastricht EU63 were all seen as potential sources of security
guarantees, and Central Europeans pursued a 'catch-all' policy aimed at establishing links
with as many of these as possible. In this chapter, the various institutions are discussed
separately, although their organizational links are becoming increasingly complex. NATO
is focusing more and more on the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)
59 'Deciding the CSCE's Future', p. 4 and 13. See also the 'Russian Federation Proposal'. in 'Deciding
the CSCE's Future', p. A 6-7; Wagrowska, 'Spor 0 bezpieczenstwo'; Grzegorz Lubczyk, 'Konferencja
KBWE w Warszawie: Poszukiwania kodeksu zasad - najwiekszym zadaniem' [CSCE Conference in
Warsaw: Search for codification of rules - the biggest task], Rzeczpospolita (11 October 1994).
60 Bruce Clark, 'Russia and West split on Europe's security', Financial Times (10 October 1994).
61 Czaputowicz, ,Szczegolny moment'.
62 Booth, 'Alliances', p. 303.
63 The Maastricht Treaty is an agreement on foreign and security policy, reached by the EC at the
Maastricht summit on 9-10 December 1991. See Steinberg, 'Role of European Institutions', p. 5.
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and its relationship to America, while the WEU relies on NATO's military assets, but
has connections with the EU's CFSP. 64 Links are also being created and strengthened
between these organizations and bodies such as the CSCE and the UN, as the above
section on pan-European security describes.
The Atlantic option: NATO membership
Among Central European countries, it was Hungary that initiated the
rapprochement between Central Europe and NATO. In early 1990, the Hungarians
submitted that WTO members should be able, in time, to join the various political and
consultative bodies within NATO. This visionary proposal foresaw the possibility of
'common membership' within the formerly Western alliance. Hungary was joined by
Poland in its demands for the 'modernization' and reform of the WTO but not in
demands for dismantling it altogether. 65 Czechoslovakia, which initially called for the
dissolution of both military pacts soon modified its approach. By May 1990, it
emphasized the importance of US troops in Europe, and began to treat NATO as a
potential nucleus for a new security system. In June 1990, Hungary announced that it
intended to withdraw from the military arm of the WTO by the end of 1991.
Poland, however, continued to follow the policy of preserving its relations with
the USSR and its position within the WTO, while advocating a reform of the bloc. This
policy took into account the country's security concerns, since it was a priority for
Poland to be involved in the negotiations over German reunification, and to secure a
border treaty with Germany that would recognize the Oder-Neisse line as common
border. Jane Sharp reports that President George Bush's call for the withdrawal of Soviet
troops from Poland in July 1989 came as a surprise to the Polish government, which
continued to see Soviet troops as the guarantor of Poland's western border. 66
Poland's relations with NAT067 began in March 1990, when the then Foreign
Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski visited the NATO Headquarters for the first time. In
64 Peter Schmidt, 'European Security Defense Identity (ESDI): A Brief Analysis from a German Point
of View', paper presented at the INSS/SWP Conference in Washington D.C. (June 1994), p. 16.
65 Alfred A. Reisch, 'Central and Eastern Europe's Quest for NATO Membership', RFE/RL Research
Report Vol. 2, No. 28 (9 July 1993), p. 34-35.
66 Sharp, 'Security options', p. 64.
67 The following section draws mainly upon a brief history of the country's relations with NATO,
published in polska Zbrojna (28 September 1994).
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June 1990, NATO issued its London Declaration". announcing the organization' s
interest in cooperation with the Central European countries. In September of the same
year, Manfred Worner, NATO's Secretary General, visited Warsaw. During his visit
Skubiszewski announced that Poland did not see membership in NATO as one of its
foreign policy goals, and Worner stated that NATO was not interested in Polish
membership.
The border treaty with Germany was signed in November 1990, and following this
event Poland opened talks concerning the withdrawal of Soviets." By the autumn of
1990, Poland and Czechoslovakia had joined Hungary in call ing for the termination of
the WTO, which they now saw as an 'empty shell' .70 It was also in the autumn of 1990
that Poland established its first diplomatic relations with NATO. The Soviet withdrawal
negotiation proved difficult, and an agreement was not reached until Spring 1991. 7 1
In April 1991, the Polish deputy Defence Minister Janusz Onyszkiewicz stated that
'joining NATO offers no solution to their [Visegrad countries '] security needs and would
in some ways recreate the division of Europe ... '72 In describing the Polish foreign
policy of this time, Foreign Minister Skubiszewski said that the initial decision not to
pursue NATO membership was inspired by the realization that links with the West would
have to be established in a gradual manner. In this process, according to him, NATO
could not be the first institution with which Poland would establish close relations.
Instead, Polish diplomacy worked towards changing NATO's picture of Central European
countries as enemies." Many Polish observers however speak of the Polish foreign
68 'London Declaration from July 6, 1990', Los Angeles Times (7 July 1990).
69 Reisch, 'Central and Eastern Europe's Quest', p. 35.
70 Ibid., p. 36.
71 'Uklad mieclzy Rzeczapospolita Polska a Federacja Rosyjska w sprawie wycofania wojsk Federacji
Rosyjskiej z terytorium Polski - Moskwa, 22 maja 1992 r.' [Agreement between Republic of Poland and
Russian Federation on the issue of withdrawal of armed forces of the Russian Federation from the Polish
territory - Moscow, 22 May 1992], Zbior Dokumentow/Recueil de Documents 3 (1992).
72 Janusz Onyszkiewicz, 'The Security of Eastern and Central Europe in the Shorter and Long-Term",
in The Prague Conference on the Future of European Security. (Brussels: The NATO Office of
Information and Press, 1991), p. 131.
73 KrzysztofSkubiszewski, 'Pozycja Polski w Europie: dzis i jutro [Poland's position in Europe: today
and tomorrow], Gazeta Wyborcza (8-9 January 1994).
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policy during this period as characterized by 'wasted chances"."
Under pressure to deal with the changing international environment, NATO's
foreign ministers announced in June 1991 in Copenhagen that 'the consolidation and
preservation of democratic societies and their freedom from any form of coercion or
intimidation are ... of direct and material concern to NATO'. 75 The Western alliance
did not directly guarantee the security of Central Europe, but some Central Europeans
felt that the formulation of the communique implied that NATO would be prepared to
help, if any power were to threaten the new European democracies." At the same time,
NATO governments made it clear that they were not prepared to extend membership to
these countries in the immediate future.
In early October 1991, facing a disintegrating USSR to the east and the war in
Yugoslavia to the south, Central European leaders emphasized a new desire for a treaty-
based relationship with NATO as the only means of reassurance in an increasingly
unstable Europe."? For Central Europeans, the case of the former Yugoslavia was in fact
a test of the various security institutions and organizations. In this conflict, NATO
demonstrated to Central Europeans its superiority over other, purely European,
institutions because of the perceived importance of its US leadership, its quicker decision-
making processes, and its military capability. Since in the former Yugoslavia Central
Europeans perceived the dependence of Western Europe on America along with
America's tendency to distance itself from European problems, they increasingly voiced
concern that the US administration was more interested in the Far East and Russia than
in their own region.
The year 1992 was a significant watershed in relations between Poland and
NATO. Although towards the end of 1991 the Polish government had begun to speak
74 See for example Kazimierz Dziewanowski, 'Polityka wlasciwego czasu' [Policy of right time],
Rzeczpospolita (16-17 July 1994).
75 Partnership with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, Statement Issued by the NAC
meeting in Ministerial Session in Copenhagen on 6th and 7th June 1991. (NATO Press Service: Brussels.
1991). See also Copenhagen Declaration on NATO's Core Security Functions in the New Europe issued
by NATO's North Atlantic Council. (Brussels: NATO's Press Service, 1991); 'NATO decides to Forge
New Ties with Fonner Foes', Globe and Mail (7 June 1991).
76 'Eastern European Security: Friends, not Allies', Economist (15 June 1991).
77 'Oswiadczenie Ministrow Spraw Zagranicznych "Panstw Trojkata" w Sprawie Wspolpracy z
Sojuszem POllloclloatlatyckim. Krakow,S pazdziernika 1991 r.' [Statement by the Ministers of Foreign
Affairs of the "Triangle States' Concerning Cooperation with the NATO. Cracow, 5 October 19911, Zbior
DOkumentow/Recueil de Documents 2 (1992).
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seriously of NATO membership, it was not until early 1992 that the Polish government
declared that full membership in NATO was the main strategic aim of Polish policy."
In addition to declarations by Polish policy-makers, the November 1992 defence doctrine
stated that Polish membership in NATO was to be accomplished before the end of the
century." Nevertheless, perceptions of Polish chances for NATO membership differed
among Polish leaders. The Foreign Minister asserted that there was no doubts about the
fact that membership could not be achieved overnight. 80 Prime Minister Suchocka
however spoke in October 1992 of 'a clear prospect of Poland's fast integration with the
NATO structures. '81
Poland began to see NATO and the continued presence of the United States in
Europe as a more important element of stability than many of NATO's own member
countries whose leaderships wondered whether NATO had become obsolete." Central
European policy-makers pursued the NATO option not only in the interests of security
but also for domestic reasons. They saw NATO membership as a way to show their
electorates the new standing of their countries in the international community, and their
new-found freedom to co-deterrnine the course of international events. Moreover, the
desires of Central European leaders to pursue this foreign policy orientation involved
economic considerations. NATO membership, they thought, would be an indication of
stability, which would then encourage foreign investment. It would also mean that
membership in other Western organizations - such as the European Community (European
Union) - was within reach. Thus, membership in the Western military alliance would
generally bring Central Europeans closer to Western Europe, and help them to achieve
a solution to the region's economic and social problems.
Although the policy-makers of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland expressed
their willingness to become NATO members, NATO initially communicated that it would
not open its doors to the former Warsaw Treaty Organization countries. In response to
78 Janusz Prystrom, 'Polityka bezpieczenstwa zewnetrznego Polski w 1992 r.' [Polish external security
policy in 199], Rocznik Polskiej Polityki Zagranicznej 1992. (Warsaw: PISM, 1994), p. 48.
79 Tenets of the Polish Security Policy, p. 6.
80 'Problems of Security in Central Europe. Lecture delivered by Professor Krzysztof Skubiszewski,
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem and the
Israel Council of Foreign Relations, Jerusalem, 9th November 1992', p. 5.
81 'Suchocka's KUL Address', Lublin (20 October 1992), p. 2.
III Sharp, 'Security options', p. 56.
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Central European interest in NATO, the organization's Secretary General Worner stated:
'We can only guarantee the security of our member states', Worner said, but declared,
as well, that NATO functioned as a stabilizing factor for all of Europe: 'NATO can
contribute to deterring the use of ... military force against any East-Central European
country. ' 83
The reasons cited by the Western alliance for initially showing reluctance to
Central European membership are too numerous to discuss here in depth. Suffice to say
that they included the desire not to have a border with the Soviet Union and not to change
the military balance at the expense of Moscow. 84 Soviet leaders made it clear that
Moscow had no inclination to give up its 'legitimate security interests' regarding its
former allies. 85 The German unification which led to the absorption of East Germany
into NATO had already jeopardized NATO's relations with the Soviet Union, and NATO
was not prepared to risk provoking the USSR further by extending the alliance to the
newly democratic Central European countries. This position induced Polish fears that the
Soviet Union, and later Russia, would have an impact on Polish links with Western
organizations, or on the creation of a Western-Russian condominium in Central Europe.
In addition, the Western alliance occasionally cited other problematic issues,
including the potential need to act in cases of regional conflicts, the costs of technical
compatibility", and the military difficulties of providing security guarantees to the
East/Central Europeans. NATO also recognized that it was not well suited to be able to
tackle some of the security concerns facing Central European countries - such the
potential influx of refugees, cross-border conflicts, nationalist and ethnic unrest, and,
83 See 'NATO's Worner Discusses Upcoming Visit', FBIS-EEU-90-223 (19 November 1990).
Generally speaking, NATO has the option to accept new European members by unanimous vote. That state
has to be in position to contribute to the North Atlantic area (Art. 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty). Article
10 provides for the possibility of accession to the treaty by any other European state in position to further
the principles of the Treaty. In 1952, Greece and Turkey, in 1955, the Federal Republic of Germany, and
in 1982, Spain, acceded to the Treaty under this article. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Facts
and Figures. (Brussels: NATO Information Services, 1984).
84 'Leaders Discuss Pact, NATO Prospects', FBIS-EEU-088 (7 May 1991).
85 'Soviet Position at Security Conference Viewed', FBIS-EEU-91-088 (7 May 1991); 'East European
Security: Friends Not Allies', Economist (15 June 1991); 'Antall Interviewed on Ties with EC, NATO',
FBIS-EEU-91-009 (22 May 1991); Sharp, 'Security options'.
86 Michael Broer and Ole Diehl, 'Die Sicherheit der neuen Demokratien in Europe und die NATO',
Europa Archiv, Vol. 46, No. 12 (25 June 1991), p. 372.
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initially, delays in the withdrawal of Soviet troops." In addition, there were warnings
that NATO would not survive an enlargement in its current form, as its decision-making
mechanisms were designed for a small and coherent group of member states. A major
reason for NATO's caution in regard to Central Europe was the debate over the future
of the alliance as well as the entire security architecture of Europe, which left the issue
of NATO's tasks in the post-Cold War era unresolved.88
At the NATO Rome Summit in November 1991, NATO members agreed to
deepen the dialogue with the countries of the former Warsaw Treaty Organization
members. They invited these countries to join them in a North Atlantic Cooperation
Council (NACC) in the 'Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation'. 89 The invitation
reflected the desire of NATO members to protect their own interests while offering
cooperation on civil-military relations, defence policy, defence conversion, and
peacekeeping'? which would not carry a large price tag. According to some observers,
the declaration actually focused on ways of safeguarding the security interests of the
present NATO members."
The Council began operating in December of 1991. NACC, which claims all of
the NATO and East and Central European countries as members, was not well received
by Poles, who complained that it could not 'change anything' and, what is worse, that
it was never intended to do so. Polish authors also criticized NACC's failure to
differentiate among the many countries invited to join it.92 Central European states
discovered that the NACC was only what Vladimir Kusin calls a 'meet-and-chat-
87 Adrian Hyde-Price, 'East Central European Security After the Cold War', paper presented at the
Political Studies Association Conference, Lancaster (15-17 April 1991), p. 23.
88 'Fonner Bloc Countries Look to NATO', FBIS-SOV-92-073 (15 April 1992), p. 7.
89 Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation: Issued by the Heads of State and Governments
Participating in the Meeting of the NAC in Rome on 7th -8th Nov. 1991. (Brussels: NATO Press
Service, 1991).
90 Michael Mihalka, 'Squaring the Circle: NATO's Offer to the East', RFE/RL Research Report Vol.
3, No. 12 (25 March 1994), p. 2.
91 Volker Heise and Zdzislaw Lachowski, 'Military dimensions of European security', unpublished
paper (1991), p. 1.
92 Tadeusz Chabiera. 'Jak przyjac propozycje NATO: Tylko spokojnie' [How to accept NATO's
proposals: Only calmly1, Rzeczpospolita (8 November 1993).
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groove:" - a forum for communication - and so continued to push for full NATO
membership.
In March 1992, during the second visit of NATO's Secretary General to Warsaw,
Skubiszewski said that there was a possibility that Poland would enter NATO, but that
it was not clear when such an event might come to pass. At approximately the same time,
Walesa presented his alternative subregional security cooperation scheme, the' NATO-bis'
proposal, described further in Chapter Nine. But the government distanced itself
immediately from that initiative.
Soviet, and later Russian attitudes played an important role in the process of
developing Central European relations with NATO, and Central Europeans perceived
Russian opposition to the expansion of NATO as a major obstacle. This problem seemed
to vanish when in August 1993, during his visit to Warsaw, Russian President Boris
Yeltsin announced that Russia would not stand in the way of Poland's attempts to gain
entry into NATO. 94 'Now the West has no argument to say no to Poland, it can't use
Russia as an excuse', said a presidential spokesman." Prime Minister Suchocka
concluded that 'any further [concerning NATO membership] does not seem possible"."
However, soon after Yeltsin's Warsaw statement, Yurii Kashlev, the Russian ambassador
to Poland, claimed that Yeltsin had been misunderstood. Among others, Russian Foreign
Minister Andrei Kozyrev and Defence Minister Pavel Grachev actually lobbied to veto
Yeltsin's statements.
In September 1993, the last Russian soldiers left Warsaw. 97 In the same month
in Budapest, the German Chancellor Helmut Kohl informed the Polish Prime Minister
Hanna Suchocka, that a post-communist victory in the upcoming Polish election could
make Poland's way into NATO more difficult. The Polish electorate did return the ex-
93 Vladimir Kusin, 'NATO and Central Europe: The Problem of Conjunction' , Notes from the Special
Adviser for Central and East European Affairs (26 October 1993), p. 7.
94 Ryszard Malik, 'Rosja nie sprzeciwia sie wejsciu Polski do NATO: Czas rozpoczac odliczanie na
nowo' [Russia does not oppose Poland entering NATO: Time to start fresh count], Rzeczpospolita (26
August 1993); ArumWielopolska, 'Jelcyn zgadza sie na Polske w NATO: Politycy stawiaja znaki zapytania'
[Yeltsin agrees to Poland in NATO: Politicians place question marks], Rzeczpospolita (30 August 1993).
95 Quoted in Jane Perlez, 'Yeltsin Endorses Polish NATO Bid: Walesa Aides Press Alliance to Open
Up Its Membership', Herald Tribune (26 August 1993).
96 See Andrew Marshall, 'NATO moved to include former enemies', Independent (7 September 1993).
97 Ian Traynor, 'Back in the arms of Boris', Guardian (21 October 1993).
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communists to power. 98 But, despite some early insinuations to the contrary", the new
government continued with foreign and security pol icies aimed at 'integration with
Europe' and membership in NATO.
In October, after the coup attempt in Moscow, Yeltsin wrote a letter to heads of
states which had taken part in the 'Two-Plus-Four' negotiations (the United States.
France, the United Kingdom, and Germany) explaining that the membership of Central
European countries in NATO could isolate Russia and that any enlargement of NATO
must respect Russia's security interests.'?' Following this statement, Les Aspin, the
American defence secretary, presented the blueprint of the so-called Partnership for Peace
during a NATO meeting in October 1993. For Central Europeans the timing of this
appeared to be no coincidence: despite Western assurances to the contrary, PfP's launch
is still considered a direct response to Yeltsin's letter. In November of the same year
Yeltsin signed a decree putting into force a military doctrine which saw the expansion of
military blocs and alliances as a potential cause of war. In December the Polish Foreign
Minister Andrzej Olechowski visited Washington D.C., and heard assurances from the
American government that Russia would not have a right to veto the issue of his
country's membership in NATO.
Hopes for Polish membership in NATO were fuelled by German support. albeit
verbal in form. German Defence Minister Volker Ruhe continued to emphasize that
Poland could enter NATO as the first new member or as part of the first group. This did
not depend on Russian attitudes, the minister claimed during a Warsaw meeting of the
defence ministers of the Weimar Group (Poland, Germany, France) on 17 July 1994.
According to Riihe, membership could be granted before the year 2000. 101
Poles see the German government as unlike the other EU countries in that it
actually has an eastern dimension to its policy. But even German support is not seen as
98 Anthony Robinson and Christopher Bobinski, 'Poland returns ex-communists to prominent role',
Financial Times (20 September 1993).
99 Adam Lebor, 'Polish leaders cast doubt on entry to NATO'. Times (21 September 1993).
100 Suzanne Crow, 'Russian Views on an Eastward Expansion of NATO'. RFE/RL Research Report
Vol. 2, No. 41 (15 October 1993), pp. 21-22.
101 'Czlonkowstwo w NATO przed 2000 L'!' [Membership in NATO before year lOOO'!1.
Rzeczpospolita (18 July 1994).
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full. 102 Support from other countries has not been forthcoming, with the US giving
mixed signals until the spring of 1995, and others flatly resisting plans for the expansion
of NATO.
The January 1994 NATO summit endorsed two new initiatives which first had
been put forward by the Americans at the meeting of NATO Defence Ministers at
Travemunde in October 1993: namely, the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and the Combined
Joint Task Forces (CJTFs).103 PfP is open to all CSCE countries.'?' In principle, it
opens NATO to the possibility of new members without specifying when and how they
might join. Thus, the PfP initiative did not in fact reflect the bolder plans discussed
before the January 1994 Summit, which entailed that the Visegrad countries would be
considered for NATO association or membership. lOS
The PfP initiative met with a mixed reception, and Romania and Bulgaria were
more enthusiastic than their northern neighbours, who had been hoping for more."? In
January 1994, during talks with Clinton's aides, Ambassador Madeleine Albright and
General John Shalikashvili, Walesa claimed that Poland might reject the initiative if
NATO did not state that Poland would certainly gain membership at some point in the
future. The Polish Foreign Minister Andrzej Olechowski summed up Polish concerns
when he said that the Americans required Central Europeans to pursue a programme in
order to be accepted as fellow NATO members, but left themselves the option to refuse
102 Maria Wagrowska, 'Polska-Unia Europejska: Trudne narzeczenstwo' [Poland-European Union:
difficult engagement], Rzeczpospolita (22 June 1994).
103 CJTFs are intended to make NATO's military structure flexible for regional tasks. The task forces
can, if NATO is not willing to react, perform on a European level. Schmidt, 'European Defense Identity',
p. 18. In addition to pragmatic considerations, CJTFs are intended to be an arrangement for cooperation
with Central and Eastern European countries under the auspices of PtP. However, since the CJTFs proposal
has been embraced by NATO, deliberations on specific arrangements have been deferred. Analysts indicate
that the delay reflects the diverging interests of NATO members. 'NATO, Peacekeeping', p. 29.
104 For the Text of the Partnership for Peace invitation, see RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 3, No.
12 (25 March 1994), p. 22. For the list of NATO Partners up until June 1994, see NATO Review No. :3
(June 94), p. 6.
105 'NATO, Peacekeeping', p. 25.
106 Kjell Engelbrekt, 'Southeast European States Seek Equal Treatment', RFEIRL Research Report,
Vol. 3, No. 12 (25 March 1994); Alfred A. Reisch, 'Central Europeans' Disappointments and Hopes'.
RFE/RL Research Report Vol. 3, No. 12 (25 March 1994).
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to expand the institution. 107
While Poland deliberated over the initiative and conducted reportedly 'sharp'
discussion with NATO representatives, the Czechs and soon after also the Hungarians
endorsed the proposal, and during the NATO summit of 10 January 1994 NATO member
countries accepted it as an official programme. Shortly thereafter, during a meeting with
Clinton in Prague, the leaders of all the Visegrad countries, including Poland, confirmed
their acceptance of the PfP. Not having much choice, Poland signed the PfP on :2
February 1994. 108 Nevertheless, the initiative remained controversial among Poles. 109
In January 1995, Prime Minister Pawlak stated that Poland thought of the PfP as a step
towards full NATO membership. Costs of the realization of the PfP programme are thus
seen as an 'investment' in future NATO security guarantees. 110
The PfP was criticized by the Polish press for not providing a political defence
against pressures from the Russian Federation. Since the Russian desire to create a 'grey
zone' of security in Central Europe has not provoked an appropriate reaction on the part
of Western powers, Poles are reminded of events surrounding the Yalta agreements!".
A Polish author reports that Polish diplomats find it disconcerting that according to the
PfP document, admission of new members is to depend not only on their particular
achievements and readiness, but also on NATO's judgement of the political and security
situation in Europe as a whole."? This situation implies some form of Russian veto
107 'Przed szczytem NATO w Brukseli z ministrem spraw zagranicznych Andrzejem Olechowskim
rozmawiaja Edward Krzemien i Piotr Najsztub: Mam trzech szefow i swiat na glowie' [Edward Krzemien
and Piotr Najsztub speak with Foreign Minister Andrzej Olechowski prior to the NATO summit in
Brussels: I have three overseers and the world on my mind.], Gazeta Wyborcza (6 January 1994).
108 This section is based on 'Kreta droga do NATO' [Complicated way into NATO], Polska Zbrojna
(28 September 1994), and Maria Wagrowska, 'Partnerstwo - jedyna droga do NATO' [Partnership - the
only way into NATO], Rzeczpospolita (3 February 1994). See also Maria Wagrowska, 'Jaki ksztalt
partnerstwa' [What form of partnership], Rzeczpospolita (27 June 1994); 'Bezpieczenstwo Polski w
naszych rekach. Z Piotrem Kolodziejczykiem - ministrem obrony narodowej rozmawia Janusz B.
Grochowski' [Poland's security in our hands. Janusz B. Grochowski speaks with Piotr Kolodziejczyk,
Minister of National Defense], Polska Zbrojna (l February 1994).
109 In a Polish opinion poll, 33 % of respondents felt that PfP was preparing the way into NATO, and
27 that it did not. Wagrowska, 'Partnerstwo - jedyna droga'.
110 'Obronnosc we wspolnocie i wspolodpowiedzialnosci. Wystapiene premiera Waldemara Pawlaka \\'
Sejmie 19 stycznia 1995 r.' [Defense in community and mutual responsibility. Presentation by Prime
Minister Waldemar Pawlak in the Sejm 19 January 1995], Rzeczpospolita (20 January 1995).
III Wagrowska, 'Jaki ksztalt partnerstwa'.
112 Czaputowicz, 'Szczegolny moment'.
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over Polish foreign policy plans.
For Poles, the PfP cannot be analyzed apart from Russian attitudes towards
Central European membership and affiliation with NATOl I3 , or from the West's
inability or unwillingness to respond adequately to the changes in Europe.":' Indeed.
even Western observers perceive that the proposal tries to avoid alienating Russia!".
Although Russia's Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev declared repeatedly that Russia
would sign the PfP Framework document, others, including Defence Minister Pavel
Grachev and other military officials, favoured the idea of signing it only if NATO
allowed Russia to amend CFE-limits in the Southern Region and gave the country a
special status within the PfP.
Eventually, during his visit to the May 1994 meeting of the NATO Defence
Ministers, Pavel Grachev agreed to sign the PfP agreement. 'In response, NATO
members indicated that they would informally have a special relationship with Russia,
giving them consultation beyond that offered by the PfP. '116 NATO's commitment was
acceptable to Poles only because they lacked alternatives, and the new situation did not
alleviate their fears about the potential implications of Russia's special status within the
PfP. In fact, in December 1994, Russia's Foreign Minister Kozyrev stunned NATO's
foreign ministers by briefly rejecting the partnership agreement on the grounds that
NATO was planning to study the possibility of expanding into Central Europe. 117
Much has been written on the PfP, its advantages and disadvantages, and Central
European responses to it. This section does not therefore aim to provide an in-depth
discussion of the initiative. It is, however, necessary to note briefly that the PfP is
expected to have an effect both on the way Central European countries cooperate with
113 'Piotr Kolodziejczyk dla "Rzeczpospolitej": "Partnerstwo dla pokoju" nie moze bye droga donikad'
[Piotr Kolodziejczyk for 'Rzeczpospolita': 'Partnership for peace' cannot be a road to nowhere],
Rzeczpospolita (14 June 1994); 'Oczekujemy partnerskiego traktowania. Wypowiedz Lecha Walesy dla
PAP' [We expect to be treated like partners. Statement of Lech Walesa for PAP), Polska Zbrojna (1
January 1994); Sylvester Walczak, 'Strobe Talbott i jego doktryna: Czlowiek, ktory zatrzymal NATO'
[Strobe Talbott and his doctrine: the man who stopped NATO], Rzeczpospolita (30 January 1994).
114 Maria Wagrowska, 'Czlonkowstwo w sojuszu polnocnoatlantyckim: Daleki horyzont' [Membership
in the Northatlantic alliance: Distant horizon], Rzeczpospolita (7 January 1994).
115 'NATO, Peacekeeping', p. 25.
116 Ibid., p. 27.
117 See Charles Goldsmith, 'Russia Balks at NATO Plan to Study Alliance's Growth', Wall Street
Journal (2-3 December 1994).
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NATO and Western armies, and on the quality and quantity of relations among
themselves. The PfP may even have the effect of inadvertently undermining sub-regional
cooperation.!" One of the analysts involved in crafting the PfP blueprint, Charles
Kupchan, wrote that insufficient focus on intraregional military cooperation was one of
the initiative's shortcomings. He argued that 'the design of the partnership actually
inhibits regional ties by encouraging neighbors to compete with each other in expanding
their individual relationships with NATO and preparing for full membership. '119
Although Poles continue to emphasize that NATO is the most significant
organization for Polish security':", there have been slight changes in their approach to
NATO. Today there is concern about Western disputes concerning the role of the
alliance, and the structure of European security architecture. In the West the debate over
the place of Central Europe within the European security architecture is far from over,
and this is considered threatening by Central Europeans. 121 In addition, Central
Europeans are concerned that the various Western security organizations and institutions
are not interlocking, as it has often been suggested, but are actually in competition or
even interblocking.!" The PfP has not alleviated these concerns. As an advisor to the
Polish Foreign Minister stated, the PfP is a slow process, and its aims are not well set
out. 123
118 Jeffrey Simon, 'Central European Security, 1994: Partnership For Peace (PFP)', Strategic Forum
1-94 (1994), p. 1.
119 Charles A. Kupchan, 'Strategic Visions', World Policy Journal Vol. 11. No.3 (Autumn 1994),
p. 117.
120 In a 1994 poll, 40% of the respondents stated that they expected Poland to be a NATO member
within a few years. Another 12% expected membership 'soon', and 25 % - in many years. Only 7 %
believed that Poland would not become a NATO member state. 71 % believe that Poland should aim at
membership in the organization, and only 9% that Poland should align with Russia or other East/Central
European countries. See 'Polacy 0 czlonkowstwie w NATO' [Poles about NATO membership], Polska
Zbrojna (9 August 1994).
121 Henryk Szlajfer, 'A View of Central and East European Security from Warsaw'. in Charles L.
Barry (ed.), The Search for Peace in Europe: Perspectives from NATO and Eastern Europe. (Fort
Lesley: NDU Press, 1993), p. 171.
122 Simon, 'Central European Security, 1994', p. 2.
123 Quoted in Maria Wagrowska, 'Podpis pod "partnerstwem'" [Signature under 'partnership' I.
Rzeczpospolita (1 February 1994).
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The Western European option: WEUIEU membership
In Europe, the end of the Cold War has brought a renewed interest in developing
a Western European rather than an Atlantic approach to security.'?' The desire of
Western European countries to anchor Germany by means of European integration and
their aspiration to create an out-of-area capability have been the main reasons for this
phenomenon. Proposals for expanding the European role in the realm of security focus
on a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), to deal with both the political and
the economic facets of security; and on defence policy, linking the WEU and the EU. 125
WEU membership: Initially denied membership in NATO, Central Europeans
began to explore the possibility of turning the Western European Union into a pan-
European security framework. 126 Accordingly, they expressed their interest in
institutional affiliation and membership but applied less pressure on these organizations
than on NATO. 127
Polish decision-makers indeed considered the WEU as one - but not the main -
tool available to accomplish the task of overcoming the division of Europe. This approach
echoed Western debates about the future of the organization. Poland continued to
emphasize the significance of the American presence in Europe, and thus also the desire
to see NATO and the WEU as compatible and not as competing organizations. The
growing emphasis on cooperation with the WEU, however, was mainly a function of
disappointment about the progress of integration into NATO. 128
The WEU interested Poland and the other Visegrad countries on three counts.
Firstly, it did not seek close relations with Russia, and created fora for Central Europeans
without Russian participation. In addition, Central European membership in the WEU
was considered less provocative to Moscow than membership in NATO. And indeed,
Poland's rapprochement with the WEU did not provoke an angry Russian reaction.
124 Schmidt, 'European Security and Defense Identity'.
125 Steinberg, 'Role of European Institutions', p. 4.
126 For a discussion of the history of the Western European Union, see: SIPRI Yearbook 1991: World
Armaments and Disarmament (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. xxv.
127 Pal Dunay, 'Adversaries All Around? (Re)Nationalization of Security and Defence Policies in
Central and Eastern Europe', Clingendael Paper (January 1994), p. 57.
128 Hieronim Kubiak, 'Poland: national security in a changing environment'. in Regina Cowen Karp
(ed.), Central and Eastern Europe: The Challenge of Transition. (Oxford: Oxford University Press for
SIPRI, 1993), p. 95.
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Nevertheless, Polish policy-makers foresee the possibility of such reactions In the
future. 129 Unlike NATO, the WEU was prepared to differentiate among former
NSWTO countries and the successor states of the Soviet Union. It did not, however.
make a distinction between Visegrad countries and other Central European countries, for
which it was criticized by Polish observers. 130
Secondly, it offered prospects of stronger guarantees than NATO. The 1948
Brussels Treaty and the 1954 Amended Brussels Treaty!" (on which the WED is based)
provided a firmer security guarantee than does the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty
(Washington Treaty) 132 • And thirdly, under Maastricht Treaty provisions, links with the
WED could be translated into Iinks with other European organizations.
According to the Maastricht Treaty, the WED plays what Peter Schmidt calls the
role of a passe-partout. It works as a possible defence arm of the ED, as well as a
European pillar within NATO. 133 In addition, according to the 1992 Petersberg
129 Jan B. de Weydenthal, 'Poland Builds Security Links with the West', RFE/RL Research Report
Vol. 3, No. 14 (8 April 1994), p. 29. The first signs of a Russian change of attitude towards WEU became
visible in December 1994: Mr. Kozyrev in a speech to the Western European Union's parliamentary
assembly on 1 December 1994 proposed cooperation between Russia and WEU. He for example offered
to make Russian satellite intelligence available to WEU. See 'Europe's post-post-cold-war defences wobble
into action', Economist (10 December 1994).
130 Stanislaw Parzymies, 'The European Union and Central Europe: Prospects of Security Cooperation',
The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs, Vol. 2, No.3 (Summer 1993), p. 98.
131 See texts of the Brussels Treaty and Amended Brussels Treaty published by Assembly of Western
European Union Information Service.
132 'The North Atlantic Treaty', NATO Handbook. (Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1980).
133 The Treaty on European Union (known as the Maastricht Treaty) was agreed by the Heads of State
and Government of the EC at Maastricht on 11 December 1991. The EC and WEU decided to enhance the
capabilities of the WEU and agreed that it should become a component of the EC's political union. Implicit
in the Maastricht formulation was some unspecified role for the WEU in the NATO area. Steinberg, 'Role
of European Institutions', pp. 6-7.
The Treaty was signed in February 1992, ratified by all members, and came into force in
November 1993. See also SIPRI Yearbook 1994. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 217-220.
Until the ratification of the Treaty, the WEU focused on its relations with NATO. See 'WEU in the
process of European Union - reply to the thirty-ninth annual report of the Council', Assembly of Western
European Union Document 1417 (10 May 1994), p. 4. According to the WEU Secretary General, despite
the Maastricht Treaty's provisions, in 1994 it continues to be unclear whether the WEU will take on a role
in the formation of the foreign policy in the context of the EU. See also Atlantic News No. 2531 (4 June
1993).
According to Jane Sharp, the Central Europeans initially preferred the WEU to be associated with
the EC, since EC membership would automatically mean WEU membership. By October 1991, the EC's
door seemed to be closing, and Central Europeans began to give preference to joining NATO. See Sharp,
'Security options', p. 57.
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Declaration!" it can playa role in all UN actions. It can also be used by members
states in the case of self-defence under Article 51 of the UN's Charter.
On the other hand, there were several reasons why the WEU seemed less suitable
than NATO to Central Europeans. Firstly, it did not assure a North American presence
in Europe. Secondly, it had no military capabilities. Indeed, its real contribution to
European security remains uncertain: While its Maastricht provisions sound impressive,
they are largely of a hypothetical nature, as the WEU lacks military resources.!" This
state of affairs can theoretically be changed by CJTFs, but it is not clear how this new
mechanism would be used in practice. Thirdly, the WEU's links to NATO and the EU
were vague. And finally, as discussed below, the WEU failed to develop a clear strategy
aimed at Central Europe, and opted for the creation of yet another 'discussion club'.
The WEU's response to the changes in the European order roughly followed three
stages. It first decided to establish bilateral information links with nine Central European
countries; then it conducted multilateral discussions in the Forum for Consultation; and
finally it offered the status of 'associate partners' to Central European countries in May
1994. 136 The first phase concentrated on dialogue and the exchange of information.
Poland established its first contacts with the WEU when its Foreign Minister participated
in an extraordinary session of the WEU Assembly in Luxembourg in March 1990. There.
he emphasized the importance of the WTO for his country, and spoke of the need to
create a pan-European security framework, while affirming that Poland was interested in
developing links with the WEU.
In April 1990, at the Council of Ministers meeting in Brussels, the Presidency and
the Secretary General of the WEU were asked to initiate contacts to exchange information
with the new governments in Central and Eastern Europe. These contacts were
established in the form of fact-finding missions first to the Visegrad countries, and later
to other parts of Central Europe. Poland was visited by the WEU Secretary General
William van Eekelen in July 1990 for the first time. The focus of Polish relations with
the WEU at that stage involved the intensification of dialogue, rather than the creation
134 'Petersberg Declaration', Bonn, WEU Council of Ministers (19 June 1992).
135 Schmidt, 'European Security and Defense Identity', p. 13.
136 See 'WEU's Approach to Central and Eastem Europe: contribution by Dr. Willem F. van Eekelen.
Secretary-General of WEU', presented at the International Seminar on Central Europe in a European
Security System, Bucharest, (7-8 November 1994). This section draws also on Andrzej Podraza. 'The
Western European Union and Central Europe: A New Relationship'. RIIA Discussion Papers 41 (1992).
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of official institutional links. This emphasis on dialogue reflected Polish security concerns
and Poland's initial decision to pursue gradual re-integration with Europe, as well as the
WEU's caution. It is for these reasons that when cooperation began, it centred on the
WEU's fora for discussion (the Assembly!", and the newly created Institute for
Security Studies) rather than on the Council (the WEU's main decision-making body).
The Secretary General visited Poland again in March 1991. This time, security
issues were on the agenda. The first meeting of the Foreign and Defence Ministers of the
WEU members and their Central European counterparts took place in June 1992. During
the meeting a formal framework for regular meetings of this kind was established.
Although Polish interest in the WEU was clear!", the debate about the future role and
functions of the WEU made it initially difficult to see it as a source of viable security
guarantees.
The second phase of Polish relations with the WEU focused on bilateral
discussions and culminated in a new status for Poland as a Consultation Partner. It was
not until June 1992, when the WEU offered the six NSWTO countries and the three
Baltic republics (Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia) the status of Consultation Partners, that
formal multilateral contacts with the region's countries were established. The Forum for
Consultation focused on discussions about 'the security architecture and stability in
Europe, the future development of the CSCE, arms control and disarmament'. 139 The
Forum's task was 'to get to know each other better', rather than to provide security
guarantees. The first consultation meeting of the permanent representatives on the WEU
Council and the heads of Central European missions took place on 14 October 1992 at
137 The WEU Assembly is a consultive body. It developed a framework for dialogue with Central
European parliamentarians. However, its powers are limited. See for example 'Parliamentary co-operation
with the countries of the WEU Forum for Consultation', Assembly of Western European Union
Document 1414 (4 May 1994); Podraza, 'The Western European Union' p. 25. Deputy Longin Pastusiak
(Head of the Polish delegation to the spring 1994 session of the WEU Assembly) said in June 1994 that
'the status of a permanent observer, granted Poland by the Assembly of the Western European Union, is
unsatisfactory.' See 'Chronicle, June 1994', Materials and Documents 7-8 (1994), p. 565. The Polish
delegation could not vote, participate actively in the various Committees, or amend reports.
138 Consequently, reflecting the Western debate on the future tasks of the WEU, the November 1992
Polish defense doctrine states that Poland follows 'with interest' the development of the organization. It sees
the WEU as an eventual military structure of the EC (EU) and at the same time the European section of
NATO. Accordingly, Poland is to gain in it a status corresponding to that within the EC (EU). See Tenets
of the Polish Security Policy, p. 13.
139 Extraordinary Meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers with States of Central Europe. BOHll
(19 June 1992). See also Willem van Eekelen, 'Western European Union - TIle European Security
Nucleus', NATO's Sixteen Nations No.3 (1993).
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the WEU Secretariat in London. 140
While Poland expressed appreciation for the chance for dialogue with the WEU
countries, it was clear that Poles were not satisfied with this arrangement. Poland's Prime
Minister stated that 'such consultations do not take advantage of all existing opportunities
for our cooperation. '141 And the Foreign Minister Skubiszewski called the
arrangement 'rather weak'. 142 Poland was 'interested in obtaining a formal status with
that institution'!" and felt that its requests for association were brushed aside and
,
moreover, that the organization's earl ier pol itical declarations had indicated a greater
interest in close cooperation.!" Polish interest in formal status, however, actually
increased following the January 1994 NATO decisions. 145
Poland also attempted to join the WEU's Eurocorps!". The prospect of Polish
soldiers entering the Eurocorps was seen by Polish policy-makers as a step toward the
realization of military integration."? Nevertheless, today Polish membership in the
Eurocorps seems rather unlikely, although Secretary General van Eekelen affirmed in
140 van Eekelen, 'WEU's Approach to Central and Eastern Europe', p. 7.
141 'Statement by Mr. Waldemar Pawlak, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of
Poland at the sitting of the Permanent Council of the Western European Union, Brussels 3rd February,
1994', Materials and Documents Vol. 3, No. 1-2 (1994), p. 324.
142 'Polityka zagraniczna Polski w 1993 roku - Expose Sejmowe Ministra Spraw Zagranicznych RP
Krzysztofa Skubiszewskiego. Warszawa, 29 April 1993 r.' [Poland's foreign policy in 1993 - Sejm expose
by the Polish Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski. Warsaw, 29 April 1993], Zbior
Dokumentow/Recueil de Documents 2 (1993), p. 15.
143 'Address by Mr. Lech Walesa, President of the Republic of Poland to the Assembly of the Republic
of Portugal, Lisbon, 12th May 1993', Materials and Documents Vol. 2, NO.5 (1993), p. 125.
144 Pawlak 'Statement at the Permanent Council of the Western European Union', p. 325.
145 Ibid., p. 325.
146 The Eurocorps is part of the WEU, and potentially the nucleus of a European army. It comprises
units from 5 WEU countries. It was formally established in November 1993. See for example: 'Wspolne
akcje sa mozliwe' [Common operations are possible], Rzeczpospolita (13 October 1994), and Giovanni de
Briganti, 'Eurocorps May Include Polish Troops', Defense News (7-13 March 1994)~ 'Wystapienie Ministra
Spraw Zagranicznych RP Krzysztofa Skubiszewskiego na Spotkaniu Ministerialnym Forum Kosultacyjnego
UZE w Sprawie Rozwoju Stosunkow Pomiedzy UZE i Partnerami Konsultacji. Rzyrn, 20 maja 1993 r.'
[Statement by the Polish Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski at the Ministerial Meeting of the WEU
Consultation Forum on Development of Relations between WEU and Consultation Partners. Rome, 20 May
1993], Zbior Dokumentow/Recueil de Documents 2 (1993), p. 140.
147 de Weydenthal, 'Poland Builds Security Links', p. 29.
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October 1994 that, theoretically, Poland could participate In WEU military
operations.':" And in the Spring of 1994, France and Germany invited Poland to send
observers to the Eurocorps.!"?
The third phase of Polish-WEU relations, beginning in May 1994, brought the
Kirchberg Declaration, in which the WEU offered its consulting partners the status of
'associate partners. '150 This new status reflects the Europe Agreements of the Central
European countries with the EU. According to the WEU Secretary-General, 'the links
with the EU are, and will increasingly be, a criterion in the development of WEU's
relations with Central European countries. '151 The new status allows Central European
countries to attend Council meetings and to be regularly briefed on the activities of its
working groups. They may be invited to attend these groups, but only on an ad hoc basis.
They are also given the opportunity to set up a liaison arrangement with the Planning
Cell. They will be permitted to participate in exercises and exercise planning 'unless
otherwise decided by the majority of member States'. They will also be requested to
specify which units of their armed forces may be used in WEU operations. This
arrangement will not be extended to former SU countries. 152
WEU's initiatives have been condoned by all Central European countries, but have
provoked only sparing commentaries, and little political attention. Generally speaking,
it is accepted in Central Europe that associate partnership will have little effect on the
military security of the NSWTO countries. Longin Pastusiak, the Head of the
parliamentary delegation to the WEU Assembly, called the new status
'unsatisfactory'!", and Polish media observers called it 'a door barely ajar"".
148 See 'Wspolne akcje sa mozliwe'.
149 de Briganti, 'Eurocorps'.
150 The offer provides the option to attend some of the WED meetings. Partners will have the right to
speak but not to veto decisions. The agreement does not allow partners to be able to call emergel.lcy
meetings. They have the right (but not the duty) to participate in WED actions, for example peace-keeping
operations. The new status does not provide any security guarantees, and does not offer prospects for full
membership. See Declaration. WED Council of Ministers, Luxembourg (22 November 1993):
'Parliamentary co-operation with the countries of the WED Forum of Consultation' , Assembly of Western
European Union Document 1414 (4 May 1994).
151 van Eekelen, 'WED's Approach to Central and Eastern Europe', p. 7.
152 Ibid., p. 12.
153 'Polska-UZE: Wspolpraca, ale nie wystarczajaca' [Poland-WEU: Cooperation, but not sufficient] .
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Nevertheless, according to Jacek Czaputowicz, an advisor to the Polish Foreign Minister,
WEU associate partnership status is of psychological significance. 155 And it is probably
for this reason more than anything else that Central Europeans continue to press for full
membership in WEU. The WEU is considered appealing mainly for its Maastricht links
to NATO and EU. Currently, it is not seen as an alternative to NATO, unless it can be
treated as its European pillar. Poland's Prime Minister stated in February 1994 that his
country regards 'NATO and the WEU, consonant with the intentions of their members,
as complementary organisations working to achieve the same basic objectives'. 156
Despite its links to NATO and the EU, however, the WEU's approaches to
Central Europe differ significantly from those of NAT0157 and the EU 158 , making it
difficult to foresee the shape and force of the WEU eventual involvement in that part of
the world. Not surprisingly, there are concerns that these differing institutional
arrangements are ultimately incompatible. For example it is not clear how a non-NATO
member could become a full WEU member!" without making the WEU a 'back door'
into NATO.
EU membership: Central Europeans occasionally mention the European Union
(EU) itself as a potential source of security guarantees. l 60 The Polish November 1992
defence doctrine specifies that future membership in the EC (now the EU) is of
paramount importance both in terms of economics and of security. This document argues
for a further deepening of European economic and political integration and for the
154 'Europa Srodkowa-Unia Zachodnioeuropejska: Drzwi ledwie uchylone' [Central Europe: Western
European Union: Door slightly ajar], Rzeczpospolita (23 November 1993).
155 Czaputowicz, 'Szczegolny moment'.
156 Pawlak, 'Statement at the Permanent Council of the Western European Union', p. 324.
157 NATO established institutionalized links with all post-WTO states. The WEU on the other hand
privileges possible new EU members (currently nine countries which either concluded or are expected to
conclude association agreements). See Schmidt, 'European Defense Identity', p. 13.
158 The WEU preceded the EU in initiating contacts with Central European countries by inviting nine
of them to take part in the Consultation Forum. The EU has institutional links with only six of them. The
Baltic countries have to date no Europe agreements similar to those signed by the Visegrad countries,
Bulgaria and Romania. 'The evolution of NATO and its consequences for WEU', Assembly of Western
European Union Document 1410 (23 March 1994), p. 6.
159 'The evolution of NATO', p. 6.
160 See for example Jaroslaw Drozd and Jaroslaw Mrozek, 'Polityka bezpieczeustwa Wspolnot
Europejskich - w poszukiwalliu nowego wymiaru' [The security policy of European Communities -
searching for a new dimension], Studia i Materialy 59 (February 1993), pp. 22-24.
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inclusion of security matters in this process. 161
One main advantage of the EU option is that Russia does not object to either the
deepening and widening policy of the EU, including security and defence, or to Central
European membership in it. Nevertheless, Russia's positive approach to the EU could
easily change rapidly. 162
Although on 16 December 1991 Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland signed
separate but identical agreements of association with the EC 163 , these did not come into
force until 1 February 1994. These agreements are mainly of an economic nature and do
not specify future EC membership as a consequence of association, but rather hold it
open as a possibility. The problem with the Europe Agreements, according to one Polish
commentator, is that they had been negotiated before there were any prospects of Central
European membership. This affected the way that the EC approached trade with the
region's countries. 164
The agreements are treated by the Polish side as 'the last phase before
membership'. Although a clause in the preamble to the agreement between the EC and
Poland states that membership is a Polish objective, this section was only included at the
final stage of negotiations due to Central European insistence. For Poland the fact that
no conditions for membership, procedure or timetable were established makes the
agreement problematic. Jolanta Adamiec says that 'actually, if we take precisely the
wording of the treaty the membership remains an objective for Poland, but not for the
161 Tenets of the Polish Security Policy, p. 13.
162 Schmidt, 'European Security and Defense Identity', p. 16.
163 'Umowy 0 Stowarzyszeniu Polski, Czechoslowacji i Wegier ze Wspolnota Europejska' [Agreements
on Association of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary with the European Community], in Polskie Drogi
do Wspolnoty Europejskiej. (Gliwice: Wokol Nas, 1993); 'Przemowienie Wicepremiera RP Leszka
Balcerowicza z okazji podpisania umowy 0 stworzyszeniu ze Wspolnota Europejska, Bruksela, 16 grudnia
1991 r. " [Speech by the Polish Deputy Prime Minister Leszek Balcerowicz at the signing of the association
agreement with the European Community. Brussels, 16 December 1991], Zbior Dokumentow/Recueil de
Documents 2 (1992); Zdzislaw Wolodkiewicz-Donimirski, 'Realizacja Ukladu 0 stowarzyszeniu ze
Wspolnotami Europejskimi' [Realization of the Treaty on association with Economic Communities], Biuro
Studiow i Ekspertyz Informacja ill. 158, 1-158 (December 1993).
164 Wagrowska, 'Polska-Unia Europejska'. For a discussion of economic aspects of the implementation
of the Association agreement, see Witold Orlowski (ed.), 'Biala Ksiega. Raport Wstepny. Polska -
Wspolnoty Europejskie: Aspekty Ekonomiczne' [~hite Book. Initial report. P~)l~nd - Eur?peaIl
Communities: Economic Aspects]. Biblioteka Europejska. (Warsaw: Urzad Rady Ministrow, 199J 1.
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Community.' 165 Following the association agreement, Polish officials expressed the
desire for EC/EU membership on numerous occasions. These statements were
accompanied by a criticism of Western Europe's lack of vision In its relations with
Central Europe. 166
On 8 April 1994, eight days after the Hungarian application for full EU
membership was submitted, Polish Foreign Minister Andrzej Olechowski applied for full
EU membership for his country. 167 The application was widely understood to be of a
declarative character. 168 There has been no formal EU answer to the application so far.
Polish diplomats, however, think that negotiations could start as soon as 1996, with
membership granted by the year 2000. 169 'Given that membership talks will take years
to conclude, Poland wants the Union to commit to a review of relations in 1996 that
would lead to negotiations', said Jan Kulakowski, Polish ambassador to the European
Union."? Among Polish priorities now is the attainment of observer status for the
intergovernmental conference to review the Maastricht Treaty in 1996. 17 1
The Polish pressure to begin negotiations is partly a reflection of German efforts
to promote Central European membership in Western organizations and institutions. Poles
however were also aware that a number of countries was waiting to be admitted toeu
th~l72 Moreover, Poles expected the admission of Austria, Sweden, and Finland In
January 1995 to slow down the process of Central Europe's integration with the EU.
165 Jolanta Adamiec, 'EC Post-Maastricht External Policy and Polish Hopes for Membership',
unpublished paper (September 1992), p. 27.
166 See for example Ewa Szymanska, 'Olechowski w USA: Europejczycy bez wizji' [Olechowski in the
USA: Europeans without vision], Rzeczpospolita (26 January 1994).
167 'Statement by Mr. Andrzej Olechowski, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland on
Poland's application for accession to the European Union at the sitting of the Diet of the Republic of
Poland, Warsaw 7th April, 1994', Materials and Documents 3-4 (1994); 'Polska zlozyla wniosek 0
czlonkowstwo w Unii Europejskiej: Marzenie na lata' [Poland filed an application for membership in
European Union: Dreams for years], Rzeczpospolita (9-10 April 1994).
168 Maria Wagrowska, 'Sygnal dla Zachodu' [Signal for the West], Rzeczpospolita (30 March 1994).
169 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, 'Poland's Expectations with Regard to the
Acceleration of her Integration into the European Union', Warsaw (2 August 1994).
170 Tom Buerkle, 'EU Joins NATO in Cold-Shouldering the East', Herald Tribune (3 February 1994).
171 Lionel Barber, 'Measuring up for a wider EU', Financial Times (27 September 1994).
172 This section is based on Artur Bilski. 'w kolejce do Europy' [In queue to Europe], Polska Zbrojna
(28 September 1994).
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They fear that the new members could treat the EU as nothing more than a free trade
area, or that they could push first for membership for the Baltic republics. Indeed. poorer
southern countries could even attempt to bloc further admissions altogether. Also, in a
larger EU it will be more difficult to achieve unanimity on the question of new members.
None of the countries on their way into the EU have declared that they would be eager
to include Poland as a partner. This, however, is not surprising: in many areas, the
former EFTA countries compete economically with Central Europeans. 173
In the West, the institutional debate centres on the possibilities of variable speeds
and concentric circles for the existing EU members'?". According to one report, 'Polish
... officials say they welcome this debate on "variable geometry" because it makes East
European aspirations to become members of the EU more credible. '175 However, there
is concern that if the French and the Germans are prepared to leave other West European
countries behind in their drive for integration, they might well be prepared to be even
more brutal concerning Central Europeans.
At the EU summit in Essen on December 9th and 10th 1994, a pre-accession
strategy for the Central European partners was accepted by the member countries. One
of the points of this proposal is a paper which defines areas where Central Europeans
must adapt their legislation to EU standards. But, this process is not linked to any firm
promises on the part of the EU. Poland does not consider this development a significant
step forward, according to Jerzy Wojciechowski, head of the legal department of Poland's
European Integration Office, since Poles have their own white paper on changes required
to make their legal system correspond to EU standards. According to Wojciechowski, his
office calculates that all the work required could be concluded in about five or six
years.!" In his opinion, then, the EU's strategy will not substantially speed up a
process that Poland has already begun. 177
173 Wagrowska, 'Polska-Unia Europejska' .
174 The German Christian Democrats put forward a proposal to create a 'hard core' of five nations in
a multi-speed EU. The French Prime Minister Balladur suggested a 'three-tier' Eur~pe with th~ Fr:nch a.nd
Germans at its core. Lionel Barber and James Blitz, 'Kohl plays down plan for multi-speed EU . Financial
Times (6 September 1994).
175 Lionel Barber, 'Measuring up for a wider EU', The Financial Times (27 September 1994).
176 'Laying down the law', Economist (10 December 1994).
J77 'Bye blizej siebie' [To be closer to each other], Rzeczpospolita (30 December 1994), .Strategia i
kalendarz' [Strategy and calendar], Polska Zbrojna (12 December 1994).
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Poland's relations with the EU have been Iikened to a protracted engagement. A
Polish commentator asks why, if there is going to be a 'wedding' between Poland and
the EU, has it not been announced, and no date been set. 178 Polish Prime Minister
Pawlak argued that' if Poland remains outside [the EU], this could slow integration and
could create instability in the countries around the European Union'. 179 And Polish
knocking on the EU door has recently become louder as a result of disappointment with
NATO initiatives.
Yet, this impatience mainly reflects Poland's interests in the economic sphere. The
EU does not yet have a clear security role except in stabilizing economies and political
systems. As far as security more generally is concerned, the EU established links with
the WEU and created a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) agreed under the
Maastricht Treaty.
The first CFSP action undertaken, and so far the only diplomatic initiative
challenging NACC/PfP, was the decision to back the Stability Pact initiative (also known
as the Balladur proposal, named after its creator)180. This initiative was aimed at
stabilizing the Central European region by backing the conclusion of bilateral treaties
between states experiencing tensions related to minority or ethnic issues. Its implicit
objective was to revive the failing credibility of the EU's foreign policy-making process
which had suffered due to events in the former Yugoslavia!", and to create a stimulus
for the Maastricht Treaty's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).182
The Pact was to have the form of a set of agreements signed by all the participants
in two regional tables (Central Europe and the Baltics). It involved nine countries -
Slovenia alone was not invited to the Paris conference. The CSCE would observe the
178 Wagrowska, 'Polska-Unia Europejska'.
179 Buerkle, 'EU Joins NATO'.
180 The French Prime Minister Edouard Balladur first presented his Memorandum, 'Proposed European
Stability Pact', to the June 1993 European Council meeting in Copenhagen. For the text of the initial
proposal, see 'French Proposal for a Pact on Stability in Europe', SIPRI Yearbook 1994. (Oxford: Oxford
University Press for SIPRI, 1994), pp. 247-249.
181 The EU is the definitive loser in the 'organizational contest' in the former Yugoslavia. Because of
its lack of military capabilities and slow decision-making mechanisms, the EU is not perceived to be able
to deal with already destabilized, conflict-ridden areas.
182 'NATO, Peacekeeping', p. 30.
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execution of decisions taken in the agreements. 183
The Pact was seen in Central Europe as a 'supplementary measure.' Because the
plan was endorsed by the EU, all of the Central European countries pledged to participate
in the conference - but without enthusiasm. They criticized the plan because they
considered it vague, based on inadequate provisions of international law, and more
importantly, because it concentrated solely on Central and Eastern European 'hot-spots',
even though numerous Western European countries face similar ethnic and secessionist
problerns.!" In addition, Poles suspected that if the initiative failed it would be used
by the EU as an 'alibi' to delay full membership for Central Europeans. i85 Thus, all
Central European governments reason that European integration with a strong Atlantic
component is a better answer to the region's problems than bilateral treaties proposed by
the Balladur plan.
According to an advisor to the Polish Foreign Minister, Poland chose to treat the
Pact as a step towards EU membership. Poland considered itself to have regulated all
bilateral issues prior to the Pact, and thus, irritated by being placed in the same group
as countries with more serious minority problems, offered to share its experiences with
other countries rather than to participate in the negotiarions."" Following the March
1995 signing of the Pact, Polish officials stated that they were 'satisfied' with the
conference, because against expectation, 'it has not hurt our interests'. 187 Polish
commentators pointed out however that the Pact did not tackle any Central European
problems. 188
Polish Prime Minister Pawlak coined the idea of 'Partnership for Development'
based on NATO's Partnership for Peace initiative - aimed at reproducing the PfP on an
economic level with the EU. He first presented the idea during the Prague meeting of
183 Czaputowicz, "Szczegolny moment'.
184 Maria Wagrowska, 'Dwie niewiadome' [Two unknowns], Rzeczpospolita (20 March 1995).
185 Maria Wagrowska, 'Nasza patronka Unia Europejska' [Our patron European UnionJ, Rzeczpospolita
(30 May 1994).
186 During the Paris meeting Olechowski presented a document describing how Poland dealt with
problems which the Pact attempts to tackle. See Czaputowicz, 'Szczegolny moment': Wagrowska. 'Dwie
niewiadome' .
187 Ibid.
188 Piotr Kasznia, 'Pakt 0 stabilnosci przyjety, problemy pozostaly' [Pact about stability accepted,
problems stayed], Rzeczpospolita (22 March 1995).
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Visegrad countries and the US president on 12 January 1994. 189 The concept has so far
not found any support among Poland's Western partners.
6. Summary and conclusions
Poland was slow to abandon the WTO after 1989. In an initial period of confused
foreign policies, a discussjo-of the viability of neutrality took place. This option however
was only briefly debated seriously. While Hungary pondered this foreign policy option,
Poland was preoccupied with border negotiations with Germany, during which it
preferred to remain within the WTO. Once the border issue was settled. it became clear
that more satisfying foreign policy alternatives than the WTO were available.
Significantly, however, neutrality continues to find some support on the Pol ish political
spectrum.
Following this brief debate, Poland's elites debated a number of foreign policy
options. The concept of collective pan-European security based on the CSCE was
considered, but, like neutrality, failed to offer any real reassurance. Poland considered
that such a framework was still very distant, and focused instead on membership in
military alliances. Some Polish observers believed that neutrality and collective security
actually had the same implications for Polish security, effectively leaving the country
without security guarantees.!" Poles expect the CSCE to continue to play a role
concerning both the former Soviet Union, and arms control, but Russia's plan to
strengthen the CSCE at the expense of NATO is unacceptable to Poles, since only
existence of a strong NATO is seen as a guarantee of stability.
Poland established contacts with NATO relatively late, but came to see it as an
important ingredient of the stability and balance of power in Europe. Consequently,
NATO's decision not to accept new members but rather to create NACC and the
Partnership for Peace was considered disappointing. Poles saw the two initiatives as
'discussion clubs' and pushed instead for time- tables, requirements and concrete
commitments to the acceptance of new members. Poland feared Russian interference in
this process.
The WEU was under less pressure to give guarantees to Central European
countries since it was not seen as an alternative to NATO, but at best a complementary
189 Wagrowska, 'Partnerstwo - jedyna droga'.
190 See for example Towpik in Biuletyn. p. 12.
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organization. The WEU created a Forum for Consultation, and eventually granted
associate partnership status to Central European countries. Neither has stirred much
attention, and except for a psychological effect they have no direct impact on the region's
security.
EU membership is occasionally considered by Central Europeans to be a matter
not only of economics but of security. The Poles and their neighbours have encountered
two problems in dealing with the EU. First, the process of accession is proving to be
protracted and uncertain. Second, the creation of a Common Foreign and Security Policy
has so far been anything but successful, making it clear to Central Europeans that no
immediate guarantees should be expected from the EU.
Despite the fact that the Western orientation of Polish foreign and security policy
is supported by almost all political forces in the country, other concepts Iive on in the
Polish political spectrum. Membership in a cultural, economic and pol itical Europe is not
universally accepted.'?' Polls suggest that about one tenth (10%) of Poles believe that
the country should align with Russia or other East/Central European countries.!" The
Western orientation is rejected by nationalist forces, but these constitute a small section
of the Polish political spectrum.
191 George Kolankiewicz, 'Poland'. in Stephen Whitefield~Me New Institutional Architecture of
Eastern Europe. (Basingstoke: St. Martin's, 1993), p. 103.
192 See 'Polacy 0 czlonkowstwie'.
CHAPTER EIGHT
EXISTING SUBREGIONAL COOPERATION FRAMEWORKS
1. Introduction
This chapter focuses on Polish approaches to the most successful existmg
subregional structure in Central Europe, the Visegrad Group (VG, also called Visegrad
Four or V4), consisting of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech and Slovak Republics. It also
takes into account Polish views of the Central European Initiative (CEI, previously
Pentagonale and Hexagonale). All VG countries are simultaneously also CEI members.
Indeed, the Visegrad Group has been occasionally described as 'an inner core' of the
CEI. It is for this reason that the CEI, although basically an economic arrangement, will
be included in this analysis. Nevertheless, the CEI, which has Western members, differs
from the VG which comprises only Central European members and is mainly a vehicle
for management of links with Western countries.
This chapter does not consider Baltic cooperation for two reasons. First, Baltic
cooperation structures include large powers Germany and Russia, and thus do not
conform to the definition of subregional cooperation frameworks. This thesis
understands such structures to consist only of small and rVIrd,''''''''size countries (see Chapter
One). Second, the Baltic Council and other forms of cooperation among Baltic states
specifically exclude the treatment of security issues. 1 Thus, Baltic cooperation, although
certainly an interesting aspect of post-Cold War Europe, does not represent what this
I Franciszek Golembski, Andrzej Kupich, Jozef Wiejacz, 'Polska w ugrupowaniach regionalnych'
[Poland in regional groupings). Rocznik Polskiej Polityki Zagranicznej 1992. (Warsaw: PISM. 1904).
p.92.
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thesis defines as a subregional security cooperation framework. 2
The first section focuses on the potential benefits of subregional security
frameworks for Poland. This chapter then provides a brief description of the history of
the Visegrad Group and the CEI. In the third section, the chapter discusses issues which
hinder both frameworks in their development into viable subregional security cooperation
structures. It focuses on three kinds of constraints: limitations originating within the
region; restrictions stemming from the approaches of Western organizations; and, finally,
pressures generated by East and Central European countries which are not members of
these two frameworks. The fifth section discusses specifically Polish attitudes towards
subregional cooperation frameworks. Finally, the chapter briefly explores the future of
subregional cooperation in Central Europe.
2. Potential Benefits of Subregional Security Cooperation
Situated between a unified Germany and disintegrating post-Soviet republics and
conscious of the potential for ethnic conflict in the region, Central Europeans are aware
that none of the region's countries can currently assure their sovereignty and security by
'going it alone'. Furthermore, Central European countries cannot individually bear the
costs of achieving military compatibility with NATO. Aside from the issue of the military
potential of neighbouring countries, the inability of these states to assure their own
security is at least partly a result of the common legacy of membership in the militarily-
integrated Warsaw Treaty Organization. Following the collapse of this alliance, Central
European deployment patterns and defence doctrines were replaced, technologies
acquired, and defensive capabilities, especially air defence, strengthened. The
reorganization and upgrading of military forces is actually necessary to deal with the new
de facto security vacuum. Clearly, in this situation subregional security cooperation could
not provide a viable security guarantee, but could improve the military capabilities of the
Visegrad countries.
Subregional cooperation frameworks could also affect the political weight of these
countries in the international arena. It would show the West that these countries can act
collectively and collaborate among themselves, thus demonstrating their ability and
2 For more information on the issue of Baltic cooperation, see Zdzislaw Galicki and Janusz Jezioranski,
'Wspolpraca regionalna i transgraniczna w strefie Morza Baltyckiego (aspekty polityczne, gospodarcze i
prawne)' [Regional and transborder cooperation in the Baltic Sea area (political, economic. and legal
aspects)], BSE Raport 43 (May 1993).
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willingness to cooperate within the framework of Western multilateral organizations.:
For example, after the negotiations of the European Agreements, it was suggested that
the Central European countries would have achieved better results if they had coordinated
their approaches and insisted on being treated as 'one basket'. A similar discussion arose
after the V4 individually announced their attitudes towards the American proposal for the
NATO Partnership for Peace.
In addition, subregional frameworks would link Poland with its neighbours to the
South, thereby potentially cutting across the dreaded East-West axis", and creating
security and economic links with countries which are not perceived to be threatening to
Polish security or sovereignty. In fact, economic and pol itical differences between Poland
and its southern neighbours are lessening, thus improving chances for subregional
cooperation. And for Poland, cooperation with southern countries could be advantageous
because, as one Polish observer indicates, in not having to cope with traditional
geopolitical problems, Poland would have the opportunity to pursue a foreign policy
based on national interests. 5
Finally, a subregional framework in Central Europe could be used as a basis for
settling problems relating to border disputes and the problems of ethnic minorities. In
other words, the Visegrad Group might function as a regional 'policeman' exerting 'peer
pressure'. This effect could extend to include other countries in the region, and might
serve as stabilizing example.
3. Brief history
The Central European Initiative (CEI)
The CEI grew out of a meeting of the foreign ministers of Italy, Austria and
Hungary in Budapest on 11 November 1989. With the membership of Austria, Italy,
Yugoslavia, Hungary and Czechoslovakia it became the Pentagonale Group, renamed the
3 Douglas L. Clarke, 'Central European Military Cooperation in the Triangle', RFE/RL Research
Report, Vol. 1, No.2 (10 Jan, 1992), p. 7; Adrian G.V. Hyde-Price, 'After the Pact: East European
Security in the 1990s', Arms Control, Vol. 12, No.2 (September 1991), p. 288.
4 Franciszek Golembski, 'The Visegrad Group - an Exercise in Multilateral Cooperation in Central
Europe', The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs Vol. 3, No.3 (Summer 1994), p. 55.
5 Ryszard Zieba, '''Nowy regionalizm" w Europie a Polska' [New regionalism' in Europe and Poland].
Sprawy Miedzynarodowe 1-2 (1992), p. 43.
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Hexagonale after Poland joined in July 1991. 6 The Hexagonale took into account the
disintegration of Yugoslavia at a special meeting in Venice in November 1991 and
,
accepted all of the Yugoslav successor states with the exception of the rump-Yugoslavia
(Serbia-Montenegro) as members. In March 1992, the CEI Foreign Ministers agreed not
to extend membership to Belorus, Bulgaria, Romania, or Ukraine for the time being.
However, they invited experts from these countries to join the CEI working groups. In
March 1994, in order to strengthen contacts with these countries, the Foreign Ministers
created a Council of Association which convenes High Officials, Foreign Ministers, and
Prime Ministers. The Council held its first meeting in Rome on 24 July 1994. In this
context, it is also worth noting that Bavaria is playing an increasingly active role in CEl's
working groups. 7
An inaugural CEI meeting in early August 1990 implied the existence of common
interests in economic, and environmental issues, and in human rights, as well as a shared
concern for regional stability. 8 In addition to working as a framework for economic and
political cooperation, the organization was intended to tackle issues relating to military
cooperation. However, the security dimension has not been on the agenda of this
subregional structure, although its member states have indeed felt compelled to discuss
security problems like the Yugoslav crisis.
Originally, this framework emphasized purely economic cooperation. However,
the CEI is not, at least according to its declarations, striving toward economic
integration. Projects are financed nationally, through the EU's PHARE program or the
assistance of the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). The CEI
tackles concrete subregional infrastructure projects. Projects are carried out by a number
of working groups, including ones focusing on the EU, the CSCE (OSCE), the Council
of Europe, and ethnic minorities. There are also consultations concerning some specific
issues of migration." The framework is not institutionalized, and has no budget and no
6 'Dokumenty Szczytu Hexagonale, Dubrownik, 27 lipca 1991 r.' [Documents of the Hexagonale
Summit, Dubrovnik, 27 July 1991), Zbior Dokumentow/Recueil de Documents 2 (1992).
7 'The Central European Initiative: A Report (as of 1st July, 1994)', Materials and Documents Vol.
3, No. 7-8 (1994), pp. 576-578 .
8 Daniel Nelson, 'Security in Europe's Eastern Half, in R.F. Staar (ed.), East-Central Europe and
the USSR. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), p. 73.
9 Janusz Prystrom, 'The Military-Strategic Emancipation of Poland', PRIF Reports 25 (January 1992),
p. 11; 'Central European Initiative: A Report', p. 581; 'Deklaracja przyjeta na wiosennej sesji ministrow
spraw zagranicznych panstw czloukowskich Inijcatywy Srodkowoeuropejskiej. Budapeszt, 22-23 marca 1993
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secretariat (although an Austrian proposal to create one in Vienna was discussed in 1993).
Its presidency rotates on an annual basis. Consultations are conducted at the level of
Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers. Since 1990, the CEI has also had a parliamentary
dimension, with CEI parliamentarians meeting alongside the summits." Recently the
CEI's economic tasks have been dwarfed by the dramatic collapse of Yugoslavia, the
'velvet divorce' of Czechoslovakia, and issues relating to Hungarian minorities abroad. II
As a result some politicians have criticized the CEI for mixing economic cooperation and
minority issues." For many member states, the CEI should remain an economic
framework,
Indeed, it is true that the prominent issue of national minorities plays a divisive
role in the forum. CEI states have for a while been attempting to reach a common
position on the minority question. At the organization's summit in Trieste in March 1994,
Slovakia, backed by the Czech Republic and Poland, voiced reservations about a draft
proposal concerning the treatment of minorities. Their reasons for these doubts included
the perceived need to follow European standards, rather than specific subregional
norms, and concerns about the political and territorial implications of the idea of
collective minority rights. 13
The Yugoslav conflict began to interfere with the functioning of the group as long
ago as late 1991. 14 This crisis has since been one of the most urgent issues discussed
within the group. In fact, member countries have had conflicting ideas about possible
solutions to the conflict which has virtually paralysed the CEI. Eventually, all Central
European governments agreed to follow the decisions and measures of Western
r." [Declaration Adopted at the spring session of ministers for foreign affairs of the Central European
Initiative members states. Budapest, 22-23 March 1993], Zbior Dokumentow/Recueil de Documents 1
(1993), p. 231.
10 'Central European Initiative: A Report', p. 578.
11 'Zgoda przy akompaniamencie zgrzytow' [Agreement with the accompaniment of discordant notes],
Rzeczpospolita (19 July 1993); Jacek Moskwa, 'Inicjatywa Srodkowoeuropejska w cieniu wojny'.
Rzeczpospolita (21 November 1994); Alfred A. Reisch, 'The Central European Initiative: To Be or Not
to Be?', RFE/RL Research Report Vol. 2, No. 34 (27 August 1993), p. 30.
12 See 'Zgoda przy akompaniamencie'.
13 See 'Czech Republic: Central European states delay agreement on national minorities', BBe S\VB
EE (8 March 1994); 'Slovakia: Prokes unhappy with Hungarian efforts to focus Cf l on minorities'. BBe
SWB EE (8 March 1994); Reisch, 'Central European Initiative', p. 37.
14 Douglas L. Clarke, 'European Multilateral Organizations: An Update', RFE/RL Research Report.
Vol. 1, No. 12 (20 March 1992), p. 21.
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organizations regarding the Yugoslav crisis. However, as the West was gradually drawn
into the conflict and began to pursue increasingly interventionist policies, Central
European support for specific policies adopted by the international community began to
vary considerably from country to country, and from measure to measure, reflecting
particular domestic concerns. Indeed, it has become painfully obvious that the countries
grouped together in the Central European Initiative have widely different geostrategic
concerns, interests, and historical sensitivities.
In 1993, Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus publicly questioned the raison d'etre
of the CEI. A discussion about the proper tasks of the organization at the July 1993 CEI
summit exposed the weaknesses of the CEI framework. Most notably, member countries
failed to answer one vital question, which was how the Central European partners should
deal with the issue of NATO's expansion." At this summit, members agreed that the
CEI needed a new set of goals." The results of this on-going process have yet to
emerge.
Yisegrad Group
In 1989, the American political scientist Zbigniew Brzezinski proposed the
creation of a Polish-Czechoslovak federation (see Chapter Three for the historical concept
and Five for Brzezinski's proposal). While the Poles were relatively responsive to this
idea, Czechoslovak leaders proposed instead the creation of a loose trilateral framework
in January 1990. The new leaders, whose links as former dissidents made them
responsive to suggestions of cooperation, reacted favourably to the idea."
The most prominent Central European subregional group which then emerged was
the Visegrad Group, which comprises the Czech and Slovak Republics (Czechoslovakia
until January 1993), Poland and Hungary - the so-called V4 countries. Visegrad remains
more of an ad hoc initiative than an institution: it has no permanent seat, or secretariat:
its affairs are often based on bilateral, rather than on multilateral agreements: and its
members seem determined not to let Visegrad activities interfere with their plans to join
15 Alfred A. Reisch, 'Central Europe's Disappointments and Hopes', RFE/RL Research Report Vol.
3, No. 12 (25 March 1994), p. 33.
16 Reisch, 'Central European Initiative', p. 32.
17 Zieba, 'Nowy regionalizm', p. 28.
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Euro-Atlantic frameworks. 18
The first manifestation of formal cooperation among the founding states
(Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland) was a summ it meeting in Bratislava in April
1990. It was ill-timed, since the three participating countries were then at different stages
of the political reform process, and it produced very few tangible results. Pal Dunay
claims that it was the WTO summit in Moscow on 7 June 1990, that actually triggered
Visegrad cooperation, since there the countries voiced the common desire to convene an
extraordinary session of the Consultative Committee of the WTO in order to review the
organization. 19
In February 1991, the second summit meeting took place at Visegrad on the
Hungarian-Slovak border. After the group's rocky start in Bratislava, this meeting was
comparatively successful. Indeed, the brief Visegrad Declaration issued at this summit
is still seen as the 'manifesto' of the subregional framework. This joint statement of
cooperation listed as its members' common goals independence, and freedom as well as
the modern market economy and parliamentary democracy. In addition, the Declaration
saw 'the total integration into the European political, economic, security, and legislative
order' as an aim of all the member countries." It stated too that members 'shall consult
on questions concerning their security', and addressed minority rights.
Yet, the Visegrad summit has actually been evaluated as a conscious decision to
refrain from dealing with security problems within a subregional alliance, and hence as
the end of an idealistic phase." At Visegrad, Polish proposals to institutionalize
cooperation were rejected. Following the meeting, Poland attempted to bring the question
of security into bilateral treaties among the Visegrad members, as the starting point for
18 J.B. Wright, 'Security and Co-operation in Europe: The view from the East'. Conflict Studies 263
(1994), p. 6.
19 Pal Dunay, 'Security Cooperation in the Visegrad Quadrangle: Present and Future', in Andrew J.
Williams (ed.), Reorganising Eastern Europe: European Institutions and the Refashioning of Europe's
Security Architecture. (Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishers, 1993), p. 123.
20 'Text of the Visegrad Summit Declaration', Report on Eastern Europe Vol. 2. No.9 (1 March
1991), p. 31.
21 Michael Broer and Ole Diehl, 'Die Sicherheit der neuen Demokratien in Europa und die NATO'.
Europa-Archiv Vol. 46, No. 12 (June 1991), p. 370; Heinz Timmermann, 'Ungam-Poles-
Tschechoslowakei: Konturen eines Dreier-Verbundes auf dem Weg nach Europa', Bundesinstitut fur
ostwissenschaftliche und international Studien Aktuelle Analysen 14 (26 March 1991); HenrykSzlajter.
'Trojkat Wyszehradzki: nieuchronna agonia? (proba diagnosy)' [Visegrad Triangle: inevitable agony? (an
attempt at diagnosis)), Studia i Materialy (August 1992), p. 1.
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a security network. The idea was supported in principle by Czechoslovakia, but rejected
by Hungary. 22 Instead, then, bi- and tri-Iateral consultations on security issues were
introduced, and functioned mainly as fora for discussion, for the coordination of
approaches to the USSR, and for the consideration of matters of integration.
The failed Moscow coup of August 1991 was the first significant security crisis
that Central European leaders faced. During the coup, they coordinated their approaches
and maintained frequent contact. 23 The Central European defence ministers met in
August 1991 and again some three months later, to deal with the implementation of
bilateral military agreements and cooperation in military production and technology. The
outcomes of these discuss ions, however, were modest. In September 1991, after the
Moscow coup, Central European leaders stressed that the military cooperation among
their countries was not a new military alliance and had no reference to any other country.
Even though Central European policy-makers faced comparable geopolitical problems,
they emphasized explicitly that they were not willing to base security cooperation on
anything more than bilateral agreements. Thus, there is no Visegrad provision for mutual
immediate assistance in case of emergency. Bilateral treaties linking all VG members
exist, and provide for consultation, but not for assistance in cases of external aggression.
The Group's summits have repeatedly specified that relations with Western
institutions are a priority. Central Europeans think of the Visegrad Group as a step
towards NATO and EC membership rather than as an alternative to either organization.
Among the VG countries, Czechoslovakia, and lately the Czech Republic, has been most
clearly opposed to a deepening of the Group. While still cooperating within the
framework, the Czechs have decided to follow an individual approach to gaining
membership in Western organizations;" In September 1993, the Czech President,
Vaclav Havel, emphasized that his country believed that the function of the Visegrad
Group had changed. He argued that the group should take on a new role as a consultative
forum and as an economic grouping, open to new members." Czech Prime Minister
22 Zieba, 'Nowy regionalizm', pp. 29-30.
23 Clarke, 'Central European Military Cooperation' , p. 45.
24 Barbara Sierszula, 'Czesi chca wlasnej drogi do Europy' [Czechs want own way into NATOI.
Rzeczpospolita (2 September 1994).
25 'G-4 zamiast Grupy Wyszehradzkiej?' [G-4 instead of Visegrad Group"], Rzeczpospolita (19 July
1994).
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Vaclav Klaus also repeatedly questioned the effectiveness and usefulness of the group,
describing it as merely a response to Western demands."
Serious complications emerged during the negotiations over the NATO Partnership
for Peace proposal. During a Prague meeting with the U.S. President Clinton in January
1994 regarding the Partnership for Peace, the Czechs avoided all emphasis on the
Visegrad Group and insisted on a separation of 'common' and 'individual' interests."
Indeed, the Czechs treated the U.S. President's visit as a bilateral meeting, arguing that
there was 'no reason why the Visegrad Four should coordinate their steps and work out
a joint stand with regard to NATO membership'. 28 Hungary, Poland, and a more
doubtful Slovakia favoured the presentation of a joint approach to the Partnership for
Peace, but could not persuade the Czechs to agree. 29 Finally, the VG countries
presented independent responses to the initiative, but their defence ministers issued a
common declaration stating that their approaches to the Partnership for Peace were
shared.:"
Slovakia, which pnor to the 'velvet divorce' had harboured some resentment
towards the Visegrad framework because of concerns about the intensification of its
relations with Hungary", is now more supportive of the Visegrad Group. When it was
mentioned that only three of the Visegrad countries might be admitted into NAT032, the
Slovaks insisted that the V4 countries should coordinate their efforts towards NATO
26 'Wyszehrad nie istnieje' [Visegrad does not exist], Rzeczpospolita (4 October 1994). For the Polish
reaction to Klaus' statements, see 'Blizej czy dalej Wspolnoty Europejskiej' [Closer or further away from
the European Community], Rzeczpospolita (18 January 1993); for the Hungarian reaction, see 'Central
European Foreign Ministers Discuss Bosnia, Visegrad at Paris Meeting' , BBC SWB EE (16 January 1993).
27 'Zgoda na Partnerstwo'[Approval of Partnership], Rzeczpospolita (13 January 1994); 'Havel
proponuje nieformalne spotkanie' [Havel proposes informal meeting], Rzeczpospolita (17 January 1994);
'Maria Wagrowska, 'Ministrowie obrony Grupy Wyszehradzkiej: eel jeden, drogi rozne' [Defense
Ministers of the Visegrad Group: One goal, different ways], Rzeczpospolita (8-9 January 1994).
28 Czech Foreign Minister Zieleniec, quoted by Reisch, 'Disappointments and Hopes', p. 30.
29 'Trudne dni Grupy Wyszehradzkiej' [Difficult days of the Visegrad Group], Polska Zbrojna (7-9
January 1994); Jerzy Markowski, "'Smuty" w Grupie' ['Smutas' in Group], Polska Zbrojna (12 January
1994).
30 'Komunikat po spotkaniu ministrow obrony panstw Grupy Wyszehradzkiej. Warszawa, 7 stycznia
1994 r.' [Communique following the meeting of ministers of defense of the Visegrad Group countries],
Polska Zbrojna (10 January 1994).
31 Jan Obnnan, 'Czechoslovakia Overcomes Its Initial Reluctance', RFEfRL Research Report Vol.
I, No. 23 (5 June 1992).
32 Reisch, 'Disappointments and Hopes', p. 31.
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membership. However, Slovakia's new ties with Romania and Russia have sparked
concerns among the V4 members about Slovakia's Western orientation."
Hungary distanced itself somewhat from the framework as well. Hungary's
Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky stated that he did not believe 'that Visegrad can be
forgotten, yet we have actually completed its modern mission. We can carryon with this
within trilateral or quadrilateral frameworks, we can carryon with it in the CEI. '34 As
a result of the Yugoslav crisis, Hungary has found itself in a new situation, with
increasingly important links to Austria, Italy, Slovenia and Croatia, and recently even
Serbia, taking priority over links with the other Visegrad countries.
Within the Visegrad Group, the Czech position might be called 'minimalist'.
Apparently, now that the country's geopolitical position makes it the most western section
of Central Europe, the Czech view is that they do not intend to let subregional co-
operation take precedence over progressive integration with the EU. For Slovakia, by
contrast, the Visegrad Group is a chance to develop links with the West. Hungary's
approach is pragmatic, but concerned to establish a process rather than an institution."
Finally, then, Poland's approach, which will be described in more depth in a separate
section of this chapter, is of a 'maximalist' character. Polish policy-makers hoped that
this structure of cooperation could solve many of the problems of Central Europe." And
thus, within the framework, Poland and Hungary function as cooperative partners, often
but not always joined by Slovakia."
The Visegrad Group has gradually developed an economic cooperation structure.
In December 1991, the Visegrad countries concluded the negotiations of their association
agreements with the ED (then the EC). Each of these agreements was negotiated
33 Sharon Fisher, 'Slovakia's Foreign Policy Since Independence', RFEfRL Research Report Vol. 2,
No. 49 (10 December 1993), p. 28.
34 'Central European Foreign Ministers Discuss Bosnia, Visegrad at Paris Meeting', BBe SWB EE
(16 January 1993).
35 Wright, 'Security and Co-operation in Europe', pp. 5-6.
36 Golembski, 'Visegrad Group', p. 66.
37 'Wegry - najlepszy partner' [Hungary - best partner], Rzeczpospolita (16 January I~94): 'Prezydenr
Wegier w Polsce: Wielobarwna Europa regionow' [Hungary's president in Poland: Multicolored Europe
of regions], Rzeczpospolita (30 March 1994); 'Przed szczytem NATO w Brukseli z ministrem spraw
zagranicznych Andrzejem Olechowskim rozmawiaja Edward Krzemien i Piotr Najsztub: Mam (.rzech szefO\~'
i swiat na glowie' [Edward Krzemien and Piotr Najsztub speak with Foreign Minister Andrzej Olechowski
prior to the NATO summit in Brussels: I have three overseers and the world on my mind], Gazeta
Wyborcza (6 January 1994).
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separately, and although some coordination took place within the Visegrad framework.
the process was marked more by competition than by close cooperation among the
Central European states. Thus, the provisions of the European Agreements were rather
disappointing to all of the countries in the region."
Also in December 1991, the Visegrad free trade agreement (CEFTA) was signed
10 order to lower customs duties and reverse decline in trade among the Visegrad
partners, but most of all to strengthen the prospects of members' integration with the
EC.
39
The agreement took effect in March 1993. The original goal was to eliminate all
duties on products originating within the V4 by the year 2001. The reduced customs
duties agreed by the Visegrad countries only matched those already granted to the EU. 40
In April 1994, the VO agreed that tariffs would cease three years sooner than planned,
in 1998.4 1
The CEFTA agreement has not yet provided any tangible results for the VG
countries. It could however become a stimulus for political cooperation and contribute
to a revival of the group. In any case, the V4 believed that the new protocol improved
their chances of ED membership."
Since 1992, Hungary's declared intention was a full integration with the EC,
which it was prepared to pursue unilaterally. In April 1994, Hungary and soon after
Poland, applied for ED membership. Hungary and Poland did not expect an answer to
their applications, but submitted them to communicate their commitment and
38 For a discussion of the agreements, see Commission of the European Communities DG External
Relations, Background Brief: Association Agreements with Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary
(March 1992).
39 On problems of trade flows following the collapse of CMEA, see Ben Slay, 'Economic Disintegration
and Reintegration in Eastern Europe: An Overview of Selected Issues', in John R. Lampe and Daniel N.
Nelson, East European Security Reconsidered. (Washington D.C.: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press,
1993); Maciej Perczynski, 'The Visegrad Group: Cooperation towards EC Entry', The Polish Quarterly
of International Affairs Vol. 2, No.2 (Spring 1993). See also 'Memorandum of the Governments of the
Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the Republic of Hungary and the Republic of Poland on strengthening
their integration with the European Communities and on the perspective of accession', Budapest, Prague
and Warsaw (September 1992).
40 Karoly Okolicsanyi, 'The Visegrad Triangle's Free Trade Zone', RFE/RL Research Report Vol.
2, No.3 (15 January 1993), p. 19.
41 'CEFTA nabiera tempa: CIa w dol' [CEFTA speeds up: customs down], Rzeczpospolita (I July
1994).
42 'Kraje CEFTA potwierdzaja wole zacisnienia wspolpracy' [CEFTA countries affirm the will to
cooperate closely], Polska Zbrojna (28 November 1994).
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determination to the process of integration. The other VO countries were not yet ready
to take such a step and accused the two of playing a domestic political card. They were
concerned that the Hungarian and Polish governments acted without regard for their VO
partners, in order to strengthen their positions at home. The problems of coordinating VG
approaches to Western economic fora reflect the competition among the Visegrad
members for the markets, investments and credits."
To summarize, then, the Visegrad member countries had two initial kinds of
goals: those focused on external matters - including coordination of European integration,
and those aimed at internal problems - mostly those concerned with economic cooperation
in the region. The institutionalization of subregional cooperation was an additional point
of discussion, and initially Poland was clearly in favour of this aim." After the Moscow
coup and the outbreak of hostilities in Yugoslavia, however, the situation changed
somewhat, and the security dimension of the V4 took on a more important role. Member
countries arrived at the conclusion that they were caught in a security vacuum. After the
Cracow summit in October 199145 , the most important issue was European integration.
The Czechoslovak divorce, and the ensuing change of elites resulted in the loosening of
subregional frameworks. The new Czech elite, and particularly Klaus, believed that
subregional cooperation would create a cordon sanitaire, which would have a detrimental
effect on the Czech Republic's drive for integration. Simultaneously, the split created a
'Slovak problem' within subregional organizations, which now became preoccupied with
Slovak-Hungarian tensions and minority issues. It is partly as a result of these
developments that the Visegrad Group is said to be stagnating. Its significance for the
pattern of power in Europe is described as 'next to negligible' .46
It would seem that the motives which initially bound the V4 countries together
43 Pal Dunay, 'Hungary: Defining the boundaries of security', in Regina Cowen Karp (ed.), Central
and Eastern Europe: The Challenge of Transition. (London: Oxford University, 1993), p. 152: F~)r
specifics of economic competition, see Eliza Konczyk, 'Poland's Trade with the European Community In
1990-1992', Foreign Trade Research Institute Discussion Papers (1993), pp .. 10-12; Magdolna ~as:,
'Economic Integration among the countries of East-Central Europe - Expenences and Evaluation".
European Studies: Integration and Disintegration in Contemporary Europe 1 (1995).
44 There have been numerous unsuccessful proposals for subregional cooperation. These concepts are
discussed in Chapter Nine.
45 'The Cracow Declaration', European Security Vol. 1, No. 1 (Spring 1992). See also Timothy
Thomas, 'The significance of the Cracow Summit', European Security Vol. I. No. I (Spring 1992).
46 Golembski, 'Visegrad Group'. p. 63.
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have been exhausted and new ones have not yet been defined." While the articles of the
Visegrad Declaration which spoke of shaking off Soviet domination have been
accomplished, the goal of total integration with the West has not yet been fulfilled, and
there are no clear prospects for success in this project (see Chapter Eight). Dunay
suggests that 'the intensity of security cooperation had already reached its peak when the
three countries were cooperating in the dismantling of old structures, primarily the WTO,
and trying to get closer to Western security institutions ... '48 Libour Roucek identifies
the common experience of Soviet domination and the common interests in overcoming
it as the driving force behind subregional multilateral ties." This motive, of course, had
a limited life expectancy, and subregional frameworks today lack the clearly defined,
pragmatic, and realistic short- and medium-term goals, which could strengthen, stabilize
and guide this form of cooperation.
4. Problems of existing subregional cooperation frameworks
Bilateral tensions within the Visegrad Group and the Central European Initiative
Despite the potential advantages of creating a viable subregional cooperation
structure, the VG and the CEI have not developed beyond relatively loose consultative
arrangements. Internal cooperation has not come easily to the Central European countries.
The Visegrad members have conflicting security concerns, since Hungary and the Czech
Republic do not share borders with the former Soviet Union, and have different
perceptions of Germany than those found in Poland50 (see Chapter Nine). Hungary and
the Czech Republic often seem uninterested in cooperating with unruly and poor
neighbours. Even where interests or goals are shared by all members, such as
membership in NATO or the EU, there are significant controversies about how these
47 Barbara Sierszula, 'Entuzjazm wyparowal, zostala szara rzeczywistosc' [Enthusiasm evaporated, gray
reality remained], Rzeczpospolita (20 October 1993).
48 Dunay, 'Hungary: defining', p. 139.
49 Libour Roucek, 'After the Bloc: The New International Relations in Eastern Europe', RIIA
Discussion Paper 40 (1992), p. 20.
50 Andrzej Grajewski, 'Udzial Polski w ugrupowaniach regionalnych' [Polish participation in regional
groupings], Rocznik Polskiej Polityki Zagranicznej 1991. (Warsaw: PISM, 1993), p. 101.
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should be achieved. 51 In addition, most of Poland's southern V4 partners are concerned
about its size and economic potential. Matters are made worse by the country's distant
history of imperialism (see Chapters Four and Five)."
Moreover, nearly all of the countries involved in subregional cooperation nurse
grievances against other members. 53 The Czechoslovak 'velvet divorce' (in response to
the June 1992 election results Czechoslovakia split peacefully on 1 January 1993) caused
tensions among member countries. The divorce created a new geopolitical
balance in the region. The Czech Republic, now without borders with the former Soviet
Union, chose to turn westward, 'weakening the Visegrad Group and creating the potential
for isolating Slovakia with reverberations extending to Ukraine. '54 Slovakia, on the other
hand, now had to rely more on subregional cooperation structures. Poland and Hungary,
afraid that Slovakia might turn East, expressed interest in keeping it in the VG. Hungary
in particular feared the emergence of a Bratislava-Bucharest-Belgrade axis, potentially
extending to Kiev and Moscow (a development which calls to mind the anti-Hungarian
Little Entente). 55
A second problematic issue has involved the Hungarian minority in Slovakia".
One of Hungary's main foreign policy objectives, primarily prior to the last election in
May 1994, was to improve the lot of its minorities abroad. Thus, it attempted to persuade
Slovakia to accept its plans for the treatment of the Hungarian minority there. Slovakia
then became concerned about possible pressures for autonomy from the rninority." A
51 Rafal Morawiec and Andrzej Kupich, 'Udzial Polski we wspolpracy regionalnej' [Poland's
participation in regional cooperation], Rocznik Polskiej Polityki Zagranicznej 1992/1993. (Warsaw:
PISM, 1994), p. 86.
52 See for example, Golembski, 'Visegrad Group', p. 62; Morawiec and Kupich, 'Udzial Polski we
wspolpracy', p. 91; Jerzy Jackowicz et aI, 'Dlaczego potrzebujemy Grupy Wyszehradzkiej' [Why do we
need the Visegrad Group], Rzeczpospolita (24 March 1994).
53 Wright, 'Security and Co-operation in Europe', pp. 5-6.
54 Jeffrey Simon, 'Czechoslovakia's "Velvet Divorce". Visegrad Cohesion, and European Fault Lines',
National Defense University McNair Paper 23 (October 1993), p. I.
55 See statement by Akos Engelmayer, Ambassador of Hungary to Poland, during a meeting of the
Foundation 'Poland in Europe': 'Grupa Wyszehradzka... Co dalej?' [Visegrad Group ... What now"],
Polska w Europie 10 (January 1993), p. 125.
56 The minority is between 570,000 and 700,000 strong.
57 See for example Ryszard Bilski and Barbara Sierszula, 'W trojkacie Budapeszt - Bratyslawa - Praga:
Konflikty i porozumienia' [In the triangle Budapest - Bratislava - Prague: Conflicts and agreements I.
Rzeczpospolita (21 July 1993).
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meeting of the Hungarian and Slovak Foreign Ministers was cancelled in November 1993
by the Hungarian side in response to Slovak demands for a declaration of the inviolability
of common borders. 58 In April 1994, a planned meeting of the Prime Ministers of the
wto countries was cancelled for the same reason. 59
A further bilateral problem which promises no immediate solution is the
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros barrage. This joint dam and electrical plant project in the common
reach of the Danube was abandoned by the Hungarian side in 1989, because of 'the
unpredictable ecological damages (sic), to the new political tensions thus generated in the
region and to the vehement protest of the concerned population'60, as the Hungarian
government declared. Slovakia rejected such Hungarian claims as 'slander' and proceeded
to construct a structure entirely on Slovak land." Such a solution did not satisfy
Hungarian concerns. Despite delicate Polish suggestions, neither the VG nor the CEI
have taken a mediating role in this conflict and the issue is now to be decided in the
International Court of Justice in the Hague.
In this context, the Slovaks have expressed anxiety about what they perceive as
a military build-up in Hungary. During the Yugoslav conflict Yugoslav aircraft violated
Hungarian airspace and dropped bombs on a village near the Hungarian border. 62
Hungary reacted by acquiring $800 million worth of MiG 29s from Russia. The MiGs,
together with the equipment provided to Hungary by Germany, and the IFF system
supplied by the United States, will significantly increase the potential of the Hungarian
air force." Slovakia has thus responded in kind, by purchasing the same type of
aircraft. 64 It is generally recognized that while these arms purchases do not exceed CFE
limits and 'while the Hungarian-Russian arms deal does not jeopardize the subregional
58 Fisher, 'Slovakia's Foreign Policy', p. 32.
59 'Moravcik says no conditions were set for meeting with Hungarian counterpart', BBC SWB EE (25
April 1994); 'Kucan: cancellation of Slovak-Hungarian summit should not harm relations', BBC SWB EE
(25 April 1994).
60 Bos-Nagymaros File. (Budapest: Government of Hungary, October 1992).
61 For Slovak interpretation of the situation, see The River Danube of Europe. (Bratislava:
Government of Slovakia, 1993).
62 Alfred A. Reisch, 'Hungary Acquires MiG-29s from Russia', RFE/RL Research Report Vol. 2.
No. 33 (20 August 1993), p. 49.
63 Ibid., p. 55.
64 Simon, 'Velvet Divorce', p. 8.
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balance of forces, the potential for an arms race in the area exists. '65
A further element disturbing the cohesion of these subregional groupings is the
unequal exposure of member countries to the conflict in Yugoslavia. Although
neighbouring countries must cope with a security threat and the economic impact
following the international sanctions regime on the rump-Yugoslavia, the responses of
subregional fora to the Yugoslav crisis have been lukewarm. They have issued statements
condemning the violence, and calling for a negotiated solution to the crisis. The tepid
support that Hungary was offered by its partners in the autumn of 1991, when faced with
a limited military threat from Yugoslavia, demonstrated the limits of subregional security
cooperation. 66
In summeay, then, subregional Central European cooperation fails to provide a
means for resolving bilateral tensions and other problems which plague the region in the
post-Cold War era." The treatment of national minorities, in particular, continues to be
a bone of contention within both subregional organizations. This failure may be partly
a result of the Central European belief that European integration is a better solution to
these problems than solutions negotiated on a subregional scale, and partly a reflection
of the process of defining national - and therefore different interests.
The approaches of Western organizations to subregional cooperation
Arguably, rivalry within subregional groupings has been a consequence of the
failure of Western organizations and institutions to address the question of Central
European integration: whether it would be easier to achieve for individual countries or
for 'baskets' of countries. 68 Western organizations perhaps cast a benevolent eye on
subregional structures since they have not been able themselves to satisfy Central
European demands and needs. Indeed, the West seems to favour the creation of self-help
structures which they can treat as units, rather than having to cope constantly with
individual governments. Nevertheless, in the long run Western institutions have failed to
state whether or not such cooperation would bring Central Europeans closer to their goal
65 Reisch, 'MiG-29s', p. 49; Fisher, 'Slovakia's Foreign Policy', p. 33.
66 Pal Dunay, 'Adversaries All Around? (Re)Nationalization of Security and Defense Policies in Central
and Eastern Europe', ClingendaeI Paper (January 1994), p. 58.
67 Roucek, 'After the Bloc', P 21.
68 Dunay, 'Adversaries All Around?', p. 58.
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of integration. Jan B. de Weydenthal suggests that 'although the emergence of the
[Visegrad] Triangle was supported by numerous Western politicians and influential
observers, there was little tangible support for the venture by Western governments. '69
At the core of the debate surrounding subregional cooperation is a conceptual
problem, inadequately addressed by Western organizations and by Central Europeans
themselves: is differentiation among the former Eastern bloc a worthwhile and welcome
approach or does it have negative consequences for relations among the region's
countries? As this question has not been answered satisfactorily, initiatives adopted by
NATO, the WED and the ED comprise 'a mixed bag'. While the EU's European
Agreements and NATO's Partnership for Peace differentiate or foresee the possibility of
differentiation, the WED's Consultation Forum and Associate Partnership, the EU's
European Stability Pact, and NATO's North Atlantic Cooperation Council tend to treat
the Central European region as 'a basket' (see Chapter Seven). Differentiation, although
generally a wise approach, does have the side effect of damaging subregional
cooperation. Conversely, lack of differentiation, although conducive to subregional
cooperation, may be perilously simplistic, since Central European countries are currently
developing their own sovereign national interests, which will necessarily diverge.
Observing the confused Western approaches toward subregional cooperation,
Central European decision-makers have argued that the creation of subregional security
and economic structures could potentially hamper their separate prospects for entering
Western structures. Two reasons are cited for this belief. First, it was always expected
that Western organizations could not treat all Central European countries as a single
'basket', and grant them simultaneous membership since this would create an unbearable
burden for these institutions. Second, if, however, the West were indeed to decide to treat
Central Europe as a group, an economic or social failure in anyone of these countries
would preclude others in the group from being admitted as members. Thus, Central
European policy-makers wanted to give their own security and military cooperation a low
profile, so that it would not be seen as either an alternative to or a detraction from their
goal of joining Western multilateral frameworks. 70
69 Jan B. de Weydenthal, 'Poland Supports the Triangle as a Means To Reach other Goals', RFE/RL
Research Report Vol. 1, No. 23 (5 June 1992), p. 17.
70 Their conclusion, according to Dunay, is that military cooperation should include only matters such
as discussions on issues of mutual interest, cooperation in securing spare parts for Soviet equipment, and
conversion procedures. Dunay, 'Hungary: defining', p. 153.
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Consequently, some of the region's countries began to demand a policy of
differentiation in Central Europe. In response to the NATO Rome summit of November
1991, VG members first demanded differentiation in favour of the four countries in the
group, using as an argument the fact that they were the only ones to have concluded
association agreements with the EC at the time." Hungary's Foreign Minister Gyula
Horn reflected these concerns when he said:
although I understand those whose view is that no differentiation must be made
among individual countries, I find this unacceptable since the admission of
Hungary to NATO before the others would not mean the exclusion or the keeping
at a distance of others, but rather a recognition of the country's particular
character. 72
Central European policies focus primarily on national concerns, and this will face
European organizations with difficult decisions regarding differentiation among the
various Central European countries. It is becoming increasingly obvious that while some
of the countries insist on differentiation in Western approaches to the region, others
resent such distinctions and consider them discriminatory.
Pressures from other Central and East European countries
Both the VG and the CEI have as their institutional goal the improvement of the
economic and political conditions of member states. By definition, then, they strive for
exclusive treatment, by the West in particular. Member countries believe that the goals
of the two frameworks imply that countries which differ, whether in economic, political
or security arrangements, could not be accepted into the groups for the time being." In
addition, member countries fear tensions with or among potential new members. Russian
strategic perceptions also playa role - where Ukrainian membership is concerned, for
example. In addition, it appears that members countries are not interested in extending
the Visegrad Group to the south because they want to prevent the creation of a belt which
could be interpreted as a cordon sanitaire.
As both the VG and the CEI do not currently intend to accept new members
71 Dunay, 'Security Cooperation', p. 131.
72 Hom, quoted in ibid., p. 122.
73 See for example Boguslaw Kisiel, 'Drogi wlaczenia Polski i Ukrainy do procesu ogolnoeuropejskiego:
problemy i perspektywy' [Ways of including Poland and Ukraine into the all-European process: problems
and perspectives], in Kazimierz Lacb (ed.), Polska i Ukraina w nowej Europie. (Warsaw: PISM, 1993).
p. 14.
219
(although some forms of cooperation are open to non-members), it is not surprising that
some of the countries outside of these subregional frameworks resent their development
as well as demands for differentiation in their favour. 74 Relegated to the sidelines of
Central European subregional cooperation, a number of them now feel isolated. These
countries, generally speaking, oppose the institutionalization of subregional frameworks
for this reason."
Romania is one of the newly isolated states in the region. A Romanian request for
Visegrad membership in February 1991 was rejected by the VG countries76, and it did
not have much more luck in the CEI. With the Hungarian-Slovak problems in mind,
members of both subregional structures recognize that the membership of Romania would
bring further problems. However, this exclusion leaves Romania on the margins of what
has come to mean 'Central Europe'. Like Romania, Bulgaria has also expressed interest
in the Visegrad and CEI frameworks. 77
Russia has also expressed its concern about the development of frameworks such
as the VG and the CEI. Initially, what was then the Soviet Union was suspicious of
Central European cooperation, as potentially directed against itself. The current Russian
attitude is somewhat ambivalent, with recent statements indicating that subregional
cooperation may now be seen as a guarantee of stability in the Central European region.
Russia is however concerned about possible Ukrainian involvement in the group." Not
surprisingly, Ukrainian membership is currently deemed unacceptable by the VG
countries. 79
Different member countries support the applications of prospective candidates.
During a meeting with President Walesa in March 1994, for example, Arpad Goncz
spoke in favour of accepting Slovenia as a member of the VG. He also speculated that
74 Dunay, 'Security Cooperation', p. 136.
75 See for example Kjell Engelbrekt, 'Southeast European States Seek Equal Treatment', RFE/RL
Research Report Vol. 3, No. 12 (25 March 1994).
76 Reisch, 'Hungary Sees Common Goals', p. 30.
77 Zieba, 'Nowy regionalizm', p. 32; Maria Wagrowska and Marian Suchowiejko, 'Bulgarii podoha
sie CEFTA' [Bulgaria likes CEFTA], Rzeczpospolita (22 July 1994).
78 Bohdan Nahalyo, 'Ukraine and the Visegrad Triangle', RFE/RL Research Report Vol. I. No. 2~
(5 June 1992).
79 Dunay, 'Security Cooperation', p. 136.
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a similar step could be undertaken with Croatia after the end of the Yugoslav conflict. >;(1
Slovakia is prepared to support the participation of Bulgaria in the CEI. Belorus.
Bulgaria, Moldova, Ukraine, Albania, and Romania have aspirations to CEI
membership." But both the VG and the CEI have indicated that there are no plans to
extend membership in the near future.
From within these organizations it would seem that only the Czechs are prepared
to use the issue of new members to support their arguments for transforming subregional
groupings into loose consultation fora. Antonin Baudys, the Czech Defence Minister, said
that from the perspective of his ministry, the Visegrad Group no longer existed. He
added that since other countries (the Baltic states, Romania, Bulgaria and Slovenia) now
want NATO membership as well, the following question arises: why should Visegrad
countries be treated differently by Western organizations than the rest of Central Europe?
Thus he considers military cooperation that is limited to the V4 unacceptable." Josef
Lux, the Czech Minister of Agriculture, told his Romanian counterpart that the Czech
Republic saw arrangements such as the CEI as 'temporary'. 83 Even President Havel
announced that the Visegrad Group 'should give less and less impression of being a
special club of post-communist countries. '84
Some Western observers have criticized existing subregional frameworks because
they 'contain shades of ententisme and exclusivism'. And it is true that both CEI and
Visegrad attend only to the interests of a few states, and exclude the post-Soviet
republics. Thus it is said that they increase the danger of interwar-style regional
fragmentation." The creation of viable subregional structures carries the danger, too,
80 'Wniosek 0 czlonkowstwo w Uni ' [Application for European Union membership], Rzeczpospolita
(29 March 1994).
81 'Kijow pragnie zblizenia z Wyszehradem' [Kiev wishes for rapprochement with Visegrad].
Rzeczpospolita (18 March 1994); Malgorzata Leczycka, 'Inicjatywa Srodkowoeuropejska: Nikt nie chce
bye sam' [Central European Initiative: Nobody wants to be alone], Polska Zbrojna (19-21 November
1993).
82 'Grupa Wyszehradzka nie istnieje' [Visegrad Group does not exist], Rzeczpospolita (15-16 January
1994).
83 'Romania: Agreement with Czech Jepublic on cooperation in agriculture', BBe SWB EE (30
September 1993).
84 'Kovac and Havel on Property Division, Visegrad Group and European Integration', BBe SWB EE
(2 April 1993).
85 Aurel Braun, 'The Post-Soviet States' Security Concerns in East-Central Europe', in John R. Lampe
and Daniel N. Nelson (ed.), East European Security Reconsidered. (Washington D.C.: The Woodrow
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of triggering the development of other subregional blocs composed of the countries that
have been rejected, thus creating a volatile and unstable situation in the region. On the
other hand, Polish observers argue that some form of differentiation (although never
clearly defined) seems to be the West's rule in dealing with the former WTO countries.
It is clear that it will be impossible for all of the former Eastern bloc countries to be
admitted to Euro-Atlantic structures simultaneously. As existing subregional cooperation
frameworks aim to bring closer to the West, 'exclusivism' appears to be a appropriate
approach. 86
5. Polish perceptions of existing subregional groupings
When subregional cooperation frameworks first came into being in Central
Europe, Poland's government was an ardent supporter of this kind of cooperation." It
has been suggested that Polish support for subregional cooperation reflected the
determination of Polish policy-makers to create a 'new European order'. 88 Thus,
subregional cooperation was declared to be one of the priorities of Polish foreign policy.
The 1993 Report on the State of National Security: External Aspects, presented by
a think-tank of the Foreign Ministry, declared this policy to be on the same level as
policies aiming at entry into Euro-Atlantic structures. 89
At subregional summit meetings, Poland subscribed to all measures that had the
potential to further subregional cooperation, and supported the idea of institutionalizing
these structures." The press championed the notion of subregional cooperation in the
initial phase, arguing that in terms of security, Poland could clearly rely more on
Wilson Center Press, 1993), p. 136.
86 Jaroslaw Bratkiewicz, 'Polska koncepcja zjednoczenia Europy na szczeblu regionalnym i
subregionalnym' [Polish concept of unification of Europe on a regional and subregionallevelJ, in Kazimierz
Lach (ed.), Polska i Ukraina w nowej Europie. (Warsaw: PISM, 1993), p. 22. In fact, in March 1995,
the German Defense Minister Volker Ruhe stated that there will be no group admissions into NATO.
'Volker Ruhe 0 jednostkach NATO w Polsce: Rosja nie moze decydowac' [Volker Ruhe on NATO units
in Poland: Russia cannot decide], Rzeczpospolita (8 March 1995).
87 de Weydenthal, 'Poland Supports the Triangle'. Nevertheless, the issue of regional cooperation is
the most controversial foreign policy issue among the country's political parties. See 'Parties' positions on
foreign policy', BBC SWB EE (l September 1993).
88 de Weydenthal, 'Poland Supports the Triangle', p. 15.
89 Report on the State of National Security: External Aspects. (Warsaw: PISM, 1993), p. 70.
90 de Weydenthal, 'Poland Supports the Triangle', p. IS.
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Czechoslovakia than, say, on Portugal. 91 In fact, Pol ish pol icy-makers saw the
subregional frameworks as a means of overcoming the country's geopolitical position.
There was hope that such forms would 'cut' across the dreaded West-East axis, and
Poland saw itself as a bridge between the CEI countries and the Baltics, thus creating a
framework to link North and South." Polish policy-makers also assumed that
encouraging regional stability through the Visegrad Group would have a stabilizing effect
on the neighbouring post-Soviet republics."
In addition, Polish policy-makers counted on the economic advantages stemming
from cooperation in projects with Poland's southern neighbours. This emphasis on the
economic aspect of cooperation reflected the belief that trade links with southern
countries would be less competitive than East-West economic relations." Finally, Poles
expected that this form of cooperation would bring the country closer to Western
European economic structures." Through cooperation with CEI countries like Italy and
Austria, Poland felt closer to the EU. 96
After this initial phase, however, the Polish government entered a phase of
'realism' in its approaches to subregional frameworks. It explicitly defined the boundaries
of subregional cooperation in order to indicate that the group should not resemble an
alliance. The 1993 Report on the State of National Security emphasized that the VG,
though an important contribution to Polish security, was not seen as a regional all iance
which could 'fill the gap left by the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, although military
cooperation is in fact one of the stronger points of the Group.' 97 Onyszkiewicz, then
the deputy Defence Minister of Poland, emphasized that the Visegrad members 'did not
intend to conclude a military pact ... or form a defence union, as regional military pacts
91 Leopold Unger, 'Dwie Racje Bytu' [Two Reasons for Existence], Gazeta Wyborcza (19 November
1991).
92 Zieba, 'Nowy regionalizm', p. 35.
93 de Weydenthal, 'Poland Supports the Triangle', p. 18; Unger, 'Dwie Racje Bytu': Tenets of the
Polish Security Policy and Security Policy, p. 6.
94 Anna T. Kowalewska, 'Ideologia i praktyka' [Ideology and practiceJ, Rzeczpospolita (18 July 1994).
95 Zieba, 'Nowy regionalizm', p. 33.
96 Leczycka, 'Inicjatywa Srodkowoeuropejska': Golembski, 'Polska w ugrupowaniach regioualnych.
p.90.
97 Report on the State of National Security, p. 72.
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had no place in today's Europe. '98
In this phase, Poland emphasized that it was no interested in setting up an
institutional framework." The Report on the State of National Security specifies that,
even in the economic sphere, which came to occupy the foreground of the Visegrad
cooperation, there should be no institutionalization. 100 This reluctance to institutionalize
the framework has been interpreted by observers as a sign of the fragility of the
group. 101
In the initial phase of subregional cooperation, Poland's policy-makers saw these
frameworks as ways of improving relations with Eastern and South-Eastern neighbours.
Instead of doing so, however, a deepening of cooperation without a simultaneous
widening came to be regarded by non-member countries as potentially threatening. In
response, Polish policy-makers soon began to emphasize that the organizations, specially
the CEI, should be opened to new members, particularly Belorus and Ukraine, countries
with which Poland feels a historical bond.
In the second phase, then, the primary goal of the Polish government within
subregional frameworks was to improve relations with the West. Poland began to
advocate relatively loose cooperation of positions on particular issues relating to
integration. To extend this argument further, it would appear that even support for
limited cooperation within the VG has often been a reflection of Polish perceptions of
Western wishes or preferences, rather than a genuine interest in deepening relations with
neighbouring countries. Thus, by the end of 1992, when it became clear that the VG
framework was becoming less important to its other members, Polish observers
interpreted this as a possible result of a lack of interest on the part of Western
organizations and institutions after the conclusion of Europe Agreements with the non-
Visegrad Central European countries. 102
98 Alfred A. Reisch, 'No Plans for a Military Pact by the Visegrad Three', RFEIRL Research Report
Vol. 1, No. 40 (9 October 1994), p. 55.
99 See for example statements by Defense Minister Piotr Koloelziejczyk quoted by ~~ur Bilski.
Zelzislaw Lasota and Andrzej Medykowski, 'Interesuje nas peine czlonkowstwo w Pakcie [We are
interested in full membership in the alliance], Polska Zbrojna (l0 January 1994).
100 Report on the State of National Security, p. 72.
101 Jan B. de Weydenthal, 'The Cracow Summit', RFE/RL Report on Eastern Europe Vol. 2. No.
43 (25 October 1991), p. 29.
102 'Przelomow juz rue bedzie' [There will be no break-throughs], Rzeczpospolita (27 October 199~).
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Poland's governing forces continued, however, to prefer to present a common
Visegrad approaches to Western institutions103. Two factors are relevant to this
preference: first, there were fears expressed in Poland that the potential breakdown of the
group would result in harmful competition among the region's countries on their way into
Europe'?"; second, Poland believed that joint positions were, if not supported, certainly
welcomed by Western organizations and institutions. 105 At the same time, Poland
dismissed the charges brought by the Czechs that VG cooperation was only formed under
Western pressure. Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski spoke out against Czech
criticisms of the subregional framework 106 , and Senator Edward Wende went further.
assessing Klaus' criticism of the group as destabilizing to the region. and saying that it
would slow down the entry of all of its members. 107
Poland continued to actively to try to deal with a number of obstacles which
affected subregional cooperation. During the negotiation of the CEFTA, Poland, faced
with problems related to the division of Czechoslovakia, was prepared to pursue a free
trade agreement with Hungary, and to put the two post-Czechoslovak states under
pressure to join the arrangement. Furthermore, Poland's Prime Minister Suchocka,
hoping for smoother VG cooperation, suggested on a number of occasions that her
country was prepared to take on a mediating role between Budapest and Bratislava. 108
The main motivation for this behaviour on the part of Polish policy-makers seems again
to have been Western perceptions. In the words of the Report on the State of National
Security, 'from the Western point of view, the objective of joining the EC and NATO
may seem problematic if the members of the Group are unable to agree and cooperate
on basic matters within a far less complex structure.' 109
103 Reisch, 'Disappointments and Hopes', p. 32.
104 See 'Przelomow juz nie bedzie'.
105 Janusz B. Grochowski, 'Grupa Wyszehradzka: Kiedy w NATO' [Visegrad Group: When in NATOl,
Polska Zbrojna (3 September 1994).
106 'Polish Foreign Minister denies Visegrad agreement "masterminded" by the West', BBe SWB EE
(16 January 1993); 'Skubiszewski promotes regional cooperation'. RFE/RL Daily Report II (19 January
1993).
107 'Blizej czy dalej Wspolnoty Europejskiej' [Closer or further away from European Community I.
Rzeczpospolita (18 January 1993).
108 'Polen und Ungarn rucken zusammen', Die Welt (25 September 1992).
109 Report on the State of National Security, p. 72.
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The third phase of Polish attitudes towards exrstmg subregional cooperation
frameworks can only be described as disappointment. On a declaratory level. Polish
politicians continued to support the concept of subregional cooperation within both the
VG and the CEL However, their achievements were criticized. The lack of cooperation
displayed by Visegrad countries during the negotiations of the Europe Agreements, and
during talks on the form of NATO's Partnership for Peace proposals caused dismay
among Poland's politicians. President Walesa suggested that the Visegrad group may have
wasted "'historical opportunity in this process. Discussing the progress and dimensions
of cooperation, Polish observers argue that the country's expectations for both the
Visegrad and CEI were disappointed. A prominent Polish analyst likened the CEI to a
cul-de-sac. He also claimed that Poland devoted too much energy to the Visegrad
Group. 110
In September 1994, President Walesa suggested that Visegrad cooperation needed
to develop a new set of goals. In his opinion, the most important cooperation issues
should be matters pertaining to NATO and EU membership. In addition, he suggested
an exchange of opinions with other VG members about the CSCE. t ll Polish policy-
makers also wanted to give the CEI a new pragmatic character, particularly in their
efforts to join the EU. At the same time, they emphasized economic cooperation and the
liberalization of trade among CEI member countries. 112 Polish leaders did not,
however, see the CEI as having a security role, and this group was not at the focus of
the security debate.
To summarize, then, Poland, although a staunch supporter of subregional
cooperation on the level of declaratory policy, actually sees it today almost exclusively
as a vehicle for cooperation and integration with the West. This approach reflects the
belief of Polish policy-makers that such arrangements are supported or indeed expected
by Western organizations and institutions, and that without cooperation frameworks, the
other VG members would attempt to leave Poland behind in their rush for European
integration.
110 Jerzy Marek Nowakowski, 'Stracone szanse czy stracone zludzienia' [Lost chances or lost illusions],
Rzeczpospolita (2-3 July 1994).
111 'Poszukiwanie wspolnego stanowiska' [Search for common positions]. Rzeczpospolita (29 September
1994).
112 'Inicjatywa Srodkowoeuropejska w cieniu wojny' [Central European Initiative in the shadow of war].
Rzeczpospolita (21 November 1994).
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6. Prospects of existing subregional groupings
In Dunay's words, 'looking back on the developments of relations in the Visegrad
Group, it is fairly easy to conclude that the security potential of this subregional
organization was grossly overestimated. '113 How, then, will these frameworks develop?
Will disappointment with half-hearted Western integration offers translate into increased
support for subregional structures? Would an external security crisis bring member
countries closer together, as the Moscow coup did in 1991?
It is difficult to be optimistic. Dissatisfaction with Western efforts has so far been
translated not into closer cooperation but into competition and the re-nationalization of
policies. External security threats, like those generated by the Balkan crisis, have been
answered with lukewarm declarations.
The CEI and the VG may have a future as lobby or pressure groups, but it does
not seem likely that they will evolve into multilateral security structures, capable of
filling the Central European security vacuum. In this respect, Central Europeans see only
one option: integration with Western European organizations. Since it is not clear which
of these multilateral frameworks will be most will ing and most suited to resolve the
security problems in Central Europe, the region is pursuing a 'catch-all' strategy intended
to improve relations with all of them. At the same time, 'subregional pacts run the risk
of becoming second-class associations. '114
Ultimately, it would seem that there was only one way to avoid the
marginalization of Central European cooperation: involvement in organizations such as
NATO, the WEU and the EU. Thus, Western organizations would have to facilitate
subregional initiatives in Central Europe as part of the process of a 'return to Europe' -
by relying, for example, on the principle of subsidiarity. Dunay suggests that 'the only
way for voluntary security cooperation is the framework of western integration. -ns
Maciej Perczynski also submits that 'the creation of a subregional cooperation
organization in Central and Eastern Europe seems impossible without the support of
Western institutions. This is a matter of, on the one hand, properly framing this
organization's political and systemic identity, and, on the other, mapping the directions
113 Dunay, 'Adversaries All Around?', p. 58.
114 Daniel N. Nelson, 'Democracy, Markets and Security in Eastern Europe', Survival Vol. 35. ~o.
2 (Summer 1993).
115 Dunay, 'Adversaries All Around?', p. 59.
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of its movement to Europe and the world. '116
As logical as these recommendations might sound, they may not be easy or even
possible to realize. One of the most serious complications has been that Western nations
seem to be at odds about their interests in Central European. Europe has had problems
defining its institutions and their functions. Meanwhile, the Central Europeans are in the
process of developing their national interests, which will make it more difficult for the
West to approach them on a multilateral basis. Furthermore, Western involvement would
imply making subregional cooperation groups into 'anterooms of European integration',
which would in turn suggest the need to specify requirements and time frameworks for
the actual integration. It is doubtful that any Western organization is currently capable
of presenting such clear plans.
It should not be forgotten that a subregional cooperation framework 'can do only
as much as its members want it to do in solving political, economic, minority and other
issues. '117 If Central Europeans foresee a future for their subregional multilateral
cooperation, they will have to define their common interests and problems, and specify
which of them can be solved regionally. Polish observers have suggested that there are
areas in which the Visegrad Group could provide pragmatic and useful security benefits,
such as matters relating to defence industries or migration.!" The process would not
be an easy one!", but some cooperation on these matters already takes place.':" In
this crisis of subregional structures, only concrete results, still sadly lacking, could
116 Maciej Perczynski, 'Subregional Cooperation in Eastern and Central Europe in the New Structure
of Global Relations', PISM Occasional Papers 28 (1991), p. 10.
117 Reisch, 'Central European Initiative', p. 37.
118 Henryk Szlajfer, 'Dezintegracja przestrzeni eurazjatyckiej a bezpieczenstwo Europy Srodkowej i
Wschodniej' [Disintegration of the Eurasian space and East Central Europe's security], Studia i Materialy
65 (June 1993), pp. 16-18.
119 See also 'Niwelowanie barier. Z prof. Bronislawem Geremkiem, przewodniczacym Sejrnowej
Komisji Spraw Zagranicznych rozmawia Jan Forowicz.' [Surveying barriers. Jan Forowic.z speak with
professor Bronislaw Geremek, chairman of the parliamentary Commission for Foreign Relations I, Polska
Zbrojna (31 May 1994); Tadeusz Wrobel, 'Grupa Wyszehradzka na rynku hroni'. Polska Zbrojna (7
April 1994).
120 Adam Stasinski, 'Miedzynarodowa kooperacja sposobem na zbrojeniowe klopoty: "Grupa" chce
wspolpracowac' [International cooperation as method for armaments problems: 'Group' want~ to co~)~erate],
Polska Zbrojna (9 September 1993); Adam Stasinski. 'Problemy uzbrojenia i wyposazema armn Grupy
Wyszehradzkiej' [Problem of armament and equipment of Visegrad Group armies], Polska Zbrojna (7
September 1993); 'Hungary to share experience', RFE Report on Eastern Europe Vol. 2, No. 41 (11
October 1991), p. 39.
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salvage Central European security cooperation.
In this context, Pol ish support for subregional cooperation may turn out to have
been 'too little, too late'. It may be late because other member countries are currently
perceiving that such forms of cooperation are in crisis. It may be too little because even
Polish support is motivated by Western preferences, rather than by the genuine desire to
create a viable and long-term subregional cooperation framework. Polish policy is thus
lacking credibility in its combination of regionalism and the quest for European
integration.
7. Conclusion
To observers, the security vacuum in Central Europe soon indicated the need for
some form of security cooperation among countries in the region. It was suggested that
the creation of such structures would be advantageous to the newly democratic countries
of the region. Jeane Kirkpatrick, for example, suggested the formation of an 'Eastern
European Union' which would balance the WEU under a NATO umbrella.':" But a
union of this kind has never been seriously entertained by governments in the region. The
idea of filling the security vacuum in the wake of the Warsaw Treaty Organization with
subregional security arrangements was, however, heralded as a promising pattern for
interaction in a region that is desperately seeking security.
During the first, ideal istic phase of post-1989 Central European foreign pol icies,
subregional groupings were established. At the least, the Visegrad Group, and the Central
European Initiative, the two subregional cooperation frameworks discussed in this
chapter, seemed to have the potential to become viable organizations to handle both
security and economic issues. It is too soon, however, to give a clear picture of their
future development, but it is obvious that, as yet, they have not developed into mature
security structures. Indeed, both find themselves suffering from a crisis of confidence.
It would appear, in fact, that most Central European countries today, including Poland.
are experiencing a period of disillusionment regarding existing subregional structures
which have outgrown systemic changes in the former Eastern bloc.
To recapitulate briefly, then, the subregional cooperation structures were used
initially to coordinate Central European approaches to Western European organizations.
121 Jeane Kirkpatrick, 'Cautions for Clinton on Foreign Policy'. International Herald Tribune (7-8
November 1992).
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As discussed above, the deepening of subregional cooperation faltered under various
constraints from within the region itself, from other Eastern European states, and from
Western organizations. Cooperation also suffered because bilateral tensions amongst
members could not be resolved within the subregional frameworks. Moreover, countries
in the region that had not been given the opportunity to enter these frameworks put
pressure on these groups not to create exclusive clubs, and not to push for a differentiated
approach from Western organizations. Finally, organizations in the West, though
generally supportive of subregional initiatives, did not make clear to the Central
Europeans whether cooperation on the subregional level would help them or hinder them
in their drive for integration into Western organizations.
As a result, both the VG and the CEI have begun to take on the function of
consultative fora, rather than security frameworks. A positive outcome of this is the
increased attention paid to subregional economic issues, but it remains to be seen whether
or not intra-regional economic activity will increase, and whether such an increase will
result in closer political and security ties.
CHAPTER NINE
PROPOSALS FOR SUBREGIONAL SECURITY COOPERATION
FRAMEWORKS IN EAST CENTRAL EUROPE
1. Introduction
The idea that a subregional security cooperation framework in East Central Europe
is desirable crops up again and again in Poland despite the fact that none of the existing
cooperation structures seem capable of assuming a meaningful security role. As an
alternative to a Western orientation, a closing of ranks among the countries in the 'grey'
security zone is advocated periodically, particularly by pol itical forces that think
themselves in the tradition of Pilsudski.
This chapter explores an aspect of the Polish political debate which is little known
outside the country. It examines proposals for subregional security cooperation that have
been presented since 1990 but have not been translated into actual institutions. I In
Poland, political forces which propose to address the problem of security by means of
subregional cooperation draw on historical concepts of East Central European security
cooperation." Where necessary, then, this chapter refers to relevant historical notions and
proposals, discussed in more depth in Chapter Four.
The discussion here focuses primarily on two concepts of subregional cooperation
that are based on neo-Pilsudskiite reasoning and put forward by political forces in Poland:
NATO-bis, and Miedzymorze, which translates as Between-the-Seas, Baltic-to-Black Sea,
Isthmus, or Intermarium. In addition, this section provides a brief discussion of similar
I For a discussion of existing frameworks see Chapter Eight.
2 'Defense Official Views Regional Security Issues', FBIS-EEU-92-203 (20 October 1992). p. 21.
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proposals put forward by political forces in the neighbouring post-Soviet republics.
This chapter suggests that Polish proposals focus, to a varying extent, on
organizing relations with the country's eastern neighbours, rather than, as in the case of
official policies, on links with Western Europe. The proposals thus reflect Pilsudski's
ideas relatively closely, and refer to the period of Polish greatness which ended with the
disintegration of the multi-national Polish-Lithuanian state in the 17th century." In this
tradition, some political forces foresee that Poland will take on a special role in the
subregional context.
This chapter concludes that Polish proposals are not necessarily a reflection of
pragmatic considerations but of Poland's images of the past. As such, they differ from
the subregional cooperation frameworks which have actually been implemented
(V isegrad , CEI). As the previous chapter argues, these frameworks largely reflect
pragmatic attempts at cooperation, and only indirectly refer to historical ties.
Accordingly, the political support enjoyed in Poland and abroad by the proposals
discussed here is relatively limited, and based mainly on democratic nationalist or
patriotic groups in the relevant countries. Because of the different political traditions in
the region, these may not be seen as nationalist proposals by the Poles themselves.
Indeed, Western historians do not generally distinguish between the nationalist and the
patriotic traditions in Polish political thought. The difference exists, however, and reflects
the continuing influence of the positivist and romantic traditions (see Chapter Four). The
difference between these two approaches is mostly apparent in ideas about the treatment
of minorities."
2. Brief history of subregional proposals in the 1980s and 90s
Subregional proposals in the perestroika period
During the perestroika years, prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union, leaders
of the national independence movements or fronts in Ukraine, Belorus, and the three
Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), held several consultations about the
possibility of a so-called Baltic-to-Black Sea Union or alliance. At a gathering of
independence-minded opposition leaders, held in the Belorussian city of Minsk on 23-24
November 1990, a statement was agreed upon which pronounced that the USSR would
3 For a more in-depth discussion of this aspect see Chapter Four.
4 Piotr S. Wandycz, Cena Wolnosci [The Price of Freedom]. (Krakow: ZNAK. 1995). p. 327.
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not live much longer. The opposition members demanded the withdrawal of Soviet troops
from the Baltic to the Black Sea. In addition they agreed to establish a commonwealth
among the five states.' The agreement was obviously premature. Once the Soviet Union
collapsed, the Baltic states began to look more to Scandinavia than to East Central
Europe for cooperation in both economics and security. Thus, Ukraine, and particularly
Belorus, found themselves under pressure to join the shaky Commonwealth of
Independent States and gradually turned eastward.
Nevertheless, the idea of a Baltic-to-Black Sea union continues to be favoured by
a number of nationalist parties which sooner or later found themselves, after the collapse
of the Soviet Union, in democratic opposition rather than in power. The Belorussian
Popular Front (BPF) 'Revival', for example, continues to support the Baltic-to-Black Sea
concept. BPF, lead by Zianon Pazniak, is the largest democratic nationalist opposition
organization in Belorus. 6
The Baltic-to-Black Sea proposal originally foresaw a subregional security
framework composed of the Baltic States, Belorus, and Ukraine. After the disintegration
of the Soviet Union, BPF politicians began to include Poland in this concept and
encouraged a relationship with this country as a way of reducing domination by the
Russian Federation." In addition, this Belorussian group expressed interest in some form
of association with the Visegrad group. They received little, however, in the way of a
response or support from the Polish government.
One Polish commentator sees the BPF's support for the Baltic-to-Black Sea
alliance as political ploy rather than a realistic idea." In general, the concept faltered
because the countries concerned were in no state to help one another economically and
the hard-pressed Belorus chose to turn to Russia instead as an economic and political
5 Jan Zaprudnik, Belarus: At a Crossroads in History. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), p. 219.
6 BPF was created in December 1988 as an anti-communist movement campaigning for independence
and national revival of Belorus. Its beginning was interpreted as a significant step to independence as. its
members demanded the creation of a sovereign and democratic country. Belorus, which had never before
enjoyed statehood, achieved independence in July 1990.
7 Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States 1994 (2nd ed.). (London: Europa
Publications, 1994), p. 168.
8 Krzysztof Gorski, senior expert, National Security Office at the President's Chancellery, Polish
Republic, interview by author, 6 February 1995, London.
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partner In the CIS. 9 The BPF is still pursuing the concept, but the Belorussian
government is more and more seriously looking to Russia.
Ukrainian nationalists were also solidly opposed to the idea of the CIS and
favoured instead the creation of a Baltic-to-Black Sea alliance. The concept became more
difficult to support when Belorus entered into a military alliance with Russia in early
1993 and an economic union in early 1994. For geographical reasons, a community of
this kind could not function with the Baltic countries and Ukraine alone.
It is probably for this reason that Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk proposed
an anti-Russian cordon sanitaire from the Baltic to the Black Sea, tactfully named 'the
collective security zone' and modelled after the NATO-bis proposal 10, presenting this
idea to the Central European governments in May 1993. Belorus' position in this
proposed structure was never clarified.
Responses to the proposal varied according to how the respective countries
perceived their chances of Western integration. It has been reported that only Romania
and Slovakia expressed interest in the proposal. 11 The Pol ish government chose not to
turn down the proposal, but not to support it either. As in the case of Belorus, the Polish
government was interested in bilateral cooperation, but not in close multilateral relations
with Ukraine." Walesa was more supportive of the idea, but did not link it to his
NATO-bis concept, although he was still feebly floating the idea of the NATO-bis at this
time.
In November 1993, Kravchuk's concept was discussed during a meeting of the
Polish-Ukrainian Consulting Committee of the Presidents which has been created in the
previous May in Kiev". Both Polish and Ukrainian members of the committee pointed
9 Strategic Survey 1993-1994. (London: Brassey's for IISS, 1994), p. 124.
10 Andrzej Romanowski, 'Czy przespalismy "smute"?' [Did we sleep through 'smuta'?], Tygodnik
Powszechny (3 October 1993).
II Vladimir Kusin, 'NATO and Central Europe: The Problem of Conjunction' , Notes from the Special
Adviser for Central and Eastern European Affairs, NATO HQ, Brussels, (26 October 1993), p. 2.
12 Krzysztof Miszczak, 'Die Sicherheitspolitik der Republik Polen', Europaische Sicherheit Vol. 42.
No. 10 (October 1993), p. 518.
13 'Statut Komitetu Konsultacyjnego Prezydentow Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej i Ukrainy' [Statutes of the
Consulting Committee of the Presidents of the Republic of Poland and Ukraine], Warsaw (30 April 1993):
'Komunikat z posiedzenia Komitetu Konsultacyjnego Prezydentow Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej i Ukrainy
[Announcement from the meeting of the Consulting Committee of the Presidents of the Republic of Poland
and Ukraine], Kiev (27 May 1993).
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out the topicality of the Kravchuk proposal. The communique was ultimately a
compromise position, since it also contained a supportive Ukrainian statement concerning
Polish efforts to join NATO. In this way, Ukraine was granted a mention of the proposal.
and Poland support for its NATO policy. 14 The communique also stated that both
Warsaw and Kiev support bi- and multilateral subregional cooperation, seeing in them
guarantees of security and stability for the whole of Europe. IS
The Confederation for Independent Poland (KPN), an independence party with
populist leanings and leftist economic beliefs consistently supported Ukrainian,
Belorussian and Baltic aspirations for independence, as well as the notion of a subregional
security grouping. 16 This support was not sufficient, however, to implement the concept,
and 'Ukraine was forced to content itself with a series of small measures designed to
create links with central and eastern European states'. 17
Soon, the issue of Polish membership in NATO became a bone of contention in
its relations with Ukraine and Belorus. Initially, Ukraine supported Poland in its drive
for NATO membership. This has changed since the last Ukrainian election, and
Ukraine's new leadership is concerned about the possibility that such a solution would
reduce Ukraine to a buffer zone between NATO and Russia, and could also further
'polarize' the eastern and western parts of Ukraine." In January 1994 Belorus' Prime
Minister Viacheslav Kiebich stated that Polish or Lithuanian membership in NATO would
create a difficult situation for his country. 19 These disagreements have strained relations
14 Aldona Chojnowska, senior expert, National Security Office at the President's Chancellery, Polish
Republic, interview by author, 15 March 1995, Warsaw.
15 'Komunikat z posiedzenia Komitetu Konsultacyjnego Prezydentow RP i Ukrainy' [Announcement
from the meeting of the Consulting Committee of the Republic of Poland and Ukraine], Warsaw (24-25
November 1993), p. 1; Malgorzata Leczycka, 'Obradowal Komitet Konsultacyjny Prezydentow: Nie rna
wolnej Polski bez wolnej Ukrainy' [The presidents' Consulting Committee met: Free Poland cannot exist
without free Ukraine] , PoIska Zbrojna (26-28 November 1993); Gorski, interview by author, 1995.
16 Louisa Vinton, 'From the Margins to the Mainstream: Confederation for an Independent Poland',
Report on Eastern Europe, Vol.2, No. 46 (15 November 1991).
17 Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth, p. 681.
18 'Ostrozniej do NATO' [More carefully into NATO], Rzeczpospolita (l December 1995); ,Ukraina
obawia sie Polski w NATO' [Ukraine fears Poland in NATO], Rzeczpospolita (6 December 1994);
'Ukraina przeciwna naszemu czlonkowstwu w sojuszu' [Ukraine opposed to our membership in alliance I.
Rzeczpospolita (15 February 1995).
19 'Bialoruski premier 0 Polsce i NATO' [Belorussian Prime Minister about Poland and NATal.
Rzeczpospolita (14 January 1994).
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between Poland and its eastern neighbours.
The idea of an East Central European subregional grouping is also alive in
Lithuania. In November 1993, Antanas Terleckas, the leader of League for Freedom of
Lithuania, a small right-wing party without representation in the Lithuanian parliament.
said in an interview that he was in favour of creating a confederation composed of the
three Baltic republics, Poland, Belorus and Ukraine. He called this creation Baltoslavia.
In his opinion, the formation of a political-military arrangement among these countries
would protect them from threats arising from their geopolitical location. Terleckas argued
that his concept would work if fears of polonization did not interfere. There would not
be an official language, but diplomats should converse in Polish, he said." In this
context, it ought to be noted that Terleckas is in fact ethnically Polish.
The concept of the Baltic-to-Black Sea community was, when initially conceived,
not actually intended to involve Poland's direct participation. The forces in the Soviet
republics that were discussing the idea had to take into the account the continued
existence of the Soviet Union. At that point, Poland was concentrating on structuring its
relations with Moscow while at the same time dealing with the issue of the German-
Polish border. So it was only once the border treaty had been signed and the Soviet
Union and the Warsaw Treaty Organization had disintegrated, that the baltic-to-Black Sea
concept was picked up by nationalist political forces in Poland.
While these parties would be defined by the West as 'nationalistic', they are not
necessarily described as such in Poland. Parties in the Pilsudski-tradition like the
Confederation for Independent Poland are considered' independence parties', or patriotic
groups. Organizations focused on nationalist ideologies are typically 'difficult to
pigeonhole programmatically. '21 They include the pan-slavist Universal Party of Slavs
and Allied Nations (Powszechna Partia Slowian i Narodow Sprzymierzonychs, which
advocates the incorporation of Poland into a 'Union of Free Nations' spanning from the
Black Sea to the Barents Sea; and the Polish Independence Party (Polska Partia
Niepodleglosciowa) .
Parties with Dmowski-like platforms are defined in Poland as nationalist. Some
advocate expansionist policies. These parties are small and insignificant, and include the
20 'Litwa: Idea utworzenia konfederacji balto-slowianskiej' [Lithuania: Concept of creation of balto-
slavic confederation], Rzeczpospolita (24 November 1993).
21 See Janusz Bugajski, Ethnic Politics in Eastern Europe: A Guide to Nationality Policies,
Organizations, and Parties. (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1994), p. 375.
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National Party (Stronnictwo Narodowei; the National Democratic Party (Stronnictwo
Narodowo-Demokratyczne); the Polish National Front (Narodowy Front Polski), which
openly seeks to build a 'Great Poland' - a Polish empire created at the expense of the
country's eastern neighbours; and the Polish National Commonwealth - Polish National
Party (Polska Wspolnota Narodowa - Polskie Stronnictwo Narodowe) which shows pan-
Slavistic leanings.
The main difference between these two political traditions is their attitude towards
Russia. While Pilsudski-ite parties advocate distancing Poland from Russia, Dmowski-ite
parties are prepared to accommodate close ties with Russia. Thus, they see Polish
expansion as possible only with Russian approval or help."
Miedzymorze
In Poland, the principal support for the Baltic-to-Black Sea concept has come from
an opposition party, the Confederation for Independent Poland (KPN). The KPN was
established in September 1979, as a separate organization within what was then the illegal
Movement for the Protection of Human and Citizens' Rights (Ruch Obrony Praw
Czlowieka i Obywatela). The organization was legalized in 1989, but it was not until late
in 1990 that it began to playa role in the political life of the country. In 1990, its leader,
Leszek Moczulski, ran unsuccessfully in the presidential election. In the 1991
parliamentary election KPN won 46 parliamentary and 4 Senate seats, and it is rumoured
that it hoped to join the coalition and take charge of the defence portfolio. Eventually,
however, the party resigned from coalition discussions and remained in opposition." In
the 1993 election it won 22 Sejm seats and no Senate seats."
During the last election campaign the KPN somewhat abandoned its emphasis on
issues of foreign and security policy, which had centred on independence and patriotic
slogans, in favour of a platform based on economic issues. As a result, it lost a
significant proportion of its voters. It now has only 16 seats in the parliament (after
22 For a brief discussion of the various nationalist political parties in Poland, and their political
platforms, see ibid., pp. 374-390.
23 'Nie rna rozlamu - mowi Moczulski: Cos w KPN peklo, cos sie skonczylo ' [There is no split - says
Moczulski: Something broke in KPN, something ended], Rzeczpospolita (3 August 1994).
24 Louisa Vinton, 'Poland Goes Left', RFE/RL Research Report Vol. 2, No. 40 (8 October 1993),
p.23.
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losing some through defection after the parliament was formed). 25
In 1989 and 1990, Polish political forces debated the concept of a subregional
community between the USSR and NATO which would connect southwards with
countries like Austria and Yugoslavia, but there was no response among prospective
partners." It is reported that the concept of Miedzymorre - and neutrality - is gaining
supporters among the representatives of the coalition party Polish Peasant Party (PSL)27.
although KPN denies any links with this party. 28 Thus, influential forces such as those
on more extreme Left sympathize to a certain extent with the nationalist - anti-Western
message of the idea of subregional security cooperation frameworks. The government,
however, officially dismisses the concept. 29
The Baltic-to-Black Sea idea is known 111 Poland under the historical name of
Miedzymorze, and forms the core of the KPN's foreign policy platform. The KPN favours
the integration of all of the countries between Germany and Russia and proposes to
construct an institutionalized Central and East European all iance (but not a federal
structure of the kind that Pilsudski put forward), with Poland as an active leader of the
group." The KPN considers this a way of establishing better relations with Ukraine",
and also with Belorus and Lithuania - countries which are home to members of Polish
ethnic groups. The KPN's leader Leszek Moczulski emphasized that Miedzymor:e is not
intended to establish a cordon sanitaire against Russia. But he was quick to argue that
25 Kazimierz Groblewski, 'KPN i BBWR blizej: Sojusz z koniecznosci ' [KPN and BBWR closer:
alliance out of necessity]' Rzeczpospolita (24 January 1995); Miroslaw Usidus, 'KPN - zwichnieta wola
mocy' [KPN - dislocated will of power], Rzeczpospolita (18 September 1993).
26 'Article Views Foreign Policy Option', FBIS-EU-90-135 (13 July 1990).
27 Maria Wagrowska, 'Elitarny klub i twarde reguly' [Elite club and tough rules], Rzeczpospolita (8
February 1995).
28 Tomasz Szczepanski, Head, Miedzymorze Department, Confederation for Independent Poland,
interview by author, 14 March 1995, Warsaw.
29 'Polityka zagraniczna: Nikt nie podwaza roli NATO' [Foreign Policy: Nobody undermines the role
of NATO], Rzeczpospolita (l February 1995).
30 See Tomasz Szczepanski, Miedzymorze: Polityka Srodkowoeuropejska KPN [Miedzymorze: KPN' s
Central European policy]. (Warsaw: Dzial Poligrafii KPN, 1993); Tezy programowe IV Kongresu:
Konfederacja Polski Niepodleglej [Programme Propositions of the IV Congress: Coufederanon tor
Independent Poland]. (Warsaw: Dzial Poligrafii KPN, January 1993); 'Apel IV ~~ngre:u KPN_ do
spoleczenstw i sil politycznych krajow Miedzymorza' [Appeal to the societies and political forces ot the
countries of Miedtymorze by the IV Congress of the KPN] (March 1992).
31 See Tadeusz Andrzej Olszanski, 'Ksztalt Miedzymorza' [The Shape of Micdtvmorzev. Gazeta Polska
KPN 1 (1992).
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Miedzymorze would be comparable to Russia in geopolitical potential. He explained, too,
that Russia could not participate in this subregional structure because it would dominate
it, but good relations with Russia should be maintained." The KPN sees not only Russia
but also Hungary as a potential problem. Tomasz Szczepanski, the head of the party's
Miedzymorze department said: 'Hungary can push Slovakia and Romania into Russian
arms, just like Germany can push Poland into Russian arms. '33 This kind of situation
would threaten the entire subregional concept.
The KPN's leaders are not enthusiastic about NATO and emphasize that it would
be impossible to join NATO's military structures. They also emphasize that it is wrong
to assume that NATO could provide security for Poland. The proponents of Miedzyrnorze
frameworks believe that Poland must avoid 'distant and exotic alliances"." Thus, the
party suggests organizing relations with neighbouring countries as a foreign pol icy
priority, rather than establishing security links with European or Euro-Atlantic
organizations. The concept of Miedzymor:e, the KPN's leader Moczulski argues, foresees
that the process of improving relations with neighbouring countries will take place within
the framework of a pan-European integration. 35
Within Miedzymor:e, Moczulski advocated creating structures and processes
similar to those in the West - economic cooperation and political integration.
Nevertheless, he emphasized that the sovereignty and individuality of participating
countries should be preserved. According to Moczulski, this would allow the region to
speed up its developmental processes, and to equalize the levels of development in
Western and East-Central Europe. This should occur, he claimed, within some twenty
five years. Moczulski conceded that these efforts should take place in cooperation with
the EU, and culminate in the integration of all of Europe."
Szczepanski argued that if NATO was to expand only to select Miedzymor:e
countries (excluding Ukraine and Belorus), Poland would become a frontier state. Thus
32 'Wiecej szybkich reform: Rozmowa z Leszkiem Moczulskim, przewodniczacym Konfederacji. Polski
Niepodleglej' [More fast reforms: Discussion with Leszek Moczulski, chairman of the Confederation for
Independent Poland], Rzeczpospolita (27 August 1993).
33 Szczepanski, interview by author, 1995.
34 Jacek C. Kaminski, 'Miedzymorze', Mysl Polska (December 1993).
35 Moczulski, 'Wiecej szybkich reform'.
36 Ibid.
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Poland should campaign on behalf of the membership of its eastern neighbours. He also
claimed that Miedzymorze could cease to exist or be transformed into an arrangement
resembling the Benelux, that is a subregional cooperation framework within a larze
<-
structure, if Euro-Atlantic structures absorbed all of its members."
The KPN was one of the instigators of an international conference of political
parties from the Miedzymorre region together with the Ukrainian Republican Party, the
Democratic Party of Ukraine, and the Green Party of Ukraine. The meeting took place
on 29-30 July 1994 in Kiev. It resulted in the creation of an 'Intersea League' which
brought together a number of political parties from Belorus, Estonia, Poland, Lithuania,
Latvia, and Ukraine." None of the parties in power in the Visegrad countries were
included in this structure, a situation that is curiously similar to both the Pilsudski
blueprint of a East Central European federation and to the original Baltic-to-Black Sea
idea. League members, in addition to the KPN, are all national ist groups from the former
non-Soviet republics, with anti-communist views, and patriotic and independence-focused
platforms." Among them is a section of the Rukh" movement led by the radical leader
37 Szczepanski, interview by author, 1995.
38 Moczulski, in 'Nie rna rozlamu - mowi Moczulski': Intersea bulletin: Countries of the Baltic-Black
Sea-Adriatic Region. Leagues of Parties 1 (August 1994).
39 The Kiev meeting was attended by representatives of the following parties: for Belorus - the Popular
Front of Belorus and the United Democratic Party; for Bulgaria - Radical Democratic Party; Estonia - Pro
Patria Parti; Latvia - For Motherland and Freedom; Lithuania Conservative Party, Lithuanian National
Union; Poland - Confederation for Independent Poland, Republican Party of Poland (Third Force);
Movement of the IIIrd Rzeczpospolita; Romania - Democratic Party of Romania; Ukraine - Ukrainian
Republican Party, Democratic Party of Ukraine, Green Party of Ukraine, Congress of Ukrainian
Nationalists, Popular Movement of Ukraine (Rukh), Party of Democratic Revival of Ukraine, and Social-
Democratic Party. See'A New Geopolitical Factor in Europe was brought to life in Ukraine's capitol',
Intersea bulletin: Countries of Baltic-Black Sea-Adriatic Region. League of Parties 1 (August 1994),
p. 15. Only the representatives of a number of Belorussian, Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Polish and
Ukrainian parties signed 'The Statement on Creation of the League of the Intersea Countries' Parties'. 'The
Action Program of the League of Intersea Countries' Political Parties' was signed only by representatives
of parties from Belarus, Poland and Ukraine. For texts and signatories see Intersea Bulletin, pp. 14, 16-
17.
40 Rukh (Ukrainian National Movement) was founded in 1989, and is the oldest and the largest political
organization of this kind in the country. It registered as political party in 1993. One of its leaders,
Viacheslav Chomovil ran unsuccessfully in the December 1991 presidential election in Ukraine (with 23.3
% of the popular vote). Rukh was in opposition to the government led by Leonid Kravchuk and now also
by Leonid Kuchma. Rukh won 28 seats during April 1994 general election. For a discussion of this party.
see Ryszard Malik and Piotr Koscinski, 'Ukraina - czas zmian: Partie i organizacje polityczne ' [Ukraine -
time of change: Parties and political organizations], Rzeczpospolita (3-4 October 1992); Piotr Koscinski.
'Komunisci beda tworzyc najwieksza frakcje w nowej Radzie Nawyzszej Ukrainy: Kto jest kim w nowyrn
parliamencie' [Communists will create the largest fraction in the new Supreme Committee of the Ukraine:
Who is who in the new parliament], Rzeczpospolita (19 April 1994).
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Viacheslav Chornovil, the Belorussian Popular Movement led by Zenon Pazniak, and the
Freedom and Fatherland Party" in Latvia." Lithuania's Sajudis movement. lead by
Vytautus Landsbergis, took an interest in the idea only when it became an opposition
party.
The goal of the organization is to coordinate party policies in East Central
European countries (but mainly in the former western republics of the Soviet Union and
in Poland), with the aim of advancing the idea of Miedzymorre and potentially also
preparing to implement the concept. 'The Action Programme of the League of Intersea
Countries' Political Parties' indicates that the founders of the organization foresee a
certain degree of institutionalization, with the formation of a representative coordination
body (the Consultative Council of the League of Intersea countries' parties), annual
meetings, and the creation of a fund. In the field of national security it specifies, among
other things, the goals of working towards preventing the recognition of the CIS as a
subject of international law, and opposing the UN recognition of Russian peacemaking
in the CIS as 'an imperialistic recurrence' .43 The programme stipulates a number of
other areas of cooperation (problems of ethnic minorities, economic cooperation, cultural
relations and environmental protection).
The League is an association of a number of relatively weak parties. A Polish
official suggested that the member parties are all still trying to develop various
independent approaches to security problems in their countries. For example,
Miedzymorze is not the only framework they seek to establish, since for many of them,
security cooperation with Scandinavian countries is also a priority. 44 Miedzymorze is thus
only one part of the foreign policy platforms rather than an exclusive programme, as it
is for the KPN.
NATO-his
Polish President Lech Walesa presented what was probably the most celebrated
and discussed proposal for a subregional security cooperation framework in East Central
41 The democratically nationalist Freedom and Fatherland Party won 5.36 % of the .popula~ vote in the
parliamentary elections of June 1993. It is currently the fifth-largest party in the Latvian parliament.
42 Gorski, interview by author, 1995.
43 'The Action Program', p. 16.
44 Gorski, interview by author, 1995.
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Europe which has never been translated into practice. In March 1992, during an official
visit to Germany, impatient with the progress of Polish affiliation with European and
Euro-Atlantic organizations, Walesa proposed to set up 'NATO-bis'. 45
He conceived of NATO-bis as a transitional security arrangement (without ever
specifying its time-frame) which would involve an Eastern and Central European alliance
and trade pact. The proposal had as its goal the preparation of the former NSWTO
countries for eventual NATO and ED membership." Walesa failed to specify, however,
how the admission of some or all of the NATO-bis members into Euro-Atlantic structures
would affect relations with the NATO-bis.
Walesa indicated in March 1992 that NATO-bis would include Poland the Czech,
and Slovak Republics, Hungary, Ukraine and Russia, and possibly Belorus. Unlike the
original Baltic-to-Black Sea proposal, NATO-bis did not foresee the participation of the
three Baltic republics, acknowledging their lack of interest in Central Europe.
Walesa said that the concept was based on four tenets: no changes in borders, no
use of force, NATO power over the region's chemical and nuclear forces, and the use
of intra-regional military forces to enforce these principles." He suggested that each
country should be committing a military division to NATO-bis. Thus, the project
envisioned the creation of common armed forces consisting of units from the former
WTO countries, and sponsored by NATO. It foresaw joint conflict prevention measures
in Eastern and Central Europe. It assumed common interests in the sphere of security in
East Central Europe, and aimed to extend Western security guarantees to the region."
NATO-bis was seen by its proponents as a mechanism for preventing and
managing conflict. Responding to the question of why such a framework was necessary,
given that there was NACC and CSCE, Jerzy Milewski, the minister of state at the
45 Katarzyna Kolodziejczyk, 'Nowe Koncepcje dla Europy Srodkowo-Wschodniej' [New Concepts for
East Central Europe], Rzeczpospolita (31 March 1992).
46 Interview with Jerzy Milewski by Maria Wagrowska, 'Uczmy sie angielskiego, ale nie zapomnijmy
o rosyjskim' [Let us learn English, but not forget about Russian], Rzeczpospolita (8 September 1992);
'Military and Security Notes on Poland', RFE/RL Research Report (6 November 1992), p. 61.
47 Edward Krzemien, 'Moje sliczne NATO-bis' [My beautiful NATO-bis], Gazeta Wyborcza (3
November 1992); 'Udzielone w ostatnim tygodniu wywiady Lecha Walesy na tematy polityki zagranicznej:
Bark wizji Europy budzi demony' [Lech Walesa's last week's interviews on issues of foreign policy: Lack
of European vision wakes demons], Rzeczpospolita (8-9 January 1994).
48 Helena Fiedorcowa, 'W drodze do Europy' [On the way to Europe], Polska Zbrojna (4-5 February
1994).
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President's Chancellery and head of the National Security Office, said that while
Yugoslavia and Nagorno-Karabakh proved that existing structures were passive, NATO-
bis could be an active mechanism capable of preventing conflicts, eliminating tension,
and extinguishing conflicts that had already erupted."
According to Milewski, Poland should have been capitalizing on the fact that most
of its eastern neighbours wanted to join NATO. Since they could not reasonably be
expected to be given the chance to join immediately, 'one can exploit this joint desire to
join NATO and talk these countries into concluding - under the auspice of and with help
of NATO - an accord ... '. 50 NATO's support was needed, then, according to Milewski,
to prevent the impression that NATO-bis was a recapitulation of the Warsaw Pact, and
to allay fears about Russia's dominance. 51
The concept of NATO-bis was accompanied by the presidential idea of EC-bis.
The concept was based on the assumption that the collapse of the CMEA left an
economic cooperation vacuum. It aimed to strengthen trade and financial relations among
the East-Central European countries, with the support of the EC and other international
economic and finance bodies. It also was intended to prepare its members to join the EC,
As Polish observers have pointed out, the only success of the idea for EC-bis was that
it drew Western attention to the fact that it was not only domestic progress but also
economic relations among the region's countries that were relevant to the process In
economic restructuring of the East Central European countries. 52
The NATO-bis and EC-bis proposals have never been elaborated in detail, a
vagueness that prompted questions and commentaries from the Polish press. 53 To explain
this lack of particulars Milewski said that NATO-bis was 'an idea and not a project
existing in real life'. 54 Despite Walesa's campaign, too, the concept did not find its way
into the Polish defence doctrine of November 1992.
49 Milewski, in 'Uczmy sie angielskiego'.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
52 Fiedorcowa, 'W drodze do Europy'.
53 Kazimierz Groblewski, 'NATO bis sliczne jak pani' [NATO-bis is as lovely as you madamI'
Rzeczpospolita (14 October 1992).
54 'Doktryna obronna prawie gotowa' [Defence doctrine almost ready], Rzeczpospolita (28 October
1992).
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The NATO-bis concept never gained the support of the government or any other
political force in Poland. Indeed, the government never even officially responded to the
concept of NATO-bis, but rather put effort into mitigating its effects from the day Walesa
first presented it. Reacting to Walesa's first reference to the idea during a visit to
Germany, the Polish Foreign Minister send out a memo to all Polish embassies abroad
that in case of media enquiries about NATO-bis, Polish diplomats should emphasize that
Polish policy toward joining the EC and NATO had not changed. 55 The Polish
government's priority was to prevent the impression that there was political conflict and
a lack of cooperation between the government and the president. Most Polish government
officials, however, unofficially considered the proposal incoherent and incompatible with
Polish policiesr"
In October 1992, minister Skubiszewski, on his return from a visit to Brussels.
met with Walesa, and after what was deemed a 'lengthy discussion', gained the
president's assurance that he would no longer speak publicly about NATO-bis. He was
to reassure the foreign observers that the primary goal of Polish policy was membership
in the EC 'and in NATO, with no halfway structures, except for the Visegrad group. 57
This statement indicates a change of heart on the part of the Polish government. In April
1991, Janusz Onyszkiewicz, then the Polish deputy defence minister, had still been
arguing that 'regional groupings are important and ideally there must be several of them,
overlapping to some extent in order to avoid competition and to build bridges between
them. '58
Despite the views of the government, President Walesa returned to his idea in
October 1992. He explained that he was trying to protect the country from 'a disaster
heading its way' - namely Russian neo-imperialist tendencies. According to his close
advisers, the president saw NATO-bis as one of his most important ideas, but he still
refrained from trying to put it into practice.
In January 1994, Walesa defended his concept yet agam. Addressing VOIces
55 Krzemien, 'Moje sliczne NATO-bis'.
56 See Longin Pastusiak, 'Stac nas na konsensus' [We can afford consensus), Rzeczpospolita (5-6
November 1994).
57 Krzemien, 'Moje sliczne NATO-bis' .
58 Janusz Onyszkiewicz, 'The Security of Eastem and Central Europe in the Shorter and Long-Term.
in Nicholas Sherwen (ed.), The Prague Conference on The Future of European Security. (Brussels:
NATO Office of Information and Press. 1991), p. 131.
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critical of NATO-bis, he said that he believed it had been the right concept at the right
time. He prided himself on proposing a regional solution to security problems a year
before the war in former Yugoslavia had begun, arguing that such a structure could have
prevented the outbreak of the conflict as well as the division of Czechoslovakia. Speaking
at the time of the NATO summit which endorsed what was for him the disappointing
Partnership for Peace initiative, he said that NATO-bis was a warning that ways must be
found to solve the region's problems. 59 Even now, the president continues to speak of
his concept occasionally, indicating that although it has been shelved, it could be revived,
if Western countries fail to provide a solution to the 'grey' security zone in Central
Europe.
3. Spiritual Foundations of Miedzymorze and NATO-his
the KPN is an openly nationalist-patriotic, neo-Pilsudskiite opposition party. Its
values are almost dogmatic, focusing on anticommunist ideology, and a devotion to the
country's independence.f" The neo-Pilsudskiite element of the KPN's platform that the
party emphasizes most is the goal of multi-ethnic alliance in East Central Europe.
Significantly, it also chooses to endorse many elements of Dmowski's programme, such
as an emphasis on the concept of the ethnic 'nation' (which Pilsudski never shared), the
recognition of minorities, the acknowledgement of the sovereignty of neighbouring
countries, and a rejection of the federalist programme." Nonetheless, one Polish
observer's claim that the KPN's programme reads like the old argument between
Pilsudski-ites and traditional nationalists" somewhat overstates the importance of
Endecja (National Democrats) influences. Clearly, the KPN's leaders realize that in
today's geostrategic situation, Poland could create a Miedzymorze federation only with
59 Walesa, in 'Udzielone w ostatnim tygodniu wywiady'.
60 Louisa Vinton 'Poland's Political Spectrum on the Eve of the Election', RFE/RL Research Report
Vol. 2, No. 36 (10 September 1993), p. 14; Adam Bromke, 'Jak korzystamy z naszej suwerennosci? N.a
wirazu' [How do we utilize our sovereignty? On a bend], Rzeczpospolita (9-10 July 1994); Jerzy Sade.cki.
'Moczulski w Krakowie: Lech Walesa zapedzony do rogu' [Moczulski in Krakow: Lech Walesa 1Il a
corner], Rzeczpospolita (24 January 1995).
61 See Kaminski, 'Miedzymorze'.
62 Wojciech Troian, "'Miedzymorze" - Koncepcja Polityki Srodkowo-Europejskiej' IMied:::ymorze -
Conception of Central European policy], Szczerbiec 10 (1994), p. 20.
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the agreement (and probably the assistance) of Russia." The party, however. sees
Russia the main problem of the region's security, and aims to maintain distance. Thus.
the suspected Endecja influences may in fact be reflections of pragmatic considerations
on the part of the KPN's leadership. The KPN prefers to speak of historical continuity
than of the revival of old concepts. 64
On a superficial level, at least, there are perceptible links between Pilsudski's
concepts and Walesa's NATO-bis proposals. The former trade unionist Walesa has often
admitted to admiring the interwar strongman of Polish politics and has referred to his
political solutions on numerous occasions. Many parallels have been drawn between the
two leaders, not only by analysts and observers but also by Walesa himself. 65 However.
many Polish historians dispute the notion that Walesa simply and uncritically copies
Pilsudski's ideas.t"
Walesa's preferred field of action has always been foreign and security policy, and
his NATO-bis concept, drawing on interwar ideas, may have been part of his long-term
campaign to gain constitutional powers in these areas for the presidential chair. In 1995,
there are as yet no clear constitutional guidelines on developments in security pol icy. The
last full Polish constitution was adopted in 1952 and only amended in 1989 to replace the
most offensive clauses from the communist era. The institution of the presidency was
created during round-table discussions between the communist government and the
opposition in 1989 and was tailored for the communist General Jaruzelski. Thus, the
opposinon attempted to restrict the President's powers by imposing parliamentary
controls. When Lech Walesa was elected to the office at the end of 1990, he found that
the presidency did not give him the opportunity to shape Polish policies. Soon after his
election, the President and his supporters began to campaign for a redefinition of his
powers, favouring the model of the French presidential system. There was, however,
63 See Tomasz Szczepanski, 'Dlaczego nie dazymy do Rewizji Granic' [Why we do not aim at revising
borders], Gazeta PoIska KPN 2 (1994).
64 Szczepanski, interview by author, 1995.
65 See for example Mariusz Urbanek, 'Przeswiadczeni 0 wlasnej nieomylnosci' IConvinced of their own
infallibility], Rzeczpospolita (12-13 November 1994).
66 Interview with Prof. Andrzej Garlicki, 'Pilsudski-bis: Bez wspolnego jezyka' [Pilsudski-his: Without
a common language], Rzeczpospolita (25-26 February 1995); Interview with Andrzej Zakrzewski, 'Nie
grozi narn powtorka maja 1926' [We are not threatened by a repetition of May 1926], Rzeczpospolita (25-
26 February 1995).
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considerable opposition to his plans among forces that advocated a parliamentary
system."
The need for a constitutional remedy was universally acknowledged In 1991, in
light of statements made by the president and his officials and advisors that were contrary
to official government policy. Morale in the armed forces was affected." As a means
of defining the powers of the different political organs, a provisional, so called 'little'
constitution was drawn up, and replaced the old in December 1992. 69 The little
constitution represents a compromise between presidential and parliamentary systems of
government: the president gains power, but it is counterbalanced by new governmental
controls; the Prime Minister must consult the President about candidates for the Ministers
of Foreign and Internal Affairs and of National Defence; and the President approves all
top military appointments. Walesa, however, continued to push for constitutional
changes, and particularly for more powers in the area of security and defence. Thus, it
may be that Walesa is linking himself to Pilsudski-ite notions because they also imply
more presidential responsibility. After all, the initially elected Pilsudski quickly developed
into a cherished strongman of Polish politics.
The KPN, while not, at least at the moment, closely Iinked to the President, or
the presidential Bezpartyjny Blok Wsparcia Reformy (BBWR, Non-party Bloc for the
Support of Reform)?", could nonetheless be classified in a similar category - as
67 See Louisa Vinton, 'Poland's "Little Constitution" clarifies Walesa's Powers', RFE/RL Research
Report, Vol. 1, No. 35 (4 September 1992), p. 19.
68 'Clear Lines of Authority Called For', RFE/RL Research Report Vol. I, No. 24 (12 June 1992),
p.47.
69 See 'Ustawa konstytucyjna z 17 pazdziernika 1992 r. 0 wzajemnych stosunkach miedzy wladza
ustawodawcza i wykonawcza Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej oraz 0 samorzadzie terytorialnym' [Constitutional
law from 17 October 1992 on interaction between juridical and executive authorities of the Polish Republic
and on regional self-government], Rzeczpospolita (19 November 1992).
70 BBWR was established as a presidential party by Lech Waiesa prior to the 1993 general election. Its
acronym is identical to interwar Bezpartyjny Blok Wspolpracy z Rzadem (Nonparty Bloc for Cooperation
with the Government). This grouping was formed in 1928 by Pilsudski's supporters, and the intellectual
fathers of the quasi-authoritarian 'sanacja' [sanitation] regime. See Michal Tymowski et al, Polska Historia
[Polish history]. (Paris: Editions Spotkania, 1986), p. 290. For the history of Pilsudski's BBWR, see
Andrzej Chojnowski, Pilsudczycy u wladzy. Dzieje Bezpartyjnego Bloku Wspolpracy z Rzadem
[Pilsudskiites in Power. A History of the Nonparty Bloc to Cooperate with the Government]. (Wroclaw:
Ossolinskich, 1986); Joseph Rothschild, Pilsudski's Coup d'Etat. (New York: Columbia University Press,
1966); Marian Turski, 'BBWR - jak bylo: Na rozkaz' [BBWR - how it was: to command], PoIityka (19
June 1993).
Walesa's BBWR has succeeded in overcoming the electoral hurdle of 1993, the first election it
participated in. It placed representatives in the parliament (16 in the Sejm and 2 in the Senate), but irs
performance during the elections has been disappointing. See Anna Sabbat-Swidlicka, 'Walesa's Conflicts
and Ambitions', RFE/RL Research Report Vol. 3, No. 14 (8 April 1994); Vinton, 'Poland Goes Left'.
~ .... t >c,o'-:,?-r)J.~ --: _~_~_ T.M"~"~~ v ...~M~:=.:'1Ski, 'Bezpartyjny blok pana prezydenta' [Nonparty bloc of
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nationalist-patriotic, and neo-Pilsudskiite.?' However, compared to the presidential
NATO-bis concept, Miedzymorze has a more eastern orientation. NATO-bis has alwavs
been aimed at membership in Euro-Atlantic organizations. The KPN on the other hand
is fairly ambiguous and sceptical about NATO membership. It is for this reason that
Walesa has never supported this proposal. 72 Simultaneously, NATO-bis has never been
considered viable by the KPN. In September 1994, KPN's Marcin Krol criticized Pol ish
foreign policy for its lack of innovative concepts. He maintained at the same time that
NATO-bis was an absurdity, which could have no influence on the real course of
events." It appears, then, that there is no formal cooperation or official link between
Walesa's office and the KPN concerning subregional security plans.
Both the presidential NATO-bis and the KPN's Miedzymorze reflect Pilsudski's
notion of Poland's significance and destination. As Piotr Wandycz explains, Pilsudski
could not envisage Poland 'as a small state reduced to the minimal ethnic core of her
national territory'. 74 Updating Pilsudski' s notion, however, the KPN sees the European
Community as a model for the region's integration. 75
NATO-bis was a relatively pragmatic interpretation of Pilsudski's ideas by
Walesa. It was based on the idea of Central Europe as Antemurales NATO so to speak,
as a bulwark of the West in the East. In this respect, Walesa departed from Pilsudski's
principles, which believed in 'equal distance' from West and East and in balancing the
two sides.
Both geopolitical concerns and perceptions of threats were at the heart of the many
interwar Polish proposals to close ranks in East Central Europe. They were also founded
according to ingrained Polish historical images of Sarmatism - the conviction that Pol ish
mister president], Rzeczpospolita (3 August 1993); Louisa Vinton, 'Correcting Pilsudski: Walesa s
Nonparty Bloc to Support Reform', RFE/RL Research Report Vol. 2, No. 35 (3 September 1993).
In January 1995, the KPN and the BBWR decided to cooperate closer within the parliament.
Groblewski, 'KPN i BBWR'.
71 Bromke, 'Jakkorzystarny'. SeealsoSadecki, 'Moczulski w Krakowie': Groblewski, 'KPN i BBWR'.
In January 1995, the two parties decided to cooperate closer within the parliament.
72 Gorski, interview by author, 1995.
73 Marcin Krol, 'Jak korzystarny z naszej suwerennosci? Szansa dla Polski' [How do we use our
sovereignty? Chance for Poland], Rzeczpospolita (6-7 July 1994).
74 Piotr S. Wandycz, 'Polish Foreign Policy: An Overview', in Timothy Wiles (ed), Poland Between
the Wars 1918-1939. (Bloomington: Indiana University Polish Studies Center, 1989), p. 65.
75 Vinton, 'From the Margins'.
2.+8
traditions are superior (see Chapter Four) and even guided by Messianism. It is to these
attitudes that Hatschikjan refers when he says that today the endeavour to establish
subregional cooperation frameworks 'unmistakably reflects the view that this part is "the
better Europe" anyway. '76 In October 1992 Przemyslaw Grudzinski, then deputy defence
minister, spoke of the fact that some parties wanted to solve the problem of security in
Central Europe on a subregional scale, by returning to some historical concepts. He
warned that such ideas were based on the idea of an active Polish leadership, leading to
the crystallization of a security zone in Central and East Europe." He referred to the
desire of some political forces in Poland to create a Polish 'near abroad'. One Polish
commentator, speaking of the early subregional proposals, remarked that 'when you look
at these proposals through Polish eyes, all you see is the eagle's crown shining more and
more brightly. '78
Interestingly, the proponents of subregional security solutions like Pilsudski's
concept and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth neglect to mention that historically the
implementation of such frameworks has proven difficult or impossible, and where
implemented, have failed to establish the security they were designed to provide.
Traditionally, members of subregional cooperation frameworks in East Central Europe
have looked to great powers for security and protection." Indeed, one Polish historian
has called the attempts of the inter-war period to create subregional cooperation
frameworks 'episodes of little meaning'. 80
76 Magarditsch Hatschikjan, 'Foreign Policy Reorientations in Eastern Central Europe', Aussenpolitik
Vol. 45, No.1 (1994), p. 53.
77 'Wywiad z Przemyslawem Grudzinskim, wiceministrem obrony miedzynarodowej: Droga d~ NATO'
[Interview with Przemyslaw Grudzinski, deputy defense minister: Way into NATO], Gazeta Wyborcza
(13 October 1992).
78 See 'Article Views Foreign Policy'.
79 Jan Stefanowicz, 'Bezpieczenstwo w Europie lat dziewiecdziesiarych' [Security. in Europe of the
nineties], Sprawy Miedzynarodowe 5 (1991), p. 16; Piotr Wandycz, '0 probach llltegracJl.Europy




4. Miedzymorze and NATO-his as Ways to Establish Links with West and East
Links with the West
The KPN is fairly ambiguous about its ideas concerning the country's links with
the West, and only vaguely sees Miedzymorze as a step in a long-term process of
integration. This proposal cannot therefore be considered a way of improving links with
the West. Instead, it could be viewed as a means of developing processes and frameworks
which would make East Central Europe a stronger and more viable region, both
politically and economically. The KPN's declared goal is for Poland to be on the same
level as Western European countries, but not by means of quick integration.
NATO-bis was intended to be an instrument for managing relations with the West,
particularly with European and Euro-Atlantic organizations. Polish observers occasionally
see this initiative in connection with attempts to enter NATO. They argue that after the
German border issue was settled and Soviet troops in Poland were no longer required,
the two options pursued in parallel were NATO membership and NATO-bis. 81 Both
approaches were seeking the same goal. It appears however, that this view of the two
foreign policy options simplifies the actual situation by ignoring the fact that NATO-bis
was in fact a response to Poland's frustrating efforts to gain NATO membership without
creating an intermediate stage of the kind that NATO-bis would have been. Walesa never
actually addressed arguments which claimed that the establishment of an arrangement
resembling a subregional alliance could in fact provide the West with arguments for
refusing to integrate the countries of Central Europe into Euro-Atlantic structures.
Another question that President Walesa has never addressed is whether his NATO-
bis proposal was also part of an international game, a bluff meant to test Western
responses to the possible turn of Central Europe away from the Western foreign and
security policy option. Occasionally Polish analysts see it as an attempt to gain leverage
with NATO countries, rather than a way to guarantee Poland's external security." The
fact that the proposal has not been officially acknowledged or prepared in more detail,
81 Ewa Kaszuba and Krzysztof Olszewski, 'Polscy politycy 0 przystapieniu do NATO: Zgodny chor
i solista' [Polish politicians about joining NATO: unanimous choire and a soloist], Rzeczpospolita (10
January 1994).
82 A Polish analyst working at the time in the President's Chancellery assessed the proposal ~s a
delusion conducted in the hope that Poland could pressure the West into meeting some of the expectations
of rapid integration into Western structures. Gorski, interview by author, 19~5. Se~ also Marek ~abof,_
'Wspolzaleznosci miedzynarodowe Polski w dziedzinie wojskowej' [Inrernational lllterdependencle.s at
Poland in the military sphere), in Edward Halizak and Marek Tabor (eds), Polska w Srodowisku
Miedzynarodowym: Problemy Wspolzaleznosci. (Warsaw: ELIPSA, 1993), p. 75.
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though it has been repeatedly discussed, speaks in favour of this interpretation.
Furthermore, Walesa has used such rhetorical methods on more than one occasion. In
January 1994, for example, prior to the NATO Summit, the Polish president, putting
pressure on the US government, warned that if NATO remained closed to Central
Europeans, it risked a revival of the Soviet Pact. 83
In an interview from June 1993, Janusz Onyszkiewicz carefully stated that the
NATO-bis concept might play a useful role in generating discussion in various
international fora, for example in the CSCE, concerning the construction of a European
security system which would include Central European countries. While he supported
bilateral military cooperation, he did not believe that an institutionalized subregional
structure involving all or some of the Central and East European countries was a viable
proposal." Deputy Defence Minister Grudzinski said that he understood the concept of
NATO-bis as a challenge presented to Western European strategists. His speculation.
although not the official position of the ministry, was that it was an attempt to show the
West that there were alternative solutions, and that a rapid inclusion of these countries
would be the best option. 85
Poland, of course, has no other means of influencing Western decisions - it does
not have the economic leverage, or the military potential that could give it the influence
it seeks. In short, then, the NATO-bis concept could be interpreted as an attempt to
develop a form of political leverage in Western debates concerning the future of the
European security architecture.
Links with the East
Poland's Ostpolitik has been a battleground for vanous political forces with
conflicting views effectively paralysing attempts to create coherent and effective political
strategies, particularly concerning Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. While Poland's relations
with Western European countries and organizations have been guided by clearly defined
aims and relatively consistent policies, then, its relations with its new eastern neighbours
83 Martin Fletcher and Michael Binyon, 'Walesa fears Nato snub could revive Soviet bloc'. Times (~
January 1994).
84 'Sojusznicze niezaangazowanie: Rozmowa z Januszem Ony~zki~wicz~n~. IlliIlj~treI~l ohrony. narou(~\\'ej
RP', [Allied non-engagement: Conversation with Janusz Onyszkiewicz. mnuster of national defense of the
Polish Republic], Trybuna 129 (4 June 1993).
85 Grudzinski, 'Droga do NATO'.
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have been subject to a vigorous but inconclusive debate about priorities, means and goals
among the Polish elites. Some argue that the Polish 'Orang nach Westen' has had the
detrimental effect of overlooking the importance of its relations with the East.
Many Polish analysts argue that Poland needs an active eastern policy, coordinated
and supported by the West, combined with an emphasis on a gradual rapprochement with
Western institutions and organizations like NATO and the EC (EU). As A.Z. Kaminski
and J. Kurczewska argue, there is actually a connection between Poland's eastern policy
and the quality of the country's contacts with the West. The role Poland plays in the east
may well determine whether Polish goals of integration with the West will be fulfilled. 86
However, to this day the Polish government's relations with its eastern neighbours
appears limited to the avoidance of complete alienation. Some, however, see Poland's
relations with the East as entirely isolated from links with the West.
Miedzymorze was intended to function as a tool for improving Poland's relation
with its eastern neighbours and thus it reflects a belief in the separation of eastern and
western orientations. The KPN's priority is close relations with the post-Soviet republics,
and it intends to establish these link within a security cooperation framework dominated
by Poland.
NATO-bis has also been interpreted as a way of organizing relations with the
country's eastern neighbours. According to Milewski, the point of the proposal is that
'the new independent countries created after the collapse of the USSR should not be left
isolated and forced to rely on their own defence resources. '87 Another Polish observer
sees NATO-bis an indication of need to prevent security risks emerging from the East.
He reasons that existing bilateral agreements with countries to the East should be vital
and active, and sees the proposal as a 'metaphor' for animating these links. ~8 His
argument is thus that NATO-bis and other subregional security cooperation concepts
should not be taken too literally but should rather be seen as attempts to establish better
security relations with Poland's Eastern neighbours. Nevertheless, in its conception
NATO-bis was certainly not intended as a way of making 'Ostpolitik' completely separate
86 A. Z. Kaminski and J. Kurczewska, 'Czy klucz do Zachodu lezy na wschodzie?' [Does the key to
the West lie in the East?], Debaty (May 1992), p. 1.
87 Milewski, in 'Uczmy sie angielskiego'.
88 Ryszard Zieba, 'Wspolzaleznosc bezpieczenstwa Polski ze srodowiskiem miedzynarodowym [The
interdependency of Polish security and the international environment]. in Halizak and Tahor (eds), Polska
w Srodowisku Miedzynarodowym, p. 222.
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from relations with the West.
Speaking against an interpretation of NATO-bis and Miedrymorze as viable tools
for improving relations with Poland's eastern neighbours is the fact that these initiatives
have in fact generated mixed responses from Eastern neighbours. In particular, the
NATO-bis proposal has met with disapproval in Russia, concerned that it would become
isolated if Central Europe created a bloc." Countries like Ukraine, Belorus, and
Lithuania, though they might appear to be grasping for straws in their efforts to assure
their security, have not always been responsive to the suggestion of an East Central
European security framework. One of the reasons for this weariness involves their
relations with Russia. Another is the concern that Russian domination would be replaced
with Polish influence. Indeed, all of these countries have at some stage in history
experienced Polish influence or rule, and have undergone attempts at Polonization (see
Chapter Three). Of course, Poland had a better claim to behave like a superpower when
it was larger and stronger, but the continuous reminder of historical images of Polish
domination in the region still troubles its eastern neighbours.
Ukrainian and Belorussian independence is in Poland's interest (see Chapters Five
and Six), but Russia's attitudes constrain Poland's relations with these countries. The
balance between helping these republics to deal with security dilemmas without alienating
Russia has not yet been struck, and according to most political forces in Poland the
NATO-bis proposal does not provide a feasible solution to this problem.?"
Links with Visegrad countries
Miedzymorze aims to include all of the countries between Germany and Russia,
but there are in fact two geographical versions of this. The version that is currently more
popular does not include the Balkans. There is however the older, so-called ' ABC'
concept, which reaches from the Adriatic to the Black and Baltic Seas. ABC is often seen
as providing a more viable basis on which to resist German and Russian influences. On
the other hand, Miedzymorze supporters realize that drawing the Balkan countries into a
subregional group would create more problems than it could solve."
Nevertheless, the main focus ofKPN's Miedzymorze is the former Soviet republics
89 Gorski, interview by author, 1995.
90 Malik, 'Slowianska jednosc'.
91 Szczepanski, interview by author, 1995.
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- areas, that is, that are occasionally interpreted as historically Polish. In this context. the
KPN's links with parties in Visegrad countries are weak. The party has occasionally
expressed support for cooperation within the Visegrad Group, seeing it as Miedrcmor;e
in embryonic stage." But as membership in the 'Intersea League' demonstrates. political
forces in Visegrad countries have shown little interest in the concept.
NATO-bis required the participation of the Visegrad countries In order,
geographically and ideologically, to link East Central Europe to Western Europe.
However, although it was planned to include the Visegrad countries, NATO-bis was
never elaborated in connection with what was by then the functioning Visegrad
cooperation framework. Krzysztof Gorski, an official from the President's Chancellery,
explained that the Visegrad Group was a political-economic organization not intended to
institutionalize security cooperation. Thus, to open it up to new countries might mean the
destruction of this framework. Such a development would leave Poland without any
reassurance whatsoever. NATO-bis, by contrast, was actually conceived as a political-
military structure. Thus it was to function in parallel to the more economically inclined
Visegrad Group. According to Gorski one has to imagine that the relationship between
Visegrad and NATO-bis is similar to the relationship between the EU and the WEU. 93
Nevertheless, as argued further below, Poland's Visegrad partners have not been
in any way supportive of the presidential proposal, maintaining that it would move them
further away from the declared goal of integration with Western Europe. As the political
scientists Antoni Kaminski and Lech Kosciuk observe, the Visegrad countries have not
succeeded, either individually or as a group, in working out a political strategy
concerning Eastern Europe." The Czech Republic has no shared border with the former
Soviet Union, and certainly no interest in being tied to any of the post-Soviet republics
and their problems. Slovak relations with Ukraine have been not the best as a result of
warm relations between Moscow and Bratislava." This changed somewhat following the
92 Ibid.
93 Gorski, interview by author, 1995.
94 Antoni Z. Kaminski and Lech Kosciuk, 'Rozpad ZSSR a bezpieczenstwo Europy Wschoduiej'
[USSR's disintegration and Eastern Europe's security], Studia i Materialy 41 (October 1992). p. 12.
95 Andrzej Niewiadomski, 'Po wizycie premiera Czernomyrdina w Bratyslawie: Przyjaciel Slowacja
[Following the visit of Prime Minister Chernomyrdin in Bratislava: Friend Slovakia]. Rzeczpo~polita <.15
February 1995). See also Christoph Royen, 'The Visegrad Triangle and the Western CIS: Potential Conflict
Constellations', in John R. Lampe and Daniel N. Nelson, East European Security Reconsidered.
(Washington D.C.: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1993); Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth.
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recent Ukrainian election which changed the course of Kiev's pol itics to more pro-
Russian. Moreover, all three of Poland's Visegrad partners - the Slovak and Czech
Republics, and Hungary - are small states, which would be dwarfed by a state Ukraine's
size. In addition, while there is some tradition of Polish cooperation with countries like
Belorus, Ukraine and Lithuania, none of the other Visegrad countries claims such links.
Russia's presence in this kind of subregional cooperation framework would make these
problems even more significant.
Geopolitical considerations: Creation of a North-South axis
Polish authors occasionally point out that subregional security cooperation
frameworks could fulfil an important geopolitical role for Poland. Subregional structures
reaching from the Baltic to the Black Sea would create a North-South axis that would cut
through what for Poland has been the historically dangerous East-West axis." The
desire to create this additional axis has been present in Polish foreign policy since the
creation of the II Republic, and it continues to be a significant consideration. In May
1992 the Polish Foreign Minister Skubiszewski expressed this in a Sejm address on
foreign policy:
Actively participating in the work of the Visegrad Triangle, and in Baltic and
central European cooperation, Poland desires to contribute to stability and
development in this part of the continent, as well as on the North-South axis, from
the Baltic to the Adriatic, an axis that has not been developed hitherto and that
was clearly eliminated in the period of the Cold War. 97
Despite the sentiments articulated in this address, Skubiszewski has never supported the
concept of NATO-bis.
A significant problem for any concept of a belt from north to south is the
destabilized situation in the Balkans, along with the fact that many of the region's
countries are unwilling to take part in such a structure. However, today, as in the
interwar period, the two predominant concerns are whether such a structure would be
able to protect the small and weak countries of Central Europe from any form of
p. 681.
96 Roman Kuzniar, 'Geostrategiczne uwarunkowania wspolzalezuosci Polski i srodo~iska
miedzynarodowego' [Geopolitical conditioning of interdependence of Poland and the international
environment], in Halizak and Tabor (eds), Polska w Srodowisku Miedzynarodowym, p. 38.
97 'Skubiszewski Sejrn Address on Foreign Policy', FBIS-EEU-92-092 (12 May 1992), p. 20.
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external, regional or domestic threat, and whether it might alienate Russia.
Domestic sources of insecurity like financial and economic constraints could not
be addressed by means of subregional security cooperation with poorer countries. It is
also questionable whether subregional structures could quell regional problems like issues
of minority rights and border disputes. The Visegrad Group is, despite all the best
efforts, unable to cope with low intensity tensions among its neighbours and within the
group. Indeed, it appears possible that membership in an East Central European security
framework could exaggerate some of the existing or potential tensions that can be
ascribed to historical concerns.
Both NATO-bis and Miedzymorze were intended by some of their protagonists to
protect Central Europe from Russia's expansionist policies." For some, NATO-bis, and
other subregional cooperation concepts are the desperate response of countries finding
themselves in a political and military vacuum, feeling 'Russia's breath' behind them, and
perceiving Germany's influence." But even analysts who are supportive of this form of
cooperation acknowledge that if functioning subregional groupings such as the Visegrad
Group are not filled with meaning, the only use for subregional security cooperation will
be its function as a semantic 'skeleton-key' used in discussions with Euro-Atlantic
organizations."? Most political forces in Poland and in other countries of the region
consider it unreasonable to imagine that subregional frameworks could provide security
from Russia.'?' Western observers share this opinion. As Edward Luttwak says, Poles
are not realistic when they say that together with Ukraine and Belorus they are capable
of creating a bloc as strong as Russia. 102
98 See for example Krzemien, 'Moje sliczne NAT'O-bis': Kusin, 'NATO and Central Europe', p. 2.
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5. Problems with subregional security concepts
None of the East Central European governments is currently supporting the
creation of subregional security cooperation frameworks. Miedzymorze continues to have
a small but vocal group of supporters in Poland, as well as among a few political
movements to the east. The plan for the 'Intersea League', joining Polish political forces
with other nationalist-patriotic forces is a sign of this factor. Some support for this idea
also comes from members of the Polish Peasant Party (PSL), currently a coalition partner
in the Polish government. It is clear, however, that the KPN is and has always been an
opposition party with the freedom to advance vague solutions and proposals.
It is more difficult to assess whether NATO-bis continues to be on the political
agenda in Poland, and if not, at what point it was abandoned. In September 1992, Jerzy
Milewski, the head of the Office of National Security at the Presidential Chancellery,
claimed that the NATO-bis concept remained valid.':" Other Polish officials, however.
state that the concept has not been taken seriously since 1992. In 1992 all significant
political forces in Poland are thought to have agreed upon the pursuit of the 'Western
option', which has meant that the subregional option has not been seriously pursued. 104
In November 1994, for example, a Polish observer following the CEFTA meeting of
heads of state of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech and Slovak Republ ics wrote that the
creation of a subregional Central European economic bloc, NATO-bis was not on the
agenda; nor, even, were common approaches to joining the EU. 105 Gorski indicates that
the president's chancellery no longer promotes the idea and according to him, it could
not be revived since it is now clear that the countries it aims to include have no interest,
in creating such a structure. 106
However, the president himself indicates occasionally that the option, though
shelved for the time being, could be revived, should the need arise. In March 1993, the
President's office continued to support the concept, indicating that' it is awaiting detailed
elaboration and preparation . . ·:·· -~c\·· in the form of a specific blueprint. '107 In
103 Milewski, in 'Uczmy sie angielskiego'.
104 Gorski, interview by author, 1995.
105 Jedrzej Bielecki, 'Szczyt CEFTA w Poznaniu: Kazdy swoja droga do Unii' lCEFTA Summit ill
Poznan: Everyone on separate way into the Union], Rzeczpospolita (26-27 November 1994).
106 Gorski, interview by author, 1995.
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January 1994, Walesa did not exclude the possibility of reviving NATO-bis either, when
he realized that the NATO Summit would not meet Polish expectations. 108 It IS
apparent, however, that no political force seriously supports NATO-bis at this time.
Differences among countries: A major problem facing any plan for a subregional
security structure is the vast differences among countries in the region. Few common
features can be found among the states of East Central Europe except for their common
post-Communist and post-WTO legacy. 109 Some observers find it useful to divide the
entire region into two parts: on the one hand, Central Europe with its northern and a
southern tier (or the Visegrad Four, and Bulgaria and Romania); and on the other, the
post-Soviet republics (East Central Europe or Eastern Europe). Yet, any division of this
kind overlooks the fact that, while there are some similarities, even within these groups
approaches to matters of defence and security vary substantially. Any attempt to create
a security cooperation structure would have to overcome differing definitions of security
threats, and contrasting foreign policy options. In addition, there are subtle but significant
cultural and religious differences among the countries, which have played an important
historical role, and continue to be a divisive factor.
A Polish observer notes that a framework with the territorial reach of
Miedzymorze would have to deal with differences and discrepancies among interests in
the region. In his opinion, the architects of such subregional cooperation plans belittle and
minimize these divisions.'!" The supporters of Miedzymorze, however, see collective
retraction of territorial claims and the recognition of minority rights as a means of
handling the tensions among the region's countries. The ongoing process of disintegration
to the East contributes to the suspicion with which post-Soviet republics see any prospects
for the creation of multilateral structures. III They feel that a reliance on the functioning
of these untried mechanisms, and simultaneously risking a conflict with Russia by doing
so, would not be the wisest strategy.
Another problem is that while the KPN sees German economic and cultural
108 Walesa, in 'Udzielone w ostatnim tygodniu wywiady'.
109 Jerzy Maria Nowakowski, 'Jalta czy Niderlandy' [Yalta or the Netherlands], Rzeczpospolita (12
September 1993).
110 Kaminski, ,Miedzymorze '.
111 Tomasz Lubienski, 'Pod drzwiami Europy' [At Europe's door]. Rzeczpospolita (2-3 October 1993).
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influences as a very real and significant threat to Central European security!". countries
to the East of the Polish border are unlikely to feel as concerned about this issue as
Poles. Thus, a common interest in terms of security is limited to the curtailing of
Russia's influence. While many observers acknowledge the Russo-phobic nature of the
Miedzymorze concept, most argue that a framework of this kind would not have the
necessary political weight or military potential to be considered a serious partner by
Russia.
No takers: A more practical problem of course, has been the lack of interest
among the countries that the NATO-bis and Miedzymorze concept intended to incorporate.
Jerzy Milewski stated that Poland's neighbours to the south and east were 'interested in
every proposed action which could help them consolidate their new and still very unstable
statehood' .113 Thus, the President's office saw Ukraine as the main partner for Poland
in NATO-bis. 114 Milewski indicated that Ukraine was very much interested in the
proposal. 115 Yet, these statements were overly optimistic. The Ukraine does not
have full independence, and is therefore without a clear political strategy. The foreign
policy options which appear possible for Ukraine at this time are neutrality, a subregional
security cooperation framework with Poland, or some form of reintegration with Russia.
Due to the results of the last Ukrainian election in 1994, Ukraine is expected by the Poles
to increasingly express interest in strengthening of the CIS. 116
Belorus and Slovakia are also problematic potential partners because of their actual
or possible relations with Russia. Belorus' statehood is questionable!", and the Pol ish
president has chosen not to make explicit references to Belorus as a plausible member of
NATO-bis. Slovakia has not yet developed a clear blueprint of its foreign policy. The
Slovak leadership may not want to affect relations with Russia by joining a subregional
112 See for example KPN's pamphlet, Szczepanski, Miedzymorze: Polityka.
113 See 'Security Chief Interviewed'.
114 Gorski, interview by author, 1995.
115 'Security Chief Interviewed', p. 24.
116 Malik, 'Slowianska jednosc': idem, 'Znowu razcm?' [Together again?], Rzeczpospolita (10
February 1995).
117 'Aleksander Lukaszenko lekcewazy jezyk bialoruski' [Alexander Lukashenko slights Belorussian
language], Rzeczpospolita (13 February 1995); Zaprudnik, Belarus. pp. 212-215.
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security framework. 118
The Czech Republic, not surprisingly, has rejected the NATO-bis concept. Its
leadership has chosen a foreign policy orientation which emphasizes the country's
individual achievements over cooperation with other countries in the region, believing
that this will be the shortest way into Europe!" (see Chapter Eight). It is reported that
'some Prague politicians ... tended to consider Poland as a volatile country with
exaggerated regional ambitions' .120 The proposal for NATO-bis certainly did nothing
to dispel this perception. Hungarian policy-makers, as well, rejected the NATO-bis
concepts and similar ideas outright on the grounds that subregional pacts and alliances
would work against the goal of unifying Europe. 121 Hungarian commentators also
criticized as the notion of Miedzymorre. 122
Confronted with the statement that Visegrad countries had not responded
favourably to the proposal either, Milewski said that some opposition politicians in the
Czech republic, Hungary and Slovakia had indeed expressed interest in the concept. 123
Yet while nationalist-patriotic groups in the Visegrad countries may have been more
sympathetic towards the idea than other parties, in practical terms their support was of
little value. 124
The Baltic countries, not initially envisioned as members of NATO-bis, have come
forward with a project similar to it for the Baltic region. Reportedly, during a November
1993 meeting of the Estonian President Lennart Meri and the chiefs of the armed forces
of the three Baltic republics, a concept of a 'Baltic NATO' made up of these three
118 Gorski, interview by author, 1995.
119 Ibid.
120 Janusz Bugajski, Nations in Turmoil: Conflict and Cooperation in Eastern Europe. (Boulder:
Westview Press, 1993), p. 91.
121 'Interview with Hungarian Defense Minister Lajos Fur', FBIS-EEU-92-188 (28 September 1992).
p. 7-8.
122 For a discussion of Hungarian approaches to this concept, see Rafal Wisniews~, 'Z: Wegierskich
scenariuszy przyszlosci Europy Srodkowej' [From Hungarian scenarios of the future of Central Europe I.
Polska W Europie 12 (June/July 1993), p. 43.
123 'Security Chief Interviewed', p. 24.
124 Gorski, interview by author, 1995.
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countries was presented.!" It reflected the desire of the Baltic republics not to be left
behind in the drive for NATO membership. Thus, the leaders of the three countries
continue to campaign for the creation of an intermediary stage on the way into NATO,
not, however, for membership in NATO-bis.
According to Milewski, in fact, the main audience for the NATO-bis proposal was
actually politicians in the West. He stated that,
if the NATO-bis concept is to be realized, Western states must first acknowledge
it as interesting enough and significant enough from their own viewpoint. There
is no such interest on the part of the West so far, and this is why the concept
remains in the sphere of ideas and has not been transformed into a concrete
proposal. 126
His statement implied further that the countries the proposal aimed to include would show
more interest if the West gave it its blessing. However, not unlike other subregional
initiatives, NATO-bis has not found a positive echo in the West. 127 Circles critical of
Walesa commented that the NATO-bis proposal was another blow to aspirations for
Polish membership in the EU and NATO.
The Polish government saw the NATO-bis proposal as an unnecessary diversion
which undermined Polish credibility abroad.!" It continued to emphasize that the
Visegrad Group remained the most prorrusing political concept on a subregional
scale!", and that the main aim of Polish policy remained full membership in
NATO. 130 An unnamed minister from Suchocka's cabinet spoke of the fact that
countries such as Russia and Ukraine and Belorus had no prospects of entering NATO.
By organizing cooperation within NATO-bis, Polish chances of joining NATO would thus
also be diminished. A similar approach to the problem was manifested by deputy defence
minister Grudzinski who said to Gazeta Wyborcza that even within the Visegrad Group,
the membership of countries like Ukraine and Bulgaria would not be acceptable to the
125 'Propozycja "Baltyckiego NATO'" [Proposal ofa "Baltic NATO"'], ~eczpospoli~a (22 November
1993); Helena Fiedorcowa, 'Baltycki sojusz' [Baltic alliance], PoIska Zbrojna (19 Apnl 1994).
126 'Security Chief Interviewed', p. 24.
127 Fiedorcowa, 'W drodze do Europy'.
128 Radek Sikorski, 'Jak korzystamy z naszej suwerennosci? Nie odwzajemnione zaloty [How do we
use out sovereignty? Unreciprocated courtship], Rzeczpospolita (15-16 October 1994).
129 Grudzinski, in 'Droga do NATO'.
130 Jacek Kwicinski, '0 bezpieczenstwie Polski - dzis i w roku 2010' [About Polish security - today and
in the year 2010], Rzeczpospolita (8 September 1992).
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Polish government because it would have the effect of moving Poland further away from
NATO.131 Andrzej Drzycimski, too, said that he could see that NATO-bis might be a
useful concept for Ukraine or Bulgaria but not for Poland!", obviously because the
latter was closer to reaching the goal of NATO membership.
There was also concern that the real ization of the proposal would recreate a
separation into detached security arrangements for East and for West. 133 A Polish
observer warned that 'East-Central Europe can of its own accord slowly become ever
more Eastern' .134 Thus Polish authors point out that the concept of NATO-bis might
have been viable in 1990 and 1991, but with the establishment of closer contacts with
Western structures it has become largely irrelevant. 135
Historical images: An additional problem that should not be underestimated is the
continued presence of images of the past among the peoples of the region. Any concepts
of subregional security cooperation in East Central Europe must address the problem of
historical Polish, German and Russian domination.':" Polish observers note that to this
day pro-Polish segments of the political elites are weak in Ukraine, Belorus and
Lithuania. 137
The Belorussian and Lithuanian supporters of blueprints for subregional security
cooperation in East Central Europe have acknowledged the problem of the perceptions
of Polish participation in such structures. While the Lithuanian Terleckas encourages
Polish participation and even a central role in such an arrangement, he specifies that this
could only be achieved if anti-Polish feelings did not run to strong. The KPN's
Szczepanski, as well, acknowledged the problem of negative historical images, but argued
that it was not reasonable to imagine that there was a real threat of polonization with
131 Krzemien, 'Moje sliczne NATO-bis'.
132 'Spotkanie z min. Andrzejem Drzycimskim: Rosjajest szansa dla naszej gospodarki' [Meeting with
minister Andrzej Drzycimski: Russia is a chance for our economy], Polska Zbrojna (16 November 1993).
133 "Trzeba napriawic bledy: 0 kontynuacji i zmianach w polityce zagranicznej ~lOwi profesor ~ojciech
Lamentowicz (Unia Pracy)' [It is necessary to mend mistakes: Professor Wojciech Larnentowicz (UP)
speaks about continuation and changes in foreign policy]. Rzeczpospolita (24 September 1993).
134 'Visegrad Triangle Relations With EC Discussed', JPRS (Joint Publications Research Service) -
EER-93-001-S (29 January 1993), p. 2.
135 Drzycimski, in 'Rosja jest szansa': Fiedorcowa, 'w drodze do Europy'.
136 Dziewanowski, 'Potrzeba wielkiej debary'.
137 Kaminski, ,Miedzymorze' .
262
nations Iike Ukraine and Lithuania, which have a sol id national consciousness.
Furthermore, Polish supporters of the Miedzymorze acknowledge that Polish neo-
imperialist tendencies would be destructive. 138
It is obvious that any Polish pressure to convince eastern neighbours to join a club
of countries which could be dominated by Poland would be perceived as neo-imperialist
policy.':" Any such behaviour would damage the carefully established and still fragile
political economic and cultural links between the country and its newly independent
eastern neighbours (see Chapter Five).
Relations with Russia: For the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, NATO-bis is
a difficult concept because of the unresolved issue of its links with Russia. Historically,
subregional proposals were intended to weaken Russia (see Chapter Four). Today,
however, Polish policy-makers believe that a large but weak Russia is not in the Polish
interest'?", since this would create numerous security problems, rather than guarantee
Polish security (see Chapter Five). In addition, if such a structure were created without
Russian participation, Russia would see it as an attempt to create a cordon sanitaire,an
effort to push it back into Asia. Russia has expressed its disapproval of active Pol ish
policy towards countries in the Miedzymorze region, and of proposals aiming to
institutionalize links between Poland and the former Soviet republics Ukraine and
Belorus.!" If Russia were to find itself outside of a subregional East Central European
security framework, it would respond by attempting to expand its sphere of
influence. 142 Russian isolation would also be difficult to accept for Western
governments. Polish officials thus claim that Russia's inclusion in NATO-bis would
invariabIy recreate the WTO. 143
The Polish National Defence Ministry indicated that the greatest practical problem
138 Szczepanski. interview by author, 1995.
139 Kazimierz Dziewanowski, 'Aby Wrzesien nie mogl sie powtorzyc' [So that September cannot repeat
itself], Rzeczpospolita (6 February 1995).
140 Antoni Z. Kaminski, 'Bezpieczenstwo Polski na tIe rozwoju procesow politycznY~~l w Europie.
Uwagi metodologiczne' [Poland's security against the background of the development of po1\(1cal processes
in Europe. Methodological remarks], Studia i Materialy 64 (May 1993), p. 13.
141 Romanowski, 'Czy przespalismy "smute"?'.
142 Slawomir Popowski, 'Koniec gry' [End of gameJ, Rzeczpospolita (6 September 1993).
143 Krzemien, 'Moje sliczne NATO-bis'.
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with Russian participation In a NATO-bis - like structure would be posed by the
proposition that Russia should renounce control over its chemical and nuclear weapons.
A Polish official said that this was impossible because it would mean the full capitulation
of Russia and its resignation from the group of nuclear countries. 144
Another Polish observer remarked that Russia would never be prepared to allow
the Ukraine to be part of a bloc like NATO-bis or Miedzymorze. 145 Indeed, Russian
commentators have labelled any attempt on the part of Poland and Ukraine to cooperate
in the sphere of security as the potential creation of a cordon sanitaire. Instead of
increasing security in the Central European region, then, subregional security cooperation
frameworks could well have the opposite effect.
6. Summary and Conclusion
Although official Polish policies can be classified as clearly pro-Western, weak
political parties and unstable political organs have generated a number of contending, but
rarely elaborated ideas about the security and defence of the country, and its foreign
policy. These ideas more often than not fall into the category of what has been called the
'''third arrangement" (a permanent, multifunctional Central European community)'. 146
They return to the interwar foreign policy concept of a belt of countries creating a North-
South axis, and are based on historical images of Jagellonian Poland. Thus, they often
reflect the notion of special Polish role in a subregional context, particularly to the East,
in areas which were part of the multi-national and expansive Polish-Lithuanian state.
The two proposals examined in this chapter, NATO-bis (advanced by presidential
circles) and Miedzymor:e (supported mainly by the Confederation for Independent
Poland), can both be described as neo-Pilsudskiite, although the former was also intended
to create links with Euro-Atlantic organizations, a notion which the supporters of the
latter reject. Miedzymorze was conceived as a separate entity, which could be dissolved
when East Central Europe reached a level of development which would allow it to be
144 Ibid.
145 Popowski, 'Kon.iec gry'.
146 Hieronim Kubiak, 'Poland: national security in a changing environment', in Regina Cowen Karp,
Central and Eastern Europe. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 100. See also "'Kres E~ropy"
to tylko literacka przenosnia: Dodawanie ulamkow'. ['End of Europe' as a literary metaphor: adding up
fractions] Polityka (17 October 1992).
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integrated in Euro-Atlantic structures. NATO-bis was seen as a strictly a transitional
arrangement.
The two proposals fail to take into account the significant differences among
countries in the region, they do not adequately address negative historical images of
domination, and they have found no 'takers' among neighbouring countries. Most
importantly, the concepts fail to address the fact that Russia is opposed to any subregional
security cooperation plans that either exclude it, or are directed against its power.
Although the sections of the Polish political spectrum that support these
subregional concepts are relatively small, the option continues to be debated. This aspect
of Polish foreign and security policy is little known outside of the country, and its
historical roots and practical implications remain unfamiliar, particularly in the West.
CHAPTER TEN
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Subregional cooperation has been hailed as a means for coping with post-Cold
War instabilities. Following the collapse of the Eastern bloc many observers suggested
that such form of security cooperation would provide some solutions to the security
problems the newly democratic countries of Central Europe were facing. However,
although a number of frameworks for cooperation was created, subregional collaboration
remains weak. This thesis focused on Polish views of subregional security cooperation
in Central Europe in order to explain its deficiencies.
The disintegration of the Eastern Pact left Poland In a position of de facto
neutrality and non-alignment. Simultaneously, the end of the Cold War era did not lessen
Polish perceptions of threats to national security. In fact, threat perceptions grew with the
spread of anew, broader definition of security. Once again, foreign pol icy became
probably the most important aspect of Polish sovereignty. A variety of policy options thus
emerged in the Polish security debate. In this context, the option that Poland and all the
Central European states soon adopted was membership in Euro-Atlantic organizations.
Polish policy-makers argued that the North-Atlantic community was the only
structure which could prevent the isolation and balkanization of the area between the
Baltic and the Black Seas. 1 Poland's preference, then, was membership in a strong North
Atlantic alliance which guaranteed a US presence in Europe. combined with a European
1 lerzy Maria Nowakowski, 'Jalta czy Niderlandy' [Yalta or the Netherlands], Rzeczpospolita (12
September 1993).
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security identity. As far as Poland was concerned, a European/North Atlantic security
framework should include Central Europe, but should not offer a preferential position to
Russia.
Policy-makers in Poland also suggested that this strategy of integration in Euro-
Atlantic organizations should come with early Western decisions on time tables. entrance
requirements, and a Western policy of differentiation among the former WTO countries.
It would also require close cooperation between Western and Central Europe concerning
the aim of military integration, which would mean splitting up the peace-dividend - a
premium so far enjoyed only by a few Western countries. In addition, it would make the
participation of Central Europe in the decision-making of Western organizations
necessary, at least concerning questions that affected the future of the region. When
hardly any of these stipulations were fulfilled by the West, Polish policy-makers and
observers realized that Poland had neither the economic nor the political means to put
pressure on its Western partners to come up with a longer-term strategy towards Central
Europe.
The vast majority of Polish decision-makers continued to be united in their desire
for a 'return to Europe'. There was, generally speaking, a political consensus on the
proper direction for Polish foreign and security policy. However, Poland (and Central
Europe more generally) was quickly losing the special treatment it had been granted for
its role in the process of decornmunization, yet, at the same time, continued to find itself
outside of the Western world. Polish analysts wrote that the paradox of Polish foreign and
security pol icy was that as economic reforms proceeded and democratic structures were
consolidated in post-Soviet states, the chances of hard security guarantees for Poland
actually diminished." There was thus a growing sense of unrequited affection in Poland.
Although officials avoided voicing their disappointment over solutions proposed by
Western partners, they regretted the absence of a Western strategy, a vision of the future
of Europe. As one Western commentator observed, 'continual waffling over Eastern
enlargement - by NATO and the European Union - has frustrated the efforts of those
2 See for example Andrzej Karkoszka, 'Bezpieczenstwo regionalne Europy Srodkowej w polskiej
polityce zagranicznej' [Central European regional security in Polish foreign policy I. in J. Stefano~icz (ed. ).
Polityczno-wojskowe aspekty poIskiej polityki wschodniej [Political-military aspects of Pohsh easten~
policy]. (Warsaw: InstytutStosunkow Miedzynarodowych, 1991). p. 101: Marek Tabor, 'W~polzale~~OSCl
miedzynarodowe Polski w dziedzinie wojskowej' [International interdependencies of Poland 1Il the military
sphere], in Edward Halizak and Marek Tabor (eds). PoIska w Srodowisku Miedzynarodowym: Problemy
WspoIzaleznosci [Poland in the International Environment: Problems of Interdependence]. (Warsaw:
ELIPSA, 1993). p. 75.
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reformers who have argued that pursuing a "Western" track and gaining membership
cards in NATO and the EU would result in tangible benefits'. 3
Following suggestions from the West that cooperation in the region would bring
Central Europeans closer to Western organizations, and realizing that the goal of full and
immediate integration would not be reached in the immediate future, Central European
countries formed subregional security cooperation frameworks, primarily the Visegrad
Group and the Central European Initiative. Of course, it is also true that subregional
security frameworks can be useful if they foster interaction and collaboration among
neighbouring states which lack a tradition of cooperation, and in the Central European
context, they could also help the states involved to cope with some of the post-Cold War
security problems of a regional or local nature.
In Poland, however, these frameworks are understood as components of the
official Polish policy aimed mainly at managing relations with the West and achieving
eventual integration - hence their motto call ing for a 'return to Europe'. The creation of
subregional frameworks was thus based on common cultural, economic and political
circumstances. And this imperative clearly demands tolerance rather the reaffirmation of
than nationalist attitudes."
The Visegrad Group and the CEI are pragmatic cooperation frameworks which
concentrate on a number of 'low' issues and projects, such as trade in the region and
environmental cooperation, and in the case of Visegrad some minor military issues like
the exchange of spare parts for weapon systems. Polish policy-makers have indeed
acknowledged the security potential for this form of cooperation: the 1992 defence
doctrine stated that developing subregional cooperation with Hungary and Czechoslovakia
(and later the Czech and Slovak Republics) was expected to help to reduce threats.
Considered promising in the West, these frameworks have not however taken on a
security dimension, since Central European policy-makers have emphasized that their goal
was never the creation of a 'third way', but integration with the West.
Moreover, for Poland, the important cooperation with its eastern neighbours
Ukraine Russia and Belorus has remained based on bilateral agreements, rather than on,
3 'Poles Apart', Wall Street Journal (18 January 1995).
4 George Kolankiewicz, 'Poland', in Stephen Whitefield, The New Institutional Architecture of
Eastern Europe. (Basingstoke: St. Martin's, 1993), p. 103.
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multilateral frameworks.' In relations with eastern neighbours, Visegrad and the Cf.l
assist at best only by 'force of example', since its members have chosen for the time
being to exclude a number of countries which have expressed interest in joining.
Yet, there are groups on both the left and the right of the Polish political spectrum
that do in fact subscribe to the idea of subregional security cooperation frameworks not
as intermediary stages but as final goals. They ascribe a different function to such
frameworks than the governing forces. These groups include mainly the so-called
patriotic or independence elements; in the Western understanding of the concept, they can
be described as nationalist. Significantly, concepts put forward by these sections of the
Polish political spectrum are also supported by parts of the former Communist
movements.
The political platforms of these parties are hardly known outside of Central
Europe. The reasons for this are numerous and range from the fact that these elements
are not interested in courting Western attention, to the point that their motivations must
be understood in the wider cultural and historical background which so few Western
observers grasp. This thesis puts these proposals both in historical and in contemporary
perspectives.
Polish nationalist political forces and some post-Communist supporters have been
critical of the fact that the government has not been capable of addressing security threats
without turning to Euro-Atlantic organizations. They have suggested that by exploiting
the initial willingness of neighbouring post-Soviet republics to establish closer relations
with Poland after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the country could have avoided the
humiliation of its pro-Western foreign policy. Official Polish policy was castigated for
conducting a timid strategy, characterized by utter deference to superpowers and
arrogance towards less powerful states. It was also argued that Western-oriented policies
did not help to overcome Poland's perennial security dilemma stemming from its place
on an East-West axis. These forces suggested that the creation of a North-South axis with
other Central European states would remedy this difficult problem. Poland's nationalist
forces thus sought to establish and manage relations with the country's eastern, and
occasionally also southern, neighbours by forming subregional security frameworks
intended to push away both the West and Russia.
'\ Tenets of the Polish Security Policy and Security Policy and Defense Strategy of the Republic
of Poland. (Warsaw: Polish National Security Office, November 1992), p. 6.
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As Aleksander Hall, a right-wing Polish leader, remarked, all European right-
wing formations refer to tradition and national heritage. In his opinion, this tendency is
particularly pronounced in the Polish case." Indeed, Polish nationalists have almost
exclusively sought an answer to Poland's security problems in the country's history.
Their plans for subregional alliances, confederations, and cooperation frameworks. and
the neo-Pilsudskiite notion of 'equal distance' are all based heavily on Polish historical
Images.
The most important proposal of this kind is Miedzymorze (lntermarium), a concept
put forward by the Confederation for Independent Poland, a political party that often
refers to its neo-Pilsudskiite orientation. It aims to create an alliance among the countries
between Germany and Russia. Miedzymorze is a 'third way' concept, not primarily
interested in close relations with the West. It also proclaims a mission for Poland among
neighbouring countries, and rejects official Polish foreign policy.
It is worth noting that a similar proposal has been put forward by the political
camp surrounding President Walesa. The presidential NATO-bis proposal can, however,
be understood as an intermediary concept designed to manage relations with both East
and West. By formulating this proposal, Walesa probably intended to provoke a reaction
from the country's Western partners, rather than to suggest a real alternative to official
Polish foreign policy. Thus the proposal could be classified as a ruch pozorny -a
'pretending motion'. 7
Most Polish observers are dismayed that the policy discussion conforms to Jerzy
Giedroyc's thesis that the country is ruled by the spirit of the two interwar political
leaders Roman Dmowski and Jozef Pilsudski - both of whom defined anti-Western
foreign policy orientations. They warn that some policy concepts aimed at managing
relations with neighbouring countries are inspired by unrealistic myths and historical
images." In fact, the concept of Miedzymorze, and to a lesser extent NATO-bis, have as
their ideological base the Pilsudskiite idea that Poland is responsible for the countries east
of its borders and that it is a bulwark of Western civilization in the East.,
6 Aleksander Hall, 'Co dalej z prawica?' [What next with the right wing"], Rzeczpospolita (16
February 1995).
7 Artur Bilski, 'W kolejce do Europy' [In queue to Europe), Polska Zbrojna (28 September 1994).
8 Jerzy Marek Nowakowski, 'W poszukiwaniu nowej koncepcji' [Searching for a new concepti.
Rzeczpospolita (14 January 1994).
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Because of the historical impl ications of these ideas for neighbouring countries,
these platforms could be damaging in a number of ways. They could establish 'second-
class' associations of countries, which would not be a source of strength. In the long run,
they could recreate the inter-war fragmentation of Europe. They also have the potential
to damage the delicate links created so far between Poland and its eastern neighbours,
since areas of Ukraine, Belorus and Lithuania have historically experienced Polish
domination.
For now, however, there is little interest in these concepts among Poles, their
eastern neighbours and the West. Most Polish observers would assess Miedzymorze and
NATO-bis as policies without a chance of success. The main reasons for this appraisal
are the lack of interest in these ideas among serious contenders for power, differences
among the interests and power potentials of the involved countries, and the possible
alienation of Russia. Responses of other post-Soviet republics to NATO-bis and
Miedzymorze plans have also been indecisive. Reactions have ranged from a total absence
of interest and concerns about potential Pol ish domination to the tacit agreement to a
special role for Poland in the region by those few forces which have been prepared to see
this form of cooperation as a Iink to the West.
So far, then, the Pilsudski-inspired subregional policy option has not exerted a
formative influence on official Polish foreign policy. 9 But the scant interest in such
subregional security arrangements in Poland could conceivably grow in the long term.
For now, even 'efforts toward ... collaboration encouraged by the West and partly
successful have been noticeable among more politicians and intellectuals than on the
popular level' 10. But unlike existing cooperation frameworks, the NATO-bis and
Miedzymorze proposals are of a populist character, appealing to a Polish sense of the
country's role and mission. Moreover, although nationalist and populist forces do not
have as significant an influence in Poland as they do in many other states of Eastern and
Central Europe, they do exist and reflect longstanding elements of Polish pol itical culture.
As such they cannot be disregarded.
Indeed, the East Central European region remains trapped by the legacy of its
history. Subregional arrangements which do not reflect historical experiences, like the
9 Magarditsch Hatschikjan, 'Foreign Policy Reorientations in Eastern Central Europe', Aussenpolitik
Vol. 45, No.1 (1994), p. 53.
10 Piotr S. Wandycz, The Price of Freedom: A history of East Central Europe from the Middle
Ages to the present. (London: Routledge, 1992), p. 272-273.
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Visegrad Group, have proved difficult to establish. Frameworks which refer to the past
of the region, such as Miedzymor:e. carry with them historical images of domination or
nco-imperialism. It is not only the complex contemporary geopolitical situation of Central
Europe, then, but also the difficult history of the region that makes cooperation a
problematic endeavour. It is not surprising that observers say that 'Eastern Europe seems
doomed to remain a fragmented region where the countries refuse to see their common
interest, regardless of geographic proximity. '11
Polish policy-makers suggest that effective subregional cooperation could take
place only within the framework of Euro-Atlantic organizations. Such a solution would
help to overcome traditional hostilities in the region, and provide reasonable and
workable goals. Until membership in Western organizations makes this possible, existing
frameworks will continue as secondary fora. In the meantime, proposals for subregional
cooperation - the 'third option' - will continue to be advanced by Poland's nationalist
elements.
II Pal Dunay, 'Security Cooperation in the Visegrad Quadrangle: Present and Fut.ure:. in Andrew !.
Williams (ed.), Reorganizing Eastern Europe: European Institutions and the Refashioning of Europe s
Security Architecture. (Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishers. 1994), p. 121.
APPENDIX A: MAPS DOCUMENTING CHANGES OF POLISH BORDERS OVER TIME
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